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Preface
I first learned about category theory about 20 years ago from Yuri I. Manin’s course on algebraic
geometry [180] when I was preparing my dissertation on Euclid’s Elements and was focused
on studying Greek mathematics and classical Greek philosophy. Then I convinced myself that
the mathematical category theory is philosophically relevant not only because of its name but
also because of its content and because of its special role in the contemporary mathematics,
which I privately compared to the role of the notion of figure in Euclid’s geometry. Today I
have more to say about these matters. The broad historical and philosophical context, in which
I studied category theory, is made explicit throughout the present book. My interest to the
Axiomatic Method stems from my work on Euclid and extends through Hilbert and axiomatic
set theories to Lawvere’s axiomatic topos theory to the Univalent Foundations of mathematics
recently proposed by Vladimir Voevodsky. This explains what the two subjects appearing in the
title of this book share in common.
The next crucial biographical episode took place in 1999 when I was a young scholar visiting
Columbia University on the Fulbright grant working on ontology of events under the supervision
of Achille Varzi. As a part of my Fulbright program I had to make a presentation in a different
American university, and I decided to use this opportunity for talking about the philosophical
significance of category theory (I cannot now remember how exactly I married then this subject
with the event ontology). Achille Varzi kindly arranged for me the invitation from Barry Smith
to give a talk at his seminar on formal ontology in the SUNY in Buffalo. When I sent to
Barry Smith my abstract he replied that nobody except probably Bill Lawvere will be able to
understand my paper, and suggested to make the paper more accessible to the general audience.
By that time I had already read some of Lawvere’s papers but was wholly unaware about the
fact that Lawvere worked in the same university and could attend my planned talk. So I took
Smith’s words for a joke. When I realized that this was not a joke I was very excited and, as
it turned out, not without a reason because my meeting with Lawvere during this visit indeed
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determined the direction of my research for many years to come. This book is a summary of
what I have achieved so far working in this direction.
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Introduction
Logical and mathematical concepts must
no longer produce instruments for
building a metaphysical “world of
thought”: their proper function and their
proper application is only within the
empirical science.
Ernest Cassirer
Mathematics is a part of physics. It is a
part of physics where experiments are
cheap. [..] In the middle of the 20th
century there were attempts to separate
mathematics from physics. The results
turned to be catastrophic.
Vladimir Arnold
The main motivation of writing this book is to develop the view on mathematics described in
the above epigraphs. Some 200 years ago this view used to be by far more common and easier to
justify than today. It is sufficient to say that it made part of Kant’s view on mathematics, and
that Kant’s view on mathematics remained extremely influential until the very end of the 19th
century. When Cassirer defended this Kantian view in the beginning of the 20th century it was
already polemical. When Arnold defended it in the end of the 20th century and in the beginning
of this current century it already sounded as an intellectual provocation, and so his words sound
today. Kant, Cassirer and Arnold do not speak about the same mathematics: each speaks about
mathematics of his own time. So the growing polemical attitude to their shared view reflects
not only a change of the common opinion about the subject but a change of this subject itself.
It is a common place that the modern mathematics is more abstract and more detached from
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physical experience than it used to be in Euclid’s times and in Kant’s times. When I say that I
nevertheless want to defend the view on mathematics as a part of physics this means that I also
want to contribute to changing the character of current mathematics, but not only to changing
the common views about it.
The above is a motivation behind this book but not its purpose. The purpose is much more
limited. In order to justify the view on mathematics as part of physics I would need to write at
least as much about physics as about mathematics. But this book is mainly about mathematics
and about logic; physics is mentioned in it only occasionally. Yet more specifically I shall focus
on the Axiomatic Method and Category Theory (including the categorical logic, which is a part
of modern logic using category-theoretic methods). Let me explain why.
When Arnold talks about recent attempts to separate mathematics from physics he has in mind
Elements of Mathematics by Nicolas Bourbaki [23] that aims at developing the whole of mathe-
matics systematically from the first principles, i.e., on an axiomatic basis. Bourbaki’s Elements
continue the long tradition of presenting renewed foundations of mathematics in the form of
Elements: this tradition begins with Euclid’s Elements (and earlier versions of Greek Elements
that have been lost) and continues through the whole history of mathematics until today. (I say
a bit more about this tradition in the introductory part of Part I). Arnold sees the key to the
problem in Bourbaki’s Axiomatic Method, and takes a notoriously hostile attitude towards the
Axiomatic Method in general. I observe on my part that the problem of separating mathematics
from physics concerns the specific form of the Axiomatic Method used by Bourbaki rather the
the Axiomatic Method in general. It is clear, in particular, that Euclid’s method does not pro-
duce the same effect. And I further observe that Bourbaki’s Axiomatic Method is a version of
Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method presented in Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry of 1899 [109], which
is another example of renewed mathematical Elements playing a more special but perhaps even
more important role in the 20th century mathematics than Bourbaki’s Elements. So I conclude
that the origin of Arnold’s problem should be traced back at least to the beginning rather than
only to the middle of the 20th century. This explains my focus on Axiomatic Method and its
history.
Why Category Theory? The mathematical notion of category (which has no immediate relation
to the philosophical notion widely known under this name) was invented in 1945 by Eilenberg
and Mac Lane [48] for general purposes, some of which I explain in Chapter 8, see also [137] for
details. In his thesis defended in 1963 [145] and a series of papers based on this thesis [146], [147],
[148], [149] Lawvere put forward a program of categorical (i.e., category-theoretic) foundations of
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mathematics and opened a new research field known today under the name of categorical logic, see
[182] for the most recent historical account. Although Lawvere and other people who pursued the
program of categorical foundations have never explicitly challenged Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method
(albeit they did and do challenge some special applications of this method, most importantly
its applications in the standard axiomatic set theories) I shall try to show in this book that
some recent works in categorical logic and new foundations of mathematics effectively modify
Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method and develop it in a wholly new direction. As it always happens in
the intellectual history this new development continue some earlier developments, which I shall
also take into account. In the last Chapter of this book I generalize upon these tendencies and
describe a hypothetical New Axiomatic Method, which admittedly does not yet exist in the form
of precise logical and mathematical procedure. I hope that my proposed general philosophical
vision of this new method will contribute to its future technical development and also help to
use it outside the pure mathematics and its philosophy.
As the reader shall see the New Axiomatic Method establishes closer relationships between math-
ematics and physics and so suggests a solution of Arnold’s problem. Although I cannot fully
justify this claim in this book (because I am not going to discuss physics systematically) I do
prepare a philosophical background for such a justification. The issue of relationships between
mathematics and physics is a hardcore philosophical issue, and I believe that Arnold’s problem
cannot be solved without taking this philosophical issue seriously. Another hardcore philosoph-
ical issue that comes into the play as soon as one discusses the use of Axiomatic Method in
mathematics is the relationships between mathematics and logic. This latter philosophical issue
unlike the former is in the focus of this book. The main philosophical dilemma that I consider
is, roughly, this: either (i) logic is fundamental in the sense that it gives us an independent
access to an ideal space of logical possibilities where the actual world exists side-by-side with
plenty of other possible worlds, which can be explored only mathematically, or as Cassirer insists
in the above epigraph, (ii) logic and mathematics must stick to the actual world as we know it
through empirical sciences, and by all means must avoid producing possible “metaphysical worlds
of thought” even if these appear more logically coherent and more mathematical beautiful than
our actual world. With many important reservations that this rough formulation requires I shall
defend the latter view. The former view (which also obviously needs a more precise formulation)
I call logicism, and when it is applied to mathematics I call it mathematical logicism. Beware
that this meaning of “mathematical logicism” is broader than Russell’s radical version of math-
ematical logicism according to which mathematics is logic [212]. So a central purpose of this
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book is to refute mathematical logicism and defend an alternative way of thinking about logic
and mathematics.
Talking about these philosophical issues I would like to stress that I study primarily their im-
plementation in mathematics. When in the beginning of the 20th century Cassirer, Russell and
other people discussed hot philosophical issues concerning mathematics and logic they not only
made general philosophical arguments but also referred to the actual state of affairs in their con-
temporary science and to the history of these subjects. They also often contributed themselves
to the ongoing research in mathematics and logic. In this book I follow the same pattern of
philosophical discussion paying a lot of attention to some recent mathematical works and to the
history of the subject but without trying to make any mathematical contribution.
Before I summarize the content of this book chapter by chapter let me say a few more words about
its style and its methodology. I stick to the traditional idea according to which philosophy and its
history naturally combine together. When this view is applied to the philosophy of science and
mathematics the result is sometimes called the historical epistemology [203]. So what I am doing
in this book can be described as a historical epistemology of logic and mathematics. However one
important reservation is here in order. In my understanding the past history, the present state
of affairs and the anticipated future of a given discipline are parts of the same whole. This whole
can be described as the current state of affairs in a broader sense of the word, which includes
both the historical reflection upon the past and the projection towards the future of the given
discipline. When I talk in this book about mathematics and its philosophy I think about these
subjects in this way. When such a view is called historical this should mean the attention to
development of the given discipline but not the exclusive attention to its past.
Although I write about logic and mathematics I don’t use myself any formal logical or other
mathematical means for expressing and justifying my arguments. A century ago this point
would be hardly worth mentioning but since using formal methods in philosophy in general and
in philosophy of mathematics in particular is nowadays popular (particularly in the philosophical
school that calls itself Analytic philosophy) this point requires some explanations. Without
going into a long discussion on this sensitive issue let me boldly express my believe that the
natural language and the philosophical prose remain so far the best instruments for historical
and philosophical work, or at least for the kind of such work that I want to do. The clarity and
the exactness that formal methods bring to philosophy come with a price, which for my purposes
is unacceptable. This price amounts to certain philosophical assumptions, without which these
formal methods cannot work. I am not prepared to pay this price until I can see clearly these
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assumptions and thus know the price exactly. A philosophical and historical analysis of the
notion of logical formalization is a part of my present project (see particularly Chapters 2 and
9). Even if a formal theory of formalization is possible I cannot see that it can be useful for this
purpose. I shall not return to the question of using formal methods in philosophy in what follows
but the reader will see that my analysis of the idea of logical formalization hardly supports the
idea of using it as an universal instrument for philosophizing.
Although I am not going to use formal methods for philosophical purposes the reader will find
below a lot of rudimentary mathematics. Since this book is about mathematics, and a part of this
book is about very recent mathematics, which still remains a work in progress (see 6.9 - 6.10),
this is not surprising. So let me explain my strategy of presenting the relevant mathematical
content and mention some mathematical prerequisites for reading this book. My intention is to
make this book readable both for a working mathematician interested in philosophy and history of
this discipline and for a philosopher like myself, who studies (or wants to study) mathematics and
its history, and finds a broad philosophical inspiration in this discipline. To present a fragment
of modern mathematics to a wider audience is a very challenging task, which normally should
not be combined with any philosophical agenda. I certainly do have a philosophical agenda,
which I have already outlined earlier in this Introduction. This is why writing this book I have
tried to reduce the burden of explaining mathematics to minimum. At the same time I tried
to avoid any metaphoric talk about mathematical concepts - even if some people would argue
that any talk about mathematics outside the pure mathematics is doomed to be metaphoric. So
I could not avoid the burden of explaining some mathematics completely but tried to use the
most elementary examples and also tried to use some existing introductory expositions when
such were available. In each particular case I refer to the existing mathematical literature and
chose this literature accordingly to my specific purpose.
For the first superficial reading the given book is self-sustained and, as I hope, it gives a right idea
of what I am after. A more attentive critical reading is by far more demanding. The ideal judge
of this book is a working mathematician who is also a working philosopher and working historian
of mathematics having some broader philosophical and scientific interests, which include some
interest in physics, its history and its philosophy. I know several people who at some degree
of approximation fit this description but I rather imagine an average reader of this book as a
person like myself who during these recent years has learnt some philosophy, some mathematics
and some history of both subjects, and who tries to make these ends meet. I shall say more about
the mathematical prerequisites and give some suggestions for reading (in addition to references
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found in the main text) in the following summary of the Chapters.
Part I of this book treats the history of Axiomatic Method. As I have already explained this
history is not only about the past. Only Chapter 1 on Euclid concerns what is indeed in the past
(albeit in 1.5 I show that even in this case the past continues to live in the present); Chapter
2 on Hilbert treats (in the original historical context) what remains today the standard notion
of Axiomatic Method; Chapter 4 on Lawvere treats what I suggest as a conceptual basis of the
New Axiomatic Method. So these three Chapters of this book present, roughy, the past, the
present and the anticipated future of the Axiomatic Method. Chapter 3 is reserved for studying
the fate of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method in the 20th century mathematics.
Instead of trying to reconstruct a general history of Axiomatic Method, I decided to chose these
three key figures and look at the relevant parts of their work more attentively. Although a
historical discussion on Euclid found in Chapter 1 may appear out of place in a book about
today’s mathematics it is important for me for several reasons. According to a common view
(supported by Hilbert himself at some occasions), Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method improves upon
Euclid’s method in terms of logical rigor and logical clarity. Of course, in such a general formu-
lation this view can hardly be challenged. However in order to see how exactly this improvement
on rigor and clarity has been achieved in the 20th century we need first to study Euclid’s method
on its own rights. This requires some special hermeneutical techniques, which are well-known
to historian of mathematics but are less familiar to logicians, mathematicians and philosophers
who also write about this subject. We shall see that in some respects Euclid’s and Hilbert’s
method are different in principle, so that the difference between these methods does not reduce
to differences in degrees of continuous magnitudes like rigor and clarity. In addition to my at-
tempt to reconstruct Euclid’s mathematical reasoning in its proper terms (and in some terms
borrowed from Greek philosophy) I explain in this Chapter the relevance of Euclid’s geometry
to Kant’s philosophy of mathematics. In the end of this Chapter I point to some Euclidean
patterns of reasoning in the recent mathematics. The main textual reference in this Chapter
is obviously Euclid’s Elements, which is now available in a new English translation [51]. An
interested reader who would like to study the history of Greek mathematics more broadly and
would like to better understand Euclid’s special place in this history (this is an important subject
that I wholly skip in this book) is advised to begin with [88], [89] and then study more recent
secondary literature.
Chapter 2 on Hilbert is also written in a historical style and contains extended quotes from
Hilbert’s writings. Although I leave outside the scope of my discussion most of the contemporary
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context of Hilbert’s work I follow the development of Hilbert’s own ideas rather closely and
distinguish in it several stages. In its narrow historical aspect my treatment of Hilbert’s work
contains nothing original. However I also make an attempt to reconstruct the history of some
relevant notions (or at least to keep track of their changing meaning) including the notion of being
formal. This historical discussion is combined with an explanation of Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic
Method, which can be used by a non-mathematical reader for the first acquaintance with this
basic method of modern mathematical reasoning. Someone well acquainted with this method will
find here an analysis of certain assumptions required by this method, which remain tacit when
this method becomes an intellectual habit and is used automatically. I shall pay a lot of attention
to philosophical remarks made by Hilbert in his presentations of Axiomatic Method trying to
reconstruct Hilbert’s thinking and its philosophical motivation. I also discuss in this Chapter
some related subjects including the notion of logicality, diagrammatic and symbolic thinking and
some others. This Chapter presents (in its historical original form) the core notion of modern
Formal Axiomatic Method, which I contrast in what follows to more traditional Euclid’s method,
on the one hand, and to some later versions of Axiomatic Method including the anticipated New
Axiomatic Method, on the other hand.
The main suggested reading for Chapter 2 is Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry, which exist
in multiple editions including the English edition [99] and some later English editions. I highly
recommend this reading also to a non-mathematical reader of this book because the real subject-
matter of this short masterpiece is the Axiomatic Method itself rather than geometry, and so
this short book can be used as a shortcut to the modern style of mathematical thinking. For a
later more developed systematic presentation of Formal Axiomatic Method and its underlying
philosophy I refer the reader to Tarski’s textbook [233]. This textbook presents in a very clear
form a philosophical view on logic and mathematics that I discuss in my present book.
In Chapter 3 I talk about applications of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method in the 20th century math-
ematics and stress the fact that it has hardly ever been used in its original form and for its
originally intended purpose. I discuss from this point view some formal studies of axiomatic
set theories, Bourbaki’s Elements of Mathematics Bourbaki:1939-1988 and more specifically an
unpublished Bourbaki’s draft [22]. My main observation amounts to saying that both the mod-
ern set theory and Bourbaki’s structural mathematics can be described in Hilbert’s terms as a
metatheory or in Tarski’s terms as a model theory of certain Hilbert-style axiomatic theory or,
more typically, of a number of such theories. Since this metatheory or model theory itself is
developed by some other means (i.e., not axiomatically in Hilbert’s sense) one can say that the
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mainstream mathematics widely applies Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method only with a pinch
of salt. In the mainstream structural mathematics of the 20th century this method serves as a
method of definition and constructing new concepts rather than method of building deductive
theories. On the basis of this observations I criticize Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method arguing that
it is not apt to support mathematical theories useful in the modern physics. Finally I consider
in this Chapter Tarski’s topological model of intuitionistic propositional logic [234] and stress its
unusual character: although, technically speaking, there is no big difference between modeling
a given formal theory and modeling a given logical calculus, philosophically it makes a huge
difference and requires a rethinking of the whole idea of Axiomatic Method. Although Tarski
himself does not draw from this work such far-reaching conclusions I use this example in the
following Chapter as a historical prototype of the New Axiomatic Method.
In addition to the literature referred to in Chapter 3 I suggest reading the classical introduction
[1] to the modern axiomatic set theory including its last philosophical chapter, and Galileo’s Two
New Sciences [69] where the author stresses the constructive experimental character of the New
Science against the background of the earlier Scholastic patterns of doing science.
Chapter 4 plays a central role in this book because here I first introduce the notion of category
and discuss a new notion of Axiomatic Method, which emerges in category theory and, more
specifically, in categorical logic. Although categorical logic is already a well established subject
(see [182] for a historical introduction) I decided to follow here the pattern of the first two
Chapters and focus my attention on the work of one particular person, namely Lawvere, who
founded this discipline in 1960-ies; as before I combine here a historical and a systematic orders of
presentation and pay a minute attention to Lawvere’s philosophical comments found throughout
his writings. After presenting Lawvere’s categorical axiomatization of (the category of) sets [146]
and of the category of categories [147], which gives the first idea of using the category theory
for axiomatization, I turn to Lawvere’s critique of the standard Formal Axiomatic Method as
“subjective” and explain his idea of objective conceptual logic realized by category-theoretic
means. I begin this latter discussion by considering two Lawvere’s papers [148], [149] that
mark the birth of the categorical logic, and in the same context explain Lawvere’s notion of
quantifiers as adjoint functors to the substitution functor. Then I make a digression on Curry’s
combinatorial logic, type theory and the so-called Curry-Howard correspondence, and show how
these conceptual developments combine in Lawvere’s notion of Cartesian closed category. Then
after a brief discussion on Lawvere’s notions of hyperdoctrine (that conceptually connects to the
discussion on homotopy type theory found in 6.9) and functorial semantics (further discussed in
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9.2) I turn to philosophical issues and discuss the role of Hegel’s dialectical logic in Lawvere’s
thinking, which Lawvere stresses himself at many instances. Here I provide a philosophical
reconstruction of Hegel’s distinction between the objective and the subjective logic and then
describe how this philosophical distinction is realized by Lawvere with the technical means of
categorical logic. This discussion helps me then for interpreting the groundbreaking paper [153]
where Lawvere suggests his axiomatization of topos theory and demonstrates the strength of his
notion of internal logic of a given category. In the last Chapter 9 I use Lawvere’s axiomatization
of topos theory as a basic example of the new axiomatic approach, which I try to describe in
general terms under the title of New Axiomatic Method.
For a better understanding of Chapter 4 it would be useful if the reader get some knowledge of
basic category theory beforehand (albeit this is not an absolutely necessary requirement and the
reader can also follow references during the reading). For a non-mathematical reader or a reader
with a modest mathematical background I recommend [164] and [163] co-authored by Lawvere
as a very accessible introduction into the subject. For a mathematical reader not familiar with
categorical logic I recommend [177] that covers most of the mathematical material that I discuss
in this Chapter (but unfortunately skips hyperdoctrines). There is a huge gap in terms of required
mathematical skills between these two suggested readings and by the present day this gap has
not been yet filled in spite of many very valuable attempts such as [140]. I believe that there is
a principle and not only technical and pedagogical difficulty involved with the project of writing
a fairly elementary introduction to category, topos theory and categorical logic. The problem is
that the elementary introductions like [164], [163] and [140] begin with considering the category
of finite sets, which are first introduced naively as bags of dots and then are treated in terms
of their maps. Although such an introduction is geometrical in its character the basic geometry
reduces here to the geometry of bags of dots, which is a geometry of a very special sort. A
genuine continuous geometry appears then only at the much more advanced level and in a much
more abstract form of Grothendieck topology and Grothendieck topos, which are systematically
treated in [177] and other books of the same advanced level. So it still remains, in my view,
a challenging task to follow Hilbert’s example and rewrite Euclidean or other simple intuitive
geometry in new categorical terms. Voevodsky Univalent Foundations discussed in 6.10 appear
to be a step in this direction.
Talking about elementary introductions to category theory and topos theory I would like also
to mention [185] by McLarty. The expression “elementary’ theory” in the title does not stand
for being easy to grasp by a beginner but is used in the technical sense of being a first-order
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theory in the sense of modern logic and the standard Formal Axiomatic Method. This book is a
systematic presentation of category and topos theory which fully complies with the requirement
of Formal Axiomatic Method and at the same time treats the internal logic of a given topos and
the idea of internal description of a given topos with its internal language. So for a logically-
minded philosopher habituated to formal methods this book may also serve as an introduction
into the subject. I would like to stress however that since in the present book I discuss specific
features of Lawvere’s axiomatic thinking, which fall apart from the standard Formal Axiomatic
Method, studying McLarty’s book does not replace studying Lawvere’s original works even if,
formally speaking, McLarty’s book fully covers the same subject.
Part II is devoted to the notion of identity (in mathematics). This may appear as a side subject
with respect to the general theme of this book but it is actually not. A mathematical logicist
argues like this: in order to build a mathematical theory in an axiomatic form one needs first to
fix some basic logical notions like that of being the same (or being equal). Unless this is done
beforehand and quite independently from the content of any particular mathematical theory, so
the argument goes, no axiomatic construction of mathematical theories is possible. A similar
point can be made, of course, about other logical notions including logical connectives “and”,
“or”, the notion of logical inference, of truth-value, etc. This standard logicist argument does
not go through in the case of categorical logical, or at least it does not go through immediately,
because the categorical logic internalizes the logical notions, i.e., reconstructs them in terms of
a given mathematical theory (see 4.9 and 9.3). This applies to logical connectives, the relation
of inference, quantifiers, truth-values and to some other logical notions. It also applies to the
logical identity relation but this case turns to be both more difficult and more mathematically and
philosophically interesting than other cases. So I treat it systematically in the two consequent
Chapters making the Part II.
In Chapter 5 I consider the question of identity/equality in mathematics in general beginning
with some naive observations and historical examples. In particular, I briefly consider Plato’s
view according to which the mathematical equality is a weak form of strict identity: while the
latter applies only the ideal world of Forms the former applies in the world of mathematics, which
takes an intermediate position between the world of immutable Forms and the world of changing
material beings. Plato’s theory is an echo of the modern mathematical structuralism discussed
later in Chapter 8. In Chapter 5 I also show the significance of discussions about identity in
mathematics in Frege’s and Russell’s works for establishing the logicist view on mathematics
in the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. Then I turn to more theoretical
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subjects including a discussion on classes and individuals, and a discussion of the distinction
between logical extension and logical intension. This Chapter resumes with a discussion on
Martin-Lo¨f’s intuitionistic type theory [183] that provides a theory of identity types, which is
very non-trivial in the intensional case. I compare Martin-Lo¨f’s approach to identity with Frege’s
approach and reconsider Frege’s famous Venus example through the optics of Martin-Lo¨f’s type
theory.
Chapter 6 continues to treat the issue of identity but this time with new approaches coming from
category theory and some related fields. In the beginning of this Chapter I stress the conceptual
similarity and the conceptual difference between the logical notion of relation and geometrical
notion of transformation aka mapping or simply map. On this basis I re-introduce the notion of
category with a naive geometrical example, stress the geometrical origin of categorical thinking
and the relationships between category theory and Klein’s Erlangen Program. (I come back to
this topic in 8.6). Then I turn to more advanced geometrically motivated categories and show
how they realize the idea of identity as a map (rather than a relation). In particular, I consider
Be´nabou’s fibered categories [16] and higher categories (aka n-categories) - first in an abstract
form and then in the geometrical form of homotopy categories. So I approach the hot subject of
homotopy type theory, which brings together identity types of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory and the
geometrical approaches to identity and the homotopical higher category theory. When I began
to study these two subjects about ten years ago the precise mathematical connection between
them was not yet established and the mathematical discipline of homotopy type theory did not
yet exist. So it was for me a great relief to learn that these ideas combine not only at the level of
speculative philosophy but also in precise mathematical terms. I conclude this Chapter with a
presentation of Voevodsky’s new foundations of mathematics that he calls Univalent Foundations
[245],[246]. In Chapter 9 I refer to the Univalent Foundations as an example of a new form of
axiomatic presentation along with the example of Lawvere’s axiomatic topos theory.
As a general mathematical reading for Part II I recommend Leinster’s book [167] on higher
category-theory, which has great pedagogical advantages, Granstrom’s book [79] on type theory,
which also provides a philosophical perspective on this theory, Jacob’s book [123] that stresses
the link between categorical logic and type theory. The homotopy type theory has been not yet
exposed in textbooks but there are very clear expository papers [9] and [7].
Last Part III of the book treats two different subjects, which fall under the scope of Hegel-
Lawvere’s distinction between objective and subjective features of logic and mathematics. In
Chapter 7 I discuss the issue of mathematical intuition from a historical perspective and argue
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using some historical examples that mathematical intuitions change through the historical time
at least as rapidly as do mathematical concepts. The main purpose of this Chapter is to re-
fute the popular view according to which mathematics always develops by increasing its degree
of abstractness and according to which the highly abstract character of modern mathematical
concepts does not allow for a faithful intuitive representation in principle. I suggest an alterna-
tive picture of the historical development of mathematics where concepts and intuitions develop
side-by-side but sometimes the conceptual development takes over the intuitive development and
sometimes, on the contrary, the intuitive development takes over the conceptual one.
I expect that a phenomenologically-minded philosophical reader may object that what I discuss
is not the strict philosophical notion of intuition but rather a commonsensical meaning of the
word “intuition” as a bunch of helpful analogies borrowed from the everyday life or elsewhere. I
argue in this Chapter that the changing mathematical intuition that I describe qualifies at least
as intuition in Kant’s sense of the term. The lack of discussion of Husserl’s views is indeed a
significant lacuna of this Chapter that I cannot easily fix. So I leave it for a future work.
Although I wholly share Lawvere’s Hegelian view concerning the objective character of scientific
logic (which perfectly squares with Cassirer’s view on the place and the role of mathematics and
logic expressed in the above epigraph) I also stress the role of the subjective intuition because
it provides the necessary link that connects the pure mathematics to the individual sensual
experience to the scientific empirical methods to the whole body of empirical science. Without
such a link Hegel’s objective dialectical logic too easily turns into a new form of speculative
dogmatic metaphysics wholly detached from reality. One may suggest that since the dogmatic
dialectics is an obvious oxymoron it cannot refer to anything real. But the dialectical logic quite
rightly protects one from such naive conclusions made on abstract logical grounds: as a matter
of painful historical fact the examples of dogmatic misuse of philosophical dialectics are abound
1.
In Chapter 8 I discuss structuralism including its mathematical variety. Considering structural-
ism as a suggestive idea rather than a system of stable philosophical views I argue against the
received view according to which category theory brings about a new variety of structuralism and
provides a new framework for developing structural mathematics. I recognize the role of struc-
tural thinking in the development of category theory and describe this role in this Chapter. In
particular, I elaborate on Eilenberg and Mac Lane’s idea of category theory as a continuation of
1Unlike the older forms of dogmatism the more recent dialectical dogmatism does not use any fixed system
of beliefs but enforces a permanent organized change of one’s beliefs on changing pragmatic grounds (political,
economical, etc.).
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Klein’s Erlangen Program [48]. This very analogy allows me to specify the crucial difference be-
tween Klein’s structural thinking and new categorical thinking: when groups are generalized up
to categories the notion of invariant structure is replaced by the notion of covariant or contravari-
ant functor. I argue that the structuralist thinking about functoriality in terms of preservation of
invariant structures is, generally, inappropriate; then I suggest a different philosophical view (or
rather another suggestive idea) where the notion of functoriality (i.e., of co- and contravariance)
becomes central. Although this conceptual development begins with a mere generalization of the
structuralist Erlangen Program it brings about a new view, which is very unlike the structuralist
view. In the end of this Chapter (8.8) I suggest a purely geometrical way of thinking about
categories alternative to the more convenient way of thinking about categories as categories of
structures. The basic idea here is thinking of geometrical objects as maps from types (of geo-
metrical objects) to spaces. I demonstrate this approach with some elementary examples from
the 19th century geometry. Thus in my suggested post-structuralist picture the notion of object
(this time understood as a map) becomes once again central.
The conceptual change described in Chapter 8 affects not only the choice of structures explored
with the Formal Axiomatic Method but also this method itself. So in the concluding Chapter 9
I make the long-promised attempt to describe the New Axiomatic Method more systematically.
I first describe the two basic functions of Axiomatic Method, which Lawvere calls the unification
and the concentration. Here I contrast the unificatory strategy of the New Method to the more
traditional unificatory strategy of Formal Axiomatic Method, which has a structuralist and a
logicist underpinning. Then I describe the concentration part, which turns to be more traditional
and in a new form reproduces some features of Euclid’s Axiomatic Method. The most original
part of the New Axiomatic Method is, of course, its logical part, which involves the notion of
internal logic. Generalizing on works of Lawvere and Voevodsky I describe here in general terms a
way of using the internal logic of some given category (which is construed in intuitive geometrical
terms at the first step of the axiomatic construction) for improving upon the construction of this
very category and providing it with some deductive structure. This way of using logic for building
mathematical theories suggests a new way of thinking about the role of logic in mathematical
theories, which is very unlike Hilbert’s and Tarski’s.
In my suggested approach logic is designed along with the rest of conceptual construction rather
than used as a ready-made foundation for making further mathematical constructions. One may
think that the freedom of making up logical calculi added to the freedom of making up new
axiomatic mathematical theories (assured already by Hilbert) only reinforce the inflation of the
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“metaphysical world of thought”. In fact the New Axiomatic Method prevents this inflation in
two different ways. First, by taking into account the objective meaning of the category of interest
(which can be, for example, a spatiotemporal category used in physics) and, second, by requiring
the relevant logic to be the internal logic of this given category. While the former feature is at
some degree also compatible with the standard Formal Axiomatic Method the latter feature is
a genuinely original contribution of the New Method.The New Method no longer reduces the
function of logical formalization to a logical censorship; instead logic is used here as a flexible
tool for the internal conceptual reconstruction.
An important part of my argument consists of pointing to Lawvere’s and Voevodsky’s works
as applications of this New Method, and stressing the fact that in both cases it allows for
a remarkable conceptual simplification and clarification of otherwise difficult and conceptually
problematic theories. Since in both cases the relevant logic is internal with respect to its base
category this logic inherits the objective meaning of this base category. This allows me to
suggest that the New Axiomatic Method may help to bridge the gap between mathematics and
physics created and justified by the standard Formal Axiomatic Method and by the logicist
view on mathematics that underpins this standard method. Notwithstanding my critique of
Hilbert’s version of Axiomatic Method developed throughout in this book, I believe (contra
Arnold) that Hilbert was perfectly right when he described this method as “the basic instrument
of all research” ([100], p. 467) and when he said that “[t]o proceed axiomatically means [..]
nothing else than to think with consciousness” ([102] p. 1120)
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Part I
A Brief History of the Axiomatic
Method
1

In his famous address “Axiomatic Thought” delivered before the Swiss Mathematical Society in
Zurich in 1917 Hilbert says:
If we consider a particular theory more closely, we always see that a few distinguished
propositions of the field of knowledge underlie the construction of the framework of
concepts, and these propositions then suffice by themselves for the construction, in
accordance with logical principles, of the entire framework. [..] These fundamental
propositions can be regarded [..] as the axioms of the individual fields of knowledge :
the progressive development of the individual field of knowledge then lies solely in the
further logical construction of the already mentioned framework of concepts. This
standpoint is especially predominant in pure mathematics. [.. A]nything at all that
can be the object of scientific thought becomes dependent on the axiomatic method,
an thereby indirectly on mathematics. ([101], p. 1108-1115)
In a different paper the author makes a further epistemological claim:
The axiomatic method is and remains the indispensable tool, appropriate to our
minds, for all exact research in any field whatsoever: it is logically incontestable and
at the same time fruitful. [..] To proceed axiomatically means in this sense nothing
else than to think with consciousness. ([102] p. 1120)
Although Hilbert’s enthusiasm about the Axiomatic Method and his high esteem of the role of this
method in science may be not universally accepted today, the modern notion of axiomatic theory
remains shaped by Hilbert’s works; his Grundlagen der Geometrie (Foundations of Geometry)
first published in 1899 [109] still serves as a paradigm of axiomatic mathematical theory. As
soon as this method is understood in the above general terms one may think that it has been
practiced by mathematicians since the early days of their discipline. Indeed in the Introduction
to his Foundations of Geometry of 1899 [109] Hilbert states the following:
Geometry, like arithmetic, requires for its logical development only a small number of
simple, fundamental principles. These fundamental principles are called the axioms
of geometry. The choice of the axioms and the investigation of their relations to
one another is a problem which, since the time of Euclid, has been discussed in
numerous excellent memoirs to be found in the mathematical literature. This problem
is tantamount to the logical analysis of our intuition of space. (Hereafter [109] is
quoted in English translation [99])
Notice Euclid’s name is the above quote. Evidently Hilbert had in mind Euclid’s Elements
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when he prepared his Foundations of Geometry for publication. Hilbert aims at developing
Euclidean geometry on a wholly new conceptual basis. 2 In this sense Hilbert’s Foundations
of 1899 qualifies as a fairly revolutionary work. However one should not forget that rewriting
geometrical chapters of Euclid’s Elements in new terms is itself an old and well-establish tradition
in the history of mathematical thought. Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry (as well as Bourbaki’s
open-ended Elements of Mathematics [23] produced later in the 20th century) make part of this
long-term tradition and can be compared with such groundbreaking works of earlier generations
as, for example, Restored Euclid by Borelli (1658) [21], New Elements of Geometry by Arnauld
(1667)[5] and Euclid Freed from All Flaws by Saccheri (1733)[76]. Thus the Hilbertian revolution
that still strongly influences today’s mathematical practice is certainly not the first revolution
of this sort and hopefully not the last one.
Hilbert thinks of his new version of Axiomatic Method as a development of and improvement
over Euclid’s method of theory-building. Surely Hilbert is aware about the fact that his method
is not the same as Euclid’s; we shall see that Hilbert in fact quite precisely points to the key
difference (see 2.6). The purpose of Chapter 1 is to describe this difference more precisely and
more systematically. In Chapter 2, I focus on Hilbert’s work and compare Hilbert’s approach
to Euclid’s. In Chapter 3, I consider applications of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method in the 20th
century mathematics and, in particular, in Bourbaki. In Chapter 4, I discuss Lawvere’s work
and show how some basic features of Euclid’s approach deliberately ignored by Hilbert get a new
life in today’s categorical logic.
2I agree with David Rowe when he says that “The reform of geometry that [Hilbert] envisaged in Grundlagen
der Geometrie was primarily conceived as a renewal of the fundamental structures of classical Euclidean geometry.”
([209], p.71)
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Chapter 1
Euclid: Doing and Showing
Reading older mathematical texts always involves a hermeneutical dilemma: in order to make
sense of the mathematical content of a given old text one wants to interpret it in modern terms;
in order to see the difference between the modern mathematical thinking and older ways of
mathematical thinking one wants to avoid anachronisms and understand the old text in its own
terms [238]. Any scholar studying older mathematics needs to find a way between the Scylla
of “antiquarianism” that seeks the scholar’s conversion into a person living during a different
historical epoch, and the Charybdis of radical “presentism” that finds in older texts nothing
but a minor part of today’s standard mathematical curricula and wholly ignores the historical
change of basic patterns of mathematical thinking 1 . My way through the channel is the
following. I read Euclid’s text verbatim (relying on Heiberg’s edition of the original Greek
[52] and using Fitzpatrick’s new English translation [51]), consider its most important modern
interpretations (including overtly anachronistic ones), criticize some of these interpretations on
the basis of textual evidences, and finally suggest some alternative interpretations. In order to
prevent the risk of losing the main argument behind the following historical details I formulate
now my general conclusion. Contrary to popular opinion Euclid’s geometry is not a system of
propositions some of which have a special status of axioms while some other are derived from the
axioms according to certain rules of logical inference. It can be rather described after Friedman
as “a form of rational argument” ([68], p. 94) 2, where some non-propositional content (including
non-propositional first principles) is indispensable. Precipitating what follows (see particularly
1Being between Scylla and Charybdis is an idiom deriving from Greek mythology. Scylla and Charybdis were
mythical sea monsters noted by Homer. Scylla was rationalized as a rock shoal (described as a six-headed sea
monster) on the Italian side of the strait and Charybdis was a whirlpool off the coast of Sicily. They were
regarded as a sea hazard located close enough to each other that they posed an inescapable threat to passing
sailors; avoiding Charybdis meant passing too close to Scylla and vice versa. (after WikipediA)
2See the full quote from Friedman in the end of Section 2.5.
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2.6) let me mention that certain non-propositional principles also make part of modern formal
theories in the form of syntactic rules. As we shall now see in Euclid the non-propositional aspect
of mathematical reasoning plays a more prominent role.
1.1 Demonstration and “Monstration”
All Propositions of Euclid’s Elements (with few easily understandable exceptions) fit into the
scheme described by Proclus in his Commentary [196] as follows:
Every Problem and every Theorem that is furnished with all its parts should contain
the following elements: an enunciation, an exposition, a specification, a construction, a
proof, and a conclusion. Of these enunciation states what is given and what is being
sought from it, a perfect enunciation consists of both these parts. The exposition
takes separately what is given and prepares it in advance for use in the investigation.
The specification takes separately the thing that is sought and makes clear precisely
what it is. The construction adds what is lacking in the given for finding what is
sought. The proof draws the proposed inference by reasoning scientifically from the
propositions that have been admitted. The conclusion reverts to the enunciation,
confirming what has been proved. ([196], p.203, italic is mine)
It is appropriate to notice here that the term “proposition”, which is traditionally used in trans-
lations as a common name of Euclid’s problems and theorems, is not found in the original text
of the Elements: Euclid numerates these things throughout each Book without naming them by
any common name. (The reader will shortly see why this detail is important.) The difference be-
tween problems and theorems is explained in 1.4 below. Let me now show how Proclus’ scheme
applies to Proposition 5 of the First Book (Theorem 1.5), which is a well-known theorem about
angles of the isosceles triangle. References in square brackets are added by the translator; some of
them will be discussed later on. Words in round brackets are added by the translator for stylistic
reason. Words in angle brackets are borrowed from the above Proclus’ quote. Throughout this
Chapter I write these words in italic when I use them in Proclus’ specific sense.
[enunciation:]
For isosceles triangles, the angles at the base are equal to one another, and if the
equal straight lines are produced then the angles under the base will be equal to one
another.
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[exposition]:
Let ABC be an isosceles triangle having the side AB equal to the side AC; and let
the straight lines BD and CE have been produced further in a straight line with AB
and AC (respectively). [Post. 2].
Fig. 1.1
[specification:]
I say that the angle ABC is equal to ACB, and (angle) CBD to BCE.
[construction:]
For let a point F be taken somewhere on BD, and let AG have been cut off from the
greater AE, equal to the lesser AF [Prop. 1.3]. Also, let the straight lines FC, GB
have been joined. [Post. 1]
[proof :]
In fact, since AF is equal to AG, and AB to AC, the two (straight lines) FA, AC
are equal to the two (straight lines) GA, AB, respectively. They also encompass a
common angle FAG. Thus, the base FC is equal to the base GB, and the triangle
AFC will be equal to the triangle AGB, and the remaining angles subtended by the
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equal sides will be equal to the corresponding remaining angles [Prop. 1.4]. (That
is) ACF to ABG, and AFC to AGB. And since the whole of AF is equal to the
whole of AG, within which AB is equal to AC, the remainder BF is thus equal to
the remainder CG [Ax.3]. But FC was also shown (to be) equal to GB. So the two
(straight lines) BF , FC are equal to the two (straight lines) CG, GB respectively,
and the angle BFC (is) equal to the angle CGB, while the base BC is common to
them. Thus the triangle BFC will be equal to the triangle CGB, and the remaining
angles subtended by the equal sides will be equal to the corresponding remaining
angles [Prop. 1.4]. Thus FBC is equal to GCB, and BCF to CBG. Therefore,
since the whole angle ABG was shown (to be) equal to the whole angle ACF , within
which CBG is equal to BCF , the remainder ABC is thus equal to the remainder
ACB [Ax. 3]. And they are at the base of triangle ABC. And FBC was also shown
(to be) equal to GCB. And they are under the base.
[conclusion:]
Thus, for isosceles triangles, the angles at the base are equal to one another, and
if the equal sides are produced then the angles under the base will be equal to one
another. (Which is) the very thing it was required to show.
An obvious difference between Proclus’ analysis of the above theorem and its usual modern analy-
sis is the following. For a modern reader the proof of this theorem begins with Proclus’ exposition
and includes Proclus’ specification, construction and proof. Thus for Proclus the proof is only a
part of what we call today the proof of this theorem. Also notice that Euclid’s theorems conclude
with the words “which ... was required to show” (as correctly translates Fitzpatrick) but not with
the words “what it was required to prove” (as inaccurately translates Heath [86]). The standard
Latin translation of this Euclid’s formula as quod erat demonstrandum is also inaccurate. These
inaccurate translations conflate two different Greek verbs: “apodeiknumi” (English “to prove”,
Latin “demonstrare”) and “deiknumi” (English “to show”, Latin “monstrare”). The difference
between the two verbs can be clearly seen in the two Aristotle’s Analytics: Aristotle uses the
verb “apodeiknumi” and the derived noun “apodeixis” (proof) as technical terms in his syllogistic
logic, and he uses the verb “deiknumi” in a broader and more informal sense when he discusses
epistemological issues (mostly in the Second Analytics). Without trying to trace here the history
of Greek logical and mathematical terminology and speculate about possible influences of some
Greek writers on some other writers, I would like to stress the remarkable fact that Aristotle’s
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use of verbs “deiknumi” and “apodeiknumi” agrees with Euclid’s and Proclus’. In my view this
fact alone is sufficient for taking seriously the difference between the two verbs and distinguishing
between proof and “showing” (or otherwise between demonstration and monstration)3.
One may think that the difference between the current meaning of the word “proof” in today’s
mathematics and logic and the meaning of Proclus’ proof (Greek “apodeixis”) is a merely ter-
minological issue, which is due to difficulties of translation from Greek to English. I shall try
now to show that this terminological difference points on a deeper problem, which is not merely
linguistic. In today’s logic the word “proof” stands for a logical inference of certain conclusion
from some given premises. In fact this is what by and large was meant by proof also by Aristotle
and Proclus. Indeed, looking at the proof (in Proclus’ sense) of Euclids Theorem 1.5 we see
that it also qualifies as a proof in the modern sense: we have here a number of premises (which
I make explicit in the next Section) and certain conclusions derived from those premises. It
is irrelevant now whether or not this particular inference is valid according to today’s logical
standards; what I want to stress here is only the general setting that involves some premises,
an inference (probably invalid) and some conclusions. This core meaning of the word “proof”
(Greek “apodeixis”) hardly changed since Proclus’ times.
So we get a problem, which is clearly not only terminological: Is it indeed justified to describe
the exposition, the specification and the construction as elements of the proof or one should
rather follow Proclus and consider these things as independent constituents of a mathematical
theorem?
The question of logical significance of the exposition, the specification and the construction in
Euclid’s geometry has been discussed in the literature; in what follows I shall briefly describe
some tentative answers to it. However before doing this I would like to stress that this question
may be ill-posed to begin with. As far as one assumes, first, that the theory of Euclid’s Elements
is (by and large) sound and, second, that any sound mathematical theory is an axiomatic theory
in the modern sense, then, in order to make these two assumptions mutually compatible, one
has to describe the exposition, the specification and the construction of each Euclid’s theorem as
parts of the proof of this theorem and specify their logical role and their logical status. I shall not
challenge the usual assumption according to which Euclid’s mathematics is by and large sound. (I
say “by and large” in order to leave some room for possible revisions and corrections of Euclid’s
3As far as mutual influences are concerned two things are certain: (i) Proclus read Aristotle and (ii) Aristotle
had at least a basic knowledge of the mathematical tradition, on which Euclid later elaborated in his Elements
(as Aristotle’s mathematical examples clearly show [87]). It remains unclear whether Aristotle’s work could
influence Euclid. In my view this is unlikely. However Aristotle’s logic certainly played an important role in later
interpretations and revisions of Euclid’s Elements. I leave this interesting issue outside of the scope of this book.
9
arguments and thus avoid controversies about the question whether a given interpretation of
Euclid is authentic or not. Although I pay more attention to textual details than it is usually
done in modern logical reconstructions of Euclid’s reasoning, I am not going to criticize these
reconstructions by pointing to their anachronistic character.) However I shall challenge the other
assumption according to which any sound mathematical theory is an axiomatic theory in the
modern sense. Since I do not take this latter assumption for granted I do not assume from the
outset that the problematic elements of Euclid’s reasoning (the exposition, the specification and
the construction) play some logical role, which only needs to be made explicit and appropriately
understood. In what follows I try to describe how these elements work without making about
them any additional assumptions and only then decide whether the role of these elements qualifies
as logical or not.
1.2 Are Euclid’s Proofs Logical?
Let’s look at Euclid’s Theorem 1.5 more attentively. I begin its analysis with its proof. Among
the premisses of this proof, one may easily identify Axiom (Common Notion) 3 according to
which
(Ax.3): If equal things are subtracted from equal things then the remainders are
equal
and the preceding Theorem 1.4 according to which
(Prop.1.4): If two triangles have two corresponding sides equal, and have the angles
enclosed by the equal sides equal, then they will also have equal bases, and the two
triangles will be equal, and the remaining angles subtended by the equal sides will
be equal to the corresponding remaining angles.
I shall not comment on the role Theorem 1.4 in this proof (which seems to be clear) but say few
things about the role of the Axiom 3.
Here is how exactly the Axiom (Common Notion) 3 is used in the above Euclid’s proof. First,
by construction we have
Con1: BF ≡ AF −AB and Con2: CG ≡ AG−AC
which is tantamount to saying that point B lays between points A, F and point C lays between
points A, G). Second, by hypothesis we have
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Hyp: AB = AC
and once again by construction
Con3: AF = AG
Now we see that we have got the situation described in Ax.3: equal things are subtracted from
equal things. Using this Axiom we conclude that BF = CG.
Notice that Ax.3 applies to all “things” (mathematical objects), for which the relation of equality
and the operation of subtraction make sense. In Euclid’s mathematics this relation and this
operation apply not only to straight segments and numbers but also to geometrical objects of
various sorts including figures, angles and solids. Since Euclid’s equality is not interchangeable
with identity I use for the two relations two different symbols: namely I use the usual symbol
for Euclid’s equality (even if this equality is not quite usual), and use symbol ≡ for identity. My
use of symbols + and − is self-explanatory4.
The other four Euclid’s Axioms (not to be confused with Postulates!) have the same character.
This makes Euclid’s Axioms in general, and Ax.3 in particular, very unlike premises like Con1-3
and Hyp, so one may wonder whether the very idea of treating these things on equal footing (as
different premises of the same inference) makes sense. More precisely we have here the following
choice. One option is to interpret Ax.3 as the following implication:
{(a ≡ b− c)&(d ≡ e− f)&(b = d)&(c = f)} → (a = b)
and then use it along with Con1-3 and Hyp for getting the desired conclusion through modus
ponens and other appropriate rules. This standard analysis involves a fundamental distinction
between premises and conclusion, on the one hand, and rules of inference, on the other hand.
It assumes that in spite of the fact that Euclid (as most of other mathematicians of all times)
remains silent about logic, his reasoning nevertheless follows some implicit logical rules. The
purpose of logical analysis in this case is to make this “underlying logic“ (as some philosophers
like to call it) explicit.
The other option that I have in mind is to interpret Ax.3 itself as a rule rather than as a premiss.
Following this rule, which can be pictures as follows:
(a ≡ b− c), (d ≡ e− f), (b = d), (c = f)
4The difference A−B of two figures A, B is a figure obtained through “cutting” B out of A; the sum A+B
is the result of concatenation of A and B. These operations are not defined up to congruence of figures (for there
are, generally speaking, many possible ways, in which one may cut out one figure from another) but, according to
Euclid’s Axioms, these operations are defined up to Euclid’s equality. This shows that Euclid’s equality is weaker
than congruence: according to Axiom 4 congruent objects are equal but, generally, the converse does not hold.
In the case of (plane) figures Euclid’s equality is equivalent to the equality (in the modern sense) of their air.
11
———————————————————————— (Ax.3)
(a = b)
one derives from Con1-3 and Hyp the desired conclusion. So interpreted Ax.3 hardly qualifies
as a logical rule because it applies only to propositions of a particular sort (namely, of the
form X = Y where X,Y are some mathematical objects of appropriate types). This Axiom
cannot help one to prove that Socrates is mortal. Nevertheless the domain of application of
this rule is quite vast and covers the whole of Euclid’s mathematics. An important advantage
of this analysis is that it doesn’t require one to make any assumption about hidden features of
Euclid’s thinking: unlike the distinction between logical rules and instances of applications of
these rules the distinction between axioms and premises like Con1-3 and Hyp is explicit in
Euclid’s Elements.
There is also a historical reason to prefer the latter reading of Euclid’s Common Notions. Aris-
totle uses the word “axiom” interchangeably with the expressions “common notions”, “common
opinions” or simply “commons” for what we call today logical laws or logical principles but not
for what we call today axioms. Moreover in this context he systematically draws an analogy
between mathematical common notions and his proposed logical principles (laws of logic). This
among other things provides an important historical justification for calling Euclid’s Common
Notions by the name of Axioms. It is obvious that mathematics in general and mathematical
common notions (axioms) in particular serve for Aristotle as an important source for developing
the very idea of logic. Roughly speaking Aristotle’s thinking, as I understand it, is this: behind
the basic principles of mathematical reasoning spelled out through mathematical common no-
tions (axioms) there are other yet more general principles relevant to reasoning about all sorts of
beings and not only about mathematical objects. The fact that Euclid, according to the estab-
lished chronology, is younger than Aristotle by some 25 years (Euclid’s dates unlike Aristotle’s
are only approximate) shouldn’t confuse one. While there is no strong evidence of the influence
of Aristotle’s work on Euclid, the influence on Aristotle of the same mathematical tradition, on
which Euclid elaborated, is clearly documented in Aristotle’s writings themselves. In particu-
lar, Aristotle quotes Euclid’s Ax.3 (which, of course, Aristotle could know from another source)
almost verbatim 5.
5Here are some quotes:
By first principles of proof [as distinguished from first principles in general] I mean the common
opinions on which all men base their demonstrations, e.g. that one of two contradictories must be
true, that it is impossible for the same thing both be and not to be, and all other propositions of
this kind. (Met. 996b27-32, Heath’s translation, corrected)
Here Aristotle refers to a logical principle as “common opinion”. In the next quote he compares mathematical
and logical axioms:
We have now to say whether it is up to the same science or to different sciences to inquire into what
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However important Aristotle’s argument in the history of Western thought may be, there is no
reason to take it for granted every time when we try today to interpret Euclid’s Elements or
any other old mathematical text. Whatever is one’s philosophical stance concerning the place of
logical principles in human reasoning one can see what kind of harm can be made if Aristotle’s
assumption about the primacy of logical and ontological principles is taken straightforwardly and
uncritically: one treats Euclid’s Axioms on equal footing with premisses like Con1-3 and Hyp
and so misses the law-like character of the Axioms. Missing this feature doesn’t allow one to see
the relationships between Greek logic and Greek mathematics, which I just sketched.
Having said that I would like to repeat that Euclid’s proof (apodeixis) is the part of Euclid’s
theorems, which more resembles what we today call proof (in logic) than other parts Euclid’s
theorems. For this reason in what follows I shall call inferences in Euclid’s proofs, which are based
on Axioms, protological inferences and distinguish them from inferences of another type that I
shall call geometrical inferences. This analysis is not incompatible with the idea (going back to
Aristotle) that behind Euclid’s protological and geometrical inferences there are inferences of a
more fundamental sort, that can be called logical in the proper sense of the word. However I claim
that Euclid’s text as it stands provides us with no evidence in favor of this strong assumption.
One can learn Euclid’s mathematics and fully appreciate its rigor without knowing anything
about logic just like Moliere’s M. Jourdain could well express himself long before he learned
anything about prose!
Whether or not the science of logic really helps one to improve on mathematical rigor - or this is
rather the mathematical rigor that helps one to do logic rigorously - is a controversial question
that I shall discuss throughout this book and suggest an answer only in the last Chapter. The
purpose of my present reading of Euclid is at the same time more modest and more ambitious
in mathematics is called axioms and into [the general issue of] essence. Clearly the inquiry into
these things is up to the same science, namely, to the science of the philosopher. For axioms hold of
everything that [there] is but not of some particular genus apart from others. Everyone makes use
of them because they concern being qua being, and each genus is. But men use them just so far as
is sufficient for their purpose, that is, within the limits of the genus relevant to their proofs. Since
axioms clearly hold for all things qua being (for being is what all things share in common) one who
studies being qua being also inquires into the axioms. This is why one who observes things partly
[=who inquires into a special domain] like a geometer or a arithmetician never tries to say whether
the axioms are true or false. (Met. 1005a19-28, my translation)
Here is the last quote where Aristotle refers to Ax.3 explicitly:
Since the mathematician too uses common [axioms] only on the case-by-case basis, it must be
the business of the first philosophy to investigate their fundamentals. For that, when equals are
subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal is common to all quantities, but mathematics
singles out and investigates some portion of its proper matter, as e.g. lines or angles or numbers,
or some other sort of quantity, not however qua being, but as [...] continuous. (Met. 1061b, my
translation)
The “science of philosopher” otherwise called the “first philosophy” is Aristotle’s logic, which in his understanding
is closely related to (if not indistinguishable from) what we call today ontology. After Alexandrian librarians we
call today the relevant collection of Aristotle’s texts by the name of metaphysics and also use this name for a
relevant philosophical discipline.
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than the purpose of logical analysis. It is more modest because this reading doesn’t purport
to assess Euclid’s reasoning from the viewpoint of today’s mathematics and logic but aims at
reconstructing this reasoning in its authentic archaic form. It is more ambitious because it doesn’t
take the today’s viewpoint for granted but aims at reconsidering this viewpoint by bringing it
into a historical perspective.
1.3 Instantiation, Objecthood and Objectivity
Let us now see where the premises Hyp and Con 1-3 come from. As I have already mentioned
they actually come from two different sources: Hyp is assumed by hypotheis while Con 1-3 are
assumed by construction. I shall consider here these two cases one after the other.
The notion of hypothetic reasoning is an important extension of the core notion of axiomatic
theory outlined above; it is well-treated in the literature and I shall not cover it here in full.
I shall consider only one particular aspect of hypothetical reasoning as it is present in Euclid.
The hypothesis that validates Hyp, informally speaking, amounts to the fact that Theorem 1.5
tells us something about isosceles triangles (rather than about objects of another sort). The
corresponding definition (Definition 1.20) tells us that two sides of the isosceles triangle are
equal. However to get from here to Hyp one needs yet another step. The enunciation of
Theorem 1.5 refers to isosceles triangles in general. But Hyp that is involved into the proof
of this Theorem concerns only particular triangle ABC. Notice also that the proof concludes
with the propositions ABC = ACB and FBC = GCB (where ABC, ACB, FBC and GCB
are angles), which also concern only particular triangle ABC. This conclusion differs from the
following conclusion (of the whole Theorem), which almost verbatim repeats the enunciation
and once again refers to isosceles triangles and their angles in general terms.
The wanted step that allows Euclid to proceed from the enunciation to Hyp is made in the
exposition of this Theorem, which introduces triangle ABC as an “arbitrary representative” of
isosceles triangles (in general). In terms of modern logic this step can be described as the uni-
versal instantiation:
∀xP (x) =⇒ P (a/x)
where P (a/x) is the result of the substitution of individual constant a at the place of all free
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occurrences of variable x in P (x). The same notion of universal instantiation allows for interpret-
ing Euclid’s specification in the obvious way. The reciprocal backward step that allows Euclid to
obtain the conclusion of the Theorem from the conclusion of the proof can be similarly described
as the universal generalization :
P (a) =⇒ ∀xP (x)
(which is a valid rule only under certain conditions that I skip here).
As long as the exposition and the specification are interpreted in terms of the universal instanti-
ation these operations are understood as logical inferences and, accordingly, as element of proof
in the modern sense of the word. A somewhat different - albeit not wholly incompatible - in-
terpretation of Euclid’s exposition and specification can be straightforwardly given in terms of
Kant’s transcendental aesthetics and transcendental logic developed in his Critique of Pure Rea-
son [130]. Kant thinks of the traditional geometrical exposition not as a logical inference of one
proposition from another but as a “general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept
with its image”; a representation of such a general procedure Kant calls a schema of the given
concept (A140). Thus for Kant any individual mathematical object (like triangle ABC) always
comes with a specific rule that one follows constructing this object in one’s imagination and
that provides a link between this object and its corresponding concept (the concept of isosceles
triangle in our example). According to Kant the representation of general concepts by imaginary
individual objects (which Kant for short also describes as “construction of concepts”) is the prin-
cipal distinctive feature of mathematical thinking, which distinguishes it from a philosophical
speculation.
Philosophical cognition is rational cognition from concepts, mathematical cognition
is that from the construction of concepts.” But to construct a concept means to
exhibit a priori the intuition corresponding to it. For the construction of a concept,
therefore, a non-empirical intuition is required, which consequently, as intuition, is an
individual object, but that must nevertheless, as the construction of a concept (of a
general representation), express in the representation universal validity for all possi-
ble intuitions that belong under the same concept, either through mere imagination,
in pure intuition, or on paper, in empirical intuition.... The individual drawn figure
is empirical, and nevertheless serves to express the concept without damage to its
universality, for in the case of this empirical intuition we have taken account only of
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the action of constructing the concept, to which many determinations, e.g., those of
the magnitude of the sides and the angles, are entirely indifferent, and thus we have
abstracted from these differences, which do not alter the concept of the triangle.
Philosophical cognition thus considers the particular only in the universal, but math-
ematical cognition considers the universal in the particular, indeed even in the indi-
vidual... (A713-4/B741-2).
Kant’s account can be understood as a further explanation of what the instantiation of math-
ematical concepts amounts to; then one may claim that the Kantian interpretation of Euclid’s
exposition and specification is compatible with its interpretation as the universal instantiation in
the modern sense. However the Kantian interpretation doesn’t suggest by itself to interpret the
instantiation as a logical procedure, i.e., as an inference of a proposition from another proposi-
tion. As the above quote makes it clear Kant describes the instantiation as a cognitive procedure
of a different sort.
Now coming back to Euclid we must first of all admit that the exposition and the specification of
Theorem 1.5 as they stand are too concise for preferring one philosophical interpretation rather
than another. Euclid introduces an isosceles triangle through Definition 1.20 providing no rule
for constructing such a thing. (This example may serve as an evidence against the often-repeated
claim that every geometrical object considered by Euclid is supposed to be constructed on the
basis of Postulates beforehand.) Nevertheless given the important role of constructions in Euclid’s
geometry, which I explain in the next Section, the idea that every geometrical object in Euclid
has an associated construction rule, appears very plausible. There is also another interesting
textual feature of Euclid’s specification that in my view makes the Kantian interpretation more
plausible.
Notice the use of the first person in the specification of Theorem 1.5 : “I say that ....”. In Elements
Euclid uses this expression systematically in the specification of every theorem. Interpreting the
specification in terms of universal instantiation one should, of course, disregard this feature as
merely rhetorical. However it may be taken into account through the following consideration.
While the enunciation of a theorem is a general proposition that can be best understood a´ la
Frege in the abstraction from any human or inhuman thinker, i.e., independently of any thinking
subject, who might believe this proposition, assert it, refute it, or do anything else about it,
the core of Euclid’s theorems (beginning with their exposition) involves an individual thinker
(individual subject) that cannot and should not be wholly abstracted away in this context. When
Euclid enunciates a theorem this enunciation does not involve - or at least is not supposed to
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involve - any particularities of Euclid’s individual thinking; the less this enunciation is affected
by Euclid’s (or anyone else’s) individual writing and speaking style the better. However the
exposition and thespecification of the given theorem essentially involve an arbitrary choice of
notation (“Let ABC be an isosceles triangle...”), which is an individual choice made by an
individual mathematician (namely, made by Euclid on the occasion of writing his Elements). This
individual choice of notation goes on par with what we have earlier described as instantiation, i.e.
the choice of one individual triangle (triangle ABC) of the given type, which serves Euclid for
proving the general theorem about all triangles of this type. The exposition can be also naturally
accompanied by drawing a diagram, which in its turn involves the choice of a particular shape
(provided this shape is of the appropriate type), to leave alone the choices of its further features
like color, etc.
Thus when in the specification of Theorem 1.5 we read “I say that the angle ABC is equal
to ACB” we indeed do have good reason to take Euclid’s wording seriously. For the sentence
“angle ABC is equal to ACB” unlike the sentence “for isosceles triangles, the angles at the
base are equal to one another” has a feature that is relevant only to one particular presentation
(and to one particular diagram if any), namely the use of letters A,B,C rather than some
others 6. The words “I say that ...” in the given context stress this situational character of the
following sentence “angle ABC is equal to ACB”. What matters in these words is, of course, not
Euclid’s personality but the reference to a particular act of speech and cognition of an individual
mathematician. Proving the same theorem on a different occasion Euclid or anybody else could
use other letters and another diagram of the appropriate type.
A competent reader of Euclid is supposed to know that the choice of letters in Euclid’s notation
is arbitrary and that Euclid’s reasoning does not depend of this choice. The arbitrary character
of this notation should be distinguished from the general arbitrariness of linguistic symbols in
natural languages. What is specific for the case of exposition and specification is the fact that here
the arbitrary elements of reasoning (like notation) are sharply distinguished from its invariant
elements. To use Kant’s term we can say that behind the notion according to which the choice
of Euclid’s notation is arbitrary (at least at the degree that letters used in this notation are
permutable) and according to which the same reasoning may work equally well with different
diagrams (provided all of them belong to the same appropriate type) there is a certain invariant
schema that sharply limits such possible choices. This schema not simply allows for making some
6Although the choice of letters in Euclid’s notation is arbitrary the system of this notation is not. This
traditional geometrical notation has a relatively stable and rather sophisticated syntax, which I briefly describe
in what follows.
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arbitrary choices but requires every possible choice in the given reasoning to be wholly arbitrary.
This requirement is tantamount to saying that subjective reasons behind choices made by an
individual mathematician for presenting a given mathematical argument are strictly irrelevant
to the “argument itself” (in spite of the fact that the argument cannot be formulated without
making such choices). In general talks in natural languages there is no similar sharp distinction
between arbitrary and invariant elements . When I write this paper I can certainly change some
wordings without changing the sense of my argument but I am not in a position to describe
precisely the scope of such possible changes and identify the intended “sense” of my argument
with a mathematical rigor. This is because my present study is philosophical and historical but
not purely mathematical.
Thus Euclid’s exposition serves for the formulation of a given universal proposition in terms,
which are suitable for a particular act of mathematical cognition made by an individual mathe-
matician. This aspect of the exposition is not accounted for by the modern notion of universal
instantiation. It may be argued that this aspect of the exposition needs not be addressed in
a logical analysis of Euclid’s mathematics that aims at explication of the objective meaning of
Euclid’s reasoning and may well leave aside cognitive aspects of this reasoning. I agree that this
latter issue lies out of the scope of logical analysis in the usual sense of the term but I disagree
that the objective meaning of Euclid’s reasoning can be properly understood without addressing
this issue. Euclid’s mathematical reasoning is objective due to a mechanism that allows one to
make universally valid inferences through one’s individual thinking. Whatever the “objective
meaning” might consist of this mechanism must be taken into account.
1.4 Proto-Logical Deduction and Geometrical Production
Remind that the proof of Euclid’s Theorem 1.5 uses not only premiss Hyp assumed “by hy-
pothesis” but also premisses Con 1-3 (as well as a number of other premisses of the same type)
assumed “by construction”. I turn now to the question about the role of Euclid’s constructions
(which, but the way, are ubiquitous not only in geometrical but also in arithmetical Books of the
Elements) and more specifically consider the question how these constructions support certain
premisses that are used in following proofs.
As it is well-known Euclid’s geometrical constructions are supposed to be realized “by ruler and
compass”. In the Elements this condition is expressed in the Elements through the following
three
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Postulates:
1. Let it have been postulated to draw a straight-line from any point to any point.
2. And to produce a finite straight-line continuously in a straight-line.
3. And to draw a circle with any center and radius.
(I leave out of my present discussion two further Euclid’s Postulates including the controversial
Fifth Postulate.)
Before I consider popular interpretations of these Postulates and suggest my own interpretation
let me briefly discuss the very term “postulate”, which is traditionally used in English translations
of Euclid’s Elements. Fitzpatrick translates Euclid’s verb “aitein” by English verb “to postulate”
following the long tradition of Latin translations, where this Greek verb is translated by Latin
verb “postulare”. However according to today’s standard dictionaries the modern English verb
“to postulate” does not translate the Greek verb “aitein” and the the Latin verb “postulare”
in general contexts: the modern dictionaries translate these verbs into “to demand” or “to ask
for”. This clearly shows that the meaning of the English verb “to postulate” that derives from
Latin “postulare” changed during its lifetime7.
Aristotle describes a postulate (aitema) as what “is assumed when the learner either has no
opinion on the subject or is of a contrary opinion” (An. Post. 76b); further he draws a contrast
between postulates and hypotheses saying that the latter appear more plausible to the learner
than the former (ibid.). It is unnecessary for my present purpose to go any further into this
semantical analysis trying to reconstruct an epistemic attitude that Euclid might have in mind
“demanding” the reader to take his Postulates for granted. The purpose of the above philological
remark is rather to warn the reader that the modern meaning of the English word “postulate”
can easily mislead when one tries to interpret Euclid’s Postulates adequately. So I suggest to
read Euclid’s Postulates as they stand and try to reconstruct their meaning from their context
forgetting for a while what one has learned about the meaning of the term “postulate” from
modern sources.
Euclid’s Postulates are usually interpreted as propositions of a certain type and on this basis
are qualified as axioms in the modern sense of the term. There are at least two different ways
7I reproduce here Fitzpatrick’s footnote about Euclid’s expression “let it be postulated”:
The Greek present perfect tense indicates a past action with present significance. Hence, the 3rd-
person present perfect imperative Hitesthw could be translated as “let it be postulated”, in the
sense “let it stand as postulated”, but not “let the postulate be now brought forward”. The literal
translation “let it have been postulated” sounds awkward in English, but more accurately captures
the meaning of the Greek.
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of rendering Postulates in a propositional form. I shall demonstrate them at the example of
Postulate 1. This Postulate can be interpreted either as the following modal proposition:
(PM1): given two different points it is always possible to drawing a (segment of) straight-line
between these points
or as the following existential proposition:
(PE1): for any two different points there exists a (segment of) straight-line lying between these
points.
Propositional interpretations of Euclid’s Postulates allow one to present Euclid’s geometry as
an axiomatic theory in the modern sense of the word and, more specifically, to present Euclid’s
geometrical constructions as parts of proofs of his theorems. Even before the modern notion
of axiomatic theory was strictly defined in formal terms many translators and commentators
of Euclid’s Elements tended to think about his theory in this way and interpreted Euclid’s
Postulates in the modal sense. Later a number of authors ([114], [122]) proposed different formal
reconstructions of Euclid’s geometry based on the existential reading of Postulates. According
to Hintikka and Remes
[R]eliance on auxiliary construction does not take us outside the axiomatic framework
of geometry. Auxiliary constructions are in fact little more than ancient counterparts
to applications of modern instantiation rules. [115], p. 270
The instantiation rules work in this context as follows. First, through the universal instantiation
(which under this reading correspond to Euclid’s exposition and specification) one gets some
propositions like Hyp about certain particular objects (individuals) like AB and AC. Then
one uses Postulates 1-3 reading them as existential axioms according to which the existence of
certain geometrical objects implies the existence of certain further geometrical objects, and so
proves the (hypothetical) existence of such further objects of interest. Finally one uses another
instantiation rule called the rule of existential instantiation:
∃xP (x) =⇒ P (a)
and thus “gets” these new objects. Under this interpretation Euclid’s constructions turn into
logical inferences of sort. As Hintikka and Remes emphasize in their paper the principal dis-
tinctive feature of Euclid’s constructions (under their interpretation) is that these constructions
introduce some new individuals; they call such individuals “new” in the sense that these indi-
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viduals are not (and cannot be) introduced through the universal instantiation of hypotheses
making part the enunciation of the given theorem.
The propositional interpretations of Euclid’s Postulates are illuminating because they allow for
analyzing traditional geometrical constructions in modern logical terms. However they require a
paraphrasing of Euclid’s wording, which from a logical point of view is far from being innocent.
In order to see this let us leave aside the epistemic attitude expressed by the verb “postulate”
and focus on the question of what Euclid postulates in his Postulates 1-3. Literally, he postulates
the following:
P1: to draw a straight-line from any point to any point.
P2: to produce a finite straight-line continuously in a straight-line.
P3: to draw a circle with any center and radius.
As they stand expressions P1-3 don’t qualify as propositions; they rather describe certain opera-
tions! And making up a proposition from something which is not a proposition is not a innocent
step. My following analysis is based on the idea that Postulates are not primitive truths from
which one may derive some further truths but are primitive operations that can be combined
with each other and so produce into some further operations. In order to make my reading clear
I paraphrase P1-3 as follows:
(OP1): drawing a (segment of) straight-line between its given endpoints
(OP2): continuing a segment of given straight-line indefinitely (“in a straight-line)”
(OP3): drawing a circle by given radius (a segment of straight-line) and center (which
is supposed to be one of the two endpoints of the given radius).
Noticeably none of OP1-3 allows for producing geometrical constructions out of nothing; each
of these fundamental operation produces a geometrical object out of some other objects, which
are supposed to be given in advance. The table below specifies inputs (operands) and outputs
(results) of OP1-3:
operation input output
OP1 two (different) points straight segment
OP2 straight segment (bigger) straight segment
OP3 straight segment and one of its endpoints circle
PE1 as it stands does not imply that there exists at least one point or at least one line in Euclid’s
geometrical universe. If there are no points then there are no lines either. Similar remarks can
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be made about the existential interpretation of other Euclid’s Postulates. Thus the existential
interpretation of Postulates by itself does not turn these Postulates into existential axioms that
guarantee that Euclid’s universe is non-empty and contains all geometrical objects constructible
by ruler and compass. To meet this purpose one also needs to postulate the existence of at least
two different points - and then argue that the absence of any counterpart of such an axiom in
Euclid is due to Euclid’s logical incompetence. My proposed interpretation of Postulates 1-3 as
operations doesn’t require such ad hoc stipulations and thus is more faithful not only to Euclid’s
text but also to a deeper structure of his reasoning 8.
Hintikka and Remes describe Euclid’s geometrical constructions as auxiliary. Such a description
may be adequate to the role of geometrical constructions in today’s practice of teaching the
elementary geometry but not to the role of constructions in Euclid’s Elements. Remind that
Euclid’s so-called Propositions are of two types: some of them are Theorems while some other
are Problems (see again the above quotation from Proclus’ Commentary ). In the Elements
Problems are at least as important as Theorems and arguably even more important: in fact the
Elements begin and end with a Problem but not with a Theorem. As we shall now see when
a given construction makes part of a problem rather than a theorem it cannot be described as
auxiliary in any appropriate sense. We shall also see the modern title “proposition” is not really
appropriate when we talk about Euclid’s Problems: while enunciations of Theorems do qualify
as propositions in the modern logical sense of the term enunciations of Problems do not.
I shall demonstrate these features at the well known example of Problem 1.1 that opens Euclid’s
Elements; my notational conventions remain the same as in the example of Theorem 1.5.
[enunciation:]
To construct an equilateral triangle on a given finite straight-line.
[exposition:]
Let AB be the given finite straight-line.
8Remind that the concepts of infinite straight line and infinite half-line (ray) are absent from Euclid’s geometry;
thus the result of OP2 is always a finite straight segment. However the result of OP2 is obviously not fully
determined by its single operand. This shows that OP2 doesn’t really fit the today’s usual notion of algebraic
operation.
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Fig. 1.2
[specification:]
So it is required to construct an equilateral triangle on the straight-line AB.
[construction:]
Let the circle BCD with center A and radius AB have been drawn [Post. 3], and
again let the circle ACE with center B and radius BA have been drawn [Post. 3].
And let the straight-lines CA and CB have been joined from the point C, where the
circles cut one another, to the points A and B [Post. 1].
[proof :]
And since the point A is the center of the circle CDB, AC is equal to AB [Def.
1.15]. Again, since the point B is the center of the circle CAE, BC is equal to BA
[Def. 1.15]. But CA was also shown (to be) equal to AB. Thus, CA and CB are
each equal to AB. But things equal to the same thing are also equal to one another
[Axiom 1]. Thus, CA is also equal to CB. Thus, the three (straight-lines) CA, AB,
and BC are equal to one another.
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[conclusion:]
Thus, the triangle ABC is equilateral, and has been constructed on the given finite
straight-line AB. (Which is) the very thing it was required to do.
As one can see at this example enunciations of Problems are expressed in the same grammatical
form as Postulates 1-3, namely in the form of infinitive verbal expressions. I read these expressions
in the same straightforward way, in which I read Postulates: as descriptions of certain geometrical
operations. The obvious difference between (enunciations of) Problems and Postulates is this:
while Postulates introduce basic operations taken for granted (drawing by ruler and compass)
Problems describe complex operations, which in the last analysis reduce to these basic operations.
Such reduction is made through a construction of a given Problem: it performs the complex
operation described in the enunciation of the problem through combining basic operations OP1-
3 (and possibly some earlier performed complex operations). The procedure that allows for
performing complex operations by combining a small number of repeatable basic operations
I shall call a geometrical production. In Problem 1.1 the construction of regular triangle is
(geometrically) produced from drawing the straight-line between two given points (Postulate 1)
and drawing a circle by given center and radius (Postulate 3). This is, of course, just another way
of saying that the regular triangle is constructed by ruler and compass; the unusual terminology
helps me to describe Euclid’s geometrical constructions more precisely.
Let us see in more detail how works Euclid’s geometrical production. Basic operations OP1-3
like other (complex) operations need to be performed : in order to produce an output they have
to be fed by some input. This input is provided through the exposition of the given Problem
(the straight line AB in the above example). OP1-3 are composed in the usual way well-known
from today’s algebra: outputs of earlier performed operations are used as inputs for further
operations9.
Just like Postulates 1-3 enunciations of Problems can be read as modal or existential propositions
(in the modern logical sense of the term). Then the (modified) enunciation of Problem 1.1
reads:
(1.1.M) it is possible to construct a regular triangle on a given finite straight-line:
9Problem 1.1 involves a difficulty that has been widely discussed in the literature: Euclid does not provide any
principle that may allow him to construct a point of intersection of the two circles involved into the construction
of this Problem. This flaw is usually described as a logical flow. In my view it is more appropriate to describe
this flow as properlygeometrical and fill the gap in the reasoning by the following additional postulate (rather
than an additional axiom):
Let it have been postulated to produce a point of intersection of two circles with a common radius.
Even if this additional postulates is introduced here purely ad hoc, the way in which it is introduced gives an
idea of how Euclid’s Postulates could emerge in the real history.
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or
(1.1.E) for all finite straight-line there exists a regular triangle on this line.
As soon as the enunciations of Euclid’s Problems are rendered into the propositional form the
Problems turn into theorems of a special sort. In the case of existential interpretation Problems
turn into existential theorems that state (under certain hypotheses) that there exist certain
objects having certain desired properties. However this is not what we find in Euclid’s text as
it stands. Every Euclid’s Problem ends with the formula “the very thing it was required to
do”, not “to show” or “to prove”. I can see no evidence in the Elements that justifies the idea
that in Euclid’s mathematics doing is less significant than showing and that the former is in
some sense reducible to the latter. In the Second Part of this paper I shall argue that doing
remains as much important in today’s mathematics as it was in Greek mathematics, and that
the idea of reducing mathematics to showing or proving (in the precise sense of modern logic) is
a unfortunate philosophical misconception.
According to another popular reading Euclid’s Problems are tasks or questions of sort. This
version of modal propositional interpretation of Euclid’s Problems involves a deontic modality
rather than a possibility modality:
(1.1.D) it is required to construct a regular triangle on a given finite straight-line:
Indeed geometrical problems similar to Euclid’s Problems can be found in today’s Elementary
Geometry textbooks as exercises. However the analogy between Euclid’s Problems and school
problems on construction by ruler and compass is not quite precise. Enunciations of Euclid’s
Problems just like the enunciations of Euclid’s Theorems prima facie express no modality what-
soever. A deontic expression appears only in the exposition of the given Problem (“it is required
to construct an equilateral triangle on the straight-line AB”). I don’t think that this fact justifies
the deontic reading of the enunciation because, as I have already explained above, the exposi-
tion describes reasoning of an individual mathematician rather than presents this reasoning in
an objective form. That every complex construction must be performed through Postulates and
earlier performed constructions is an epistemic requirement, which is on par with the requirement
according to which every theorem must be proved rather than simply stated. Remind that the
expositions of Euclid’s Theorems have the form “I say that...”. This indeed makes an apparent
contrast with the expositions of Problems that have the form “it is required to ....”. However
this contrast doesn’t seem me to be really sharp. Euclid’s expression “I say that...” in the given
context is interchangeable with the expression “it is required to show that...”, which matches
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the closing formula of Theorems “(this is) the very thing it was required to show”. Euclid’s
expression “it is required to...” that he uses in the expositions of Problems similarly matches the
closing formula of Problems “(this is) the very thing it was required to do”. The requirement
according to which every Theorem must be “shown” or “monstrated” doesn’t imply, of course,
that the enunciation (statement) of this Theorem has a deontic meaning. The requirement ac-
cording to which every Problem must be “done” doesn’t imply either that the enunciation of
this Problem has something to do with deontic modalities.
The analogy between axioms and theorems, on the one hand, and postulates and problems, on the
other hand, may suggest that Euclid’s geometry splits into two independent parts one of which
is ruled by (proto)logical deduction while the other is ruled by geometrical production. However
this doesn’t happen and in fact problems and theorems turn to be mutually dependent elements of
the same theory. The above example of Problem 1.1 and Theorem 1.5 show how the intertwining
of problems and theorems works. Theorems, generally, involve constructions (called in this case
auxiliary), which may depend (in the order of geometrical production) on earlier treated problems
(as the construction of Theorem 1.5 depends on Problem 1.3.) Problems in their turn always
involve appropriate proofs that prove that the construction of the given theorem indeed performs
the operation described in the enunciation of this theorem (rather than performs some other
operation). Such proofs, generally, depend (in the order of the protological deduction) on certain
earlier treated theorems (just like in the case of proofs of theorems). Although this mechanism
linking problems with theorems may look unproblematic it gives rise to the following puzzle.
Geometrical production produces geometrical objects from some other objects. Protological
deduction deduces certain propositions from some other propositions. How it then may happen
that the geometrical production has an impact on the protological deduction? In particular, how
the geometrical production may justify premises assumed “by construction”, so these premises
are used in following proofs?
In order to answer this question let’s come back to the premise Con3 (AF = AG) from Theorem
1.5 and see what if anything makes it true. AF = AG because Euclid or anybody else following
Euclid’s instructions constructs this pair of straight segments in this way. How do we know
that by following these instructions one indeed gets the desired result? This is because the
construction of Problem 1.3 that contains the appropriate instruction is followed by a proof
that proves that this construction does exactly what it is required to do. Construction 1.3 in
its turn uses construction 1.2 while construction 1.2 uses construction 1.1 quoted above. In
other words construction 1.1 (geometrically) produces construction 1.2 and construction 1.2 in
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its turn produces construction 1.3. This geometrical production produces the relevant part of
construction 1.5 (the construction of equal straight segments AF and AG) from first principles,
namely from Postulates 1-3. In order to get the corresponding protological deduction of premise
Con3 from first principles we should now look at proofs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 and then combine these
three proofs into a single chain. For economizing space I leave now details to reader and only
report what we get in the end. The result is somewhat surprising from the point of view of
the modern logical analysis. The chain of constructions leading to construction 1.5 involves a
number of circles (through Postulate 3). Radii of a given circle are equal by definition (Definition
1.15). Thus by constructing a circle and its two radii, say, X and Y one gets a primitive (not
supposed to be proved) premise X = Y . Having at hand a number of premises of this form and
using Axioms as inference rules (but not as premises!) one gets the desired deduction of Con3.
The fact that first principles of the protological deduction of Con3 appear to be partly provided
by a definition helps to explain why Euclid places his definitions among other first principles
such as postulates and axioms.
The above analysis allows for disentangling the protological deduction of Con3 from the ge-
ometrical production of straight segments AF , AG and so the aforementioned puzzle remains
even after we have looked at Euclid’s reasoning under a microscope. Even if we can describe in
detail the impact of Problems to Theorems and vice versa it remains unclear how the two kind of
things can possibly work together. Here is my tentative answer to this question. Every Euclid’s
proof involves only concrete premises like Con3 and Hyp, which are related to certain individual
objects. It is assumed that such a premise is valid only if the corresponding object is effectively
constructed. (At least this concerns all premises “by construction”; as we have seen at the ex-
ample of Theorem 1.5 hypothetic premises sometimes don’t respect this rule.) This fundamental
principle links Euclid’s geometrical production and protological deduction together.
One may argue that my proposed analysis after all is not significantly different from the stan-
dard logical analysis of Euclid’s geometrical reasoning according to which Euclid first proves
that certain geometrical objects exist and only then prove some further propositions concerning
properties of these objects. Is there indeed any significant difference between proving that such-
and-such object exist and producing this object through what I call the geometrical production?
There is of course a difference of a metaphysical sort between these two notions: to produce
an object is not quite the same thing as to prove that certain object exists. But arguably this
difference has no objective significance and so one may simply ignore it. There is however a
further difference between the geometrical production and the mathematical existence, which
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seems me more important. Euclid’s Elements contain two sets of rules, namely axioms and pos-
tulates, supposed to be applied to operations of two different sorts: axioms tell us how to derive
equalities from other equalities while postulates tell us how to produce geometrical objects from
other geometrical objects. A logical analysis of Euclid’s geometry that involves a propositional
(in particular existential) reading of postulates aims at replacing these two sets of rules by a
single set of rules called logical. I would like to stress again that the results my proposed analysis
do not exclude the possibility of logical analysis. Such a replacement may be or be not a good
idea but in any event logical rules are not made in the Euclid’s text explicit and I do not see
much point in saying that he uses rules of this sort implicitly. The fact that we can use today
modern logic for interpreting Euclid is a completely different issue. An interpretation of Euclid’s
geometry by means of logical analysis can be indeed illuminating but one should not confuse
oneself by believing that Euclid already had a grasp of modern logic even if could not formulate
principles of this logic explicitly.
For further references I shall call the 6-part structure of Euclid’s problems and theorems Euclidean
structure. As the above analysis makes it clear the Euclidean structure does not fit into Hilbert’s
notion of axiomatic theory even when this latter notion is formulated in very general terms as in
the above quotes. While Hilbert and his modern followers assume that a mathematical theory is
a set of truths, some of which are assumed as axioms and some other are logically inferred from
axioms, Euclid builds his theory through a combination of two different procedures, which I call
protological deduction and geometrical production. Precipitating what follows I would like to
mention here that Hilbert’s view on mathematical theory (which is presented more accurately in
the next Chapter) is not unique in the 20th century. An influential alternative view has been put
forward by Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer; a relevant part of this alternative view is formulated
by Brouwer’s student Heyting as follows:
One of Brouwer’s main theses was that mathematics is not based on logic, but that
logic is based on mathematics. [..] If mathematics consists of mental constructions,
then every mathematical theorem is the expression of a result of a successful con-
struction. The proof of the theorem consists in this construction itself, and the steps
of the proof are the same as the steps of the mathematical construction. These are
intuitively clear mental acts, and not applications of logical laws. (quoted by [222],
p. 237)
This general description prima facie better fits Euclid’s procedures than the modern axiomatic
approach. The problem is that this description does not by itself provide us with an alternative
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general method of building mathematical theories. I postpone the discussion on this matter until
2.2 and conclude the present Chapter with a observation concerning the relevance of Euclid’s
way of theory-building to today’s mathematical practice.
1.5 Euclid and Modern Mathematics
What has been said above may give one an impression that in Euclid’s Elements we deal with
an archaic pattern of mathematical thinking that has noting to do with today’s mathematics.
However this impression is wrong. In fact the Euclidean structure is apparently present in today’s
mathematics, perhaps in a slightly modified form. Consider the following example taken from a
standard mathematical textbook ([136], p. 100, my translation into English):
Theorem 3:
Any closed subset of a compact space is compact
Proof:
Let F be a closed subset of compact space T and {Fα} be an arbitrary centered
system of closed subsets of subspace F ⊂ T . Then every Fα is also closed in T , and
hence {Fα} is a centered system of closed sets in T . Therefore ∩Fα 6= ∅. By Theorem
1 it follows that F is compact.
Although the above theorem is presented in the usual for today’s mathematics form “proposition-
proof”, its Euclidean structure can be made explicit without re-interpretations and paraphras-
ing:
[enunciation:]
Any closed subset of a compact space is compact
[exposition:]
Let F be a closed subset of compact space T
[specification: absent]
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[construction:]
[Let] {Fα} [be] an arbitrary centered system of closed subsets of subspace F ⊂ T .
[proof :]
[E]very Fα is also closed in T , and hence {Fα} is a centered system of closed sets in
T . Therefore ∩Fα 6= ∅. By Theorem 1 it follows that F is compact.
[conclusion: absent ] The absent specification can be formulated as follows:
I say that F is a compact space
while the absent conclusion is supposed to be a literal repetition of the enunciation of this
theorem. Clearly these latter elements can be dropped for parsimony reason. In order to better
separate the construction and the proof of the above theorem the authors could first construct set
∩Fα and only then prove that it is non-empty. However this variation of the classical Euclidean
scheme also seems me negligible. I propose the reader to check it at other modern examples that
the Euclidean structure remains today at work.
Does this mean that the modern notion of axiomatic theory is inadequate to today’s mathematical
practice just like it is inadequate to Euclid’s mathematics? Such a conclusion would be too hasty.
Arguably, in spite of the fact that today’s mathematics preserves some traditional outlook it is
essentially different. So the “Euclidean appearance” of today’s mathematics cannot be a sufficient
evidence for the claim the the Euclidean structure remains significant in it. In order to justify
this claim a different argument is needed.
Before I try to provide such an argument I would like to point to the fact that the modern
notion of axiomatic theory is used in today’s mathematics in two rather different ways. First, it
is used as a broad methodological idea that determines the general architecture of a theory but
has no impact on details. Such an application of the modern axiomatic method is usually called
informal. Second, the notion of axiomatic theory is used for building formal theories that contain
a list of axioms and a set of theorems derived from these axioms according to explicitly specified
rules of logical inference. In the next Chapter I shall describe the notion of formal axiomatic
theory more precisely and try to explain the precise sense in which it is called formal.
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Chapter 2
Hilbert: Making It Formal
In the standard textbooks Hilbert’s philosophy of mathematics is commonly labelled formalism
and under this title distinguished from Brouwer’s intuitionism, on the one hand, and Russell’s
logicism, on the other hand. However, as Hintikka [112] rightly remarks, this popular name is
very misleading. There are difficulties of two sorts. First of all, Hilbert’s work in foundations of
mathematics was a long-term project that began in 1890-ies and continued more than 40 years.
Although Hilbert unlike Russell never abruptly changed his mind about foundational matters
the development of Hilbert’s project involved significant shifts in its philosophical underpinning.
When one takes this into consideration it becomes impossible to identify Hilbert’s views with any
particular “ism”. Second of all, the meaning of being formal is also changing: Hilbert and his
contemporaries often use this term not in the same sense in which we use it today, and even today
this term is often used in different ways in the mathematical and the philosophical communities.
The two difficulties are mutually related because Hilbert’s work in foundations strongly affected
the changing meaning of being formal.
I shall not treat here the history of Hilbert’s research in foundations systematically1 but try to
reconstruct the core dialectics of Hilbert’s ideas, which is crucial for my analysis of today’s state
of affairs given in the next Chapter. I shall refer in this present Chapter to three Hilbert’s texts:
first, Foundations of Geometry of 1899 [109], second, his address Axiomatic Thought of 1917 [101]
and, finally, his paper Foundations of Mathematics of 1927 [100], which makes explicit the philo-
sophical background behind the monumental two-volume work [106] co-authored with Bernays
and published in 1934-1939 under the same title. We shall see that although the Axiomatic
Method as presented in Foundations of Geometry of 1899 and in Foundations of Mathematics in
1For the question of historical origins of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method see [236] and [37]
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both cases qualifies as (or at least is commonly called by Hilbert’s contemporaries) formal, the
sense of being formal is not the same in the two cases.
2.1 Foundations of 1899: Logical Form and Mathematical
Intuition
In the last Section I stressed Hilbert’s assumption according to which the deduction of mathe-
matical theorems from axioms is purely logical and then argued that the geometrical theory of
Euclid’s Elements prima facie falsifies this assumption. However this assumption is not specific
for Hilbert’s approach. Frege, who sharply criticizes Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 on a differ-
ent ground (that I shortly explain), wholly agrees with Hilbert on this general point. A major
difference between Frege’s and (early) Hilbert’s versions of the Axiomatic Method, which led to
a controversy between the two thinkers [64], was the following. Frege assumes as a matter of
course that all terms involved into axioms and theorems of a given theory are meaningful and
that their meanings are specified in advance and rigidly fixed once and for all (at least within the
given theory). Hilbert in his turn allows certain terms of a given to change their meanings and
be considered without any fixed meaning at all. A theory of this latter sort Frege and some other
Hilbert’s contemporaries call formal. For a mathematically educated reader (let alone logician)
this “informal” notion of formal theory is, of course, very familiar. Nevertheless for my purpose
it is useful to present it here in an explicit form. Then I shall explain the sense in which Frege
et al. call such a theory formal.
The first paragraph of the Foundations of 1899 reads:
Let us consider three distinct systems of things. The things composing the first
system, we will call points and designate them by the letters A, B, C,. . . ; those
of the second, we will call straight lines and designate them by the letters a, b,
c,..; and those of the third system, we will call planes and designate them by the
Greek letters α, β, γ . [..] We think of these points, straight lines, and planes as
having certain mutual relations, which we indicate by means of such words as “are
situated”, “between”; “parallel”, “congruent”, “continuous”, etc. The complete and
exact description of these relations follows as a consequence of the axioms of geometry.
These axioms [..] express certain related fundamental facts of our intuition.
The idea is this. The purpose of foundations of geometry is to develop geometry ab ovo. This
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means that “fundamental facts of our [geometrical] intuition” cannot be here tacitly taken for
granted (as this is done in non-foundational geometrical studies) but must be explicitly described
and postulated. The proposed method of describing these facts is the following. First, one iden-
tifies a list of types of objects, which are primitive in the sense that they are not defined in
terms of some other (types of) objects; they are introduced without any definition. Second, one
identifies a list of primitive relations between primitive objects; these primitive relations are also
introduced without definitions. Finally, one makes up a list of axioms, i.e., propositions, which
involve only primitive objects and primitive relations between these objects. Every consequence
of these axioms qualifies as a geometrical theorem. (I shall specify a relevant notion of conse-
quence in what follows; we shall see that there are in fact two different notions of consequence,
which are here in play.)
Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method does not assume that primitive objects and primitive relations
are given through the usual linguistic meanings of words “point”, “between”, etc. Primitive
objects are assumed instead to be bare “things” (possibly of several different types), which are
called points, straight lines and the like by a merely linguistic convention having no theoretical
significance. Primitive relations are treated similarly. Thus Hilbert’s list of types of primitive
objects and of primitive relations given in the above quote does not say us anything except
that the given axiomatic theory involves three different types of primitive objects and several
different relations between these objects. All the relevant information about these objects and
these relations is supposed to be captured by axioms, which specify certain facts about these
objects and these relations without using any assumption as to what are these objects and these
relations.
To see how it works consider the First Axiom of Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899:
(A1.0) Two distinct points A and B always completely determine a straight line a
(op.cit., p.2).
and remind that words “points” and “straight line” should not be read here in the usual sense.
Notice also a relation between the points and the line, which is expressed by saying that the
points determine the line; there is more than one way to translate this expression in terms of
relations but Hilbert uses here the binary relation of incidence between a given straight line and
a given point, which can be also informally expressed by saying that the given point lies at the
given straight line (or equivalently by saying that the given straight line goes through the given
point). This semantic hygiene leaves us with the following formal reading of A1.0
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(A1.1) Given two different primitive objects A,B of basic type P (“points”) there
exist a unique primitive object a of another basic type L (“straight lines”), such that
each of A,B and a hold a primitive relation R (“incidence”).
Although A1.1 may seem to be not very informative it presents what Hilbert’s First Axiom “really
says” more accurately than A1.0. The idea of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method is that a system of
propositions like A1.1 provided with an appropriate system of logic may completely determine (in
a sense that I try to clarify further in what follows) what the Euclidean (or some other) geometry
“really is”. The same method of theory-building is supposed to apply in various domains of the
theoretical inquiry both within and outside the pure mathematics. Whatever is the domain
of application of the Axiomatic Method the axioms always involve only abstract objects and
abstract relations. What is specific for Euclidean geometry from Hilbert’s axiomatic viewpoint
is the list of its axioms rather than any particular subject-matter like space or extension.
Suppose a non-experienced reader looks at A1.1 and asks what this proposition has to do with
the Euclidean geometry. An appropriate explanation can be given by translation A1.1 back to
A1.0 followed by the “naive” reading of A1.0, which turns it into a proposition similar to Euclid’s
First Postulate. This naive reading of A1.0 refers to a “fundamental fact of our intuition”, which,
by Hilbert’s word, this axiom “expresses”. However in the given context this “fundamental
fact of intuition” does not ground the corresponding axiom A1.0 but merely motivates it. We
shall shortly see, however, that in a different version of his Axiomatic Method presented in the
Foundations of 1927 [100] Hilbert grants a fundamental role to the geometrical intuition of a
special sort.
How a proposition like A1.1 may qualify as an axiom? In his letter to Frege Hilbert says:
[A]s soon as I posited an axiom it will exist and be “true”. [..] If the arbitrarily
posited axioms together with all their consequences do not contradict each other,
then they are true and the things defined by these axioms exist. For me, this is the
criterion of truth and existence. ([64], p. 12)
Some comments are here in order.
(1) Unlike Frege, Hilbert does not think about mathematical axioms as self-evident truths. In
the above quote Hilbert speaks of axioms as sheer stipulations, which are “true” in virtue of the
fact that they are posited by someone. The only rule restricting the positing of new axioms is the
rule according to which each axiom must be self-consistent and any set of such axioms (belonging
to the same theory) may contain only mutually consistent axioms. As Hilbert puts this in the
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above passage “If the arbitrarily posited axioms [..] do not contradict each other, then they
are true”. One may remark (as did Frege) that given a set of true propositions it is impossible
to infer from them a contradiction anyway. However this observation does not make Hilbert’s
rule redundant because being true does not have its usual meaning. Since being true reduces to
being stipulated the question Which stipulations are allowed and which are not? must be treated
independently. Thus the consistency condition must be checked before “axioms become true”, i.e.
before one stipulates that a given set of expressions represents a set of mathematical truths. Such
a checking requires a special notion of consistency, which applies to linguistic expressions having
no definite truth-values. At the time of writing his letter to Frege Hilbert did not formulate yet
the appropriate notion of consistency rigorously; we shall shortly see how he tried to solve this
problem afterwards.
(2) Notice the peculiar form of Hilbert’s axioms, which involves terms with variable meaning. An
expression of this form turns into a proposition only when the meaning of all its terms becomes
determined. So in order to stipulate that a set of axiom-like expressions represents a set of
axioms, Hilbert needs to assume that there exist “things defined by these axioms”, which (a)
make all terms in these axioms meaningful and (b) which make these axioms true. In the above
quote Hilbert states that the existence of such things is always granted when the corresponding
set of axioms is consistent. (“If the arbitrarily posited axioms [..] do not contradict each other,
then [..] the things defined by these axioms exist”.) Notice that the existence of these things has
no other prerequisites except consistency. Whence there arise two mutually related questions:
What are the things “defined by axioms”? and How the axioms “define” them? Let me consider
these two questions in turn.
The former question has at least three different answers. The first general answer is this: given
an expression like A1.1, which bears on “bare things” and “bare relations” of multiple types
one instantiates these things and these relations in one’s mind and so get what Hilbert after
Kant calls objects of thought or thought-things (Gedankendinge in German), which are related by
corresponding thought-relations 2. These thought-things and thought-relations exist merely in
virtue of the fact that one thinks of them consistently. They may be or be not supported by some
sensual intuitions; the sensual intuition is a separate issue which must not be confused with the
capacity to instantiate objects and relations between objects as such. This latter capacity can be
also called intuition - not in the sense of Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetics but exclusively in the
sense of Kant’s Doctrine of Method [130]. Hintikka [112] quite rightly stresses the fundamental
2Compare with Orwell’s thoughtcrimes.
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role of this restricted notion of intuition in Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method. Even when we think of
mathematical objects as “bare things” without associating with these things anything over and
above the relations stipulated through axioms like A1.1 we think about these objects, by Kant’s
word, in concreto (which shows, by the way, that the usual characterization of such object as
abstract is somewhat misleading). The mathematical intuition in the relevant restricted sense of
the term is the capacity to think concretely about objects and relations between objects without
associating to these objects and these relations any additional qualities.
The second answer concerns the role of sensual intuition. Remind that in the introductory part
of his Foundations of 1899 Hilbert says that his geometrical axioms “express certain related
fundamental facts of our intuition”. Earlier in 1891 he made the following remark:
Geometry is the science that deals with the properties of space. [..] I can never
penetrate the properties of space by pure reflection, much as I can never recognize
the basic laws of mechanics, the law of gravitation or any other physical law in this
way. Space is not a product of my reflections. Rather, it is given to me through the
senses. (quoted after Corry [35], p. 44)
In 1894 Hilbert develops this view on geometry:
Among the appearances or facts of experience manifest to us in the observation of
nature, there is a peculiar type, namely, those facts concerning the outer shape of
things, Geometry deals with these facts [..]. Geometry is a science whose essentials
are developed to such a degree, that all its facts can already be logically deduced
from earlier ones. Much different is the case with the theory of electricity or with
optics, in which still many new facts are being discovered. Nevertheless, with regards
to its origins, geometry is a natural science (ib. p.45)
[A]ll other sciences-above all mechanics, but subsequently also optics, the theory of
electricity, etc.- should be treated according to the model set forth in geometry. (ib.
p.45)
What Hilbert says here about the empirical character of Geometry prima facie is not compatible
with his notion of Geometry as a free creation of mind expressed in his letter to Frege quoted
above. It is not impossible, of course, that during this period of time Hilbert had conflicting ideas
about the nature of Geometry and could contradict himself. However it seems me suggestive to
try to reconcile the two notions of Geometry. As a part of the pure mathematics Geometry is
treated as a free creation of mind; the fundamental question here is whether or not the given set of
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geometrical axioms is consistent while the question where those axioms come from is irrelevant.
As a natural science Geometry seeks to express properties of the physical space through an
appropriate set of axioms, then “logically deduce” from these axioms some further geometrical
propositions and finally check these deduced propositions against properties of the physical space.
So the two Geometries well fit together: the physical geometry takes care about choosing axioms
properly while the mathematical geometry takes care about the consistency of any proposed set
of geometrical axioms, about the deduction of new theorems from these axioms and some other
relevant problems. This epistemological model is applicable to all natural sciences; what makes
geometry “more mathematical” than say, the theory of electricity, is the fact that geometry easier
allows for an axiomatic treatment because its “essentials” are better developed.
So we may consider geometry in a larger sense, which combines the axiomatic mathematical
geometry, on the one hand, and the empirical physical geometry, on the other hand. Objects
of this combined geometry are no longer bare individuals but spatial physical bodies, light rays,
etc. Interestingly, the traditional notion according to which geometry presents properties of
the physical space in an idealized form is irrelevant to Hilbert’s axiomatic setting. Geometrical
objects are thought of here either as bare individuals detached from any sensual intuition or as
physical bodies as they are perceived by senses; Hilbert’s epistemic scheme, which we reconstruct
on the basis of the above passages, does not include any intermediate “ideal” element between
the axiomatic logical reasoning and the sensual perception. We shall see, however, that in his
later works Hilbert introduces such ideal elements (2.4).
The third answer to the question about Hilbert’s mathematical “things” and their existence
concerns the possibility of interpreting axioms of a given axiomatic theory in terms of another
mathematical theory. For example with the help of standard tools of Analytic Geometry A1.0 and
other Hilbert’s axioms translate into true propositions about real numbers. An interpretation M
that translates all axioms of a given axiomatic theory A into true propositions of another theory
T is called a model of A in T ; one says also that axioms of A are true in model M . Suppose we
know which proposition of T is true and which is false. This allows one to reverse the order of
ideas about A. Observe that in order to check whether or not axioms of A are true in M one
does not need to establish consistency of this set of axioms in advance. Moreover, if axioms of
A are true in M (i.e., if M is indeed a model of A) then one may conclude that A is consistent!
Remind Hilbert’s remark according to which any consistent set of propositions can be made by
a fiat into a system of axioms, which are true and meaningful. Now we proceed the other way
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round: we first check that our axioms are true and meaningful in some model 3 and on this basis
conclude that the given set of axioms is consistent. However this conclusion is not valid unless
T , which is the background theory of M , is consistent in its turn. So what the above argument
really proves is not the absolute but only the relative consistency of A, i.e., the proposition of
the form “if T is consistent then A is also consistent”.
From a mathematical point of view this third way of interpreting Hilbert-style axioms turns
to be the most productive. Already in his Foundations of 1899 Hilbert applies this method
systematically; in the course of 20th century this method develops into the modern model theory,
which remains today an active field of mathematical research still having some philosophical
flavor. I would like to stress here that interpreting a Hilbert-style axiomatic theory in terms
of another mathematical theory and interpreting such a theory in some intuitive terms directly
are two very different issues. Since both procedures go under the same title of “interpretation”
they are too often confused in the current debates. The idea that Hilbert’s axiomatic theory
of Euclidean geometry can be either interpreted “as usual”, i.e., by associating with the terms
“point”, “straight line”, “between”, etc. their “usual” intuitive meanings, or alternatively, be
interpreted arithmetically by identifying points with pairs of numbers, etc., is plainly misleading
because it puts under the same title of interpretation two procedures, which do not belong to
the same general type.
(3) Let us finally discuss Hibert’s view according to which axioms of a given mathematical
theory “define” objects of this theory. Since Hilbert’s axioms refer only to bare “things” and
bare relations and since, according to Hilbert, any consistent set of such axioms allows one to
produce a “system of things” S satisfying these axioms by a fiat (or more precisely by the very
fact that one forms consistent thoughts “about” certain things), such S can be thought of as the
“definiendum” of the axioms. One may ask however whether a given consistent set of axioms
defines the corresponding system S uniquely. Here is what Hilbert says about this in the same
letter to Frege:
You say that my concepts, e.g. “point”, “between”, are not unequivocally fixed
[..]. But surely it is self-evident that every theory is merely a framework or schema
of concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that basic
elements can be construed as one pleases. If I think of my points as some system or
other of things, e.g. the system of love, of law, or of chimney sweeps [..] and then
3By meaningfulness of a given axiom in a given model I mean the bare fact that this axiom translates into
a meaningful proposition. Saying that every axiom of a given theory is true and meaningful in a model of this
theory is, of coarse, pleonastic.
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conceive of all my axioms as relations between these things, then my theorems, e.g.
the Pythagorean one, will hold of these things as well. In other words, each and every
theory can always be applied to infinitely many systems of basic elements. For one
merely has to apply a univocal and invertible one-to-one transformation and stipulate
that the axioms for the transformed things be correspondingly similar. (cit. by [64],
p.13).
There are two important ideas in this passage. First Hilbert stresses here once again that in his
axiomatic setting primitive geometrical terms have no intrinsic meaning: any system of things
(i.e., model) satisfying Hilbert’s axioms counts as an Euclidean space. This point has been
already discussed earlier in this Chapter and I shall not return to it. Then follows this crucial
observation: given a model M of a given axiomatic theory one can always get another model
M ′ of the same theory through a one-to-one transformation of elements of M into elements
of the new model M ′ in such a way that relations between elements of M ′ also satisfy the
axioms of the given theory. In the modern language the kind of transformation described here
by Hilbert is called isomorphism. Apparently Hilbert thinks here about an axiomatic theory
that determines its models up to isomorphism, i.e., such that all its models are isomorphic,
i.e., are transformable into each other by some isomorphisms. Such theories are called today
categorical. (Beware that that sense of being categorical has nothing to do with the category
theory!) Isomorphic models can be seen as “equal” and representing the same structure, which
is invariant under transformations between these model. This leads to a philosophical view on
mathematics known as mathematical structuralism; according to this view structures are basic
mathematical objects. I consider the mathematical structuralism and its significance for the
Axiomatic Method in Chapter 8. The idea of the “replacement of equality by isomorphism” is
also discussed in Chapters 5, 6.
Precipitating this further discussion I would like only to stress here that not every Hilbert-style
axiomatic theory is categorical. In fact this is a rather strong property that most of useful
axiomatic theories do not enjoy. Apparently Hilbert didn’t see this problem before he first
published his Foundations in 1899; however in his lecture On the Concept of Number [103]
delivered in the same year 1899 and published in 1900 Hilbert already introduces an ”axiom of
completeness” (Vollstandigkeitsaxiom), which requires from any model of a given theory (this
time it was arithmetic) this maximal property: any model M of the given theory extended with
some new elements is no longer a model. Then he proves that among all models of his theory
(without the completeness axiom) there is only one model (up to isomorphism, of course!),
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which also satisfies the completeness axiom, see [36] p. 160 for details. The second edition of
Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry appeared in 1903 [98] already contains a geometrical axiom
of completeness.
Let me now return to the question about the sense of being formal. Frege and his contem-
poraries called Hilbert’s axioms for geometry formal extending the sense of being formal used
by Trendelenburg [237] when he made popular the expression “formal logic”. Formal logic in
Trendelenburg’s sense is by and large what Kant calls general logic as distinguished from his
transcendental logic: the formal or general logic takes into account only the form of reasoning
and is neutral with respect to its content (Kant’s transcendental logic is not wholly neutral with
respect to the content of reasoning because it takes into account the difference between objects
of possible experience and thought-objects of other sorts). The modern usual sense of “formal
logic” retains this older sense but does not reduce to it because it also includes the idea of
symbolic mathematical presentation of logical form, see 2.3 below. Although Hilbert’s axioms
are not logical tautologies that hold for all objects and all relations whatsoever, they represent
logical forms of propositions obtained through the usual contentual reading of the same axioms
and allow for alternative instantiations of this logical form (i.e., for alternative models). For ex-
ample, by reading words “point” and “straight line” in Hilbert’s First Axiom A.1.0 naively, i.e.,
by associating with these words their usual linguistic meanings, one gets an universal contentual
proposition about (all) points and (all) straight lines (in the relevant domain where this axiom
applies). However the intended meaning of this axiom expressed more explicitly in A1.1 specifies
only a property of abstract relation between abstract objects of two different types. This de-
scription is purely formal in the sense that it fixes no domain of objects and no concrete relation.
It specifies a specific form of relation between objects but specifies no particular relation and no
particular object and no particular type of objects.
Today we would qualify the theory of Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 as informal or semiformal
at best. This is because this theory is formulated in the natural German with the help of some
symbols like any typical introductory mathematical text. Today’s paradigmatic examples of
formal theories is given by axiomatic theories of sets and of arithmetic like ZF and PA. These
latter theories differ from the theory of Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 first of all by their symbolic
syntax. In 2.3 we shall see how the idea of using such a symbolic syntax combines with Hilbert’s
earlier approach described in this Section. We shall see that the symbolic approach involves
some epistemological ideas, which do not make part of the traditional notion of being formal
relevant to Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899. So being formal, semiformal and informal should not
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be thought of only as a matter of degree.
2.2 Foundations of 1899: Logicality and Logicism
Consider once again the Hilbert’s First Axiom A1.0
Any two distinct points of a straight line completely determine that line
and remind that certain words in this sentence including the words “points” and “straight line”,
are not supposed to be understood in their usual sense. Now remark that some other words
like “any” and “two” are supposed to be understood in the usual sense. Clearly this second
category of words plays in Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 an essential role: unless at least some
words in these axioms are meaningful the axioms reduce to an abracadabra! In the last Section
I elaborated on words of the former category, now let us look more attentively on words of the
latter category. First of all let us see how exactly words are sorted into two sorts here. Words
of the first sort refer to primitive geometrical concepts like point, straight line and between
(whether these primitive concepts are understood traditionally or in the sophisticated formal
way explained above). What about words of the second category?
In order to answer this question it is helpful to paraphrase A1.0 as follows:
If different points A,B belong to straight line a and to straight line b then a is
identical to b
Now leaving out geometrical words and expressions “points A,B”, “straight line a”, “straight
line b”, “belong to” we get this list: “if”, “different”, “and”, “then”, “is”, and “identical to”. So
the last paraphrase helps us to see that the words belonging to the second list stand for logical
notions.
How to distinguish between logical and non-logical terms more formally? There exist in the
literature two main approaches to defining the notion of logicality : one develops the idea of
logic being content-free (so that logical signs are understood as the “punctuation marks”) and
the other that describes itself as semantic develops the idea of logic being content-invariant
[19]. This later approach dates back to Tarski’s proposal [235] to identify logical notions with
invariants of all permutations of elements of some given set 4.
4Bonnay [19] formulates Tarski’s Thesis as follows: beginquote Given a set M , an operation QM acting on M
is logical iff it is invariant under all permutations endquote
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This latter approach obviously better squares with Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method; the idea here
is to make the fixity of meanings of logical terms and the variability of meanings of non-logical
terms into a formal criterion allowing one to distinguish between these two sorts of terms. Tarski
accounts for this fixity as invariance under permutations of elements of a given set of individuals
(which represents here a certain universe of discourse). This approach to logicality is motivated by
Klein’s Erlangen Program in geometry [134]; it establishes a conceptual link between Klein’s and
Hilbert’s works in foundations of geometry, which is both conceptually significant and historically
plausible. I discuss it in 8.3 below.
Now I would like only to stress Hilbert’s fundamental assumption behind his Axiomatic Method
(as presented in his Foundations of 1899) according to which logic is the ground layer foundation
of all theories built axiomatically. As Hintikka puts this, for Hilbert
The basic clarified form of mathematical theorizing is a purely logical axiom system.
([112], p.20)
This does not mean, of course, that Hilbert like Russell in [212] tries to reduce mathematics to
logic. This later version of logicism is certainly not Hilbert’s. In this book I shall use the term
“mathematical logicism” in a broader sense of epistemic primacy of logic over mathematics. In
this broader sense Hilbert’s view on mathematics qualifies is another version of logicism.
As I have already mentioned in 1.4 the idea of logic and metaphysics as a foundation of all science
dates back to Aristotle. This idea had apparently little or no influence on Greek mathematics
(that followed Euclid rather than Aristotle) but later became quite influential in the medieval
Scholasticism. The Early Modern mathematically-laden science that triumphed with Newton’s
Principia largely rejected the old scholastic pattern of theory-building and developed a very
different notion of scientific theory that was described in general terms by Kant in his Critique of
the Pure Reason. The Kantian philosophy of science and mathematics remained the mainstream
until the beginning of the 20th century when the old scholastic pattern of theory-building kicked
back under the new name of modern Axiomatic Method.
In Kant’s view the objectivity of pure mathematics (which underlies the objectivity of the
mathematically-laden empirical science) roots in its objecthood, i.e., in the universal schemata
according to which one constructs mathematical objects - but not just in the general character
of mathematical concepts. Making difference between the mathematical objectivity and the uni-
versal logical validity, according to Kant, is crucial for differentiating between the mathematical
reasoning and the philosophical speculation. Here is the famous passage:
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Give a philosopher the concept of triangle and let him try to find out in his way
how the sum of its angles might be related to a right angle. He has nothing but the
concept of figure enclosed by three straight lines, and in it the concept of equally
many angles. Now he may reflect on his concept as long as he wants, yet he will
never produce anything new. He can analyze and make distinct the concept of a
straight line, or of an angle, or of the number three, but he will not come upon any
other properties that do not already lie in these concepts. But now let the geometer
take up this question. He begins at once to construct a triangle. Since he knows that
two right angles together are exactly equal to all of the adjacent angles that can be
drawn at one point on a straight line, he extends one side of his triangle and obtains
two adjacent angles that together are equal to the two right ones. [..] In such a way
through a chain of inferences that is always guided by intuition, he arrives at a fully
illuminated and at the same time general solution of the question.” (Critique of Pure
Reason [130], A 716 / B 744)
Kant’s philosophy of mathematics and mathematically-laden science is based upon an analysis of
his best contemporary science as represented by Newton’s Principia [68]. This does not mean, of
course, that Kant derives his philosophical principles from the principles of Newtonian physics;
Kant’s critical philosophy rather aims at explaining how the type of knowledge best represented
by the Newtonian physics is possible (as an objectively valid knowledge). Anyway this method
of philosophical work makes Kant’s philosophy strongly dependent on the contemporary math-
ematics and science. Cohen, Natorp and other neo-Kantians who wished to sustain the Kantian
project of critical philosophy in the 19th century realized this fact very clearly and made efforts
to supply the Kantian philosophy with a historical dimension allowing one to keep track of the
progress in sciences and mathematics. [92]. It was not quite clear in the 19th century and it still
remains a matter of controversy today which (if any) features of Kant’s original approach remain
sustainable in the context of the current science and mathematics, and which features of this
original approach are hopelessly outdated. More radically one may wonder if there is anything
at all in Kant’s analysis that survives all the dramatic changes in science and pure mathematics
that have happened since Kant’s own time.
In spite of a number of interesting attempts of upgrading the Kantian philosophy of mathematics
in order to account for new mathematical developments (like the invention of non-Euclidean
geometries) at certain point the Kantian line in the philosophy of mathematics has been largely
abandoned. Bertrand Russell’s intellectual development is representative in this sense: after
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publishing in 1897 his Kantian Essay on Foundations of Geometry [210] and a short romance
with Hegel [120] Russell learns in 1900 about new works in mathematical logic, publishes during
the same year an essay on Leibniz [211], who now becomes the right philosophical ancestor, and
already in 1903 publishes the Principles of Mathematics [212] where the subject is developed
on new logicist grounds. In the Introduction to this book Russell explains his attitude to the
Kantian line of thought as follows:
It seemed plain that mathematics consists of deductions, and yet the orthodox ac-
counts of deduction were largely or wholly inapplicable to existing mathematics. Not
only the Aristotelian syllogistic theory, but also the modem doctrines of Symbolic
Logic, were either theoretically inadequate to mathematical reasoning, or at any rate
required such artificial forms of statement that they could not be practically applied.
In this fact lay the strength of the Kantian view, which asserted that mathematical
reasoning is not strictly formal, but always uses intuitions, i.e. the a priori knowledge
of space and time. Thanks to the progress of Symbolic Logic, especially as treated
by Professor Peano, this part of the Kantian philosophy is now capable of a final
and irrevocable refutation. By the help of ten principles of deduction and ten other
premisses of a general logical nature (e.g. implication is a relation”), all mathematics
can be strictly and formally deduced. [..]
The general doctrine that all mathematics is deduction by logical principles from
logical principles was strongly advocated by Leibniz... But owing partly to a faulty
logic, partly to belief in the logical necessity of Euclidean Geometry, he was led into
hopeless errors in the endeavour to carry out in detail a view which, in its general
outline, is now known to be correct. The actual propositions of Euclid, for example,
do not follow from the principles of logic alone ; and the perception of this fact led
Kant to his innovations in the theory of knowledge. But since the growth of non-
Euclidean Geometry, it has appeared that pure mathematics has no concern with
the question whether the axioms and propositions of Euclid hold of actual space or
not ..... What pure mathematics asserts is merely that the Euclidean propositions
follow from the Euclidean axioms, i.e., it asserts an implication. .... We assert always
in mathematics that if a certain assertion p is true of any entity x or of any set of
entities x, y, z..., then some other assertion q is true of those entities ; but we do not
assert either p or q separately of our entities.
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The above argument, which is supposed to refute Kant, obviously begs the question. From the
outset Russell takes it for granted that “mathematics consists of deductions” and his following
remarks make it clear that by deduction Russell means here a logical deduction, i.e. a deduction
of propositions from certain other propositions according to some general rules, which are not
specific for mathematics. This statement overtly contradicts what Kant says about mathematics,
and the following Russell’s argument only provides this first statement with some additional
details but does not constitute any philosophical objection to Kant. Kant’s own objection to the
Leibnizian view on mathematics, to which Russell adheres here, is this. From a formal point
of view (i.e. as far as only logical form of sentences is taken into consideration) mathematics
is no different from a mere metaphysical speculation; a speculative metaphysical theory can be
developed on an axiomatic basis just like any mathematical theory (think about Spinoza’s Ethics
for example). What makes the crucial difference between mathematics and speculation is the fact
that mathematics constructs its objects according to certain rules, while speculation proceeds
with concepts without being involved in any similar constructive activity. The fact that the
speculative thought may also posit some entities falling under these concepts from the Kantian
viewpoint does not constitute an objection because such stipulated entities doesn’t qualify as
objects in the strong Kantian sense of the term. Behind an object there is a procedure (governed
by a certain rule) that constructs it; speculative entities are stipulated as mere thought-things
falling under given descriptions by a fiat. This is the reason why the pure mathematics is objective
in the sense in which the pure speculation is not. What makes the pure mathematics objective
is the rule-like character of object-construction. The formal logical consistency is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for claiming that a given axiomatic theory is objectively valid. This
objective character of mathematics, according to Kant, allows for application of mathematics
in natural sciences (I leave however this further point aside). Russell’s critique of Kant in the
Principles of Mathematics simply does not take into account the Kantian problem of separation
of the pure mathematics from the pure speculation. In this respect Russell’s Leibnizian approach
to mathematics is more traditional than Kant’s and in Kantian terms qualifies as dogmatic. Not
surprisingly Russell provides his philosophy of mathematics with a metaphysical doctrine that
he calls the logical atomism. This is how he describes the relation of this doctrine to logic and
mathematics in the Introduction to his [216]:
As I have attempted to prove in The Principles of Mathematics, when we analyse
mathematics we bring it all back to logic. It all comes back to logic in the strictest
and most formal sense. In the present lectures, I shall try to set forth in a sort of
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outline, rather briefly and rather unsatisfactorily, a kind of logical doctrine which
seems to me to result from the philosophy of mathematics - not exactly logically, but
as what emerges as one reflects: a certain kind of logical doctrine, and on the basis
of this a certain kind of metaphysic.
As a recent biographer describes Russell’s work during this early period of his career
From August 1900 until the completion of Principia Mathematica in 1910 Russell was
both a metaphysician and a working logician. The two are completely intertwined in
his work: metaphysics was to provide the basis for logic; logic and logicism were to
be the basis for arguments for the metaphysics. ([120], p. 7-8)
Thus we can see how an older pattern of intellectual work, which many people in the 19th
century believed to be definitely sublated by Kant’s critical philosophy and other developments,
reemerged in the beginning of the 20th century in the context of new mathematics and new
symbolic logic. An attempt to describe the general intellectual context of that time would
obviously lead me too far but it is my understanding that Russell’s case in an extreme form
represents a more general intellectual tendency. Even more important is the fact that this
tendency towards the revival of the traditional alliance between logical and metaphysical thinking
is still very much alive today, and in fact since 1900 this intellectual project has firmly established
itself in the philosophical school known as Analytic Philosophy (as well as in some other branches
of today’s philosophy). So my critique of Russell of early 1900ies and, in particular, my attempts
to revendicate the Kantian and the Hegelian (see 4.8 below) lines of philosophical thought in
the context of recent mathematics of our own times, aims primarily at the modern proponents
of this traditional alliance.
Russell’s interpretation of Kant’s work in the philosophy of mathematics as an attempt to fill
logical gaps appearing when one tries to reconstruct Euclid’s geometry with Aristotle’s syllogistic
logic hardly correctly describes Kant’s intention. However these Russell’s words are helpful
for a better understanding of his own project. Russell suggests two independent reasons why
there are such logical gaps: first, because Euclid’s geometry is logically imperfect and, second,
because Aristotle’s logic is not appropriate for doing mathematics. However the new mathematics
(including non-Euclidean geometries) and the new symbolic logic taken together, according to
Russell, wholly fix the problem making Russell’s Leibnizian dream real. What Russell’s Principles
of Mathematics aim at is made clear by the following lines that I take from the Preface to this
work:
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The second volume, in which I have had the great good fortune to secure the col-
laboration of Mr A. N. Whitehead, will be addressed exclusively to mathematicians;
it will contain chains of deductions, from the premisses of symbolic logic through
Arithmetic, finite and infinite, to Geometry, in an order similar to that adopted in
the present volume ; it will also contain various original developments, in which the
method of Professor Peano, as supplemented by the Logic of Relations, has shown
itself a powerful instrument of mathematical investigation.
(The planned second volume of The Principles of Mathematics appeared later as a co-authored
independent three-volume work [218].)
Thus we can see that in early 1900ies Hilbert was not alone who thought about logic as the
ground layer foundation of mathematics. (This is in spite of the fact that unlike Hilbert in his
Foundations of 1899 officially sticks to Kant! - notice the Kant’s quote used as the epigraph in
this book. We shall shortly see (2.4) that Hilbert’s latter version of Axiomatic Method better
fit’s the Kantian view on mathematics than this earlier version.) However there were also strong
opposing voices during the same period of time. Among prominent critics of logical approaches
in foundations of mathematics were Poincare´ [42] and Brouwer. Consider, for example, this
Brouwer’s passage written in 1907:
About mathematical reasoning, I show in the beginning of the chapter that it is no
logical reasoning, that it uses the connectives of logic only because of the poverty of
language, and thus may perhaps keeps alive the language accompaniment even after
the human intellect has already long ago outgrown the logical argument itself. For,
far from the fact that it would be a “strange company” that does not reason logically,
I believe that it is only a matter of inertia, that the words that go with it [i.e., logic]
as yet still exist in modern languages. A pure use of these words hardly occurs, and
[in] impure [form] they are used in daily life, where they have led to all kinds of
misunderstanding and dogmatism [..]. Those misconceptions arose, not because of
insufficient mathematical insight, but because mathematics, lacking a pure language,
makes do with the language of logical reasoning, although its thoughts reason not
logically, but mathematically, which is something totally different. (quoted after
[240], p. 128-129)
I warn the reader that Brouwer’s concern expressed in the above quote is not met by using the
formalintuitionistic logic instead of classical logic in foundations of mathematics because this
replacement of logic leaves untouched the assumption about the primacy of logic over mathe-
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matics; such a replacement only translates (through Heyting’s formalization of the intuitionistic
logic [96]) some Brouwer’s ideas into a logicist foundational framework. However the very fact
that today we have more than one candidate logic for building foundations of mathematics is
remarkable. The logicist view on mathematics was particularly appealing in the beginning of the
20th century because at that time the traditional geometry was already split into its Euclidean
and multiple non-Euclidean versions but logic still preserved its traditional unity. Today we live
in a very different environment. Here how Gabbay describes it as for 1994:
In recent years we have witnessed a very strong and fruitful interaction between
traditional logic on the one hand and computer science and Artificial intelligence on
the other. As a result, there was urgent need for logic to evolve. New systems were
developed to cater for the needs of applications. Old concepts were changed and
modified and new concepts came into prominence. The community became divided.
Many expressed themselves strongly, both for and against, the new ideas. Papers
were rejected or accepted on ideological grounds, as well as technical substance. In
this atmosphere, it seemed necessary to clarify the basic concepts underlying logic
and computation, especially the very notion of a logical system. [..] The views
among members of the community are varied and in many cases, very strongly held.
There is at one extreme the pluralistic view, expressed to me once in a meeting by a
distinguished colleague who said something like “we use logics like we use computer
languages”. At the other end of the spectrum there is the view of those who believe
there is only one true logic, and all the rest is nonsense. Of course there exist several
proposals for this true logic with their respective bands of followers. ([44], Preface,
p. v)
So anyone who holds today a logicist view on mathematics (in the broad sense of “logicist”
explained above) needs, first, to specify which is his or her favorite logic used in foundations,
second, to explain why this particular logic is the most appropriate for the purpose 5. and,
third (which is perhaps the hardest task), to explain why and in which sense one’s favorite logic
qualifies as logic. This problematic character of modern logic does not imply that the logicist
view on mathematics is no longer tenable but it certainly shows that this view can not and
should not be taken for granted. In Chapter 9 we shall see how the New Axiomatic Methods
deals with this new degree of freedom of today’s axiomatic thought.
5Alternatively one may consider a variety of “Non-Classical Mathematics” each based on its proper logic [242].
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A more detailed argument against the mathematical logicism has been given in 1907 by Ernest
Cassirer [32] who continued to push the Kantian line taking into account newest mathematical
developments of his time. Referring to Russell [212] and new formal logical methods under the
name of “logistics” Cassirer says:
Here rises a problem that lies wholly outside the scope of “logistics” [..] All empirical
judgements belong to their domain: they must respect the limits of experience. What
logistics develops is a system of hypothetical assumptions about which we cannot
know, whether they are actually established in experience or whether they allow for
some immediate or non-immediate concrete application. According to Russell even
the general notion of magnitude does not belong to the domain of pure mathematics
and logic but has an empirical element, which can be grasped only through a sensual
perception. From the standpoint of logistics the task of thought ends when it manages
to establish a strict deductive link between all its constructions and productions.
Thus the worry about laws governing the world of objects is left wholly to the direct
observation, which alone, within its proper very narrow limits, is supposed to tell
us whether we find here certain rules or a pure chaos. [According to Russell] logic
and mathematics deal only with the order of concepts and should not care about the
order or disorder of objects. As long as one follows this line of conceptual analysis the
empirical entity always escapes one’s rational understanding. The more mathematical
deduction demonstrates us its virtue and its power, the less we can understand the
crucial role of deduction in the theoretical natural sciences.([32], p. 43)
So, according to Cassirer, what the formal logical foundations of mathematics can not possibly
provide (whatever system of formal logic is one’s favorite) are the notions of objecthood and
objectivity appropriate for doing the modern mathematically-laden empirical science (i.e., the
Galilean science as I called it 3.3 above). The popular idea to equate the notion of object with
that of logical individual, which stems from Frege [192], not only leaves this problem open and but
also hides it by eliminating a useful terminological distinction, which helps Kant to distinguish
objects of possible experience from thought-things of other sorts. Although Cassirer does not
provide any concrete solution of this problem he stresses the relevance of Kantian approach to
the modern science in the following words (the second phrase I used as an epigraph to this
book):
The principle according to which our concepts should be sourced in intuitions means
that they should be sourced in the mathematical physics and should prove effective in
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this field. Logical and mathematical concepts must no longer produce instruments for
building a metaphysical “world of thought”: their proper function and their proper
application is only within the empirical science itself. ([32], p. 43-44)
The fact that the modern logic indeed tends to create “metaphysical worlds of thought” rather
than make itself into a part of empirical science, and that today’s mainstream philosophy of
logic encourages and justifies this overtly metaphysical tendency (usually by presenting it as
an innocent intellectual game), appears to me very worrying. Although the hostile attitude
towards logic and its mainstream philosophy, which is widely spread in mathematical circles,
demonstrates a healthy intellectual reaction, such a negative reaction by itself does not solve the
problem. In Chapter 4 I come back to this Cassirer’s argument and after Lawvere point to a
way out (4.8).
2.3 Axiomatization of Logic: Logical Form versus Sym-
bolic Form
In his address of 1917 already quoted above Hilbert says among other things the following:
[I]t appears necessary to axiomatize logic itself and to prove that number theory
and set theory are only parts of logic. This method was prepared long ago (not
least by Frege’s profound investigations); it has been most successfully explained by
the acute mathematician and logician Russell. One could regard the completion of
this magnificent Russellian enterprise of the axiomatization of logic as the crowning
achievement of the work of axiomatization as a whole. ([101] p. 1113)
Leaving now aside the purported reduction of number theory (arithmetic) and set theory to
logic let us focus on the idea of axiomatization of logic. By calling the axiomatization of logic
the “crowning achievement of the work of axiomatization as a whole” Hilbert suggests that the
axiomatization of logic is a continuous extension of the axiomatization of geometry, arithmetic
and of any other part of mathematics or natural science. However the notion of axiomatization,
which I have tried to reconstruct above on the basis of Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 does not
immediately allow for such an extension. In the nutshell the axiomatization in the sense of
Foundations of 1899 works like this: using some fixed logical vocabulary one produces a finite
list of axioms, which refer only to abstract objects and abstract relations; an intended “naive”
interpretation of these axioms and of all theorems derivable from these axioms is supposed to
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capture the content of the corresponding informal theory in a more precise and “logically clear”
form. Notice that this whole procedure applies logic as a tool; an axiomatizer needs to have this
tool in a ready-made form just like a carpenter needs a ready-made hammer for putting down a
nail. So if the above reconstruction of Axiomatic Method is correct in order to axiomatize logic
one needs to use logic. How this may possibly work?
Instead of speculating further on this matter let us see how Hilbert axiomatizes logic in his course
on Theoretical Logic [104] co-authored with Ackermann and first published in 1928. This work
is greatly influenced by earlier works by Frege and Russell; I shall not however trace here these
influences but consider Hilbert’s and Ackermann’s book on its own rights. The Introduction to
this book opens with the following words:
Mathematical logic, also called symbolic logic or logistic, is an extension of the formal
method of mathematics to the field of logic. It employs for logic a symbolic language
like that which has long been in use to express mathematical relations. In mathemat-
ics it would nowadays be considered Utopian to think of using only ordinary language
in constructing a mathematical discipline. The great advances in mathematics since
antiquity, for instance in algebra, have been dependent to a large extent upon success
in finding a usable and efficient symbolism. (quoted after English translation [105],
p. 1)
We see that from the very beginning Hilbert and Ackermann introduce here a new kind of
logic, which they call mathematical or symbolic6. As we shall shortly see Hilbert’s notion of
axiomatization of logic makes sense only in a symbolic setting. The following description of
mathematical (symbolic) logic as an “extension of the formal method of mathematics to the
field of logic” is puzzling. If by formal method one understands the Axiomatic Method in the
sense of Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 then it is unclear how this application can make logic
symbolic. Indeed, Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 is written with the usual mixture of informal
prose, geometrical diagrams and the traditional algebraic and geometrical symbols; Hilbert’s
formal approach developed in this book is no more symbolic than the approach taken in any
other elementary geometry textbook published in the 19th century.
Notice also that in the above passage Hilbert talks about application of the “formal method of
mathematics” in logic. So he thinks here about the formal method of mathematics as something
6Saying that symbolic logic is a “new” kind of logic I mean that this kind of logic is new with respect to the
“informal” logic used in Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899; I don’t mean, of course, that symbolic logic first appears
in Hilbert and Ackermann’s book. In a part of the Introduction to this book, which I do not quote here, the
authors provide a brief historical sketch of symbolic logic tracing its history back to Leibniz.
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established independently from logic and then suggest to “extend” this method to the new field
of logic. However the formal method of Foundations of 1899 is certainly not independent of logic.
So talking about “formal method” in the above quote Hilbert and Ackermann mean something
different. What is then this other formal method?
Hilbert’s reference to symbolic algebra provides an important hint. Unlike the notion of logical
form that can be understood after Trendelenburg [237] quite independently of any symbolic rep-
resentation, the notion of algebraic form was intimately connected to mathematical symbolism
throughout the Modern history of algebra. Descartes’ Geometry of 1637 [40] which first estab-
lished algebra as a field of theoretical research at the same time produced what Serfati recently
called a “symbolic revolution” in mathematics [225]. The key idea of Descartes algebra is the
following: the same syntactic operations with symbols may represent geometrical operations with
straight segments and arithmetical operations with numbers. In this sense algebraic operations
are general forms of operations shared by certain arithmetical and geometrical operations 7. The
role of symbolism is crucial here. Although an abstract notion of operation with abstract non-
specified operanda may make logical sense it can hardly make mathematical sense. The algebraic
symbolism invented by Descartes allowed for thinking of abstract operations (applicable both
in geometry and arithmetics) in terms of concrete syntactic operations. This idea was used by
Boole and other pioneers of symbolic logic. We shall shortly see how Hilbert uses this idea in his
new approach to foundations of mathematics.
So at least one thing that Hilbert most certainly had in mind talking in the above passage about
the “formal method of mathematics” and suggesting an application of this method in logic is
the method of (symbolic) algebra. However in the above passage he describes algebra only as
a special case. This is why we cannot derive the wanted sense of being formal from the notion
of algebraic form. A more general notion of form, which turns to be appropriate in this case, is
Cassirer’s notion of symbolic form [33]. I shall not develop it here in its full generality but focus
only on its mathematical version relevant to Hilbert’s work.
The passage quoted above continues as follows:
The purpose of the symbolic language in mathematical logic is to achieve in logic
what it has achieved in mathematics, namely, an exact scientific treatment of its
subject-matter. The logical relations which hold with regard to judgments, concepts,
7Beware that this interpretation of algebra is anachronistic. Arnauld in his New Elements of Geometry [5]
suggests that algebraic operations are operations with general mathematical magnitudes; his notion of magnitude
generalizes upon geometrical magnitudes and arithmetical magnitudes aka numbers. The modern “abstract”
approach in algebra, which is behind the anachronistic reading of Descartes, has been first systematically developed
by van der Waerden in the early 1930-ies [241].
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etc., are represented by formulas whose interpretation is free from the ambiguities
so common in ordinary language. The transition from statements to their logical
consequences, as occurs in the drawing of conclusions, is analyzed into its primitive
elements, and appears as a formal transformation of the initial formulas in accordance
with certain rules, similar to the rules of algebra; logical thinking is reflected in a
logical calculus. This calculus makes possible a successful attack on problems whose
nature precludes their solution by purely contentual [inhaltlische] logical thinking.
Among these, for instance, is the problem of characterizing those statements which
can be deduced from given premises. ([105], p.1)
The first sentence of this passage clearly shows that Hilbert considers here an application of math-
ematics to logic as a way to improve on logic with mathematics. Hilbert and Ackermann claim
here that by using the symbolic methods mathematics achieves “an exact scientific treatment of
its subject-matter”; using this evidence the authors suggest that these methods may equally al-
low for an exact scientific treatment of logic. This project should be certainly distinguished from
the idea of improving on mathematics through the clarification of its logical structure purported
by Hilbert in his Foundations of 1899. Nevertheless Hilbert tends to describe both projects in
similar terms, namely in terms of formalization and axiomatization. Notice the expression “con-
tentual logical thinking” that appears in the above passage. Contentual logical thinking in this
context is opposed to formal logical thinking. Interestingly, Hilbert and Ackermann themselves
do not use the expression “formal logic” in this context and talk instead of mathematical logic
and symbolic logic. This can be perhaps explained by the fact that at that time the expression
“formal logic” was still more commonly used in Trendelenburg’s sense, which does not imply that
formal logic should always involve symbolic methods. However when Hilbert and Ackermann
oppose what they call “contentual” logic to symbolic logic the qualification of this symbolic logic
as formal anyway immediately suggests itself. This is a different sense of being formal, which
is more familiar to us today. What Hilbert and Ackermann call “contentual” logic would be
described today as “informal” logic (even if this informal logic qualifies as formal in the weaker
Trendelenburg’s sense).
Thus Hilbert and Ackermann’s formalization and axiomatization of logic amounts to providing
the given system of logic with a new symbolic form, not to the specification of the “logical form
of logic”. Even if the authors describe the axiomatization of logic as “the crowning achievement
of the work of axiomatization” this “crowing achievement” is not a simple continuation of the
axiomatization in the sense of Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899. Blurring the distinction between
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axiomatization of mathematical theories, on the one hand, and the axiomatization of logic, on
the other hand, also blurs the distinction between theories and logic, which is fundamental for
the 1899 approach. Hilbert and Ackermann’s distinction between the “contentual logic” and
the formal (symbolic) logic opens the new possibility of non-standard interpretation of logical
signs on equal footing with non-logical signs. In 3.4 we shall see how this new possibility is
realized in Tarski’s topological model of intuitionistic propositional calculus; in 4.4 I show how
a further exploration of this possibility leads to a significant change of the Axiomatic Method as
presented in Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899. But the conceptual problem that leads to this further
development can be seen already at this early stage of the history of Axiomatic Method.
A fundamental idea behind the Axiomatic Method in the sense of 1899 is a reduction of math-
ematical reasoning to the form of “purely logical axiom system” (Hintikka). But since the dis-
tinction between logical systems and mathematical theories is blurred such a reduction becomes
senseless because there is no longer any clear sense in which a given axiom system can be called
purely logical rather than simply mathematical. One can however clearly distinguish in this
new symbolic setting between formal (to wit symbolic) and contentual theories, and like in 1899
think of formal theories as a foundation for the corresponding contentual theories. Given such a
contentual theory T one can design its formal counterpart F and then find another contentual
interpretation T ′ of F . Although it is natural to describe this latter procedure as formalization
and axiomatization (assuming that F is built axiomatically) this latter kind of formalization
and axiomatization is quite unlike the formalization and axiomatization in the sense of 1899.
While the formalization in the sense of 1899 involves the notion of logical form the symbolic
formalization just described involves, generally, only the notion of symbolic form.
In Hilbert’s thinking both kinds of formalization are merged together, so he hardly distinguishes
between them clearly. He apparently assumes that a formal symbolic logical system unlike a
formal symbolic mathematical theory does not allow (and does not call for) for multiple alterna-
tive contentual interpretations but instead simply clarifies and purifies common vague contentual
logical notions expressed in the natural language. This additional assumption apparently allows
for systems of formal symbolic logic with a fixed semantics of logical terms. But in fact this
assumption produces a tacit shift in the meaning of being formal. If the given symbolic logical
system pins down the precise sense of logical notions, which outside the symbolic setting don’t
have any clear meaning, then the logical symbols used in this logical system are used as proper
names of corresponding logical concepts (like the symbol & conventionally used for denoting the
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logical conjunction) rather than variables that may acquire different interpretations 8. In math-
ematics symbols are used in this way when, for example, number pi is denoted by symbol “pi”
and number 1 is denoted by symbol “1”. So the only notion of symbolic form, which is relevant
in this case, is very unspecific and applies to any natural or artificial language. A notion of
symbolic form, which is more specific and more relevant to logic and mathematics comes into the
play only when a formal mathematical theory presented by symbolic means allows for alternative
contentual interpretations: in this case one can say that the formal symbolic theory grasps the
symbolic form shared by all such interpretations. In the case of the system of symbolic logic
proposed by Hilbert and Ackermann (see below) this latter specific sense of being formal does
not apply. Apparently Hilbert and Ackermann continue to think of their logic as being formal in
the traditional Trendelenburg’s sense, and do not pay attention to the fact that this traditional
sense of being formal does not square with the formal vs. contentual distinction relevant to
mathematical theories.
In 8.3 we shall see that Tarski’s analysis of logicality mentioned in the last Section allows for a
reconstruction of Hilbert’s thinking, which is more coherent that the above reconstruction based
on Hilbert’s own words. It is hard to say which of the two reconstructions is more historically
correct and I leave this question for a further study. (I would like the Tarski-based structuralist
interpretation to be correct but I lack sufficient textual evidences.) It seems me likely that Hilbert
was indeed driven by structuralist geometrical ideas described in 8.3 but since he had to apply
a more traditional conceptual apparatus for talking about logic, this led him to incoherences
that we notice in the above quote. Leaving aside this historical issues I would like to stress
once again that the idea of interpreting formal logical systems on equal footing with formal
mathematical theories suggested by Hilbert’s idea of “contentual logical thinking” is behind the
recent transformations of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method, which I thoroughly discuss later in this
book.
Let us now see what kind of axiomatic system of logic Hilbert and Ackermann offer in their
book. In fact the authors offer several such systems; for our analysis it is sufficient to consider
the simplest one that the authors call sentential calculus (Aussagenkalku¨l) and that is usually
called today propositional calculus. The given axiomatic presentation of this system of sym-
bolic logic consists of four elements (this analysis into elements is due to myself but not to the
authors):
8I am now talking about variables in the general non-technical sense. Non-logical constants of a given formal
theory (in the usual technical sense of the term) also count as variables in this general sense because such constants
are differently interpreted in different models of this theory.
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1) Specification of symbols, types of symbols, and of the intended interpretations of these sym-
bols. Hilbert and Ackermann distinguish symbols of three types: (i) capital letters standing for
propositional variables, (ii) logical symbols, (iii) auxiliary symbols like parentheses and commas,
which serve for separating and grouping other symbols.
2) Specification of syntactic rules according to which well-formed formulas (strings of symbols)
are constructed from the specified symbols. These formulas stand for propositions obtained from
some given propositions (represented by singular symbols) with a help of logical connectives
(also represented by corresponding symbols). So linking propositions by logical connectives is
represented here by concatenation of the corresponding symbols into a single string and insert-
ing appropriate auxiliary symbols in a way similar to which this is done with the usual linear
alphabetic writing9
3) Axioms of this logic, which are distinguished formulas interpreted as logical tautologies, i.e.,
propositions, which are true for all possible values of variables.
4) Specification of logical rules, which allow one to construct certain formulas (representing
propositions) from some other formulas (representing other propositions). This construction is
interpreted as logical deduction. The set of formulas deducible from the axioms according to
logical rules 3 is interpreted as the set of (all) logical tautologies.
Let us now see whether or not this “axiomatization” of propositional logic is similar to the
axiomatization of Euclidean geometry in the Foundations of 1899. Is this the same notion of
axiomatization that is at work in both cases? A common feature is this: in both cases we have
a generic set of true propositions called axioms and certain rules that allow one to deduce some
other true propositions from these axioms. Here however the analogy between the axiomatic
geometry and the axiomatic logic stops. The axiomatic theory of geometry has a logical part
and a properly geometrical part. The properly geometrical part is the geometrical axioms and
geometrical theorems deduced from these axioms. All the rest (including the rules of deduction)
is logic. The considered axiomatic theory of logic consists of logical axioms (generic tautologies),
all other tautologies (deducible from the axioms) and rules of two sorts plus the specification of
symbols. If logical truths (tautologies) are thought of as universal truths about everything and
geometrical truths are thought of as truths about some specific kind of things called geometrical
objects then the comparison between the axiomatic geometry and the axiomatic logic may make
sense.
9Calling the linear alphabetic writing “usual” I mean, of course, that it is usual in the geographic area where
I live.
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It is appropriate to notice here that the specification of certain tautologies as “logical axioms”
used by Hilbert and Ackerman’s in their axiomatization of logic is not necessary for a formal
specification of a formal logical system. As has been shown by Gentzen [74][75] a reasonable
formal logical system may have no axiom at the expense of having a bigger number of rules.
But there is no logical system that has axioms and has no rules. In that sense rules is a more
essential element of a logical system than logical axioms. This fact emphasizes my point that
the “axiomatization of logic” should not be taken on equal footing with the axiomatization
of geometry or axiomatization of any other special theory. What really matters in Hilbert’s
“axiomatization of logic” is developing logic by symbolic means. As I have just mentioned this
can be done without using axioms.
2.4 Foundations of 1927: Intuition Strikes Back
As we have seen the formalization of logic (that Hilbert calls it “axiomatization”) is not an
innocent procedure which merely makes logical notions clearer and more explicit; whether it has
this effect or not the formalization allows for studying and developing logic by mathematical
means. Not surprisingly, the replacement of the traditional non-mathematical “informal” logic
by the mathematical symbolic logic has a very significant impact upon Hilbert’s ideas about
Axiomatic Method and foundations of mathematics. Let us now see how his new foundational
project looks like. In the beginning of his paper Foundations of Mathematics [100] that has been
delivered in July 1927 at the Hamburg Mathematical Seminar, Hilbert describes this project in
the following words:
With this new way of providing a foundation for mathematics, which we may appro-
priately call a proof theory, I pursue a significant goal, for I should like to eliminate
once and for all the questions regarding the foundations of mathematics in the form in
which they are now posed, by turning every mathematical proposition into a formula
that can be concretely exhibited and strictly derived, thus recasting mathematical
definitions and inferences in such a way that they are unshakable and yet provide an
adequate picture of the whole science. I believe that I can attain this goal completely
with my proof theory, even if a great deal of work must still be done before it is fully
developed.
No more than any other science can mathematics be founded by logic alone; rather,
as a condition for the use of logical inferences and the performance of logical op-
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erations, something must already be given to us in our faculty of representation,
certain extralogical concrete objects that are intuitively present as immediate expe-
rience prior to all thought. If logical inference is to be reliable, it must be possible
to survey these objects completely in all their parts, and the fact that they occur,
that they differ from one another, and that they follow each other, or are concate-
nated, is immediately given intuitively, together with the objects, as something that
neither can be reduced to anything else nor requires reduction. This is the basic
philosophical position that I regard as requisite for mathematics and, in general, for
all scientific thinking, understanding, and communication. And in mathematics, in
particular, what we consider is the concrete signs themselves, whose shape, according
to the conception we have adopted, is immediately clear and recognizable. This is
the very least that must be presupposed; no scientific thinker can dispense with it,
and therefore everyone must maintain it, consciously or not. ([100], p. 464-465)
When Hilbert says that mathematics cannot be “founded by logic alone” a modern reader ac-
quainted with Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method readily agrees: of course, for doing mathematics one
needs in addition to principles of logic some specific mathematical axioms like axioms of set
theory! As we shall shortly see Hilbert indeed uses such specific axioms in his Foundations of
1927. But in the above passage he refers to something completely different! He states here that
no logical inference is possible without “certain extralogical concrete objects that are intuitively
present as immediate experience prior to all thought” and then specifies that as far as mathemat-
ics is concerned those “extralogical concrete objects” are “the concrete signs themselves, whose
shape, according to the conception we have adopted, is immediately clear and recognizable”.
Since mathematical symbolic logic does use concrete signs (symbols) Hilbert’s “logic alone” can-
not be mathematical; in the given context the mathematical logic should be rather understood
as the pure logic provided with certain “extralogical” (to wit symbolic) means. According to the
new Hilbert’s view the immediate intuitive giveness of the “concrete signs”, which allows one to
acknowledge “the fact that they occur, that they differ from one another, and that they follow
each other, or are concatenated” is an indispensable ingredient of foundations of mathematics.
For further references I shall call this specific sort of mathematical intuition, which allows one
to manipulate and calculate with mathematical symbols, the symbolic intuition.
Let us compare Hilbert’s view on foundations expressed in the above passage with his earlier
views expressed in his comments on his Foundations of 1899. In 1899 he founds geometry on
the “pure” (non-mathematical) logic and some axioms formulated in terms of this logic. The
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only notion of intuition, which is still indispensable in this setting, is the intuition in the sense of
Kant’s Doctrine of Method ; this minimal intuition can be accounted for by the logical notion of
existential instantiation and be considered itself as a part of logic (see 1.3 above). In 1927 Hilbert
no longer relies on the “pure” informal logic but stresses the foundational impact of symbolic
intuition. Hilbert explicitly describes here symbols as “extralogical”; the following explanation
does not allow one to reduce the notion of intuition related to these extralogical objects to the
minimal “logical” intuition. Indeed, while the mere fact that these objects “occur” and “differ
from one another” does not yet make them extralogical, the fact that “they follow each other, or
are concatenated” certainly does! Thus Hilbert’s new foundational proposal of 1927 unlike that
of 1899 essentially involves a non-logical notion of symbolic intuition.
This does not mean however that by 1927 Hilbert abandon his earlier idea according to which all
mathematical theories require a logical background. He rather upgrades this idea as follows: a
system of logic, which is appropriate for founding mathematics, is not a system of “pure” (non-
mathematical) logic but a system of symbolic mathematical logic (which includes an extra-logical
symbolic aspect). Here is how Hilbert describes this upgrade himself:
[I]n my theory contentual inference is replaced by manipulation of signs [ausseres
Handeln] according to rules; in this way the axiomatic method attains that reliability
and perfection that it can and must reach if it is to become the basic instrument of
all research. ([100], p. 467)
The replacement of the “contentual inference” by the manipulation of signs involves two ways
of formalization, which work here together but nevertheless can and should be carefully dis-
tinguished. The formalization in the sense of 1899 remains here at work, so the manipulation
of signs presents here the logical form of the given contentual inference. Simultaneously the
manipulation with signs presents the symbolic form of the same contentual inference.
Since Hilbert makes it clear that his new method amounts to “extending the formal point of
view of algebra to all of mathematic” (ib. p. 470) we may safely identify the symbolic form
with the algebraic form in the given context. However Hilbert’s proposal does not reduce to
the algebraization of logic the same sense, in which one can speak of the algebraization of logic
in earlier works by Boole, Morgan and others. For Hilbert uses a feature of algebra that plays
no special role in earlier works in mathematical logic: I mean the algebraic method of “ideal
elements” like −1 or √−1. Leaving a more detailed discussion on this algebraic method until
2.6 and 7.4 let me first describe Hilbert’s proposal. After the introductory remarks quoted above
he first introduces a system of symbolic logic similar to one presented in [104] and, second, adds
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two further groups of axioms, which he describes as “specifically mathematical”, namely “axioms
of equality” and “axioms of number”. Then Hilbert shows how this apparatus allows one to do
the finitary arithmetic. One may wonder if doing the finitary arithmetics with this heavy logical
machinery indeed provides any epistemic advantage over doing it in the traditional way. Hilbert’s
answer is: No, it does not! As far as the finitary arithmetic is concerned this machinery allows
one at best to “impart information” 10. If I understand here Hilbert correctly his thinking is this:
since usual arithmetical manipulations with natural numbers represented by strings of strokes
or by the standard Arabic numerals are just as intuitively clear as the manipulation of symbols
and formulas in the Hilbert’s symbolic system, from the foundational viewpoint the difference
between the two formalisms is after all not essential (notwithstanding the fact that the former
formalism has an advantage of being simpler and more convenient, while the latter formalism has
an advantage of making explicit the logical structure of reasoning). However the new proposed
formalism is advantageous as soon as one goes beyond the finitary arithmetic. Hilbert suggests
thinking about such an extension after the pattern of algebraic extension:
Just as, for example, the negative numbers are indispensable in elementary num-
ber theory and just as modern number theory and algebra become possible only
through the Kummer-Dedekind ideals, so scientific mathematics becomes possible
only through the introduction of ideal propositions. ([100], p.471)
An “ideal proposition” is any proposition that is not provable from Hilbert’s logical and arith-
metical axioms, i.e., any proposition, which is not a proposition of the finitary arithmetic. So
any additional axiom and any formal proposition obtained as a formal consequence of the ex-
tended axiom system (which includes the same logical and arithmetical axioms plus the new
axiom) qualifies as ideal. The only requirement that limits such possible extensions is the re-
quirement according to which the extended system of axioms must be consistent. As soon as
the consistency is granted one may safely think of “ideal” objects and “ideal” relations involved
into the given ideal proposition as existent along the same pattern of thinking, which we have
already explained talking about the Foundations of 1899 (remind from 2.1 of thought-things
and thought-relations). And in fact one can do more. Since these ideal objects and relations
are represented by symbols and strings of symbols, which (unlike the bare thought-things and
10
If we now begin to construct mathematics, we shall first set our sights upon elementary number
theory; we recognize that we can obtain and prove its truths through contentual intuitive consid-
erations. The formulas that we encounter when we take this approach are used only to impart
information. Letters stand for numerals, and an equation informs us of the fact that two signs stand
for the same thing. ([100], p. 469)
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thought-relations) are bone fide mathematical objects on their own, any further interpretation
of these ideal things is an option but not a necessary requirement. In the new symbolic setting
these ideal things are concretely represented to begin with, and one may work with them just like
in algebra people work with
√−1. Crucially, working with ideal objects and relations involves
the same type of syntactic manipulations as calculating with natural numbers. So even if the
Hilbert’s Foundations of 1927 is an overkill in the case of the finitary arithmetic it’s expected
advantage is that it allows for an uniform treatment of the whole of mathematics by means
similar to those used in the finitely arithmetic.
The possibility of checking consistency is evidently crucial for Hilbert’s project. Although in
1927 Hilbert offers no general solution of this problem he suggests that this problem is relatively
easy and “fundamentally lies within the province of intuition just as much as does in contentual
number theory the task, say, of proving the irrationality of
√
2” ([100], p. 471). In the formal
symbolic setting where a proof is represented by a string of symbols and formulas are constructed
according to precise syntactic rules the proof of consistency of a given set of axioms amounts
to a proof showing that there is no string of formulas that ends up with a formula expressing
contradiction like 0 6= 0 (a simple argument shows that if 0 6= 0 cannot be formally proved no
other contradiction can be proved either). Hilbert realizes, of course, that such a consistency
proof will not itself qualify as formal but will belong to his proof theory, which in a different place
[106] Hilbert calls by the name of metamathematics. However since the whole of metamathematics
“fundamentally lies within the province of intuition just as much as does in contentual number
theory” this remark does not lead to the infinite regress in foundations. Thus the intuitive proof
theory aka metamathematics (in Hilbert’s original sense of this term) in Hilbert’s view of 1927
becomes a foundation for the rest of mathematics. Beware that so far this is a declaration of
intent, not yet an accomplished project. A more advanced version of the same project is presented
in two volumes [106] published by Hilbert with a cooperation with Bernays in 1934-1939.
As we all well know today in 1927 Hilbert severely underestimated potential difficulties of his
proof theory; Go¨del’s famous incompleteness theorems and all the following work in the area con-
vinced many people that Hilbert’s Program failed [254]. However even if Hilbert’s foundational
project as described in the Foundations of 1927 indeed failed, his Axiomatic Method making
part of this program certainly survived and until today remains standard.
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2.5 Symbolic Logic and Diagrammatic Logic
What kind of things qualify as symbols? Should they always be the convenient letters written
from the left to the right or other systems of writing can be used to the same effect? Is the
conceptual structure of the symbolic logic neutral with respect to its symbolic presentation or
it is at some degree determined by this presentation? Can one open new logical possibilities
by modifying this standard syntax? As every user of LATEXperfectly knows various sorts of
complicated non-standard multi-level symbols and diagrams can be encoded into the convenient
strings of letters. Tolstoy’s printed novels communicate us all sort of things using the same type
of linear coding. But this useful feature of the standard symbolic syntax hardly justifies by itself
Hilbert’s far-reaching idea of the ultimate epistemic reduction of mathematical intuition to the
symbolic intuition associated with the symbolic syntax of this particular sort (moreover if one
takes into consideration the failure of Hilbert’s program in its original form). Instead of trying
to answer the above questions directly I propose now to look at some other syntactic possibilities
known from the history of symbolic logic. Namely, I shall talk about logical diagrams after
Venn’s [127] of 1881 where this subject is treated systematically. Then I come back to Hilbert
and make some further comments about his idea of formal symbolic mathematics.
Here is how Venn in 1881 [127] describes the complementary roles of symbols and diagrams in
logic talking about “subdivisions of classes”:
For one thing, we can of course always represent the products of such a subdivision
in the language of common [non-symbolic] Logic, or even in that of common life, if
we choose to do so. They do not readily offer themselves for this purpose, but when
pressed will consent, though failing sadly in the desired symmetry and compactness.
The relative cumbousness of such a mode of expression is obviously the real measure
of our need for a reformed or symbolic language. [..] The reader will see at once how
conveniently and briefly we can thus indicate any desired combination of class terms,
and, by consequence, any desired proposition. [..]
That such a scheme is complete there can be no doubt. But unfortunately, owing
to this very completeness, it is apt to prove terribly lengthy. [..] This then is the
state of thing which a reformed scheme of diagrammatic notation has to meet. It
must correspond in all essential respects to that regular system of class subdivision
which has just been referred to under its verbal and its literal or symbolic aspect.
Theoretically, as we shall see, this is perfectly attainable. ([127], p. 102-103)
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As we can see Venn discusses here the use of symbols and diagrams in logic from a practical rather
than theoretical viewpoint. Unlike Hilbert Venn does not try to distinguish his symbolic logic
from the “pure” logic; instead he distinguishes between the symbolic logic and the “common”
logic meaning the “informal” logic that applies only the natural language without helping itself
with special symbols. Then Venn stresses that diagrams become helpful when the corresponding
symbolic expressions turn to be “terribly lengthy”. Does the length of symbolic expression play
any role from a theoretical or foundational viewpoint? Hilbert could argue that the length of
symbolic expressions is irrelevant to the theoretical logic and to the foundations of mathematics
(as far as this length remains finite) even if it matters practically. I am not convinced by this
argument. Hilbert’s project aims at reduction of the “ideal” objects and propositions to their
“real” counterparts, i.e., to their corresponding symbolic expressions. The idea that a long
symbolic calculation is just as reliable as a short one is obviously a simplifying idealization.
Even if this idealization is acceptable for certain purposes there is no reason to disregard a more
realistic picture in a theoretical study. If Venn is right that diagrams help to tackle with the
complexity of symbolic logical operations the diagrammatic notation must be taken as seriously
as the symbolic notation.
It may be argued that symbols unlike diagrams do not involve the idea of resemblance to what
these things stand for, and that this fact makes symbols appropriate and diagrams inappropriate
in foundations of mathematics. In old good times, so the argument goes, when mathematics
dealt with circles, triangles and the like people could picture these things with diagrams and use
these diagrams in their proofs. However since the modern mathematics involves highly abstract
concepts, which do not allow for such a straightforward intuitive representation, diagrams become
irrelevant. If such abstract mathematical concepts allow for any intuitive representation at all
such representations are purely symbolic and do not involve any relation of resemblance between
symbolic constructions their corresponding mathematical objects.
This argument is based on several misunderstandings. The idea that traditional geometrical
diagrams in some sense resemble certain ideal objects is a Platonic interpretation of the tradi-
tional geometrical practice that can and must be distinguished from this practice itself. One
does not need this interpretation for doing traditional geometry with traditional geometrical
diagrams. Notice that Venn’s logical diagrams just like Venn’s and Hilbert’s logical symbols are
not supposed to resemble anything at all.
The idea that symbolic constructions do not resemble anything should be also taken critically. In
my view the relation of resemblance between mathematical objects and their material represen-
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tations is ill-construed to begin with. We can rather establish such a relations between different
material representations of the same object. For example an Euclidean circle can be represented
both with the traditional diagram (found in Section 6.2 in this book) and also symbolically with
a single letter. Then one may observe that each of these two representations is unlike the other
and further observe that a letter used for denoting the circle is unlike any other letter that can
be used for the same purpose. Here we can see the difference. The capacity to read diagrams and
the capacity read letters equally require the capacity to distinguish between graphical shapes and
to identify tokens of the same shape. But in the case of diagrams this graphical typing reflects
the typing of corresponding mathematical objects while in the case of letters it does not. In that
particular respect diagrams are more informative than letter symbols (although letters, of course,
have other epistemic advantages). However I cannot see any general philosophical justification
of the idea that using graphical types in one way rather than in another way is more appropriate
in mathematics and logic. Which one is more appropriate in a given context is rather a technical
question.
Let us read again more attentively what Hilbert says in the passage quoted in the last Sec-
tion:
[A]s a condition for the use of logical inferences and the performance of logical op-
erations, something must already be given to us in our faculty of representation,
certain extralogical concrete objects that are intuitively present as immediate expe-
rience prior to all thought. If logical inference is to be reliable, it must be possible to
survey these objects completely in all their parts, and the fact that they occur, that
they differ from one another, and that they follow each other, or are concatenated,
is immediately given intuitively, together with the objects, as something that neither
can be reduced to anything else nor requires reduction. ([100], p. 464-465)
Hilbert describes the above claim as his “basic philosophical position that I regard as requisite
for mathematics and, in general, for all scientific thinking, understanding, and communication”.
Yet one may remark that in this claim Hilbert mentions objects that “follow each other” and “are
concatenated” which is hardly appropriate in a claim aiming at the full philosophical generality
because the notions of order (“following each other”) and concatenation are applicable to objects
of some sorts but may be not applicable to objects of some other sorts. If Hilbert would like
to claim here that the order and the concatenation of the “extralogical concrete objects” are
indeed necessary in “all scientific thinking, understanding, and communication” he would need
to provide an additional argument justifying this latter claim, which is actually missing. The
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following lines make it clear that Hilbert has here in mind nothing else but the familiar symbolic
algebraic notation:
And in mathematics, in particular, what we consider is the concrete signs themselves,
whose shape, according to the conception we have adopted, is immediately clear and
recognizable. This is the very least that must be presupposed; no scientific thinker
can dispense with it, and therefore everyone must maintain it, consciously or not.
([100], p. 465)
Why signs rather than diagrams? Why the concatenations of signs rather than geometric con-
structions of other sorts? Well, Hilbert’s project aims at showing that the manipulation with
signs (symbols) is sufficient for all mathematical purposes. Even if this foundational project
works out it does not close the possibility of a different foundation with uses a different intuitive
background and a different basic geometry. Notice also that Hilbert’s foundational project in-
volves his understanding of purposes of doing mathematics. Without trying to reconstruct the
exact Hilbert’s view on this issue I shall show in 3.3 that Hilbert’s formal mathematics is not
quite appropriate for applications in natural sciences and try to explain why. As soon as the
application of mathematics in science counts as a purpose of doing mathematics this argument
shows that the manipulation with signs in the way suggested by Hilbert is not sufficient for all
mathematical purposes.
In order to see a possibility of Axiomatic Method, which involves other mathematical intuitions
than symbolic, it is instructive to look back at Euclid’s Elements from a particular point of view
suggested by Friedman [68]. Friedman suggest this point of view as his reconstruction of Kant’s
view but this does not matter in the given context:
Euclidean geometry [..] is not to be compared with Hilbert’s axiomatization [of
Euclidean geometry in his [109]], say, but rather with Frege’s Begriffsschrift. It is
not a substantive doctrine, but a form of rational representation: a form of rational
argument and inference. Accordingly, its propositions are established, not by quasi-
perceptual acquaintance with some particular subject matter, but, as far as possible,
by the most rigorous methods of proof - by the proof-procedures of Euclid, Book
I, for example. There remains a serious question about Euclid’s axioms, of course;
when pressed, Kant would most likely claim that they represent the most general
conditions under which alone a concept of extended magnitude - and therefore a
rigorous conception of an external world - is possible (see A163/B204). And, of
course, we now know that Kant is fundamentally mistaken here. ([68], p. 94-95)
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Euclidean geometry can be equally compared in this sense with Hilbert’s symbolic logic: “when
pressed” Hilbert like Kant could say that unless the symbolic syntax of his logic is taken for
granted one, strictly speaking, cannot reason mathematically. Or perhaps Hilbert’s mathematical
genius and the common sense would win in this case over his philosophical ideas and he would take
a more flexible attitude claiming only a particular way of building foundations for mathematics
and asking his opponent to do this better.
Although Euclidean geometry cannot any longer serve us as an organon of scientific reasoning I
can see no reason why a theory capable to play this role today should be anything like a symbolic
logical calculus. Moreover, I believe that if such a scientific organon is possible at all it must
reflect objective features of the physical world learned through experience (as Euclidean geometry
does it at a limited degree) rather than be based on speculative ideas about the correct thinking
underpinned by some metaphysical theories. In Chapter 4 I present a tentative organon of this
sort, which is Lawvere’s categorical logic. (I shall tell more about Venn’s diagrammatic logic
during this discussion.) In the end of Chapter 6 I consider Voevodsky’s Univalent Foundations
as another candidate organon of the same sort. Now let us return back to Hilbert and see how
his foundational project of 1927 develops in his later work.
2.6 Foundations of 1934-1939: Doing is Showing?
Foundations of Mathematics [106] published by Hilbert and Bernays in two volumes in 1934
(first volume) and 1939 (second volume) is a systematic technical development of the project
outlined in Hilbert’s paper of 1927 [100]. Leaving this technical development wholly aside I shall
now focus only on the authors’ discussion about “formal axiomatics” in the beginning of the first
volume. Here is the passage of my interest:
The term axiomatic will be used partly in a broader and partly in a narrower sense.We
will call the development of a theory axiomatic in the broadest sense if the basic
notions and presuppositions are stated first, and then the further content of the
theory is logically derived with the help of definitions and proofs. In this sense,
Euclid provided an axiomatic grounding for geometry, Newton for mechanics, and
Clausius for thermodynamics.
In Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry [of 1899] the axiomatic standpoint received
a sharpening regarding the axiomatic development of a theory: From the factual
and conceptual subject matter that gives rise to the basic notions of the theory, we
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retain only the essence that is formulated in the axioms, and ignore all other content.
Finally, for axiomatics in the narrowest sense, the existential form comes in as an
additional factor. This marks the difference between the axiomatic method and the
constructive or genetic method of grounding a theory. While the constructive method
introduces the objects of a theory only as a genus of things, an axiomatic theory refers
to a fixed system of things (or several such systems), and for all predicates of the
propositions of the theory, this fixed system of things constitutes a delimited domain
of subjects, about which hold propositions of the given theory.
There is the assumption that the domain of individuals is given as a whole. Except
for the trivial cases where the theory deals only with a finite and fixed set of things,
this is an idealizing assumption that properly augments the assumptions formulated
in the axioms.
We will call this sharpened form of axiomatics (where the subject matter is ignored
and the existential form comes in) formal axiomatics for short. (quoted after bilingual
edition [107], p.1a-2a)
We have already discussed the distinction between formal and contentual axioms and I shall not
return to it now but comment on the authors’ distinction between the constructive (genetic) and
the axiomatic methods of theory-building. My first comment concerns Euclid. As we can see in
the above passage Hilbert and Bernays qualify Euclid’s method as axiomatic in a “broader” sense.
This “broader” sense of being axiomatic includes what Hilbert and Bernays call constructive or
genetic method. This is clear from another description of Euclid’s method that Hilbert and
Bernays provide later in their book:
Euclid’s axiomatics was intended to be contentual and intuitive, and the intuitive
meaning of the figures is not ignored in it. Furthermore, its axioms are not in ex-
istential form either: Euclid does not presuppose that points or lines constitute any
fixed domain of individuals. Therefore, he does not state any existence axioms either,
but only construction postulates. (ib., p. 20a)
The above quote clearly shows that Hilbert is well aware about the difference between his and
Euclid’s approaches to theory-building, which I have emphasized in 1.2 11. The reference to
Foundations of 1899 in the work of 1934 suggests that in 1934 Hilbert retains his earlier notion
11Nevertheless Hilbert and Bernays in a different place describe Euclid’s (as well as Newton’s and Clausius’)
method in this way: “the basic notions and presuppositions are stated first, and then the further content of the
theory is logically derived with the help of definitions and proofs” (ib., p. 1, my emphasis). As we have shown
in Chapter 1 this description of Euclid’s “genetic” method is incorrect. The fact that this method amounts
to building certain non-logical objects like triangles from given basic objects according to certain rules is not a
sufficient reason for calling it logical.
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of Axiomatic Method. But as a matter of fact in 1934 Hilbert and Bernays use the symbolic
version of this method. As we shall now see this fact has important consequences for the author’s
distinction between constructive (genetic) and axiomatic (in the narrow sense) ways of building
mathematical theories.
Remind that in the symbolic setting mathematical proofs are chains of formulas constructed
according to certain fixed rules (with a help of some basic construction including formulas repre-
senting axioms). In this setting to prove (a proposition expressed by formula F ) is to construct
(a chain of formulas that ends up with F ). Thus doing mathematics in Hilbert’s formal axiomatic
setting does not reduce contentual constructions in mathematics altogether but reduces all such
constructions to constructions of a special sort, namely, to the finite symbolic constructions.
Notice however that this reduction does not concern the metamathematical proofs including the
proofs of consistency (of a given set of formal axiom). In the metamathematics everything works
like in the traditional contentual mathematics developed by “genetic” methods. One not only
performs here certain constructions (chains of formulas) but also makes certain judgements about
these constructions, including judgements of the form “such-and-such construction is impossible”
(remind that in order to prove the consistency of a set of axioms it is sufficient to show that
formula 0 6= 0 is not derivable from these axioms). I would like to stress that this new turn
of the dialectics of “doing” and “showing” is relevant only to the symbolic version of Hilbert’s
formal Axiomatic Method but not to the “informal” version of this method presented in Hilbert’s
Foundations 1899. Although all main features of Foundations of 1899 are present in the new
Foundations of 1934, these new Foundations have some new features which significantly change
the whole picture.
In this context I would like to consider more attentively Hilbert’s algebraic motivation explained
in his Foundations of 1927. Remind that Hilbert suggests thinking of his ideal propositions
(represented by formulas) after the pattern of algebraic “ideal objects” like
√−1. In 2.4 I have
tried to explain the analogy (after Hilbert) but now I would like to stress a point where it
fails: while in algebra manipulations with symbols represent manipulations with ideal objects in
Hilbert’s formal setting manipulations with symbols represent logical inferences and other logical
operation, which allows one to say different things about ideal objects but not manipulate with
them.
Let me demonstrate this point with two historical examples. Consider, first, the following inter-
esting passage from Arnauld’s New Elements of 1683 :
What cannot be multiplied by its nature can be multiplied through a mental fiction
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where the truth presents itself as certainly as in a real multiplication. In order to
learn the distance covered during 10 hours by one who covers 24 lieu per 8 hours I
multiply through a mental fiction 10 hours by 24 lieu that gives me the imaginary
product of 240 hour times lieu, which I divide then by 8 hours and get 30 lieu. By the
same mental fiction one multiplies a surface by another surface even if the product
has 4 dimensions and cannot exist in nature. One may discover many truths through
multiplications of this sort.
People say that this is because the imaginary products can be reduced to lines. [..]
But there is no evidence that [relevant] proofs depend on those lines, which are in
fact wholly alien to them. ([5] p. 38-39, my translation from French)
Traditionally (in particular, in the early Arab algebra) the product of two straight lines is con-
strued as a rectangle having these given lines as its sides; the product of three lines is a solid but
in order to form products of four and more linear factors in this geometrical way one needs higher
dimensions, which according to Arnauld “cannot exist in nature”. Nevertheless he is ready to
consider such higher-dimensional geometrical constructions as useful fictions on equal footing
with products of distances by time intervals, which don’t have any immediate physical inter-
pretation either but are demonstratively useful for calculations. In the last quoted paragraph
Arnauld refers to Descartes’ proposal to construct the multiplication of geometrical magnitudes
differently, so the product of straight lines is again a straight line; in modern words Descartes’
definition of multiplication of straight lines makes this operation algebraically closed. (Descartes
uses an auxiliary line 1 as a unit and then considers similar triangles with sides 1, a, b, c such that
1
a =
b
c , which gives him the wanted definition of c = ab, see [40]) Arnauld finds this trick artificial
and unnecessary. What makes him confident about higher-dimensional geometrical products and
quasi-physical units like hour times lieu is the symbolic algebraic calculus supporting these oth-
erwise problematics notions. Using this symbolic calculus one forms the product of four factors
p = abcd as easily as any product of two or three factors. One cannot easily imagine the product
of two surfaces (just like one cannot give a physical sense to hours times lieu) but one can easily
concatenate the string ab and the string cd and think of this operation as multiplication of two
surfaces. Descartes’ alternative definition of the geometrical product aims at providing a “clear
and distinct” intuitive underpinning of this operation that avoids the talk of higher dimensions.
Arnauld finds Descartes’ construction of product unnecessary because in his eyes the symbolic
calculus provides such an intuitive underpinning by itself. The “proofs” that Arnauld mentions
in this context are nothing but symbolic calculations.
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Now consider this passage from MacLaurin’s Treatise of Fluxions of 1742 where the author shows
how the symbolic algebra allows for operating with Newton’s fluxions in a precise way in spite
of the “obstruse” intuitive nature of those things.
The improvement that have been made by it [the doctrine of fluxions] [..] are in a
great measure owing to a facility, conciseness, and great extend of the method of
computation, or algebraic part. It is for the sake of these advantages that so many
symbols are employed in algebra. [..] [Algebra] may have been employed to cover,
under a complication of symbols, obstruse doctrines, that could not bear the light so
well in a plain geometrical form; but, without doubt, obscurity may be avoided in
this art as well as in geometry, by defining clearly the import and use of the symbols,
and proceeding with care afterwards.
(quoted by [27], v2, p. 330)
The above passages from Arnauld and MacLaurin well illustrate Hilbert’s remarks in his Foun-
dations of 1927 where he stresses an epistemic impact of the “formal method of albera” (see
above). Let us however compare the above historical examples with Hilbert and Bernay’s new
symbolic axioms for plane Euclidean geometry found in the Foundations of 1934. This new set of
axioms involves a single type of primitive objects called points (instead of two types specified in
the Foundations of 1899) and two primitive ternary relations Gr(x, y, z) and Zw(x, y, z), which
are informally interpreted as points x, y, z lie on the same straight line (Gr stands for German
Gerade) and point y lies between point x and point z (Zw stands for German zwischen). The
First Axiom reads:
(x)(y)Gr(x, x, y)
that translates into the prose as follows:
all points x, y lie on the same line
(prefix (x) in Hilbert’s notation reads “for all x”). Using this axiom, other geometrical axioms
expressed similarly, logical axioms and, finally, the appropriate deductive rules (which in the
given symbolic setting are syntactic rules allowing for building new formulas from some given
formulas) one may formally derive certain theorems (which are some new formulas generated from
the axioms by the given rules). However this formal deduction does not allow for constructing
any new geometrical object: remind that “an axiomatic theory refers to a fixed system of things
(or several such systems), and for all predicates of the propositions of the theory, this fixed
system of things constitutes a delimited domain of subjects, about which hold propositions of
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the given theory”12 The only way of producing new ideal objects within the formal axiomatic
framework is to suggest a new system of axioms and assure its consistency. This is very unlike
the way, in which the ideal objects are produced in the traditional symbolic algebra. Arnauld first
takes it for granted that the product of three straight lines is a parallelepiped; next he represents
the straight lines by symbols a, b, c and represents their product (i.e., the parallelepiped) by the
string abc (I modernize his notation slightly but this is not essential here). Then he considers
string abcd, thinks how to interpret it geometrically and gets a vague idea of a 4-dimensional
object that “cannot exist in nature”. Since the algebraic rules of multiplication do not limit the
number of factors 4-element strings turn to be just as well-manageable as 3-elements strings.
Thus one may safely operate with 4-dimensional and n-dimensional parallelepipeds symbolically,
no matter how “ideal” such things appear to the geometrical intuition. A symbolic construction,
namely the concatenating of four primitive symbols (letters), represents here an ideal geometrical
construction (the construction of 4-dimensional parallelepiped).
Hilbert’s symbolic constructions unlike Arnauld’s and MacLaurin’s symbolic constructions rep-
resent not ideal constructions themselves but propositions and systems of propositions “about”
ideal objects. This makes Hilbert’s ideal objects (i.e., all mathematical objects except syntac-
tic objects) fundamentally non-constructive like Plato’s “ideal numbers” (see 5.4 below). One
may stipulate their existence by adopting appropriate axioms (keeping in mind the consistency
requirement) but one cannot construct them from simpler elements. In 3.3 I argue that this
feature of Hilbert’s formalism makes it inappropriate for building mathematical theories useful
in sciences.
For further references I shall call the Axiomatic Method as it is described in Hilbert’s Foundations
of 1927 [100] and implemented in the Foundations of 1934-39 [106] by the name of Formal
Axiomatic Method and call the procedure of reconstruction of mathematics with this method the
formalization of mathematics. It is essential for what follows not to confuse this specific notion
of formalization with any other notion that can be occasionally called by the same name.
A modernized version of Formal Axiomatic Method, which includes basics of the modern model
theory, is presented (together with a philosophical underpinning) in Tarski’s textbook [233]. A
more detailed historical study of the Axiomatic Method would require an analysis of this and
many other similar works but this task is out of the scope of the present book. I focus my
12One may suggest that this method allows for introducing new objects defined as classes (or sets) of points
satisfying holding certain relations definable in terms of the primitive relations; for example a straight line can
be tentatively defined as a class of points such that any three points x, y, z of this class hold relation Gr(x, y, z).
However in fact the formal deduction cannot be interpreted in this ay because in the given setting a class of
things does not count as a new thing. So one needs a background set theory for following this suggestion.
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attention on Hilbert’s work because for my purposes it is essential to analyze how ideas emerge
and less essential to study how they solidify and become an orthodoxy.
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Chapter 3
Formal Axiomatic Method and
the 20th Century Mathematics
The Formal Axiomatic Method has been proposed by Hilbert about a century ago and it is
appropriate to ask how it performed during the past century. It appears to me that its impact
is somewhat controversial. On the one hand, during this time period the Formal Axiomatic
Method was and still remains the standard method of theory-building in eyes of logicians and
logically-minded mathematicians, physicists, biologists and philosophers. On the same side of
the scale I put the progress in the logico-mathematical investigations (some of which use the
title of foundations of mathematics), which apply this method in some form. Finally, in some
form this method is widely used in the current educational practice. (I specify the relevant
forms of the Axiomatic Method below in this Chapter.) But on the other hand, one can also
observe that by this date the Formal Axiomatic Method had no significant effect on either in
the mainstream mathematics or in natural sciences, which remained largely “informal”; none of
recent significant advances in mathematics (like the recent proof of Poincare´ conjecture) used
formal logical methods.
So the today’s situation is somewhat schizophrenic. When Hilbert in his Foundations of 1927
suggested his Formal Axiomatic Method as the “basic instrument of all research” ([100], p. 467)
he really meant it, and this clearly did not happen. At the same time most mathematicians and
logicians (as well as many philosophers and a few physicists) agree that the Axiomatic Method
is useful; some of these people also believe that this method is indispensable in their discipline.
When they are asked what do they really mean by Axiomatic Method they likely refer to the
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modern axiomatic set theory or to another example of axiomatic theory built by Hilbert’s method.
If we now ask mathematicians and physicists how it is possible that the Axiomatic Method plays
an important role in their discipline without having any clearly visible effect on it the most
popular answer will be likely this: the Axiomatic Method matters only in the foundations of
science while the mainstream science cares very little about its own foundations. At that point
philosophers and logicians join the discussion and argue like this. It is, of course, not normal
that the foundations of your science are not properly taken care of. But this is understandable
because you, guys, have a lot of other things to do. And perhaps you are not quite qualified for
the job because the foundations is a somewhat philosophical and logical subject. So forget about
foundations and leave this subject to us and give us in return some jobs at mathematical and
physical departments. We shall take care about the foundations and you will do the rest.
I am not satisfied by this division of labor (even if I have a philosophical interest to mathematics
and don’t mind a job at a mathematical department) because, in my view, it produces a wrong
notion of foundation of a discipline, which allows a foundation to be wholly detached from the
discipline itself. A notion of foundation that seems me satisfactory is described by Lawvere and
Rosebrugh in the following words:
A foundation makes explicit the essential general features, ingredients, and operations
of a science, as well as its origins and generals laws of development. The purpose of
making these explicit is to provide a guide to the learning, use, and further devel-
opment of the science. A “pure” foundation that forgets this purpose and pursues a
speculative “foundations” for its own sake is clearly a nonfoundation. ([163], p.235)
Having this Lawvere’s notion of foundations of mathematics in mind I cannot reserve for Hilbert’s
Axiomatic Method a place in foundations of today’s mathematics until I can see more clearly the
role of this method in a broader mathematical context. In the following Section I consider the
case of “speculative foundations”, i.e., the 20th century research of formal axiomatic set theories,
and in the next Section the case of Bourbaki’s mathematics, which is not wholly “speculative”
in that sense because it has an important continuing impact on mathematical education and re-
flects some important features (even if ignores some other important features) of the mainstream
mathematics of the second half of the 20th century. We shall see that although in both cases
the Formal Axiomatic Method plays a central role, in neither of these case this method is used
as intended by Hilbert. In the second half of this Chapter I shall do two other things: first,
put forward an argument explaining why the Formal Axiomatic Method is not quite appropri-
ate for natural sciences and, second, discuss an unusual application of this method by Tarski,
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which I consider as a step towards the rethinking of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method in Lawvere’s
work.
3.1 Set Theory
Remind the notion of system of things required by the Formal Axiomatic Method. Can one pro-
vide a formal axiomatic theory of such systems? Unless one assumes that a system U of systems
of things is an element of itself this project does not involve a circularity but provides a somewhat
restricted notion of system of things (as an element of U) that can serve for developing various
formal axiomatic theories on the top of the formal theory of U . This anachronistic description of
Zermelo’s idea to axiomatize set theory explains why and how the later development of Hilbert’s
formal approach to foundations of mathematics involved not only the Formal Axiomatic Method
itself but also the axiomatic theory of sets1.
Since Zermelo’s pioneering works in the axiomatic set theory the mainstream research in set
theory focused on studies of various formal theories of sets of models of such theories. This
makes set theory a rare and arguably the most important example of a modern mathematical
theory developed wholly within a formal axiomatic setting. So in order to see how the Formal
Axiomatic Method works in today’s mathematics it is useful to consider the case of set theory
quite independently from any foundational claims made about this theory. For being more
concrete let us consider Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis (CH), which in 1900 has been listed by
Hilbert [97] as the number one among 23 open mathematical problems that Hilbert at that time
judged to be the most important2.
CH is a very peculiar example of mathematical problem because today there is still no common
opinion as to whether this problem is solved or still remains open! And this peculiar situation is
obviously due to the fact that the modern set theory unlike (almost) the rest of mathematics is
developed in a formal axiomatic setting. The story in brief is the following. In 1938 Go¨del [77]
discovered that ZF (which is an improved version of Zermelo’s axiomatic theory of sets so called
after the names of Zermelo and Fraenkel [1]) is consistent with CH by building a model of ZF
in which CH holds. In 1963 Cohen [34] discovered that ZF is also consistent with the negation
1Zermelo’s principal motivation for axiomatizing set theory was saving Cantor’s so-called “naive” set theory
from paradoxes [194]
2The Continuum Hypothesis conjectured by Cantor states that there is no cardinal number strictly bigger
than the minimal infinite cardinal number ℵ0 (which can be described as the “number of all natural numbers”)
and strictly smaller that the cardinal number 2ℵ0 of the set of all subsets of some set having the cardinal number
ω (for example, the set of all series of natural numbers, including infinite series). Number 2ℵ0 has been identified
by Cantor with the number of points on a given continuous line or surface; hence the name of this conjecture
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of CH by building a model of ZF in which CH does not hold. So it is well established today
that neither CH nor its negation can be derived from the axioms of ZF [138]. What remains
controversial is whether or not this independence result provides a definite answer to the original
question by allowing one to claim that the original question is ill-posed. An additional axiom -
or some wholly new system of axioms for set theory - may eventually help, of course, to settle
the problem in the sense that CH or its negation can be deduced from the new system of axioms.
There are obvious trivial “solutions” of this sort like considering CH itself as an axiom. Then,
however, it remains to show that the system of axiom for set theory solving the CH problem is
a “right” one, and so the proposed solution is “genuine”. I cannot see how this can be done on
purely mathematical grounds; any possible argument to the effect that one system of axioms for
set theory is “more natural” than some other has a speculative nature and lacks any objective
validity. Even if one gets some non-trivial proof of CH from some system of axioms that appear
to be in some sense natural one can hardly claim that this system of axioms is the “right one”
solely because it solves the CH problem and because such a proposed solution is smart and
elegant. Although this situation is not unprecedented and may be compared, in particular, with
the fate of the Problem of Parallels in geometry of the 19th century (see 7.3 below) it makes a
sharp contrast with the mainstream mathematics that still manages to provide yes-no answers
to many well-posed questions.
It may be argued that the formal axiomatic framework makes explicit a relativistic nature of
mathematics, which we should learn to live with; according to this viewpoint it is pointless to ask
whether CH is true or false without further qualifications, and all that mathematicians can do
is to study which axioms do imply CH (modulo some specified rules of inference), which axioms
imply its negation, and which do neither (like the axioms of ZF). More generally, the only thing
that mathematics can do according to this point of view is to provide true propositions of the
if - then form: if such-and-such propositions are true then certain other propositions are also
true. I cannot see how such a deductive relativism (or “if-thenism”) about mathematics can
be sustainable. It is incompatible not only with the common mathematical practice but also,
more specifically, with the current practice of studying formal axiomatic systems. Denote S the
proposition saying that CH is independent from the axioms of ZF (in the sense that neither S nor
its negation can be derived from these axioms). S is commonly seen as an established theorem on
a par with any other firmly established mathematical theorem. However S is not expressed in the
if - then form; it is expressed as an “absolute” mathematical truth about ZF and CH, which does
not refer to any particular formal framework. The proof of S (that comprises the construction
76
of Go¨del’s model L verifying CH and Cohen’s forcing construction falsifying CH) is a piece of
rather sophisticated “usual” or “informal” mathematics but not a formal inference within certain
axiomatic theory. So a consistent if-thenist would not hold without further qualifications that CH
is independent from the axioms of ZF but rather say that it depends of one’s assumptions.
Remind that Hilbert’s foundational project of 1927 was supported by the hypothesis according
to which all metamathematical questions concerning the consistency and the independency of
axioms expressed in a formal language were trivial or, to put it more precisely, treatable by
finitary means. And we know today this hypothesis is false. When people suggest today ZF
as a foundation of mathematics they no longer hope to prove the consistency of this formal
theory (since such a proof requires a stronger metatheory) but rather take a pragmatic attitude
according to which this theory can be used unless one eventually discovers that it is contradic-
tory; if this happens there are always ways of modifying the axioms of ZF that may block the
eventual contradiction. As I have already said the known proofs of S are far from being trivial
or finitary.
Thus in spite of the fact that that the modern set theory no longer considers sets naively but
works instead with various formal axiomatic theories of sets this modern theory like any other
modern mathematical theory relies on non-formalized proofs. What is specific for the modern
set theory is its object rather than its method. Instead of studying sets “directly” in the same
way in which, say, group-theorists study groups, set-theorists study formal axiomatic theories
of sets. However the methods used by modern set-theorists are not essentially different from
methods used in other parts of today’s mathematics. It remains in my sense an open question
whether or not such a roundabout way of studying sets has indeed proved effective. True, at the
present there is no clear alternative to it. However it is not inconceivable that in the near future
the mathematical community may bring about an improved “naive” concept of set that would
allow one to study sets like groups. It is not inconceivable that such an old-fashioned way of
thinking about sets could after all allow for a real progress in the CH problem. In any event it
seems me important to keep such a possibility open and not try to take it out of the table using
philosophical arguments.
The distinction between a theory and metatheory (and, more generally, between mathematics
and metamathematics, which dates back to Hilbert, is helpful for making things clearer. In mod-
ern set theory a theory is ZF or another formal axiomatic theory while proofs of independence
of CH from the axioms of ZF and similar results belong to a meta-theory that tell us impor-
tant things about formal axiomatic theories. I would like, however, to stress here the fact that
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this terminology, which remains standard in the community of people working in foundations
of mathematics, is heavily philosophically-laden and overtly clashes with the language in which
the wider mathematical community usually describes its own activities. Namely, the distinc-
tion between mathematics and metamathematics implies the view according to which formal
axiomatic theories are “usual” mathematical theories while metatheories belong to a special do-
main of metamathematics that lays somehow “beyond” the usual mathematics and has some
philosophical flavor. But if we leave now philosophy aside and describe the same subject-matter
in the language of mathematicians we come to a different view: formal axiomatic theories are not
mathematical theories in the usual sense of the word while their corresponding metatheories are
comparable with “usual” theories from any other area of mathematics! This linguistic confusion
reflects a gap between what today’s mathematics is and what in the opinion of certain people
it must be. In any event it seems me essential to fix it by suggesting a more neutral language.
By the analogy with the distinction between an object language and a metalanguage in formal
semantics I suggest to use the term “object-theory” for what in formal axiomatic studies (but
not in the rest of mathematics) is usually called simply a “theory” 3.
One may argue as follows. True, any formal object-theory requires some supporting informal
metatheory. True, metatheories are, generally, sophisticated. But metatheories can be formal-
ized in their turn and studied with the metametatheories. Although this regress is potentially
infinite and is not going to lead us to any ultimate self-evident ground it nevertheless deepens
our understanding of foundations of mathematics. Although informal instruments cannot be
then wholly taken away like the Wittgenstein’s ladder they can be viewed as a part of general
philosophical underpinning of mathematics rather than as a part of mathematics proper4.
Once again I claim that the above view is based on an a priori idea about mathematics and
its foundations that is not justified neither by the old nor by the recent mathematical practice.
First of all it confuses firm (meta)mathematical results like the independence of CH with a gen-
eral philosophical discussion. It reflects an existing trend in the Analytic philosophy of mixing
mathematical and speculative arguments indiscriminately, which is rejected by the majority of
mathematicians who do not want to allow for philosophical speculation in mathematical papers.
3Remind from 2.4 that Hilbert’s distinction between real and ideal mathematical objects translates into
Hilbert’s distinction between (contentual) mathematics and metamathematics as follows: mathematics stud-
ies ideal objects with a help real syntactic constructions; metamathematics studies real syntactic constructions
without using anything ideal. This, remind, was Hilbert’s original idea supposed to help mathematics to “get real”
without leaving the ideal “Cantor’s Paradise”. When in the light of Go¨de’s incompleteness theorems and other
developments it became clear that metamathematics cannot do solely with finitary means, some limited “ideal
content” - i.e., some more advanced mathematical content - was allowed in it. The title of “The Mathematics of
Metamathematics” appeared in 1969 [202] perfectly illustrates this shift, which has relaxed the boundary between
mathematics and metamathematics.
4A similar view is developed by Shapiro in [227]
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I support this rejection from the philosophers’ side and insist that although philosophical specu-
lation and mathematics may indeed fertilize each other they must be carefully distinguished and
kept apart. The fact that metamathematical results are obtained “informally” does not preclude
them to be firm and mathematically valid; such results must be sharply distinguished from their
philosophical interpretations, which do not have and cannot possibly have any objective validity.
Second of all the above view once again takes it for granted that a formalized object-theory is
a self-standing mathematical theory. This seems me very dubious. Metamathematical results
concerning ZF and and its likes make the core content of the modern set theory rather than only
a foundation of this theory, which can be left aside unless one has a special interest in studying
foundations (while philosophical interpretations can and should be left aside when one works in
set theory as a mathematician).
Thus we can see that even in set theory where formal methods are applied systematically the
(metamathematical) informal methods remain essential. Let us now see how the Axiomatic
Method applies in the modern mathematics outside set theory and mathematical logic.
3.2 Bourbaki
The multi-volumed Elements of Mathematics [23] produced in 1939-1998 by a group of (mainly
French) mathematicians using the pseudoname Nicolas Bourbaki is the most recent serious at-
tempt to write a self-contained compendium of the core contemporary mathematics after the
Euclid’s example (interpreted liberally)5. Although Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 fall under the
same description the two works differ in their purpose. Remind that Hilbert’s work of 1899 is
focused on the Euclidean geometry, which in the end of the 19th century was already only a rela-
tively small part of what was commonly known under the name of geometry in the mathematical
community. Hilbert rebuilt here an old theory with a new Axiomatic Method, clarified the log-
ical structure of this old theory, and left it to other people to do a similar job for more recent
theories like the Riemanian geometry (see for example Veblen and Whitehead [243]). So in his
Foundations of 1899 Hilbert presented a method allegedly applicable everywhere in mathematics
and beyond, but unlike Euclid he did not try in this work to account for basic mathematical
concepts sufficient for developing the rest of his contemporary mathematics. Bourbaki in his
turn like Euclid aims at providing a genuine self-contained introduction into the contemporary
5The original French title is Ele´ments de mathe´matique, which uses the unusual singular form “ mathe´matique”
(while the usual French word for mathematics is “mathe´matiques”). So a more accurate English translation of
the title is Elements of Mathematic. This unusual singular form of the word is supposed to stressed Bourbaki’s
aim of the unification of mathematics.
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mathematics, which systematically presents not only its method but also its basic content. A
concise general description of this project, which makes explicit some grounding ideas behind it,
has been published in 1950 as a separate article [24]
The section of this article named “Logical Formalism and the Axiomatic Method” begins as
follows:
After more or less evident bankruptcy of the different systems [..] it looked, at the
beginning of the present [20th] century as if the attempt had just about been aban-
doned to conceive of mathematics as a science characterized by a definitely specified
purpose and method; instead there was a tendency to look upon mathematics as a
“collection of disciplines based on particular, exactly specified concepts”, interrelated
by “a thousand roads of communications” [..] [quoted by the author from [165], p.447]
Today, we believe however that the internal evolution of mathematical science has,
in spite of appearance, brought about a closer unity among its different parts, so
as to create something like a central nucleus that is more coherent than it has ever
been. The essential aspect of this evolution has been the systematic study of the
relation existing between different mathematical theories, and which has led to what
is generally known as the “axiomatic method.” ([24], p.222)
After this recognition of the unifying power of the Axiomatic Method Bourbaki makes an inter-
esting move by distinguishing between the logical aspect of the Axiomatic Method from another
aspect, which can be called structural (see Chapter 8); in Bourbaki’s view this is the latter rather
than former aspect that makes the Axiomatic Method a powerful instrument of the unification;
as we shall now see Bourbaki points here to his proper version of Axiomatic Method rather than
Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method in its original form as described in the last Chapter:
[E]very mathematical theory is a concatenation of propositions, each one derived from
the preceding ones in conformity with the rules of a logical system [..] It is therefore
a meaningless truism to say that this “deductive reasoning” is a unifying principle
for mathematics. [..] [I]t is the external form which the mathematician gives to his
thought, the vehicle which makes it accessible to others, in short, the language suited
to mathematicians; this is all, no further significance should be attached to it.
What the axiomatic method sets as its essential aim, is exactly that which logical
formalism by itself cannot supply, namely the profound intelligibility of mathematics.
[..] Where the superficial observer sees only two, or several, quite distinct theories,
lending one another “unexpected support” [quoted by the author from [165], p.446]
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through the intervention of a mathematician of genius, the axiomatic method teaches
us to look for the deep-lying reasons for such a discovery, to find the common ideas of
these theories, buried under the accumulation of details properly belonging to each
of them, to bring these ideas forward and to put them in their proper light. ([24],
p.223)
In order to illustrate his point Bourbaki uses the example of the “abstract” group theory; the
author describes here this theory as an axiomatic theory construed after the pattern of Hilbert’s
Foundations of 1899 [109] as a system of things, which are subject to the following three axioms
(modulo a slight change Bourbaki’s original notion).
G1: x ◦ (y ◦ z) = (x ◦ y) ◦ z (associativity of ◦)
G2: there exists an item 1 (called unit) such that for all x x ◦ 1 = 1 ◦ x = x
G3: for all x there exists x−1 (called inverse of x) such that x ◦ x−1 = x−1 ◦ x = 1.
A system of things satisfying these axioms as called a group. Expression x ◦ y = z stands here
for an abstract binary algebraic operation, which in the given context is to be understood as
a (uninterpreted) logical ternary relation R(x, y, z) having this special property: if x = x′ and
y = y′ then R(x, y, z)↔ R(x′, y′, z) (which means informally that the output of the operation is
uniquely determined by its input).
The above axiomatic theory of groups (which I shall denote GT for further references) have
various interpretations, which were known and studied before GT the rise of Hilbert’s Axiomatic
Method: by interpreting variables x, y, z, as invertible geometrical transformations (like motion)
and interpreting the operation ◦ as composition of these transformation one gets the notion
of group of geometrical transformation; by interpreting variables x, y, z, as whole numbers and
interpreting ◦ as + (addition of whole numbers) one gets the additive group of whole numbers,
etc. Such examples belong to different domains of mathematics and many of them play some
significant role in their proper domains. But until GT was axiomatically formulated as above
6 and until it brought about the precise general notion of group those examples could not be
understood as instances and special cases of one and the same thing (for no such thing was
known yet!) and the links between these different groups, which were eventually guessed by
some smart mathematicians, looked as unsystematic and sometimes even mysterious. Thus in
this case the Axiomatic Method helps to bring about the new powerful mathematical concept of a
6As Bourbaki notices here GT can be defined through different axioms. What determines the identity of this
theory is its set of true propositions (including both axioms and theorems inferred from these axioms) but not a
given set of axioms.
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group and develop the corresponding general theory, which unifies a large spectrum of significant
mathematical results from different areas of mathematics.
As we see Bourbaki points here on a general phenomenon, which is not specific to the Axiomatic
Method (and moreover to Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method), namely to the mathematical
concept-building and its unifying role. Such basic mathematical concepts as number, figure and
the like can be similarly seen as abstractions generalizing upon more specific examples like sets
of dots or sets of strokes (for number) and circles, polygons, etc. (for figures). Although the
generalization upon and abstraction from specific features of previously known examples is not
the only way in which emerge new mathematical concepts this way of emergence is a major one.
And in Bourbaki’s example it works through the Axiomatic Method. Let us see how it works
more attentively.
First of all we need to distinguish between two ways in which an axiomatic theory unifies its
content. When a set of contentual propositions is logically deduced from certain propositions
belonging to the same set and chosen as axioms this unifies all these propositions into a single
(contentual) theory. As we have seen Bourbaki recognizes this fact but in the last quote he clearly
points to a different way of unification, which is equally made possible by the Axiomatic Method.
This different way of unification is made possible by the formal character of Axiomatic Method,
where “formal” is to be understood in the sense of Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 rather than in
the sense of his Foundations of 1927 [100] (which is referred to in the above quote in the expression
“logical formalism”). This second axiomatic unification amounts to the following: a formal (as
opposed to contentual) axiomatic theory unifies its interpretations (models) by identifying certain
common features of these interpretations and abstracting from all other specific features of those
interpretations. The usual talk of interpretation of a given formal theory takes it for granted that
the formal theory is given first and interpreted next. Now we reverse the perspective and consider
the (would-be) interpretations as given (as contentual mathematical theories and fragments of
such theories) and then think how to make up a formal theory, which captures common features
of these things and thus unifies them. The example of GT is used by Bourbaki to illustrate the
latter but not the former way of unification.
Thus Bourbaki shows - in my view quite correctly - that the Formal Axiomatic Method has a
unifying capacity, which is absent from contentual versions of the Axiomatic Method. However
Bourbaki’s version of Axiomatic Method is not identical to Hilbert’s! Let me now describe the
difference.
As an example of a theorem of GT Bourbaki mentions this proposition P:
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For all x, y, z if x ◦ y = x ◦ z then y = z
which follows from G1 - G3 almost immediately. I claim that the simplicity of this example does
not allow it to represent correctly Bourbaki’s Axiomatic Method. Notice that among objects of
GT there is no (abstract) groups just like among objects of Euclidean (3D) geometry developed
in Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 there is no such thing as (3D) Euclidean space. As a system
of things (model) of GT any group is a domain where all axioms and theorems of GT hold;
objects of this theory are elements of the given group but not this group itself. But Bourbaki’s
theory of (abstract) groups (see [23] vol. 2, Chapter 1, Section 6) like any other presentation of
this theory does treat groups as its objects, distinguishes between different groups, classify them
and makes various constructions with them. Notice that GT by itself does not allow one even
to formulate the notion of subgroup! Take also in consideration that GT is not categorical (in
the usual model-theoretic sense of the term), which simply amounts to saying that not all groups
are isomorphic. So axioms G1 - G3 provide nothing but the general notion of abstract group
and in this sense can be compared with a definition of some traditional mathematical object
like triangle; theorems of GT like P are to be compared with propositions like “all triangles
have three angles” implied by the definition of triangle. Remind the famous passage from Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason that has been already quoted above
“Give a philosopher the concept of triangle and let him try to find out in his way
how the sum of its angles might be related to a right angle. He has nothing but the
concept of figure enclosed by three straight lines, and in it the concept of equally
many angles. Now he may reflect on his concept as long as he wants, yet he will
never produce anything new. He can analyze and make distinct the concept of a
straight line, or of an angle, or of the number three, but he will not come upon any
other properties that do not already lie in these concepts. But now let the geometer
take up this question. He begins at once to construct a triangle .... In such a way
through a chain of inferences that is always guided by intuition, he arrives at a fully
illuminated and at the same time general solution of the question.” (Critique of Pure
Reason [130], A 716 / B 744)
Kant’s point apparently applies to the case of group theory too. Although there are some general
truths like P which logically follow from the concept of group (i.e., from axioms G1 - G3) those
truths are of little mathematical interest. The genuine mathematical work in the (abstract)
group theory begins when groups are conceived of (or “constructed”) as individual objects. In
this way mathematicians prove non-trivial facts about groups that do not follow from G1 - G3
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alone (the mathematical reader may think of Lagrange’s theorem for a simple example). I do not
mean to suggest here that Kant’s philosophy of mathematics in its original form fully applies to
the modern mathematics in general and to the modern group theory in particular. So we need
to study more precisely how groups and other modern mathematical concepts are constructed as
objects; this issue will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 8. However already at this point it is
clear that GT by itself no more deserves the name of group theory than a definition of triangle
deserves the name of a theory of triangle. Kant’s point about the proper geometrical study of
triangles and a “philsophical” study of triangles that seeks to get the relevant knowledge directly
from definitions (see 1.3 above) is perfectly relevant in the case of group theory!
Before I make explicit the way in which groups and other mathematical concepts are constructed
as (mathematical) objects I need to clarify a widespread terminological ambiguity. Bourbaki
call abstract groups abstract by the contrast with such “concrete” examples of groups as the
additive group of whole numbers, the group of Euclidean motions and the like. This way of
distinguishing between the abstract and the concrete in mathematics is specific for the given
mathematical context and should not be confused to the general distinction between abstract
concepts and concrete instants of those concepts, which is applicable everywhere in mathematics
and beyond. The former distinction describes a way of obtaining some mathematical concepts
from some others: given the concept of the additive group, the concept of group of Euclidean
motions, the concept of group of permutations, etc., one forms the general concept of group
through abstraction from certain specific features of each of these examples. The obtained
concept of so-called abstract group like any other mathematical concept may be though of both
in abstracto, i.e., as a self-standing non-represented concept, and in in concreto as represented
by an individual object or a set of such objects. The confusion between the two senses of
“abstract” and “concrete” in mathematics is not without a reason; it can be explained by the
fact that at certain points of history certain concepts obtained through abstraction from earlier
known mathematical concepts cannot be immediately represented in concreto, and so remain
speculative rather than genuinely mathematical until they get supported by newly developed
corresponding modes of representation. In Chapter 8 below I show more precisely how this
dialectics of abstract and concrete works in the history of mathematics. Notice that the title of
“abstract group theory” used by Bourbaki in 1950 today is an anachronism: what Bourbaki in
1950 calls an “abstract group” today is commonly called simply a group.
Let’s now see what kind of representation of the abstract group concept is used by Bourbaki in
their volume on algebra, which includes the group theory. Like in other similar cases they use
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for it a set-theoretic representation; the relevant set theory is developed in the first volume of
Bourbaki’s Elements (I shall tell more about it shortly.) Crucially, the set-theoretic representa-
tion does not reduce to interpreting GT in set theory. One gets a set-theoretic model of GT
by interpreting variables x, y, z, as elements of some set G and interpreting the group operation
◦ in terms of Cartesian product of sets which reduces it to the primitive set-theoretic relation
of membership. However such a model of GT is nothing but one particular group G but not a
domain where live all groups accounted for by group theory! So the group theory as developed
in Bourbaki’s Elements is not just an interpreted version of GT but a theory of set-theoretic
models of GT developed on the basis of (Bourbaki’s) set theory. Thus all Bourbaki’s groups
live in an universe of sets (that interprets their set theory). The same is the case for objects
(structures) of other sorts treated in Bourbaki’s Elements. In this sense set theory qualifies as a
foundation of all Bourbaki’s mathematics.
We see that Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method is used by Bourbaki in a very peculiar way, which is not
made clear by Bourbaki’s remark about the Axiomatic Method in his paper of 1950 [24]. Namely,
the Hilbert-style axiomatic theory of groups GT is used by Bourbaki for defining objects of their
theory of groups, which is not an informal version of GT but something quite different! Objects
of this sort Bourbaki call structures. Formal Axiomatic Method involves the idea that isomorphic
structures are essentially the same. Thus Bourbaki’s structures have a double identity criterion:
in one sense the identity of a given structure is given by the identity of its underlying set (which is
formally treated in the corresponding set theory) and in a different sense the identity of structures
is their isomorphism. In Chapter 8 we shall see how this conceptual tension translates into a
philosophical controversy between structuralism and set-theoretic substantialism. The issue of
identity of structures will be also discussed in Part 2 of this book. Here I would like to stress
that the peculiar way, in which Bourbaki applies Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method, allows Bourbaki’s
mathematics to fit (by and large) the pattern of traditional mathematics, where mathematical
concepts are represented by individual objects.
Let us now look at Bourbaki’s set theory presented in the first volume of his Elements [23]. This
theory follows the formal method of Hilbert’s Foundations of 1927 closer than any other known
to me axiomatic exposition of set theory. The First Chapter of the volume, which has the title
Description of Formal Mathematics, begins with an account of signs and assemblies (strings) of
signs provided with a definition of mathematical theory according to which a theory
... contains rules which allow us to assert that certain assemblies of signs are terms or
relations of the theory, and other rules which allow us to assert that certain assemblies
85
are theorems of the theory. (quoted by English translation [25], p. 16)
Then follows a description of operations that allow for constructing new assemblies of signs from
some given assemblies; the simplest operation of this sort is the concatenation of two given assem-
blies A,B into a new assembly AB. On such a purely syntactic basis Bourbaki introduces some
logical concepts necessary for a formal axiomatic treatment of set theory. Although Bourbaki’s
version of axiomatic set theory is not identical to ZF it is similar in its character; the differences
between the two ways of formalizing set theory are not relevant to the present discussion and I
leave them aside. The general Bourbaki’s strategy in set theory is to develop formally all set-
theoretic concepts used in various specific theories treated in other volumes after the pattern of
group theory, so that all these specific theories appear as (or can be translated into) fragments
of the formal Set-theory.
As a matter of fact the formal notation used in the first volume never reappears in the following
volumes, so the possibility of translation of specific theories into the formal set theory remains
theoretical and is never explicitly explored. Instead the formal set theory presented in the first
volume Bourbaki everywhere else uses its informal version, which is systematically exposed in an
unpublished draft of the first volume of the Elements [22]. After a philosophical introduction the
author introduces (informally) the concept of fundamental set and the relation of membership
between sets and their elements. (The author calls a set fundamental in order to distinguish a
well-defined set concept from a more general notion of collection.) Then the author introduces
(with the usual informal notation) the concept of subset, which is the subject to the following
axiom:
Any predicate of type A defines a subset of A; any subset of A can be defined through
a predicate of type A. ([22], p.7, hereafter my translation from French)
(Predicate of type A is a predicate P such that for every element a of set A P (a) has a definite
truth-value. The subset S of set A defined by P consists of such and only of such a for which
P (a) is true.)
Next Bourbaki introduces the concept of complement of a given subset, of powerset P (A) of a
given set A (i.e., the set of all subsets of A); of union, intersection and cartesian product of
sets (described as operations on sets), of relation and function between sets. Having these basic
concepts in his disposal the author says:
In any mathematical theory one begins with a number of fundamental sets, each of
which consists of elements of a certain type that needs to be considered. Then on
86
the basis of types that are already known one introduces new types of elements (for
example, the subsets of a set of elements, pairs of elements) and for each of those
new types of elements one introduces sets of elements of those types.
So one forms a family of sets constructed from the fundamental sets. Those construc-
tions are the following:
1) given set A, which is already constructed, take the set P (A) of the subsets of A;
2) given sets A, B, which are already constructed, take the cartesian product AxB
of these sets.
The sets of objects, which are constructed in this way, are introduced into a theory
step by step when it is needed. Each proof involves only a finite number of sets. We
call such sets types of the given theory; their infinite hierarchy constitutes a scale of
types. ([22], p.43-44)
On this basis the author describes the (informal) concept of structure as follows:
We begin with a number of fundamental sets: A,B,C, ..., L that we call base sets.
To be given a structure on this base amounts to this:
1) be given properties of elements of these sets; 2) be given relations between ele-
ments of these sets; 3) be given a number of types making part of the scale of types
constructed on this base; 4) be given relations between elements of certain types con-
structed on this base; 5) assume as true a number of mutually consistent propositions
about these properties and these relations. ([22], p.44-45)
What I want to stress is the fact that principles of building mathematical theory described in the
Bourbaki’s draft are not so different from Euclid’s: Bourbaki like Euclid begins with principles of
building mathematical objects but not with axioms. Axioms (in the modern sense of the term)
appear only in the very end of the above list (the 5th item) and as I have already argued they
play the role of definitions. While for Euclid the basic data is a finite family of points and the rest
of the geometrical universe is constructed from these points by Postulates for Bourbaki the basic
data is a finite family of sets and the rest is constructed as just described. While for Euclid the
basic type of geometrical object is a figure for Bourbaki the basic type of mathematical object
is a structure. In both cases the constructed objects come with certain propositions that can be
asserted about these objects without proofs because they immediately follow from corresponding
definitions. In both cases the construction of objects is a subject of certain rules but not the
matter of a mere stipulation. In order to continue this analogy one may compare the notion of
isomorphism of structures in Bourbaki with Euclid’s notion of congruence of figures.
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We see that Bourbaki’s mathematics has two different layers. On the ground layer it has a
formal set theory built with Formal Axiomatic Method. But the rest of this mathematics is
developed with an informal notion of set described through constructive postulates like “take
the cartesian product of given sets”, which are similar to Euclid’s Postulates. Calling such
postulates constructive I mean not that they involve only finitary operations (they are obviously
infinitary) but that they are not existential propositions. However the formal theory of sets
provides a theoretical possibility of translating all these informal set-theoretic postulates into
formal existential axioms and ultimately - of translating all of Bourbaki’s mathematics into
strings of symbols operated according to purely syntactic rules, which can be also described as
constructive postulates (about operating with strings of symbols). So this translation allows (in
principle) for replacement of informal set-theoretic infinitary postulates into finitary syntactic
postulates.
It is interesting to observe that the ground set-theoretic layer of Bourbaki’s mathematics is seen
by the author as undesirable; it looks like Bourbaki would be happy to get rid of it but does
not know how to do this exactly. Here is what he says about it in the earlier quoted draft (my
translation from French):
The reader will see that the nature of elements of fundamental sets can be always
easily left undetermined and that this point of view is often useful. From here there
is only one step to thinking that only structure matters and that the true aim of
mathematical theory is a study of structure independently from sets that may rep-
resent it. Perhaps it is indeed possible to study structures themselves and forbid
oneself to consider fundamental sets. However because of the commodity of language
and the invincible habit of mind we take the “ontological” approach, i.e., stipulate
fundamental sets for each theory.
and in his manifesto of 1950 Bourbaki says in a footnote:
We take here a naive point of view and do not deal with the thorny questions, half
philosophical, half mathematical, raised by the problem of the “nature” of the math-
ematical “beings” or “objects”. Suffice it to say that the axiomatic studies of the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries have gradually replaced the initial pluralism of the
mental representation of these “beings” thought of at first as ideal “abstractions” of
sense experiences and retaining all their heterogeneity by an unitary concept, gradu-
ally reducing all the mathematical notions, first to the concept of the natural number
and then, in a second stage, to the notion of set. This latter concept, considered for a
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long time as “primitive” and “undefinable”, has been the object of endless polemics,
as a result of its extremely general character and on account of the very vague type of
mental representation which it calls forth; the difficulties did not disappear until the
notion of set itself disappeared (and with it all the metaphysical pseudo-problems con-
cerning mathematical “beings”) in the light of the recent work on logical formalism.
From this new point of view, mathematical structures become, properly speaking,
the only “objects” of mathematics. ([24], p. 225-226)
Since “the recent work on logical formalism” referred to by Bourbaki in the last quote does not
contain anything that goes beyond Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method these passages are rather
puzzling. A way to understand Bourbaki’s misgivings about set theory is this. A strictly formal
version of the Axiomatic Method like one applied in Bourbaki’s volume on set theory does not
require set theory developed in advance; however except this volume the set theory (namely its
informal version) is used by Bourbaki essentially. So the misgiving may be due to the fact that,
in particular, Bourbaki’s group theory is not a formal theory like GT (which by itself does not
require the notion of set) but a theory of set-theoretic models of GT. Although this fact may
indeed explain Bourbaki’s reference to the “logical formalism” the idea of making structures into
objects is hardly compatible with the Formal Axiomatic Method (for structures determined by
formal axiomatic theories are not objects of their theories). So what Bourbaki really aim at
is not a strictly formal axiomatic treatment of group theory and the rest of mathematics but
rather finding an appropriate replacement for set theory in its role of universal vehicle carrying
all specific mathematical structures. In 8.5 I shall come back to this issue and consider category
theory as such an alternative vehicle.
Coming now back to the question about the role of the Formal Axiomatic Method in the 20th
century mathematics we observe the following. Bourbaki formulated an important part of the
contemporary mathematics in set-theoretic terms and thus showed a theoretical possibility to
formalize this part of mathematics by reducing it to formal axiomatic set theory. However the
Formal Axiomatic Method did not become in Bourbaki’s hands the “basic instrument of all
research” as Hilbert suggested in 1927 ([100], p. 467); it is used instead only for foundational
purposes (notwithstanding the fact that the syntax of Bourbaki’s formal set theory lacks the
intuitive clearness through which Hilbert hoped to ground the infinitary reasoning in mathe-
matics). As an instrument of research and more importantly as an instrument of presenting
a ready-made knowledge in a systematic form Bourbaki uses a different version of Axiomatic
Method, which I have tried to describe in this paragraph. Describing this other method as in-
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formal one should keep in mind that the relevant difference between being formal or informal
is not a matter of degree. As we have seen Bourbaki’s method involves features, which are not
present in Hilbert’s method, in particular the idea of using formal axioms for defining objects of a
given theory rather than developing this theory itself. Another important difference concerns the
doing-showing dilemma. While Formal Axiomatic Method makes mathematical (as distinguished
from metamathematical) reasoning into a (syntactic) construction Bourbaki uses informal set-
theoretic constructions and proves (informally) theorems about these constructions and in this
sense more closely follows Euclid’s example. The fact that this new way of doing-and-showing
can be in principle represented formally should not be, of course, neglected. However it does not
provide any substance to the claim that the Axiomatic Method used by Bourbaki throughout
his Elements qualifies as formal in Hilbert’s sense.
3.3 Galilean Science and Set-Theoretic Foundations of Math-
ematics
Remind from the last Section Bourbaki’s claim according to which “every mathematical theory
is a concatenation of propositions, each one derived from the preceding ones in conformity with
the rules of a logical system”, which the author suggests as self-evident. This is a statement
of what I have called above a mathematical logicism in the large sense and argued that it is
not self-evident at all. In Chapter 1 I have shown that Euclid’s mathematics does not fit the
logicist description of mathematics as a “concatenation of propositions” because in addition to
theorems it contains problems, which aim at constructing some objects rather than prove some
propositions. In 2.4 - 2.6) we have seen that Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method (in the sense of
his Foundations of 1927 and later works) employs a very special form of mathematical logicism,
which reduces a “concatenation of propositions” to a symbolic construction and in this way
assures a fundamental role of mathematical intuition of a special sort. Finally we have observed
that Bourbaki’s mathematics, in fact, is not quite unlike Euclid’s: it cannot be described as
a concatenation of propositions either because it similarly involves constructions of objects of
special sort called structures. The idea of reduction of all constructive postulates to existential
propositions plays a role only at the ground level of the formal set theory, where informal
set-theoretic constructions indeed translate into symbolic constructions (or more precisely, a
possibility of such translation is shown albeit no such translation is actually done). Now I would
like to return to the issue of mathematical logicism and argue that mathematics has a non-
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propositional constructive aspect, which makes possible application of mathematics in empirical
sciences and technology. This view is obviously not original and dates back at least to Kant.
Nevertheless it is appropriate to spell it here again in modern terms.
It is hardly controversial that mathematics deals with forms of possible human experience; in
its simplest and most general form this claim is simply tantamount to saying that mathemat-
ics applies across a wide range of human practices. Today this is even more true than it was
in Kant’s time: crucial technologies, on which depend our well-being, in many ways depend
on mathematical considerations and cannot be sustained and further developed without mathe-
matical expertise; mathematics today makes part of any engineering education. In Kant’s time
the only properly mathematized science was (Newtonian) mechanics; the following progress of
science in the 19th century has brought us to the point when every physical theory deserving
the name has a mathematical aspect. Today physics and chemistry are mathematized and the
mathematization of biology is in progress. Using mathematical models also becomes an usual
practice in social sciences.
Let me now be more specific and ask which general forms of experience are relevant to today’s
science and technology. This question is obviously yet too large and too general to be answered in
any detail here. I would like however to stress only the following point. At least since Galileo’s
times science practices an active intervention of humans into the nature through experiments
rather than a passive observation and description of the observed phenomena. So we are talking
now about the mathematically-laden science where mathematics serves for guiding human inter-
actions with the environment rather than simply for describing how this environment appears to
our senses. As van Fraassen puts this
The real importance of theory, to the working scientist, is that it is a factor in
experimental design. ([57], p. 73)
Thus mathematical forms of possible experience relevant to the modern science are forms of such
possible interactions with the environment rather than only linguistic and logical forms that
allow for spelling out some plausible hypotheses about the world and deriving from them some
consequences according to certain rules. The forms of the latter kind may be sufficient for devel-
oping a speculative science along the older scholastic pattern but they are certainly not sufficient
for developing the modern mathematically-laden science and the modern mathematically-laden
technology.
As far as the pure mathematics is conceived as a domain of abstract logical possibilities the fact
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that mathematics proves “unreasonably effective” [252] in its applications to empirical sciences
and technology remains a complete mystery. The mystery is dissolved as soon as one observes that
mathematics explores not everything that can possibly be the case (which is a hardly observable
domain unless one delimit the sense of “possibly” in one way or another) but rather what we
can possibly do within the limits of our human capacities (which are steadily growing with the
progress of science and technology). What are these limits is a tricky question. On the one hand,
mathematics systematically ignores certain apparent limits by exaggerating relevant capacities:
this is usually called the mathematical idealization. For example, mathematicians pretend that
they can count up to 1010
10 just as easily as up to 10 or that they can draw a straight line between
two stars just as easily as they can draw a line between two points marked on a sheet of paper.
This strategy usually works until the point where the empirical constraints become pressing and
people invent new mathematics that takes these constraints into account as this, for example,
happened when people realized that the old good Euclidean geometry is not appropriate for
describing the physical space at large astronomical scales (in spite of the fact that it still works
amazingly well at the scale of a planetary system like ours). One the other hand, it also happens
that in a real experiment people observe what in terms of the assumed mathematical description
of this experiment qualifies as impossible as this happened in the Michelson-Morley experiment
supposed to measure parameters of the ether flow around the Earth. In such cases people say
that the assumed mathematical description (and hence the corresponding physical theory) is
wrong and look for a new one. Sometimes the suitable mathematics can be found in a nearly
ready-made form and only used for building a new physical theory but sometimes in order to fix
the problem one needs to develop the appropriate mathematics from the outset as this happened
in the history of the electro-magnetism, for example. This picture suggests the view on the pure
mathematics as a proper part of the modern Galilean science.
Russell’s neo-Leibnizian logicism about mathematics promises nothing more and nothing less
than that: to make mathematics a part of logic, so that any mathematical form of possible
experience turns into the form of a proposition (and forms of logical inference of propositions
from some other propositions), which may eventually refer to some experience. Russell’s view
is quite radical in this respect, and many people including Hilbert who were directly involved
into reforming mathematics on the basis of new logic in the beginning of the 20th century didn’t
share Russell’s philosophical views. Anyway, as I have already argued, a weaker form of the neo-
Leibnizian approach is intrinsic to Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method. Even if forms of possible
experience delivered by a formal axiomatic theory do not qualify as logical forms in the precise
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sense of the term they nevertheless are forms of possible empirical propositions rather than forms
of empirical interactions or anything else. This, in my view, explains the very little success that
Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method has had so far in physics and other natural sciences.
As far as we want to continue to develop the Galilean science (and the technology connected to
this type of science) our mathematics must provide for it forms of possible empirical interaction
rather than just forms of propositions. In other words it must provide forms appropriate for doing
various things in the world but not only forms for talking about this world and showing how
the world looks like in a mathematical representation. Since formal axiomatic theories are not
appropriate for this job we need to learn how to build mathematical theories differently.
As Kant shows in great detail the traditional geometry and his contemporary algebra are useful in
the Galilean science because these mathematical theories are constructive in the sense that they
involve rules for constructing their objects (explicitly or implicitly). Today we cannot hope, of
course, to get a new mathematical theory that would allow for identifying a physical object with
a mathematical object in the same way, in which one may identify (modulo the mathematical
idealization), say, a planet with an Euclidean sphere. Today’s physicists describe particles using
the mathematical group theory and manipulate with these particles in experiments using a special
hi-tech equipment; they don’t expect that mathematical manipulations with groups would map
their experimental manipulations in a direct way. Nevertheless the constructive character of the
mainstream informal mathematical practice, which I have stressed earlier in this Chapter, still
helps physicists and other scientists to design their experiments and their equipments. Scientists
make up mathematical models of their experimental systems, manipulate both with the models
(theoretically) and with the experimental systems (in real experiments) and see whether the
manipulations of the two sorts work coherently. This is, of course, an oversimplified picture
of the scientific experiment (for more details see [57]) but it is sufficient for seeing that the
possibility to establish a correlation between mathematical manipulations, on the one hand, and
experimental manipulations, on the other hand, remains essential in today’s mathematically-
laden experimental science.
I cannot see how such a correlation cannot be possibly established when the only type of math-
ematical objects available for manipulation are syntactic objects, which represent (logical forms
of) propositions related to certain experimental settings but do not represent these experimental
settings themselves. Given a proposition expressed in a formal language one may interpret it in
terms of physical data and evaluate whether under this interpretation the given proposition is
true or false. From a number of so interpreted true propositions one may deduce some further
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propositions, consider them as physical predictions and finally check these predictions against
the available physical data. So far so good but notice that from a methodological viewpoint this
way of doing natural science resembles Ptolemean astronomy saving phenomena rather than the
Galilean physics intervening into the nature with experiments! In order to design an experiment
one needs a mathematical model (representation) of a given physical environment itself but not
of formal propositions interpretable in terms of this environment; mathematical manipulations
(i.e. some further constructions) with a model of the former sort may serve as a guide for real
experimental manipulations within the given environment, mathematical manipulations with a
model of the latter sort cannot be directly used for this purpose.
Bourbaki’s Elements present a possible compromise between the formal axiomatic approach
and a more traditional constructive approach of doing mathematics. (Beware that I use here
the term “constructive” in the sense of Hilbert’s distinction between “construction postulates”
and propositional “existential form” ([107], p. 20). This sense of being constructive does not
imply anything about the admissibility of mathematical constructions of a given type. The
admissibility of constructions depends on concrete constructive postulates but I am now taking
about constructive postulates in general.) So we have in Bourbaki’s Elements a formal axiomatic
theory (of sets) on the ground level, informal set-theoretic constructions on upper levels and
the (theoretical) possibility to translate the higher-level mathematics into the formal ground-
level terms. Arguably such a translation (however impractical it may be) plays an important
justificatory role since it allows for reduction of problematic set-theoretic constructions (like
the construction of the powerset of a given infinite set) to formal deductions from axioms of
set-theory (including existential axioms) to (long and tedious but anyway finitary) symbolic
constructions. So the question of admissibility of problematic set-theoretic constrictions reduces
to the question of admissibility of the corresponding symbolic constructions. And in this latter
case we have a clear criterion of admissibility: a given formal deduction is admissible if and only
if it, first, conforms the explicit rules of deduction and, second, the given formal theory of sets
is consistent, which is tantamount to saying that from the given axioms the proposition 0 6= 0
can not be deduced by the aforementioned rules (i.e. that these rules do not allow to build a
symbolic construction with the axioms on the one end and 0 6= 0 on the other end).
Although having such a device for checking suspicious mathematical constructions and suspicious
mathematical proofs seems to be a good idea Bourbaki’s attempt to apply this device in practice
brings a rather controversial outcome. First of all it does not allow for an effective proof-checking:
formal versions of Bourbaki’s proofs are too long and cumbersome to be survey able by a human
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mathematician and at the same they are not adopted for an automatic proof-checking with
a computer. This is why the theoretical possibility of translating set-theoretic constructions
into symbolic one may serve only as an epistemic ground justifying certain basic set-theoretic
constructions like the powerset.
It must be however stressed that in Bourbaki’s Elements the Formal Axiomatic Method does
not perform this foundational task as perfectly as Hilbert has imagined it in 1927. There are
two fundamental difficulties here that Hilbert did not acknowledge. First, the criterion of formal
consistency cannot be used straightforwardly because the proof of consistency of Bourbaki’s set
theory or any other formal set theory requires using some stronger theory. So we don’t really
know whether or not the background set theory is consistent. Second, what can and what cannot
be proved in a formal theory depends on the chosen background logic and such a choice, as I
have already stressed, is a matter of controversy. Given these fundamental difficulties I doubt
that formal Set theories can play the foundational role they are supposed to play in Bourbaki
or elsewhere in the modern mathematics. The powerset operation is admitted by Bourbaki not
because its formal existential version (i.e., the formal powerset axiom) is formally consistent with
other axioms of set theory but rather on an intuitive ground by an appropriate modification of the
intuition relevant to the finite case. The finite intuition underpinning Euclid’s First Postulate is
similarly modified in the case of the Second Postulate, which allows for an infinite extension of a
given straight segment. Although the infinite powerset operation requires a deeper modification
of the finite intuition this is nevertheless a matter of degree rather than matter of principle. This
is why any sharp distinction between “real” and “ideal” objects in mathematics is in my view
unjustified. In Chapter 7 I show how in the history of mathematics “ideal” objects become “real”
through the development of appropriate intuitions. The power set operation can be, in my view,
stipulated directly as a constructive postulate (“constructive” in the above sense!) rather than
in the roundabout way through the existential powerset axiom. Having said that I do not deny
that the formal logical analysis has helped to clarify some important issues in foundations of set
theory and in foundations of mathematics in general. We have learned about certain set-theoretic
paradoxes and ways of avoiding them. In particular we learned to distinguish sets from proper
classes (like the class of all sets, see 5.8). So even formal axiomatic set theories cannot provide
ultimate foundations they show how us how to avoid known contradiction by forbidding certain
constructions like the set of all sets.
Using a formal set theory as a foundation and using a set theory informally for building structures
are related but still different issues, which we need to distinguish carefully. We have seen that
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the idea of building mathematical objects as structured sets comes from the Formal Axiomatic
Method but then lives an independent life within theories, which are nor formal neither axiomatic
in Hilbert’s sense of these terms. It is appropriate to ask whether the informal “set-theoretical
language” is indeed sufficient for doing modern mathematics. We shall see in Chapter 8 that the
answer is rather in negative. Here I shall only make a remark concerning possible applications
of Bourbaki’s structural mathematics in natural sciences. Although the informal Bourbaki’s
structural mathematics just like Euclid’s mathematics involves constructions (but not only logical
deductions) the set-theoretic nature of these constructions apparently makes an obstacle for
interpreting these constructions in physical terms and applying them in physics and other natural
sciences. Consider the case of group theory: in spite of the fact that this theory is widely used in
the 20th century physics physicists normally think of groups as groups of transformations (see 6.1
) rather than construe them as structured sets. This fact is hardly surprising since Cantor’s notion
of infinite set is of metaphysical rather than physical origin and has no physical sense; naively this
can be expressed by saying that infinite sets do not exist in nature. The later development of set
theory, which eventually led to modern axiomatic theories of sets, clarified the logical aspect of
set theory but did not have anything to do with physics either. This makes Bourbaki’s structural
mathematics quite unlike Euclid’s mathematics where the basic mathematical concepts such as
number and (geometrical) magnitude are directly relevant to the material practices of counting
and measuring, which are even today indispensable in any empirical science. The question, which
I want to stress now is the following: is the present detachment of foundations of mathematics
from the foundations of natural science indeed an epistemic necessity or rather an outcome of
bad epistemic strategy?
It is true that the contemporary mathematics is so sophisticated and the experience relevant to
the contemporary fundamental physics is so unlike the everyday human experience that we cannot
hope to find a pre-established cognitive mechanism providing a natural link between mathematics
and physics at the level of their foundations. However constructing such a link artificially can be
an epistemic strategy on its own. As I have already mentioned in 2.2 the idea to use metaphysics
as a guide and formal logic as a tool for building foundations of mathematics is related to the
anti-Kantian turn in the philosophy in the very beginning of the 20th century, which gave a new
credit to the traditional pre-Modern and pre-Galilean patterns of doing science. I claim that the
epistemic success of this type of science in the past is a sufficient reason to continue to keep its
basic epistemic strategy untouched and think how to conform new mathematical and physical
results with it rather than give up this strategy and replace it by a new form of Scholasticism. This
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may sound like knocking into an open door in the large scientific and mathematical community
but not in the community of people professionally working in the foundations of mathematics,
most of which still follows the logicist agenda established by Frege and Russell a century ago
and works in an isolation from the mainstream mathematics and physics. I would like to stress
that linking foundations of mathematics to foundations of physics is in not in my view only a
pragmatic question of having better mathematical tools for physics but a fundamental question
concerning foundations of the modern mathematized natural science. Although in this book I
cannot present a systematic defense of the Galilean Science I claim that the irrelevance of set-
theoretic foundations of mathematics to the contemporary physics is a strong reason for rejecting
these attempted foundations and looking for a replacement.
3.4 Towards the New Axiomatic Method: Interpreting Logic
In the 20th century the part Symbolic Logic, which describes itself as “philosophical”, went
through a booming development; for an overview I refer the reader to the last continuing edition
of the Handbook of Philosophical Logic edited by Gabbay and Guenthner [45] 7. Without trying
to survey here the recent history of philosophical logic I shall try only to answer this question:
Whether or not the development of logic after Hilbert brought about any new notion of Axiomatic
Method?
In order to answer this question let me first of all stress that Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method
is extremely flexible and leaves one the freedom not only for building various axiomatic theories
(including incompatible ones) but also for making a choice of the background logic. The mere
replacement of (formalized) Classical logic by the (formalized) Intuitionistic logic or any other
system of formal logic does require the replacement of the Formal Axiomatic Method by a new
method of theory-building8. However there is, in my view, at least one continuing development
in logic, which indeed changes the sense of the Formal Axiomatic Method but not only presents
a new application of the same method.
Remind from 2.3 that in their logical textbook of 1928 [104] Hilbert and Ackermann distin-
guish between “contentual” and formal (i.e., symbolic) logic along with distinguishing between
7If one asks what is specifically “philosophical” about the multiple formal systems presented in this Handbook
then, I think, the answer is twofold: all these formal systems are designed with certain philosophical motivations
and/or used for treating some philosophical problems. The relevant notion of being philosophical derives from a
particular notion of philosophy, which can be roughly identified with the Analytic Philosophy.
8Although this second degree of freedom (which adds to the free choice of axioms) has been not previewed
by Hilbert himself I don’t qualify its discovery as a modification of Hilbert’s Axiomatics Method. However this
new degree of freedom undermines Hilbert’s suggested epistemic justification of his method and thus creates new
epistemological problems. I shall discuss these problems and suggest a solution in Chapter 9.
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contentual and formal axiomatic mathematical theories. Do Hilbert and Ackermann also mean
here a possibility of providing their system of symbolic logic with alternative interpretations
(alternative models) along with alternative interpretations of formal axiomatic theories based on
this system of logic? As I have already argued this is not the case: the authors rather think of
formalization of “contentual”, i.e., informal, logical concepts as a way of making these concepts
sharper and better manageable with a help of symbolic means. A similar attitude is expressed
in 1932 by Gentzen in a footnote:
If the words ’sentence’ (’theorem’) and ’proof are used informally as constituents of
our language they are of course intended to mean something quite different from the
purely formally introduced concepts of ’sentence’ (’theorem’) and ’proof (and even
under an intuitive interpretation the latter concepts are still considerably narrower
than the former); the context should make it clear in each case how these concepts
are intended. ([73], p. 312)
So in Gentzen’s view a formal language allows for a narrower and more precise formulation of
logical concepts than the natural language. It is an essential part of this view that each formal
logical concepts has certain intended interpretation, which can be expressed by formal means
more precisely than by the natural language. Tarski is his Introduction of 1941 [233] treats logic
as a formal theory such that it necessarily makes part of any other (formal) theory and which
can be called, in this sense, the minimal theory. (He does not discuss in this textbook the issue
of multiplicity of logics and talks about the logic in singular.) After explaining the notion of
model of a given formal theory and providing some examples Tarski remarks:
For precision it may be added, that the considerations which we sketched here are
applicable to any deductive theory in whose construction logic is presupposed, but
their application to logic itself brings about certain complications which we would
rather not discuss here. ([233] p. 119)
Let me now point to such a complication, which is of philosophical rather than mathematical
character. In his earlier paper Sentential Calculus and Topology [234] first published in 1938
Tarski develops topological interpretations of Classical and Intuitionistic propositional calculi.
Under these interpretations the syntax of propositional logic is interpreted in terms of elements
(open subsets) of a given topological space and operations with these elements, so a given well-
formed formula F designates (not a proposition but) a certain element φ of the given space
construed from other elements. Then Tarski proves that F is derivable in the given calculus if
and only if φ has certain property P (which is not the same in the Classical and the Intuitionistic
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cases).
Let me briefly explain for a non-mathematical reader what is topology and an open set. Topology
is a “gummy geometry”, which studies those properties of geometrical objects, which remain
invariant under invertible continuous transformations. Think about a circle (more precisely a
circumference of a circle) and allow it to change its form however you want but without cutting it
and without gluing it to itself. Such a “gummy” object qualifies as a circle (or “one-dimensional
sphere”) in the topological sense of the term (even if it may look like an oval and so not qualify
as circle in the usual Euclidean sense of the term). A standard way to define a topological
object (usually called a topological space) using set theory is the following. For a given set T (of
“points”) one specifies which subsets U ⊆ T count as open; the complement T\U of an open set
is called closed. The choice of open (sub)sets is restricted by several axioms, which I shall not
list here. Consider a circle (or any closed curve) on the Euclidean plane and think of these two
things as sets of points. Then the “natural” topology is one where the interior area of the circle
counts as open while the rest (the rest of the plane together with the curve) counts as closed.
In this setting a continuous transformation is defined as one that reflects opens, i.e., one, which
never transforms closed sets into open.
I shall not reproduce here details of this Tarski’s construction and discuss only its problematic
significance for the Formal Axiomatic Method. Remind that a pillar of Formal Axiomatic Method
is the symbolic logic and that this pillar is twofold: it comprises a symbolic syntax, on the one
hand, and a logical content, on the other hand. Each of the two aspects of symbolic logic
has its specific epistemic impact: the logical content comprises basic laws of reasoning; the
symbolic syntax makes these laws explicit through the symbolic intuition (2.4). This is why the
logical content of formal theories (built by Hilbrt’s Formal Axiomatic Method) unlike their non-
logical content is indispensable. Indeed, given a list of mutually consistent axioms one may after
Hilbert stipulate thought-things and thought-relations satisfying these axioms and consider them
as mathematical objects; since the axioms are written with a symbolic language this language
provides these “ideal” objects with a symbolic representation, which makes it easy to reason about
these objects as if they were “real”. Further interpretations of the given formal theory can be
interesting and useful (and may even constitute the pragmatic raison d’eˆtre of the given theory)
but, strictly speaking they are not necessary. However this way of construing mathematical
objects does not work unless one has the notion of logical consistency in one’s disposal. On
the syntactic level the logical consistency translates into the impossibility of building a string
of formulae, which begins with the axioms and ends up with a distinguished formula like 0 6= 0
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(provided one follows fixed rules about building strings of formulas). However this syntactic
counterpart of the logical consistency is not sufficient by itself to make the Formal Axiomatic
Method work. In order to make the method work one must assume, in particular, that the
symbolic expression 0 6= 0 expresses a contradiction. So the logical content unlike the non-logical
content cannot be dispensed with in formal theories. It is always possible, of course, to study
systems of symbols on their own rights but the Formal Axiomatic Method does not fall out of
such a study unless one brings logical concepts into it. So interpreting logical and non-logical
terms in a formal theory are indeed two rather different issues. Understandably Tarski did not
want to enter into these details in his introductory chapter on model theory [233].
With Tarski’s topological interpretation of the Classical and Intuitionistic propositional calculi
we get in addition to the intended logical interpretation of the given symbolic calculi a non-
intended one. Tarski [234] uses for this interpretation Kuratowski’s semi-formal set-theoretic
approach to topology [139]; a fully formalized version of this latter theory would comprise (i)
a background logic, (ii) a formal set theory, and (iii) an axiomatic theory of topological spaces
interpreted in the underlying set theory. What sense one can make of the fact that a theory,
which involves these three foundational levels (i), (ii), (iii) interprets a logical calculus, which
can be a fragment of its own background logic (i)?
The standard notion of model and its usual epistemological underpinning (as developed in [233])
hardly allows for thinking about Tarski’s topological interpretation as epistemically significant.
However, if one sees this construction from a different perspective, which brings one back to Boole
and Venn, the same construction appears as a proper part of propositional logic (rather than its
interpretation), which accounts (in topological terms) for the universe of discourse relevant to
this logic . We shall discuss this alternative view on logic in the next Chapter ( see 4.3 below).
Let me only mention here that the issue of universe of discourse in Venn’s work is closely related
to his use of logical diagrams (see 2.5 above), and that the logical diagrams are topological
objects in the sense that their sizes and shapes do not matter but their topological properties
(and only such properties) do.
Tarski himself makes the following remark about his proposed topological interpretation of the
two propositional calculi (which the translator calls sentential):
The present discussion seems to me to have a certain interest not only from the
purely formal point of view; it also throws an interesting light on the content relations
between the two systems of the sentential calculus and the intuitions underlying these
systems [zugrundeliegende Intuitionen]. ( [234], p. 421)
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Does Tarski claims here seriously that certain topological intuitions underly logical calculi or he
rather talks about intuitions here in a vague sense, which does not imply any epistemological
commitment on his part? Be it as it may Tarski’s topological interpretation of propositional
logic points to a connection between geometry and logic, which is very unlike that assumed in
Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 [109] and other works following the same line of thought. Remind
from 2.1 that in 1899 Hilbert thinks of logic as an ultimate foundation of geometrical theories,
which are treated on equal footing with physical theories and theories of other sorts. This way
of founding geometry on logic allows Hilbert to avoid in foundations of geometry any appeal
to geometrical intuition (or at least this is his intention). When the foundations of Euclidean
geometry are remade by Hilbert with a symbolic logical calculus the intuition comes back and its
foundational role becomes explicit but this concerns only the symbolic rather than the properly
geometrical intuition. Now under Tarski’s topological interpretation the propositional fragment
of logic itself appears to be geometrical in a sense. (The same observation can be made already
on the basis of using diagrams in logic.) This suggests that some geometrical (and in particular
topological) intuitions may after all play a role in foundations too.
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Chapter 4
Lawvere: Pursuit of
Objectivity
In a paper of 2003 Lawvere makes the following general remark about foundations of mathematics
and Axiomatic Method:
In my own education I was fortunate to have two teachers who used the term “foun-
dations” in a common-sense way (rather than in the speculative way of the Bolzano-
Frege-Peano-Russell tradition). [..] The orientation of these works seemed to be
“concentrate the essence of practice and in turn use the result to guide practice”. I
propose to apply the tool of categorical logic to further develop that inspiration.
Foundations is derived from applications by unification and concentration, in other
words, by the axiomatic method. Applications are guided by foundations which have
been learned through education. ( [158], p. 213, italic is author’s)
The author’s attitude to foundations of mathematics, which he describes as commonsensical,
assumes a permanent interaction between the foundations and the current mathematical practice
(“applications”). It is opposed in this sense to the “Bolzano-Frege-Peano-Russell tradition”
(making part of today’s Analytic philosophy), which attempts to provide Formal Axiomatic
Method with a philosophical underpinning disregarding its problematic status in the context
of the current mathematical research. Lawvere’s notion of Axiomatic Method is very general;
his more specific proposal concerns the categorical logic, which is an area of logic invented by
Lawvere himself [14], [182].
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Here the first time in this book we meet the mathematical notion of category, which is going to
play an important role in what follows. I shall introduce this notion twice in this book: in this
current Section and then more geometrically in 6.3 below; the original motivation of category
theory is (partly) explained and in 8.5. Here I allow myself to reproduce the introduction of the
notion of category, which Lawvere designed for a philosophical reader in his [150]. This particular
introduction is of special interest for us because it appears to me that in this philosophical
publication Lawvere makes an attempt to use a new original axiomatic approach, which at least
at this time (1960-70ies) he did not use in his properly mathematical papers.
The formalism of category theory is itself often presented in “geometric” terms. In
fact, to give a category is to give a meaning to the word morphism and to the
commutativity of diagrams like
A
f // B B
g
@
@@
@@
@@
A
f
??~~~~~~~
h
// C
A
f //
a

B
b

A′ g // B′
which involve morphisms, in such a way that the obvious associativity and identity
conditions hold, as well as the condition that whenever
A
f // B , B
f // C
are commutative then there is just one h such that
B
g
@
@@
@@
@@
A
f
??~~~~~~~
h
// C
is commutative.
To save printing space, one also says that A is the domain, and B the codomain of f
when
A
f // B
is commutative, and in particular that h is the composition f.g if
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B
g
@
@@
@@
@@
A
f
??~~~~~~~
h
// C
is commutative. We regard objects as co-extensive with identity morphisms, or equiv-
alently with those morphisms which appear as domains or codomains. As usual we
call a morphism which has a two-sided inverse an isomorphism. ([150], p. 283)
1
Although Lawvere in the first phrase of the above quote uses inverted commas around the
word “geometrical”, I suggest that he thinks about the geometric aspect of categorical diagrams
seriously. Notice that the concept of category is introduced here right from the stretch as in the
case of a “purely formal” axiomatic introduction of this concept by usual symbolic means (like
one found in the beginning of Lawvere’s [147], see also [48] of 1945 where the mathematical notion
of category are first introduced by Eilenberg and MacLane). So this “geometrical” introduction
of the categorical formalism is to be contrasted with the standard introduction by means of
symbolic sogic (i.e., by the Formal Axiomatic Method in the precise sense of this expression
specified above). Lawvere’s remark that with a help of the above diagrams one is supposed
to “give a meaning” not only to the term “morphism” but also to the term “commutativity”
suggests that Lawvere treats this latter term also as primitive (albeit “primitive” should not be
understood here in the formal logical sense). The usual definition of commutative diagram is this:
a given categorical diagram is commutative when for all pairs of its nodes A,B all morphisms
between these nodes obtained by composition of composable morphisms shown at this diagram
are equal; for example the commutativity of the square diagram shown above amounts to the
equality f.b = a.g. Lawvere’s idea, if I understand him correctly, is rather to postulate the
commutativity for simple cases like A
f // B and then transport it geometrically to more
complicated cases like the square diagram and beyond.
Although this introduction of the concept of category addressed to philosophers is not sufficient
for a rigorous treatment of the concept of adjoint functors discussed further in the same paper,
I believe that this is not a merely informal description of the notion of category either. Even if
it does not qualify yet as a new form of rigorous Axiomatic Method it gives an idea how such a
new method may look like. A crucial characteristic feature of the new method is the involvement
1Given morphism A
f // B its two-sided inverse is morphism B
g // A such that f.g = A and g.f = B.
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of geometry at the foundational level and its dialectical interplay with logic. In 4.9 we shall see
how this dialectics between logic and geometry develops in a more involved and more rigorous
context of topos theory.
The axiomatic introduction of the notion category found in the very beginning of Lawvere’s
Ph.D. thesis [145] has the same geometrical flavour:
[In a category w]e identify objects with their identity maps and we regard a diagram
A
f // B
as a formula which asserts that A is the (identity map of the) domain of f and that
B is the (identity map of the) codomain of f . Thus, for example, the following is a
universally valid formula
A
f // B ⇒ A A // A ∧ A f // B ∧ B B // B ∧Af = f = fB
What is remarkable here is the way in which Lawvere combines the diagrammatic and the logical
symbolic notation. The diagram
A
f // B
in the category theory usually represents a mathematical object, namely a particular morphism f
in some category. I assume that Lawvere as anybody else uses this diagram in this sense too (even
if he may understand the notion of being a particular object in his proper way). However he also
reads it as an assertion and combines it with standard propositional connectives. “Officially”
this is only an unusual symbolic convention, which does not change the sense of the matter.
However in fact it touches upon the core of Formal Axiomatic Method. Remind from 2.4 that
this method assumes a distinction between “real” and “ideal” mathematical constructions: only
symbolic constructions qualify in this sense as real while all their interpretations qualify as ideal.
As I have stressed earlier this distinction creates a gap between the formalized and the “real” (i.e.,
informal) mathematics because manipulations with “real” symbols in formal theories represent
some logical operations but not operations with the “ideal” objects themselves (3.3). I would
like to stress now that Hilbert’s distinction between real and ideal mathematical objects is built
into the Formal Axiomatic Method technically but is not a matter of philosophical interpretation
of this method. A user of this method cannot ignore this distinction even if he or she is not
inclined to describe it in Hilbert’s original terms. More commonly this distinction is described
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today as the distinction between the formal syntax and its informal semantics.
Let me repeat a part of my earlier argument using a simple example. Hilbert in [106] uses
symbolic expression Zw(x, y, z) for denoting a predicate saying that given point y lies between
given points x, z; here the symbolic expression itself makes part of the formal syntax of the given
theory (formalized Euclidean geometry) and what this symbolic expression stands for makes
part of the informal semantics of this theory. As soon as values of x, y, z are fixed Zw(x, y, z)
expresses a proposition. Now let us tentatively identify Zw(x, y, z) with a geometrical object
(construction), which makes the corresponding proposition true, namely with a triple of points
< x, y, z > such that y lies between x and z. So we get in the same parcel, first, an object, and,
second, a true proposition “about” this object - just like in the case of expression f : A → B
read both as a particular morphism f and an (asserted) proposition saying that A is the domain
and B is the codomain of f .
In some special cases such a constructive interpretation of Hilbert’s formalism seems to work.
Consider formula Zw(x, y, z)→ Zw(z, y, x) and read it, first, as intended (i.e., as a logical impli-
cation) and second, as a description of the geometrical operation, which turns this geometrical
construction
X Y Z
into that
Z Y X
by permuting endpoints X,Y . In this particular case indeed there is a structural similarity
(which can be described as a precise isomorphism if one likes) between operations with symbols
x, y, z in Hilbert’s formulas and operations with symbols X,Y, Z making part of the traditional
geometrical notation used together with traditional geometrical diagrams.
However such a geometrical interpretation of formulas obviously does not extend to the whole
of Hilbert’s formalized Euclidean geometry. Notice that formula Zw(x, y, z) is meaningful even
if it expresses a false proposition; in such cases we still have a symbolic construction but have
no corresponding geometrical construction. (Mutatis mutandis this remark applies to Lawvere’s
notation: unless the diagram A→ B is commutative it does not represent any actual morphism.
This is why Lawvere in the above quote reads this diagram as an assertion but not as a mere
proposition.) Further, if we consider a bit more complex formulas like this one
∀x∀y∀z(Zw(x, y, z)→ Zw(z, y, x))
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(which under the intended interpretation says that Zw(x, y, z)→ Zw(z, y, x) is universally valid)
we find no obvious geometrical interpretation for symbol ∀, and hence no geometrical counterpart
of the extension of formula Zw(x, y, z) → Zw(z, y, x) with prefix ∀x∀y∀z . Clearly if we con-
sider formal deductions we lose any structural similarity between symbolic constructions, which
represent these deductions, and geometrical constructions making part of the informal intended
interpretation of the given theory. So in order to make sense of this theory we should do exactly
what Hilbert asks us to do: consider only the formulas as real mathematical constructions and
treat geometrical constructions and geometrical operations appearing in the intended informal
interpretation of this theory as a metaphorical fac¸on de parler about ideal mathematical objects
and their relations.
Since, as I have already argued, mathematicians in their actual practice generally do not tend
to reduce mathematical constructions to symbolic constructions they develop a mathematical
notation called by some philosophers (but rarely by mathematicians themselves) informal or
semi-formal. This latter sort of notation just like the traditional geometrical notation helps one to
describe mathematical constructions in terms of certain symbolic and diagrammatic constructions
and does not, generally, require making difference between “real” and “ideal” mathematical
objects (although such a difference may eventually appear in some more specific contexts, for
example, if one treats real numbers as real and imaginary numbers as ideal). It is often assumed
that the semi-formal presentation of mathematical theories is essentially a useful shorthand
to a corresponding formal presentation, which can be obtained through some tedious routine
procedure of formalization; in particular this is the official position of Bourbaki in his Elements.
Using this latter example I have argued in 3.2 that this position is not tenable (even if the
formalization is workable) because the semi-formal presentation allows for manipulating with
mathematical objects other than symbols while the purely formal presentation does not; as a
part of the same argument I have also argued in 3.3 that manipulations with mathematical
objects other than symbols is an epistemically (but not only pragmatically) significant aspect of
mathematics. So even if a purely formal presentation of mathematical theories is possible this
presentation does not presents an essential aspect of these theories. Beware that talking about
the formal presentation I mean here a presentation made by the Formal Axiomatic Method in
the precise Hilbert’s sense. My argument does not concern the issue of symbolic presentation as
such. I do not deny that any mathematical content can be presented in a symbolic form - even
if I do not think that such a presentation is always better than a presentation that combines
symbols with diagrams and some prose.
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Commutative diagrams first appeared in mathematics as a part of semi-formal notation2 and are
commonly used today (both within and outside the category theory proper) as such. Lawvere’s
attempt to use commutative diagrams as a part of formal syntax is a bold attempt to bridge
the gap between the formal and the semi-formal (aka “usual”) notation in mathematics. Instead
paying the usual lip service according to which the semi-formal notation can be replaced by a
purely formal notation “in principle” Lawvere does not want to tolerate the gap between the
“official” foundations and the practice. Clearly the symbolic convention according to which
commutative diagrams stand for assertions, does not solve the problem. However as we shall
shortly see Lawvere’s contribution into Axiomatic Method involves much more; in particular, we
shall see that the idea of geometrical interpretation of logical quantifiers, which sounds absurd
in the context of Hilbert’s approach, becomes a part of Lawvere’s novel approach. A central
role in Lawvere’s approach is played by categorical logic which he designs as a tool of axiomatic
thinking that helps to “concentrate the essence of practice and in turn use the result to guide
practice” ([158], p. 213)
Before we discuss Lawvere’s notion of categorical logic I would like to mention two Lawvere’s
achievements, which do not involve the categorical logic proper but can be described as unusual
applications of the usual Formal Axiomatic Method. This “classical” aspect of Lawvere’s work
is equally important for our analysis.
4.1 Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets
An important Lawvere’s achievement made wholly within the standard Formal Axiomatic Method
is his Elementary Theory of the Category of Sets (ETCS) first presented in his thesis in 1963
[145], [159] and published the next year as a separate paper [146] 3. The category of sets S is
category having (all) sets as objects and (all) functions between these sets as morphisms. If a
universe of sets is given in advance (say, through the axiomatic theory of sets ZF ) category S
can be understood as a specific way of thinking about this universe. (Beware that the totality
of all sets is a proper class but not a set, see 5.8.) Lawvere’s ETCS reverses this order of ideas
and introduces S axiomatically using, first, MacLane and Eilenberg’s axioms for a general cat-
egory and, second, some additional axioms which distinguish S among other categories up to
categorical equivalence (which is an equivalence relation weaker than that of isomorphism, see
2According to MacLane [176], p. 29, commutative diagrams were first used in early 1940ies by W. Hurewicz
in topology some time before the official birth of category theory in 1945 [48]
3A longer version [160] of this paper dating back to 1964 has been recently republished with new author’s
commentaries.
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6.7). The major difference between ZF and other similar axiomatic theories of sets, on the one
hand, and ETCS, on the other hand, lies in the choice of primitive non-logical constants. While
ZF and other similar theories take the binary relation of membership between sets as primitive
(usually denoted by symbol ∈) ETCS takes as primitive the binary operation of composition of
functions (which is a ternary relation between functions).
As McLarty and Lawvere rightly stress [160] this way of thinking about sets has important
advantages. Surely ETCS qualifies as an important example of what is colloquially called the
categorical thinking. I would like to stress, however, that ETCS is built by exactly the same
method as ZF, namely by the standard Formal Axiomatic Method, so in this particular case
the new categorical thinking wholly complies with the earlier established method of building
axiomatic mathematical theories. No categorical logic is involved in the ETCS in its original
form. The theorem according to which the axioms of ETCS specify the category of sets up to
categorical equivalence (see 6.7) is explicitly described by Lawvere as a “metatheorem” - once
again in full accordance with the Formal Axiomatic Method in its canonical form.
4.2 Category of Categories As a Foundation
Lawere’s axiomatic theory of Category of Categories As a Foundation (CCAF), which equally
stems from his thesis and which has been presented in a separate paper in 1966 [147], like ETCS
rests on a formal axiomatic theory of general categories; this time Lawvere writes down the
appropriate axioms explicitly once again using the Formal Axiomatic Method without trying to
modify it. This background part of CCAF Lawvere calls the elementary theory (ET). After the
introduction of the axioms of ET and providing some definitions Lawvere says:
By a category we of course understand (intuitively) any structure which is an in-
terpretation of the elementary theory of abstract categories, and by a functor we
understand (intuitively) any triple consisting of two categories and a rule T which
assigns, to each morphism x of the first category, a unique morphism xT of the second
category in such a way that ...
(follows the usual definition of functor as a structure-preserving map, which I explain and criticize
in 8.6 below).
ET is a preparatory step towards an extended theory, which Lawvere calls basic theory (BT).
BT begins with the introduction of the category of categories and a re-introduction of the notion
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of functor:
Of course, now that we are in the category of categories, the things denoted by the
capitals will be called categories rather than objects, and we shall speak of functors
rather than morphisms.
Remind that in his ETCS paper [146] Lawvere distinguishes between his theory and the relevant
metatheory explicitly. In the CCAF paper this distinction is blurred. The definition of functor
through the structure-preserving rule T is clearly metatheoretical. But the following re-definition
of functor as a morphism in a category of categories brings us back to the theoretical (i.e.
elementary) level. The usual way of handling the difference between a theory and its metatheory
in this case is the following. First of all one needs to specify what is meant by “all” categories.
A natural candidate is the class of all small categories, i.e., all categories in which morphisms
(including identity morphisms aka objects) form sets. Then having a set theory in one’s disposal
one may consider the class of all set-theoretic models of ET and then using the meta-theoretical
notion of functor conceive of a large category C of all small categories4. Since C is large and
its objects are small C is not its own object. All this reasoning is clearly metatheoretical with
respect to ET. What we get at the end is a class of set-theoretic models of ET (i.e., the class
of small categories), which with a help of the metatheoretical notion of functor (as morphism
between small categories) is made into another (not set-theoretical) model of ET. Whether or
not the obtained large category of all small categories is legitimate is an instance of the general
problem about legitimacy of large collections like the putative collection of all sets (8.7).
This line of thought relies on a set theory and for this reason is not appropriate for Lawvere’s
purpose, which is to construe his category of categories as foundation. A rationale behind this
project is that small categories are certainly not all categories that one typically encounters in
the mathematical practice (see 8.5). So Lawvere’s idea is different: to think of the hypothetical
category CAT of all categories as an intended model of ET and then add to ET new axioms
which distinguish CAT between other categories; then pick up from CAT an arbitrary object
A (i.e., an arbitrary category) and finally specify A as a category by internal means of CAT
(stipulating additional properties of CAT when needed). So Lawvere replaces the set-theoretic
bottom-up approach outlined in the last paragraph by an original top-down approach.
More precisely it goes as follows (I omit details and streamline the argument). Stipulate the
existence of terminal object 1 in CAT , i.e., the object with exactly one incoming functor from
4Since the totality of all sets is not a set but a proper class (see 5.8) the category of all small categories is not
small. In the axiomatic theory of sets called after Quine New Foundations (NF) the totality of all sets is a set.
However NF turns to be not appropriate for modeling categories, see [184].
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each object of CAT . Then identify objects (= identity functors) of A as functors in CAT of
the form 1→ A. Stipulate also the existence of initial object 0, i.e. the object with exactly one
outgoing functor into each object of CAT . Then consider in CAT object 2 of the form 0→1
and stipulate for it some additional properties among which is the following: 2 is a universal
generator which means that:
G (generator): for all f , g of the form:
A
f //
g
// B
and such that f 6= g there exist x such that:
2
x // A
f //
g
// B
and xf 6= xg.
U (universal): if any other categoryN has the same property, then there are y, z such that:
A
y //
B
z
oo
and yz = 2.
This allows Lawvere to identify functors (morphisms) of A as functors of the form 2→ A in CAT .
The fact that 2 is the universal generator (it is unique up to isomorphism as follows from the
above definition) assures that categories are determined “arrow-wise”: two categories coincide if
and only if they coincide on all their arrows. This new definition of functor also allows one to
make sense of the notion of a component of a given functor of the form h: A→ B , which in ET
is understood as a map m sending a particular morphism f of A into a particular morphism g
of B . In BT, m turns into this commutative triangle:
2
 



?
??
??
??
A // B
Thus categories and functors are no longer built “from their elements” but rather “split into”
their elements when appropriate. Although the notion of functor as a structure-preserving map
can be recovered in this new context it no longer serves for defining the very notion of functor.
112
Rule T used by Lawvere for defining functors in the elementary theory disappears in BT without
leaving any trace.
Further consider this triangle which Lawvere denotes 3 :
0
>
>>
>>
>>
    
  
  
 
1 // 2
(It should satisfy a universal property which I omit). 3 serves for defining composition of
morphisms in our “test-category” A as a functor of the form 3→ A in C. Finally, in order to
assure the associativity of the composition Lawvere introduces category 4, which is pictured as
follows:
3
0
@@       
//
>
>>
>>
>>
2
^^>>>>>>>
1
@@       
OO
(The associativity concerns here the path 0→ 1→ 2→ 3.)
This construction provided with appropriate axioms makes A into an “internal model” of ET
in the following precise sense: If F is any theorem of ET, then “for all A, A satisfies F” is a
theorem of BT.
It must be mentioned that this Lawvere’s work contains a technical flaw that has been noticed by
Isbell in his review [121]. This flaw has been later fixed, in particular, by McLarty [184] who also
provides some additional clarifications on CCAF, which I use in the following discussion.
Let us see once again what we get here. We have a formal first-order theory BT and its hy-
pothetical intended model CAT . Lawvere and McLarty describe CAT as a “metacategory” ,
and McLarty quite rightly, in my view, stresses that “whether there are useful axioms on CAT
making CAT an object in itself” still remains an “open question” ([184], p. 1259). That BT does
not make CAT into an object is hardly surprising. Similarly, Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry
[109] does not make Euclidean space into an object although it introduces points, straight lines
and planes as (primitive) objects. With respect to the given axiomatic theory the Euclidean
space is the “system of things”, i.e., an universe of discourse and in this sense it has a metathe-
113
oretical status; CAT is metatheoretical with respect to BT in the same sense. So far BT works
just like any other formal axiomatic theory and so fully complies with the Formal Axiomatic
Method.
An unusual feature of BT concerns the fact that it contains ET as its part. ET is sufficient for
the axiomatic introduction of the notion of category: any “system of things” that satisfy ET is
a category by definition. Why one needs more axioms in category theory? An obvious answer is
this: ET is not categorical, i.e., it does not define a category up to isomorphism; there are many
different categories that one wishes to study but not just one. We have already seen in 3.2 that
the usual axiomatic group theory has the same property and that in order to make this latter
axiomatic theory useful one needs to use it together with set theory, which serves for building
and handling its various models. CCAF assumes no such background metatheory. Instead it
upgrades ET to BT with additional axioms and so determines a category of a special sort, namely
CAT - in a sense of “determines” that does not implies that CAT is an object as just explained
5. Although CAT is not itself an object but a “system of things” one must expect that those
“things”, i.e., elements of CAT , namely categories and functors, are determined through the
theory of CAT (i.e., through BT) as objects. This is exactly what BT claims to achieve. This
means, however, that BT significantly strengthens the concept of category with respect to its
usual definition through ET. To be a category in the sense of being an object of CAT assumes
more axioms than to be a category in the sense of being a model of ET. Let us see what this
strengthening exactly amounts to.
There are two ways of thinking about the additional axioms of BT, which complement each other.
First, these additional axioms pick some specific notion of category. They strengthen the notion
of category in the same sense in which the definition of isosceles triangle strengthen the definition
of triangle. Clearly that such a strengthening by itself has no bearing on the foundations of the
category theory or the foundations of mathematics in general. Second, these additional axioms
allow for a re-introduction of basic category-theoretic concepts like object (as a functor of the
form 1 → A) , morphism (as a functor of the form 2 → A) and the rest. This second sense of
“strengthening” certainly does have a bearing on foundations and is of our special interest in our
discussion of the Axiomatic Method. Indeed although BT is construed as a formal theory in full
accordance with the Formal Axiomatic Method we see that within this theory (given its intended
interpretation CAT ) Lawvere develops a different way of introduction primitive concepts, which
essentially involves CAT and hence some previously assumed category-theoretic constructions.
5BT does not determine CAT up to isomorphism (or in any other relevant sense) uniquely [184] but let me
not bother about this problem now
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So we have here a foundation involving two levels: the level of elementary theory ET and the level
of description of the same primitive categorical concepts by categorical means made available
through BT. I would like to stress that the distinction between these two foundational levels
does not coincide with the standard distinction between a formal theory and its metatheory.
Although Lawvere describes CAT as metacategory he does not provide it with a metatheory.
McLarty [184] provides some elements of such a metatheory by considering some candidates for
CAT but it is not relevant to my present point. The second-level axiomatic foundation I am
talking about from a formal viewpoint is fully accounted for by the extension of ET to BT. So
from a formal point of view it amounts to a particular interpretation of this extension. Still
this particular interpretation is explicit in Lawvere’s paper and it amounts to determining basic
categorical concepts by categorical (rather than standard formal ) means. I would like to stress
however that these categorical means do not qualify as elements of categorical logic, which I
consider below.
It is appropriate to ask whether or not this latter “purely categorical” way of laying out axiomatic
foundations may work independently from the Formal Axiomatic Method. Surely it does not
work in such an independent way in Lawvere’s CCAF paper [147]; McLarty’s development of
Lawvere’s idea [184] does not go in this direction but rather cleans it up from the point of view
of the standard Formal Axiomatic Method. (McLarty after Lawvere challenges the set-theoretic
foundations built with this method but does not challenge the method itself.) In 4.9 I argue that
in another work Lawvere does use a new axiomatic method that I shall call the New Axiomatic
Method; in 9.3 I describe this New Method in general terms.
4.3 Conceptual Theories and their Presentations
In two abstracts [148], [149] published in 1966 and 1967 correspondingly Lawvere presents an
improved version of yet another idea first developed in his thesis [145], [159], namely, the idea of
presenting a formal theory (more precisely every first-order theory with equality) as a category
T of a special sort and presenting models of T as functors from this theory to the category of sets
(i.e., functors of the form T → S). Terms and formulas in this setting are specific morphisms
in T , truth-values form a distinguished object L in T , and (every instance of) the existential
quantifier ∃ is also a morphism in T . In this context Lawvere makes a distinction between a
non-interpreted theory T and its syntactic presentation L:
Given a first-order language-with-axioms L, the associated theory T may be thought
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of as the “Sinn” [= meaning] of L and the category S[T ] as the “Bedeutung” [=
reference] of L. ([148], p.295)
referring to Frege’s [59], which we discuss in 5.10 - 5.11. S[T ] is the category of models of T ,
i.e., of specific functors of the form T → S. No details are provided about the “association” with
a given language L an appropriate theory T .
The following discussion aims at placing Lawvere’s ideas into the historical context discussed in
earlier Chapters. For a more technical exposition I refer the reader to [182].
Lawvere’s “language-with-axioms” L is a standard formal theory like ZF formulated with a list of
axioms written down with usual symbolic means. So we have here a standard Formal Axiomatic
setting with formal theories, on the one hand, and set-theoretic models of these theories, on the
other hand. Now Lawvere introduces into this general framework a third intermediate element,
which he calls after Frege [59] the meaning of L and identifies this meaning (rather than L itself)
with a non-interpreted theory. As a later Lawvere’s comment makes it clear L in this context is
to be thought of as a particular presentation of the corresponding theory T ; T itself is thought of
as a conceptual (rather than formal) theory, which remains invariant under changes of its various
presentations:
Since in practice many abstract concepts [...] arise by means other than presentations,
it is more accurate to apply the term “theory”, not to the presentations as had become
traditional in formalist logic, but rather to the more invariant abstract concepts
themselves which serve a pivotal role, both in their connection with the syntax of
presentations, as well as with the semantics of representations. ( [159], p. 8)
Lawvere’s conceptual theories like usual formal theories include a core part, which can be iden-
tified as a pure logic. Although in [148] Lawvere does not provide any explicit criterion for
distinguishing between logical and non-logical elements of a theory it is clear that the notions
of existential quantifier and truth-value belong to the former category. Saying that Lawvere in
this paper interprets logic in category-theoretic terms is actually in odds with Lawvere’s way of
thinking about this matter: Lawvere would rather say that the category-theoretic terms allow for
formulating logic concepts in an invariant form, which does not depend on this or that symbolic
presentation of these concepts. Nevertheless I shall use this external language because it helps me
to compare Lawvere’s categorical logic with Tarski’s topological interpretation of propositional
logic mentioned above (3.4).
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Remind that Tarski [234] provides a topological interpretation of Classical and Intuitionistic
propositional logic, which puts into one-one correspondence logical operations, on the one hand,
and some operations with elements of a topological space, on the other hand. Lawvere’s categori-
cal interpretation of logic works similarly but it is more powerful because it interprets more logic.
First, it works for the first-order logic but not only for propositional logic. (Here the crucial role
plays Lawvere’s interpretation of logical quantifiers as functors, which we shall discuss shortly.)
Second, it also interprets truth-values (true, false), which in Tarski’s topological interpretation
remain uninterpreted. These features allow Lawvere to think about his categorical interpretation
of logic (also called a categorical semantics of logic by some authors [8]) as a genuine conceptual
formulation of logic and to call it categorical logic rather than by any other name. The fol-
lowing quote from Lawvere’s textbook [163] co-authored with Rosebrugh shows that Lawvere’s
categorical logic has a philosophical but not only technical aspect; the same passage provides an
informal explanation of Lawvere’s interpretation of logical quantifiers as functors:
The term “logic” has always had two meanings - a broader one and a narrower one:
(1) All the general laws about the movement of human thinking should ultimately be
made explicit so that thinking can be a reliable instrument, but
(2) already Aristotle realized that one must start on that vast program with a more
sharply defined subcase.
The achievements of this subprogram include the recognition of the necessity of mak-
ing explicit
(a) a limited universe of discourse, as well as
(b) the correspondence assigning, to each adjective that is meaningful over a whole
universe, the part of that universe where the adjective applies. This correspondence
necessarily involves
(c) an attendant homomorphic relation between connectives (like and and or) that
apply to the adjectives and corresponding operations (like intersection and union)
that apply to the parts “named” by the adjectives.
When thinking is temporarily limited to only one universe, the universe as such need
not be mentioned; however, thinking actually involves relationships between several
universes. [..] Each suitable passage from one universe of discourse to another induces
(0) an operation of substitution in the inverse direction, applying to the adjectives
meaningful over the second universe and yielding new adjectives meaningful over the
first universe. The same passage also induces two operations in the forward direction:
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(1) one operation corresponds to the idea of the direct image of a part but is called
“existential quantification” as it applies to the adjectives that name the parts;
(2) the other forward operation is called “universal quantification” on the adjectives
and corresponds to a different geometrical operation on the parts of the first universe.
It is the study of the resulting algebra of parts of a universe of discourse and of these
three transformations of parts between universes that we sometimes call “logic in the
narrow sense”. Presentations of algebraic structures for the purpose of calculation
are always needed, but it is a serious mistake to confuse the arbitrary formulations
of such presentations with the objective structure itself or to arbitrarily enshrine one
choice of presentation as the notion of logical theory, thereby obscuring even the
existence of the invariant mathematical content. In the long run it is best to try
to bring the form of the subjective presentation paradigm as much as possible into
harmony with the objective content of the objects to be presented; with the help of
the categorical method we will be able to approach that goal. ( [163], p. 193 - 194)
Notice that Lawvere and Rosebrugh put at the first place of their description of “logic in the
narrow sense” the stipulation of “limited universe of discourse”. So the authors definitely asso-
ciate themselves with the logical tradition, which originates in Leibniz and then develops through
Boole’s pioneering works in symbolic logic, through De Morgan, Jevons, Venn and Peirce. An-
swering Schro¨der’s criticism Frege calls logic developed in this tradition “calculus ratiocinator”
(calculus or reasoning) and opposes it to another tradition (to which he adheres himself), where
logic is understood as “lingua characteristica” aka characteristica universalis (universal language
of thought); this latter tradition also dates back to Leibniz but then develops relatively inde-
pendently by Frege, Peano, Russell, Quine and Church [110],[113], [111]. While the calculus
ratiocinator tradition applies logic “locally” leaving it up to the user to determine the universe
of discourse in every concrete application, the characteristica universalis tradition tends to apply
logic to the fixed metaphysical universe that is supposed to include all that there is 6. Thus
6
For Frege there is [..] only one possible Begriffsschrift, for there is only one kind of human thinking it
must reflect. Frege’s Formelsprache is not a particular development beyond our ordinary language;
it is a purified and streamlined version of the entire ordinary language itself. It is calculated to
replace ordinary language, at least in its mathematical uses, not to extend it. [..] This syndrome
of ideas characterizes what I have called language as the universal medium. Since the meanings
(references) of the expressions of our language cannot be expressed in that language we cannot
rationally consider varying them, either, at least not in a way that could be specified in language
and theorized about. In this sense, our language cannot be reinterpreted. Hence all model theory
of our actual language is impossible, for the basic idea of all model theory is precisely to let the
interpretation of the language vary. [..] And hence the meanings of our language cannot be changed,
it can be used for one purpose only, viz. to speak of this one actual world of ours. Hence a kind of
one-world assumption is implicit in the idea of language as the universal medium. ([113], p. x-xi)
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Lawvere’s categorical logic belongs to the calculus ratiocinator tradition rather than the charac-
teristica universalis tradition.
In his book [127] already quoted above Venn includes a chapter titled The Universe of Discourse,
and its symbolic representation where he, in particular, remarks (referring to a famous example
of syllogism, which includes a premises “All men are mortal”):
Hence we constantly make assertions about all men without the slightest intention of
being bound by our words beyond a reference to a comparatively small selection of
mankind. ([127], p. 182)
and further
All and nothing therefore, in any application of our formulae, are to be interpreted
in accordance with the limits which we may decide to lay down at the outset of the
particular logical processes in question.([127], p. 186)
Since the choice of the universe of discourse is for Venn a matter of “application” of logic rather
than matter of “symbolic statement” of logic, Venn unlike Lawvere describes the notion of
universe as “extra-logical” (ib., p. 184). In this context Venn makes an interesting link between
the issue of universe of discourse and logical diagrams:
It has been said above that this question of the Universe only arises when we apply
our formulas. Now diagrams are strictly speaking a form of application, and therefore
such considerations at once meet us when we come to make use of diagrams. I draw
a circle to represent X, then what is outside of that circle represents not-X, but the
limits of that outside are whatever I choose to consider them. ([127], p. 186)
Even if laying down logical diagrams according to given symbolic formulas may indeed qualify
as “a form of application” of these formulas, the logical diagrams certainly make part of Venn’s
logic and in this sense are quite unlike men and any other external objects, which one may wish
to include in one’s universe of discourse at a given occasion. So the “application” of logical
formulas to diagrams is a form of self-application. In other words, the use of logical diagrams
makes the notion of universe of discourse in some sense internal after all. Thus Venn’s use of
diagrams in logic can be seen as a step toward Lawvere’s position, who considers “making explicit
a limited universe of discourse” as an essential determination of logic rather than a matter of its
application. Tarski’s topological interpretation of Classical and Intuitionistic propositional calculi
(see3.4) can be also most naturally understood as a specification of the universe of discourse
of a given calculus. Beware however that Tarski himself does not consistently think of this
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construction as a proper part of logic.
The next necessary determination of logic according to Lawvere and Rosebrugh is classical and
can be found already in Boole: given a predicate (adjective) P (x) and an universe U consisting
of individuals x such that P (x) is meaningful (i.e. has a definite truth-value) for all x, one is also
given a part (subclass) of U consisting of such individuals x for which P (x) is true. I would like
to stress that in the standard set-theoretic foundations of mathematics using formal axiomatic
theories of sets like ZF this principle is rendered into the form of an axiom schema of set theory
(called Separation or Restricted Comprehension Axiom Schema) [1] but not as a principle of
logic. This technical point is a part of Lawvere’s disagreement with the “speculative” “Bolzano-
Frege-Peano-Russell tradition” in foundations of mathematics, which the standard set-theoretic
foundations inherit ([158], p. 213). Now we see that this disagreement is neither purely technical
nor purely ideological but that it also concerns Lawvere’s philosophical understanding of logic
as a conceptual tool (calculus ratiocinator) rather than the characteristica universalis, i.e., the
“universal medium” ([113], p. xi).
The last point of determination of logic according to Lawvere and Rosebrugh concerns the “atten-
dant homomorphic relation” between logical connectives, on the one hand, and the “mereology”
of the corresponding universe of discourse; as along as this universe is thought of as a class, this
mereology reduces to a number of operations with subclasses of this class like unions and inter-
section. The “attendant relation” is, of course, well-known since Boole; the structure shared by
propositions, on the one hand, and subclasses of a given class, on the other hand, is called after
Boole the Boolean algebra. Tarski’s topological interpretation of propositional calculus (3.4) al-
lows for a similar “homomorphic relation” for the case of intuitionistic propositional calculus; the
corresponding structure is called Heyting algebra. I would like once again to stress that Lawvere
and Rosebrugh talk here about the “homomorphic relation” between logical connectives and the
mereology of the universe of discourse as a proper part of logic but not as a model-theoretic
issue.
Whether there exists only one metaphysical universe of everything or one has a freedom to
assume as many universes of discourse as one likes may seem to be a philosophical issue that
can and arguably must be separated from the logical formalism as such. However as the further
explanations of Lawvere and Rosebrugh make it clear such a complete separation of “application”
of logic from the logic itself is not compatible with their approach. In fact the assumption
about the plurality of universes of discourse is necessary for the most original technical aspect
of Lawvere’s proposal, namely for his interpretation of logical quantifiers there exist and for all
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as functors adjoint to substitution (also understood as a functor).
An adjoint situation (called also an adjunction) is a pair of categories A,B with two functors
f, g going in opposite directions:
A
f //
B
g
oo
provided with certain natural transformations (i.e., morphisms between functors) and satisfying
certain conditions, which make these functors in some special sense mutually inverse. Given an
adjoint situation as above functor g is called left adjoint to functor f and functor f is called
right adjoint to functor g, in symbols g a f . A given functor has at most one (up to unique
isomorphism) left adjoint and one right adjoint. Here is the precise definition 7. In addition to
functors f, g adjunction g a f comprises natural transformations α : A → fg and β : gf → B
such that (gα)(βf) = g and (αf)(gβ) = f . (As above I write here the composition in the
geometrical order and following Lawvere in [147] do not distinguish between objects and their
identity morphisms.) The required condition is that the following two triangles commute:
g
gα //
1g   A
AA
AA
AA
AA
gfg
βg

g
f
αf //
1f   A
AA
AA
AA
AA
fgf
fβ

f
Once again I would like to stress that saying that quantifiers are interpreted as adjoint functors
provides an external description of Lawvere’s discovery; as the above quote from Lawvere and
Rosbrugh makes it clear Lawvere himself thinks of this functorial interpretation of quantifiers
as the “objective content” of the notion of quantification. Let me now discuss some of this
conceptual objective content beginning with the notion of substitution; in this discussion I shall
continue to trace a historical link between the categorical logic and the earlier calculus ratiocinator
tradition in logic as represented by Venn [127].
While Venn thinks of multiple universes of discourse as certain independent domains of appli-
cation of his logic, Lawvere and Rosebrugh claim that “thinking actually involves relationships
7The concept of adjunction has been first introduced in 1958 by Kahn [128] in the context of algebraic geometry.
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between several universes” (my emphasis) and then talk about the “passage” from one universe
of discourse to another. In a category-theoretic setting universes are presented as objects X,Y, ..
of some category and passages between universes are presented as morphisms like
X
f // Y
(Notice that passages between two given universes are, generally, many and they are, generally,
not inversible.) Thus we have here a category of universes of discourse but not just a class of these
things. Let us for simplicity think of these universes as sets but have in mind that the functorial
construction of logical quantifiers does not require this assumption. (We shall see in 4.5 how this
construction works in a more general setting and how in such a more general setting it reveals its
distinctive geometrical aspect.) Suppose now that we have a one-place predicate (a property) P ,
which is meaningful on set Y , so that there is a subset PY of Y (in symbols PY ⊆ Y ) such that
for all y ∈ Y P (y) is true just in case y ∈ PY . Now using these data (together with morphism f
as above) we can define a new predicate R on X as follows: we say that for all x ∈ X R(x) is true
when f(x) ∈ PY and false otherwise. So we get subset RX ⊆ X such that for all x ∈ X R(x) is
true just in case x ∈ RX . Let us assume in addition that every subset PY of Y is determined by
some predicate P meaningful on Y . Then given morphism (“passage”) f from “universe” X to
“universe” Y we get a way to associate with every subset PY (every part of universe Y ) a subset
RX and, correspondingly, a way to associate with every predicate P meaningful on Y a certain
predicate R meaningful on X. Since subsets of given set Y form Boolean algebra B(Y ) we get
a map between Boolean algebras (notice the change of direction!):
f∗ : B(Y ) // B(X)
Since Boolean algebras themselves are categories (with objects subsets and maps inclusions of
subsets) f∗ is a functor. For every proposition of form P (y) where y ∈ Y functor f∗ takes some
x ∈ X such that y = f(x) and produces a new proposition P (f(x)) = R(x) (for a single given
y it may produce a set of different propositions of this form). Since it replaces y in P (y) by
f(x) = y it is appropriate to call f∗ substitution functor.
The left adjoint to the substitution functor f∗ is functor
∃f : B(X) // B(Y )
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which sends every R ∈ B(X) (i.e. every subset of X) into P ∈ B(Y ) (subset of Y ) consisting
of elements y ∈ Y , such that there exists some x ∈ R such that y = f(x); in (some more)
symbols
∃f (R) = {y|∃x(y = f(x) ∧ x ∈ R)}
In other words ∃f sends R into its image P under f . Now if (as above) we think of R as a
property R(x) meaningful on X and think of P as a property P (y) meaningful on Y we can
describe ∃f by saying that it transformes R(x) into P (y) = ∃fxP ′(x, y) and interpret ∃f as the
usual existential quantifier.
The right adjoint to the substitution functor f∗ is functor
∀f : B(X) // B(Y )
which sends every subset R of X into subset P of Y defined as follows:
∀f (R) = {y|∀x(y = f(x)⇒ x ∈ R)}
and thus transforms R(X) into P (y) = ∀fxP ′(x, y).
Notice that functors ∃f and ∀f are defined here as adjoints to functor f∗, i.e., quite independently
from their interpretation as logical quantifiers explained above.
The very fact that that in this setting quantifiers arise “naturally” through the functorial adjunc-
tion is remarkable from a mathematical point of view. According to Marquis and Reyes “[t]his
was a key observation that convinced many mathematicians that this was the right analysis of
quantifiers” ([182], p.710).
Let me now focus on philosophical aspects of this Lawvere’s achievement.
Lawvere’s approach to logicality like Tarski’s approach discussed in 2.2 is semantical because it
essentially uses the notion of universe of discourse. Nevertheless it is very unlike Tarski’s. While
Tarski thinks about logic in a traditional vein as an invariant structure over a given universe
of discourse, Lawvere’s categorical logic is a device that allows one to translate a proposition
meaningful in a given universe Y into another proposition meaningful in another given universe
X taking into account the relationship between the two universes expressed by morphism f :
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X → Y ; as we have seen the corresponding “translation functor” f∗ expresses the simple idea of
substitution of a given variable y by term f(x). The fact that logical quantifiers are defined in
this setting through the substitution shows that the operation of translation between different
universes is not just a useful extra feature of logic but its very conceptual basis. The only
logical structure that is shared by all universes is the propositional (Boolean, Heyting or other)
structure. However for the first-order and higher-order logic the translational nature of logic
becomes essential. Logic is understood here no longer as a system of universal forms of thought,
which are not sensitive to differences between various domains of its application, but rather as
a universal translational protocol, which allows one to navigate between different domains. This
makes Lawvere’s conception of logic fundamentally relational: notice that quantifiers applied
in domain X are relativized to a particular “passage” f : X → Y from this domain to certain
codomain Y ; one needs to specify such a passage and the corresponding codomain every time
when one talks about “all x from X”, for example, when one says that all men are mortal. Does
this make sense? Let us see. The content of the proposition all men are mortal can be expressed
by saying that being a man implies being mortal. So this content can be expressed by means
of propositional logic without using quantifiers. But when quantifiers are really needed - as for
example in the case of Hilbert’s First Axiom (see 2.6 above):
∀x∀yGr(x, x, y)
(saying that any two points are aligned) - one should have in mind that talking about “all points”
does not make sense within the universe of points Pt but requires a “higher” or, better to say,
simply some external viewpoint, which allows one to look at Pt from outside and see it as a whole.
In the given example such an external viewpoint can be specified rather straightforwardly: since
the First Axiom characterizes a geometrical space, one should stipulate an appropriate categoryG
of spaces and make a new independent variable in the above expression to range over these spaces.
Then the universal quantifiers in the above axiom can be understood as Lawvere quantifiers; they
depend not only on category G but on a chosen functor f : Pt→ G from points to spaces. From
the traditional Hilbertian viewpoint functor G and f belong to the metatheory and so must be
treated separately but Lawvere shows us that without these things the first-order logic used in
the given formal theory cannot work. Since “a quantifier is an operation in logic that moves a
statement from one context to a related context” 8 one cannot use quantifiers working within a
single context.
8http://www.ncatlab.org/nlab/show/quantifier as for April 2012
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The informal explanation of the notion of logical quantifier given by Lawvere and Rosebrugh
in the above quote in terms of universes of discourse makes it clear that these universes must
not be understood as external domains of interpretation of a given theory; as objects of a given
logical category these things are proper elements of this category and so they do not provide by
themselves an interpretation (semantics) in the model-theoretic sense of the term. In [150] where
Lawvere presents an advanced version of his categorical notion of elementary theory he refers
to objects of the given logical category as types. This terminology points to Lawvere’s “1963
observation [..], that cartesian closed categories serve as a common abstraction of type theory
and propositional logic” ([162], p.1), which deserves our special discussion. For a systematic
study of this subject (that extends far beyond Lawvere’s original observation of 1963) see [169]
and [123].
4.4 Curry-Howard Correspondence and Cartesian Closed
Categories
The idea of logical calculus that not simply applies to different domains of individuals but
explicitly distinguishes between different types of individuals dates back to Russell who has
coined the term “theory of types” ([212], Appendix B); the idea can even be traced further back
to Aristotle’s distinction between different genus of things and his principle according to which
switching between different genus in a reasoning (metabasis) is not allowed. One may remark
that the type distinction reflects a feature of our natural languages:
Types are inherent in everyday language, for example, when we distinguish between
“who” and “what” or between “somebody” and “something”. ( [169], p. 125
and further remark that distinguishing between different types of objects is tacitly made in the
mathematical practice:
In our mathematical practice we have learned to keep things apart. If we have a
rational number and set of points in the Euclidean plane, we cannot even imagine
what it means to form the intersection. [..] If we think of a set of objects, we usually
think of collecting things of a certain type, and set-theoretical operations are to be
carried out inside that type. Some types might be considered as subtypes of some
other types, but in other cases two different types have nothing to do with each other.
That does not mean that their intersection is empty, but that it would be insane to
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even talk about the intersection. ([190], p. 31)
Indeed the standard Set-theoretic foundations of mathematics do not allow for distinguishing
between types of objects (at least at the foundational level) and, formally, do allow for crazy
set-theoretic operations mentioned in the above quote (since every mathematical object is a set
one may always form an intersection of two objects). Notice that the type distinction between
points and straight lines, which is made explicit in Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899, disappears in
his Foundations of 1934, where the Formal Axiomatic Method takes its mature symbolic form
(remind that in the latter case Hilbert treats only points as primitive objects). This is not
surprising because the system of (symbolic) logic used by Hilbert is not typed. One could expect
that the replacement of the underlying logical calculus by a typed logic may solve the problem
without effecting the foundations of the Formal Axiomatic Method itself; however at least one
particular development in type theory, namely one that has eventually led to the discovery of
the so-called Curry-Howard correspondence aka Curry-Howard isomorphism, as a matter of fact
does touch upon the foundations of the Axiomatic Method and connects the type theory to
categorical logic, as we shall now see.
As Lawvere ([162], p.2) and some other people notice the name of Curry-Howard isomorphism
is misleading because the term “isomorphism” is used in it loosely. I would like to stress that it
is also misleading in a different sense, namely in the sense that it does not properly reflect the
original philosophical motivation behind this discovery. In 1924 Scho¨nfinkel published a paper
[220], [221] aiming at deepening Hilbert’s formalization of logic, which, as I have already stressed
in Chapter 2, indeed does not provide a purely formal treatment of logical concepts like propo-
sition and variable; the sense in which Hilbert treats logical concepts “formally” is significantly
weaker than the sense in which he treats formally non-logical concepts (2.3). Scho¨nfinkel’s
idea was to reduce the logical concepts, which so far were generally seen as basic, to a small
number of allegedly more fundamental syntactic operations like substitution and permutation of
signs9 Independently similar ideas inspired Huskell Curry in 1920ies (before he first came across
9
The successes that we have encountered thus far on the road taken encourage us to attempt further
progress. We are led to the idea, which at first glance certainly appears extremely bold, of attempting
to eliminate by suitable reduction the remaining fundamental notions, those of proposition, proposi-
tional function, and variable, from those contexts in which we are dealing with completely arbitrary,
logically general propositions (for others the attempt would obviously be pointless). To examine
this possibility more closely and to pursue it would be valuable not only from the methodological
point of view that enjoins us to strive for the greatest possible conceptual uniformity but also from
a certain philosophic, or, if you wish, aesthetic point of view. For a variable in a proposition of
logic is, after all, nothing but a token that characterizes certain argument places and operators as
belonging together; thus it has the status of a mere auxiliary notion that is really inappropriate to
the constant, “eternal” essence of the propositions of logic. It seems to me remarkable in the extreme
that the goal we have just set can be realized also; as it happens, it can be done by a reduction to
three fundamental signs. ( [221] , p. 358-359)
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Scho¨nfinkel’s paper during the academic year of 1927-1928) who gave to this field of study its
current name of combinatory logic 10 Here is how Curry describes the aim and the scope of
combinatory logic in a later co-authored monograph:
Combinatory logic is a branch of mathematical logic which concerns itself with the
ultimate foundations. Its purpose is the analysis of certain notions of such basic
character that they are ordinarly taken for granted. These include [(i)] the process of
substitution, usually indicated by the use of variables; and also [(ii)] the classification
of the entities constructed by these processes into types or categories, which in many
systems has to be done intuitively before the theory can be applied. It has been
observed that these notions, although generally presupposed, are not simple; they
constitute a prelogic, so to speak, whose analysis is by no means trivial. ([85], p. 2)
Purposes (i) and (ii) mentioned by Curry in the above quotes are mutually dependent 11. Since
a formal logical calculus is seen as a bare symbolic calculus where signs do not have any previ-
ously assumed meaning one needs to make explicitly certain distinctions between different types
of symbolic constructions without which this calculus cannot qualify as logical - including, in
particular, the distinction between individuals, propositions and logical connectives. The idea of
Combinatory logic as Curry describes it requires making all such distinctions formally without
appealing to the usual meaning of words “individual”, “proposition”, etc. Thus pushing the
formal approach to logic to the extreme shows the necessity of typing, so one may argue that
the type distinction is always present in logic whether one describes explicitly or not. As Jacobs
puts this
A logic is always a logic over a type theory. ([123], p. 1)
In 1969 William Howard reformulated and extended Curry’s results in a note [118] that has been
first published only in 1980. Instead of using Combinatorial logic Howard used the formalism of
(simply) typed lambda calculus invented by Alonzo Church in late 1920s [31] and first published
in 1933. Curry was of, of course, aware about the fact that the formalism of lambda-calculus
comes close to that of combinatory logic but he claimed that his formalism provides a deeper
foundational analysis ([85], p.6 - 9). Unlike Curry Howard did not stress the philosophical mo-
tivation and the foundational significance of this result but formulated it in terms of structural
10For more detailed historical accounts see [31], [224].
11In the above quote Curry uses the term “category” interchangeably with the the term “type” - and further in
his book he uses the former term more often than the latter. Although in the category theory the term “category”
is used in a different sense the two different uses of this term are compatible as long as one assumes in the spirit
of CCAF that an object of a category is, generally, itself a category.
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correspondence between two families of formal calculi, namely, the simply typed lambda calculi,
on the one hand, and the formal deductive systems, on the other hand. Although such a presenta-
tion may have certain advantages for a mathematical reader not interested in foundational issues,
it leaves behind the philosophical content of Curry’s work and gives a wrong impression that
we are dealing here with some unexplained structural similarity rather than with a conceptually
clear mathematical fact concerning the foundations of logic.
Lawvere’s 1963 insight that the relevant structure shared by type theories and deductive systems
can be described as a category of special sort (that is called cartesian closed) has been system-
atically developed by Joachim Lambek in late 1960s and early 1970s, see [142], [143], [144]; a
systematic analysis of relationships between combinatory logic, lambda-calculus and cartesian
closed categories, which also contains some historical notes, is found in Lambek’s and Scott’s
monograph [169]. For my present purpose it is sufficient to stress that the notion of cartesian
closed category (CCC) used by Lawvere for logical purposes connects his work to the earlier
attempts to deepen foundations of logic and mathematics made by Scho¨nfinkel, Church, Curry
and their collaborators. It is appropriate also to mention that the notion of CCC first appears
(without the name) in Lawvere’s work as a property of the category of sets [146] but not as a
part of logic. Lawvere’s thinking about CCC is made explicit in the following Introduction to
his paper [151] of 1969 where CCC first appears in press under that name:
Cartesian closed categories [..] serve as a common abstraction of type theory and
propositional logic [..] ([151], p. 134)
For Lawvere CCC is not an exclusively logical category but rather a category that plays a (central)
role in logic in particular. In that sense there is a clear difference between Curry’s strategy who
pursues “the ultimate foundations” of logic by studying general features of syntactic structures
and Lawvere’s strategy, who uses the category theory for describing “abstract structures” found
everywhere in mathematics including mathematical logic and who does not grant to syntactic
structures any special importance.
The abstraction of CCC, which lies behind the so-called Curry-Howard correspondence, sheds a
new light on the doing versus showing dilemma, which I have stressed earlier. We have seen that
in Euclid these two aspects of mathematical reasoning are intrinsically intertwined - in spite of the
fact that Euclid explicitly qualifies each “Proposition” of his Elements either as a problem or as a
theorem (using appropriate endings, see 1.4). In Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method (in its mature form
of 1927 and later) the relationships between doing and showing are arranged as follows: what we
do are syntactic constructions and what we show by doing these “real” syntactic constructions
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are certain facts concerning “ideal” mathematical objects in terms of which we interpret these
constructions (2.6). (A different sort of showing is reserved for metamathematics; I leave it now
aside.) The setting of Curry-Howard Correspondence does not apply Hilbert’s rigid distinction
between “real” and “ideal” mathematical objects and allows for doing something else than only
building formulas: the simply typed lambda calculus is not a formal deductive machinery but a
kit for building mathematical objects of sort like Euclid’s geometrical “calculus” of constructions
with ruler and compass. The Curry-Howard correspondence amounts to the observation that
the rules of simply typed lambda calculus can be used (mutatis mutandis) for making formal
deductions; the notion of CCC makes the mathematical sense of this correspondence precise.
Thus in the given case the relationships between doing and showing are arranged differently.
We no longer assume that we do things of one sort (build strings of symbols) and then use
these things for showing something about things of another sort (by interpreting these strings
of symbols as propositions about “ideal” mathematical objects); instead we explore the same
structure of CCC by doing allowed calculations and showing with these calculations certain facts
about this very structure. As we can see this arrangement is similar to Euclid’s and dissimilar to
Hilbert’s. It is appropriate to notice here that CCC is not the only kind of category that allows
for this new form of synthetic mathematical reasoning (albeit historically it was invented first).
A similar synthetic approach is supported, in particular, by locally cartesian closed categories
(LCCC), which provide a categorical framework for Martin-Lo¨f’s intuitionistic type theory with
dependent types [223], see 5.11 and 6.9.
4.5 Hyperdoctrines
The idea of quantifiers as adjoints to substitution, which I explained in 4.3 pretending that we
were talking about sets, was first mentioned by Lawvere in [149] and then fully elaborated in
the Dialectica paper [150] with a help of the notion of CCC; the categorical construction, which
supports the quantification (and in fact the full first-order logic) Lawvere calls a hyperdoctrine.
A hyperdoctrine consists of a CCC T of “types” and functor h that associates (i) with every
object A of T - a category P (A) of “parts” of A, which in the given context are also thought
of as “predicates” or “attributes”12, and (ii) with every morphism f : A → B - a functor
sf : P (A)← P (B) (beware the reversal of the arrow!) thought of as “substitution” (in the sense
12A given part PA[φ] consists of those and only those “elements” of A, which have attribute φ; now this idea
is expressed in a form, which doesn’t require the reference to elements. This does not mean that we get rid of
elements altogether but means only that we don’t use the notion of element as primitive; in fact this notion can
be recovered in the given setting and, moreover, in a generalized form.
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explained in 4.3 but this time in a more general setting). It is assumed that every P (A) is a
partial order (parts are partially ordered by inclusion), which is tantamount to saying that it is a
category having at most one morphism PA[φ]→ PA[φ] with for given domain and codomain. It
is also assumed that P (A) is CCC. This allows for thinking about this partial order as a deductive
order and denote it `A.
Notice once again how closely this setting reproduces the traditional ideas of British symbolic
and diagrammatic logic as presented by Venn [127]! An important difference, however, is that in
Lawvere’s case the order `A is construed concretely as a structure on given type A rather than
as an abstract structure (like Boolean algebra) responsible for logical deduction, which merely
applies to A and to any other “universe of discourse”. This change of viewpoint is the key
idea that allowed Lawvere to capture algebraically the first-order logic after the example of the
traditional algebraic treatment of propositional logic by Boole, Venn and others.
As we already know from 4.3 the universal and the existential quantifiers are recovered as the
right and the left adjoints to functor sf , so the quantification also turns into a concrete structure
associated with the given morphism f , which maps one given type (the domain of quantification)
to another given type (the codomain). The fact that a sound notion of quantification requires
not only a specification of its domain A but also a specification of (i) its codomain B and (ii)
a particular map f : A → B between the domain and the codomain, is a discovery of great
philosophical significance, which I have already tried to explain. The reader is advised to re-read
now 4.3 and see that the above discussion concerns the general hyperdoctrine but not only to
the hyperdoctrine of sets used then as a convenient example13.
Observe that functor h : T → P that associates to the category T of types a further structure,
is “something more” than a “usual” contravariant functor, which maps our given category T to
another one. Objects of category P (which I did not describe so far) are categories P (A) (so
it is a category of categories) and its morphisms are functors of the form sf : P (B) → P (A).
Crucially, we cannot disregard here the internal structure of each P (A) and thus treat P as an
abstract category of some appropriate kind. As we shall see in 6.9 P can be described in a more
compact way as a 2-category but now it is more appropriate for my purpose to describe functor
h as a fibration (in particular, because this is how Lawvere describes it in [152]). The notion
of fibration comes from geometry: it is a way of “thickening” a given geometrical object G by
13Here is how the category of sets presents itself as a hyperdoctrine. First consider this category as the category
T of types (think of each set A as a particular type). Next associate (i) with every set A its powerset (i.e. set of all
subsets of A) P (A) and (ii) with every function f : A→ B a new function between powersets sf : P (B)→ P (A)
(substitution) which sends given subset B′ ⊆ B to subset A′ ⊆ A formed as follows: a ∈ A is a member of A′
if and only if b = f(a) is a member of B′. Elements of powerset P (A) (i.e., the subsets of set A) are partially
ordered by inclusion, this partial order has the structure of Boolean algebra and the resulting logic is classical.
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associating with every point p of G a new object f(p) called a fiber in a way, that reflects the
structure of the base object G. For a suggestive example think of a hairy head: if the hair is
normally cut (i.e., is neither too short nor too long) one can see how the form of the hair reflects
the form of the head without being reduced to it (if the hair is too short one can see only the
form of the head, and if it is too long the form of the head becomes invisible). Now we have a
similar situation: the hyperdoctrine h transforms every “thin” type A into a “thick” category
P (A) of attributes over this type and every “thin” morphism f : A → B into a “thick” functor
sf : P (B)→ P (A) between the categories of attributes.
Let me say a few more words about the geometrical notion of fibration, which will be used in
Chapter 6. In accordance to the direction of h I informally described the geometrical fibration
as a process of “thickening”, which is non-trivial in the sense that it adds more structure. In
the case of hyperdoctrines it adds a logical structure. However in order to give a geometrical
definition of fibration it is more appropriate to describe fibration in terms of the opposite process
that maps the “hairy head” onto its base “bold head” (which is the simplest way of cutting one’s
hair). Hence the definition of fiber bundle (which is a special case of fibration corresponding to
intuitive examples like that of hairy head) as a continuous surjective (i.e., onto) map E → B,
which locally looks like a projection of a product space B × F onto one of its components F . A
trivial example of fiber bundle is given by a cylinder C seen as the product O × L of its base
circle over its side (the “hair”) and the projection p : O × L→ O of this cylinder onto its base.
(In order to reverse the process think of this cylinder as formed by hairs growing out of its base.)
A non-trivial example is obtained from the former one by twisting the side L of the cylinder:
this twist produces a Mo¨bius strip M . Observe that M and C grow from the same base O with
the same hair L; however M cannot be (globally) described as a product space and the map
f : M → O is no longer a projection (Fig. 4.1)
Fig. 4.1
The notion of fiber bundle allows for a generalization called Hurewicz fibration or simply fibration,
which turns to be particularly appropriate in a categorical context as we shall see in 6.8. Hurewicz
fibration must not be confused with Grothenideck fibration discussed in 6.5. How these two
categorical notions of fibration relate to each other will be also explained in 6.8.
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The fact the geometrical aspect of the notion of hyperdoctrine is something more than just
a useful intuitive way of thinking about it has been demonstrated by Lawvere’s work in topos
theory [153] almost simultaneously with the first public appearance of hyperdoctrines in [150] and
the second appearance of hyper doctrines in [152]; we shall better see how works this dialectical
interplay between geometry and logic in in 4.9.
Although in the late 1960ies and early 1970ies the “internalization” of quantifiers with hyperdoc-
trines was justly commonly perceived as the most impressive result of Lawvere’s work, I would
like to mention now another Lawvere’s achievement, which attracted the common interest more
recently. This is the internalization of equality (aka identity in logic). The idea first appears in
[149] (before the introduction of hyperdoctrines) and then becomes central in [152]. Technically
it comes in the same parcel with the internalization of quantifiers. Consider in the category T
of types (making part of hyperdoctrine h as above) morphism δA : A → A × A which we want
to play the role of the diagonal map that sends each “element” of type A to its cartesian square
(which always exists because T is cartesian closed). Then consider in P (A) the “maximal” at-
tribute 1A, which we interpret as the predicate “identically true over A” (if A is a set then 1A
is the maximal subset of A, which however we must formally distinguish from A itself); any
deduction in P (A) that has the form 1A → X we interpret as a proof over A. Finally consider
the adjunction ∃δA a sδA and the image idA = ∃δA(1A), which is an attribute in P (A × A); we
take this latter attribute to be the internal equality relation for terms of type A. The adjunction
brings the canonical map 1A → sδA(idA), which we read as a proof (over A) of reflexivity of
idA.
As we shall see in 6.9 the geometrical view on hyperdoctrines as fibrations sheds a new light
on the notion of identity and reveals its highly non-trivial character. The link between the
proof theory and the homotopy theory pointed to by Lawvere in 1970 [152] 14 recently became
a field of active research, which led Voevodsky to the idea of the new Univalent Foundations of
mathematics discussed in 6.10 below.
14
For deductions over X, one may take provable entailments (so that the category P (X) reduces to
a preodered set) or one may take suitable “homotopy classes” of deductions in the usual sense.
One can write down an inductive definition of the “homotopy” relation, but the author does not
understand well what results. ([152], p. 3-4)
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4.6 Functorial Semantics
The model-theoretical notion of interpretation (model) is treated by Lawvere in [148], [149] under
the title of Functorial Semantics. The idea is to identify a model of a given theory T (presented
as a category as just explained) with a functor T → S to the category of sets, which preserves
the additional structure (i.e., the features of theory T distinguishing it from a general category).
In [150] Lawvere uses the same notion of model but this time describes the category of sets
itself as a hyperdoctrine. Thus the Functorial Semantics is a rather straightforward translation
into a category-theoretic setting of the standard Tarski’s set-theoretic semantics. However this
translation is far from being trivial: as we shall now see it brings about (or “reveals” if one likes)
some genuinely new features.
Remind that the older notion of interpretation involves the idea of substitution of non-logical
terms of formal theory T by certain objects and relations making part of another (usually in-
formal) theory T ′ like in the case of the arithmetical model of Euclidean geometry described by
Hilbert in his Foundations of 1899; what is then usually called a model is a particular construc-
tion in T ′. What this standard setting lacks is a properly mathematical theory of substitution.
Tarski’s model theory describes concrete cases of substitution precisely but still has no general
mathematicaldescription of this procedure. Lawvere’s category-theoretic approach construes the
relevant notion of substitution as a mathematical object, namely a functor. In additional to
technical advantages of this approach, which I cannot analyze here, it also changes the usual way
of thinking about relationships between theories and their interpretations (models) discussed in
the last Chapters. With the functorial approach to model theory the notion of categoricity of
a formal theory (i.e., the uniqueness of its model up to isomorphism) loses its usual appeal: in
the new setting one expects to obtain a category MT of models (i.e., of certain functors) of given
theory T , which has algebraic properties making it manageable, but not necessarily a category
consisting of a single object (up to isomorphism). Further, this setting allows for considering
given theory T itself as a special object of MT , so by Lawvere’s word
The theory appears itself as a generic model [159], p.19.
It is appropriate to ask whether or not Lawvere’s theories are formal in anything like Hilbert’s
sense of the word. As we have already seen the answer is rather in negative because Lawvere
distinguishes between “invariant” conceptual theories from their formal presentations, and by
default uses the word “theory” for invariant theories. Let us now see more precisely how Lawvere
describes the relationships between the formal and the conceptual, and how in this context he
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thinks about theories and their semantics. I come back to Lawvere’s functorial semantics in
9.2.
4.7 Formal and Conceptual
Lawvere’s Dialectica paper [150] begins as follows:
That pursuit of exact knowledge which we call mathematics seems to involve in an es-
sential way two dual aspects, which we may call the Formal and the Conceptual. For
example, we manipulate algebraically a polynomial equation and visualize geometri-
cally the corresponding curve. Or we concentrate in one moment on the deduction
of theorems from the axioms of group theory, and in the next consider the classes of
actual groups to which the theorems refer. Thus the Conceptual is in a certain sense
the subject matter of the Formal.
The above passage can be interpreted coherently if one reminds that “formal” in the contempo-
rary mathematical parlance implies “symbolic”. So Lawvere talks here about (possibly uninter-
preted) symbolic calculi, on the one hand, and their non-symbolic interpretations, on the other
hand. I would like to stress that although such a distinction makes perfect sense with respect to
our contemporary mathematics it does not apply to mathematics throughout all of its history.
It certainly does not apply to mathematics practiced before the 17th century when symbolic
methods were first introduced.
Later in the same paper Lawvere considers the “Theories” on equal footing with the Formal and
the Conceptual and suggests (without providing details) to think about these three things as a
pair of adjoint situations:
Theoriesop
semantics// Conceptual
structure
oo
Formal
//
Theoriesoo
which compose into
Formalop
// Conceptualoo
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I shall not try to reconstruct missing mathematical details but try to interpret these suggested
adjoint situations heuristically. The sense of the first one is clear: an interpretation of a given
theory in terms of appropriate concepts provides this theory with an appropriate semantics
while a reciprocal operation amounts to extraction of certain theoretical structure from a given
conceptual domain. This resembles the usual notions of semantics and structure but one should
keep in mind that Lawvere’s Theories are not formal theories in the usual syntactic sense but are
connected with the Formal through another pair of adjoint functors. Since in a different place
Lawvere describes theories as “invariant abstract concepts” it makes sense to qualify concepts
in
Theoriesop
// Conceptualoo
as (variable) concrete concepts and include under this latter title what Kant would call “represen-
tation” (like the curve produced as a graph of a given polynomial in Lawvere’s example).
As far as I can see the main purpose of this tripartition is to keep after Hilbert and Tarski
the distinction between a theory and its (various) semantics and at the same time distinguish
between the given theory and its (various) formal syntactic presentations. Crucially Lawvere’s
“invariant” notion of theory unlike the “semi-formal” notion of theory developed in Hilbert’s
Foundations of 1899 (which in a sense is also invariant with respect to the choice of its possible
formalization) is itself a mathematical object, namely, a category.
Recently Joyal summarized Lawvere’s tripartition as follows:
Ideally, every formal system of logic should exhibit three layers: a conceptual layer
which specifies a certain class C of categories and functors, a semantic layer which
specifies natural examples of categories in C (the semantic domains) and a formal
layer which specifies a language and a deduction system for constructing algebraically
the categories in C. The layers are not independent of each other and each clarifies
the others. But the conceptual layer has the central role as a kind of middle-man:
Formal layer ← Conceptual layer → Semantic layer ([126], p. 19)
4.8 Categorical Logic and Hegelian Dialectics
As we have seen Lawvere critisizes the standard Hilbert-style Axiomatic Method by arguing
that this method fixes attention upon particular syntactic presentations of logical structures and
ignores the invariant content of logical and mathematical theories. Lawvere’s novel categorical
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logic aims at revealing this invariant content and putting the syntactic presentations at their
appropriate (modest) place. As Lawvere makes it explicit at many instances (some of which
are referred to below) his project is underpinned by Hegel’s philosophy and, in particular, by
Hegel’s distinction between the objective and the subjective logic [90]. I shall try now to persuade
the reader that Lawvere’s Hegelian perspective on science, mathematics and category theory is
indeed crucial for a philosophical understanding of his work. I would like to stress that in order
to appreciate the relevance of Hegel’s dialectical philosophy in categorical logic one does not
need to be a “Hegelian” - although this must go without saying it seems me appropriate to
make this remark in the present intellectual context of continuing ideological and cultural (and
very rarely properly philosophical) battles between the so-called “Analytic” and “Continental”
philosophical traditions, which make an echo of the Cold War and other more tragic episodes of
the passed century. It is also important to have in mind that in [153] Lawvere states explicitly
that he himself is not a Hegelian (p. 74, footnote 2). In a later work Lawvere describes his
understanding of the mutual impact of mathematics and philosophy as follows:
It is my belief that in the next decade and in the next century the technical advances
forged by category theorists will be of value to dialectical philosophy, lending precise
form with disputable mathematical models to ancient philosophical distinctions such
as general vs. particular, objective vs. subjective, being vs. becoming, space vs.
quantity, equality vs. difference, quantitative vs. qualitative etc. In turn the explicit
attention by mathematicians to such philosophical questions is necessary to achieve
the goal of making mathematics (and hence other sciences) more widely learnable
and useable. Of course this will require that philosophers learn mathematics and
that mathematicians learn philosophy. ([155], p. 16)
Interestingly, Lawvere shares with his philosophical adversaries including Russell and other An-
alytic philosophers the idea that mathematics allows to put philosophical distinctions and ar-
guments in a sharper and better disputable form, which allegedly allows for “doing philosophy
mathematically” - the view, which is denied by most of so-called Continental thinkers. (I don’t
want to make myself a subject to the Analytic/Contintental distinction, which is my view is
very ill-construed 15 but I would like to remind that I am also not enthusiastic about the idea of
using mathematical methods in philosophy. I explained some reasons for it the above Introduc-
tion.),
15While the expression “Analytic philosophy” is a self-description the expression “Continental philosophy” is
invented by Analytic philosophers in the second half of the 20th century and to the best of my knowledge has
been never used as a self-description.
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At the same time, as we shall shortly see, Lawvere’s disagreements with the basics of Analytic
philosophy are too profound for qualifying his work as a mere “formalization of Hegel’s dialec-
tics by means of modern logic”. This makes Lawvere’s philosophical thinking and its impact
onto mathematics quite unique in its kind. As a philosopher Lawvere inherits from different
schools of thought and remains remarkably unaffected by the unfortunate Analytic versus Con-
tinental distinction. I believe that today such a position is a sine qua non for doing philosophy
seriously.
Let me now turn to Hegel and, more specifically, to his distinction between the objective and
subjective logic. Here is a relevant passage:
What is to be considered is the whole Notion, firstly as the Notion in the form of
being, secondly, as the Notion; in the first case, the Notion is only in itself, the
Notion of reality or being; in the second case, it is the Notion as such, the Notion
existing for itself (as it is, to name concrete forms, in thinking man, and even in
the sentient animal and in organic individuality generally [..]). Accordingly, logic
should be divided primarily into the logic of the Notion as being and of the Notion as
Notion - or, by employing the usual terms (although these as least definite are most
ambiguous) into ’objective’ and ’subjective’ logic. ([90], 79)
Hegel’s Notion is a category that comprise both (i) the reality (aka being) and human (and more
generally also animal, as Hegel hints) (ii) thinking about reality. This notion of notion, which
is crucial for Hegel’s so-called “objective idealism”, is not of our primary concern here because
Lawvere rejects Hegel’s objective idealism ([153], p. 74) and does not use it. So the relevant
part of the content of the above quote is this: logic is divided into two parts one of which is
(i) the logic of being aka the objective logic, while the other is (ii) the logic of thinking aka the
subjective logic (it is called by this latter name because thinking requires a thinking subject).
Hegel’s subjective logic is what today (and also in Hegel’s times) is commonly called logic. Let
us first focus on the objective logic.
For explaining Hilbert’s notion of objective logic I cannot help but use a bit of Hilbert’s dialectical
method of definition - even if I’m trying now to reduce the use of this method to minimum in
order to make my explanation more accessible to people who are not used to it. This simply
amounts to saying that I am going to define this notion through several approximations rather
than give immediately a formal definition.
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In the first approximation I identify Hegel’s objective logic (=logic of being) with ontology. In
this first approximation the above quote simply tells us about the familiar distinction between
logic (in the usual sense of logic of thinking) and ontologyr. This a useful approximation but it
is by no means sufficient for our purpose.
At the next dialectical step we should distinguish between ontology as a part of metaphysics
(meaning the metaphysics of Aristotle, of Schoolmen, Wolf’s metaphysics or the contemporary
Analytic metaphysics) and the objective logic proper. As Hegel tells us a way to pursue a
dialectical reasoning consists in following the history of relevant notions. This is what we need
at this second step. The relevant historical character is Kant:
Recently Kant has opposed to what has usually been called logic another, namely, a
transcendental logic. What has here been called objective logic would correspond in
part to what with him is transcendental logic. He [Kant] distinguishes it from what
he calls general logic in this way, [a] that it treats of the notions which refer a priori
to objects, and consequently does not abstract from the whole content of objective
cognition, or, in other words, it contains the rules of the pure thinking of an object,
and [b] at the same time it treats of the origin of our cognition [..]. It is to this second
aspect that Kant’s philosophical interest is exclusively directed. ([90], 81)
So our second approximation amounts to saying after Hegel that the objective logic “corresponds
in part” to Kant’s transcendental logic. I find it actually useful in this second approximation to
boldly identify Hegel’s objective logic with Kant’s transcendental logic. As we shall see at the
final third step, the difference between the two is much neater than the difference between the
objective logic and the traditional ontology.
We have already encountered Kant’s notion of transcendental logic earlier in this book (see 1.3,
2.2). As Hegel reminds us in the above quote Kant distinguishes his transcendental logic from
the “general logic”, which is most often called today simply logic, by specifying that the tran-
scendental logic is not wholly topic-neutral: while the general logic deals with abstract logical
individuals the transcendental logic deals only with objects of possible experience, i.e., with
would-be empirical objects. This is why the general logic applies everywhere but the transcen-
dental logic applies only in mathematics and (mathematized) empirical sciences. Notice now
that there is a sense in which the transcendental logic provides a replacement for the traditional
metaphysical ontology.
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Let me explain this with an example. Doing the traditional metaphysics 16 one may stipulate that
all entities (or alternatively - only entities of a special sort called physical entities) live in space
and time, and then ask whether space and time are absolute or relational, elaborate on formal
properties of spatio-temporal relations and so on. Kant’s transcendental logic reformulates these
questions into questions about our thinking about space and time, i.e., into logical questions (in
the special “transcendental” sense of “logical”). Although some questions about space and time
can be asked and answered in both settings similarly, the two settings, generally, give rise to
different questions and different answers. This is why the difference between the two approaches
does not reduce to two different answers to the question Does the world (as we usually think about
it) really exist or it is a creation of our brains? This latter question belongs to the metaphysical
ontology rather than to the transcendental logic, and so from the point of view of transcendental
logic it is ill-posed.
The third approximation (that will be my last) is more difficult because here we touch upon the
heart of Hegel’s project: somehow to get rid of the subjective bent of Kant’s transcendental logic
without bringing back the traditional metaphysics. The main idea is to keep doing something like
logic (rather than the sort of speculative physics called metaphysics) but make it objective. 17.
In the following passage Hegel compares his objective logic with the traditional metaphysics and
at the same time describes it as an improved version of Kant’s philosophical “critique”:
The objective logic, then, takes the place rather of the former metaphysics which was
16I keep talking about the “traditional metaphysics” but not simply about “metaphysics” not for saying that
the metaphysics is doomed to be swept away by the future scientific progress (it is very hard to make today
such an optimistic prediction) but because Kant has a different and more specific notion of metaphysics, which is
irrelevant in the given context.
17The claim that Kant’s transcendental logic is “subjectively bent” is less evident and less simple than it may
appear. Natorp [189] denounces such a claim as a misinterpretation - although his argument can be perhaps
better understood as an attempt to improve on Kant rather than simply reconstruct his thought. However
Hegel’s understanding of Kant’s alleged subjectivism is far from being naive; here is a relevant passage, which
also provides a useful exposition of Kant’s understanding of objecthood:
An object, says Kant, is that in the notion of which the manifold of a given intuition is unified. But
all unifying of representations demands a unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Conse-
quently it is this unity of consciousness which alone constitutes the connection of the representations
with the object and therewith their objective validity and on which rests even the possibility of the
understanding. Kant distinguishes this unity from the subjective unity of consciousness, the unity
of representation whereby I am conscious of a manifold as either simultaneous or successive, this
being dependent on empirical conditions. On the other hand, the principles of the objective deter-
mination of notions are, he says, to be derived solely from the principle of the transcendental unity
of apperception. Through the categories which are these objective determinations, the manifold of
given representations is so determined as to be brought into the unity of consciousness. According
to this exposition, the unity of the notion is that whereby something is not a mere mode of feeling,
an intuition, or even a mere representation, but is an object, and this objective unity is the unity of
the ego with itself. In point of fact, the comprehension of an object consists in nothing else than that
the ego makes it its own, pervades it and brings it into its own form, that is, into the universality
that is immediately a determinateness, or a determinateness that is immediately universality. As
intuited or even in ordinary conception, the object is still something external and alien. When it
is comprehended, the being-in-and-for-self which it possesses in intuition and pictorial thought is
transformed into a positedness; the I in thinking it pervades it. ([90], 1293)
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intended to be the scientific construction of the world in terms of thoughts alone.
If we have regard to the final shape of this science, then it is first and immediately
ontology whose place is taken by objective logic [..] But further, objective logic also
comprises the rest of metaphysics in so far as this attempted to comprehend with the
forms of pure thought particular substrata taken primarily from figurate conception,
namely the soul, the world and God [..]. [Objective l]ogic, however, considers these
forms free from those substrata, from the subjects of figurate conception; it considers
them, their nature and worth, in their own proper character. Former metaphysics
omitted to do this and consequently incurred the just reproach of having employed
these forms uncritically without a preliminary investigation as to whether and how
they were capable of being determinations of the thing-in-itself, to use the Kantian
expression - or rather of the Reasonable. Objective logic is therefore the genuine
critique of them - a critique which does not consider them as contrasted under the
abstract forms of the a priori and the a posteriori, but considers the determinations
themselves according to their specific content. ([90], 85)
Observe that the price paid by Hegel for fixing Kant’s critical philosophy is high: along with
the subjective bend Hegel gets rid of Kant’s a priori versus a posteriori distinction; arguably
this step diminishes the role of empirical data in sciences and after all allows for the “scientific
construction of the world in terms of thoughts alone” in a new dialectical form. As far as I am
concerned this price is too high. However this critical remark does rule out Hegel’s dialectical
method of reasoning as such but rather rises the problem of how to use this method in the
modern science without compromising against the empirical character of this science.
Let us now turn to subjective logic. It requires for its explication a dialectical procedure of a
different sort because this kind of logic is most commonly simply identified with logic. Apparently
this common opinion did not change much since Hegel’s times - albeit the booming development
of logic during the last century perhaps made it a bit less “ossified” and more “fluid”:
This part of the logic which contains the Doctrine of the Notion [..] is issued under
the particular title System of Subjective Logic, for the convenience of those friends
of this science who are accustomed to take a greater interest in the matters here
treated and included in the scope of logic commonly so called, than in the further
logical topics treated in the first two parts [which cover the Objective Logic]. For
these earlier parts I could claim the indulgence of fair-minded critics on account of
the scant preliminary studies in this field which could have afforded me a support,
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material, and a guiding thread. In the case of the present part, I may claim their
indulgence rather for the opposite reason; for the logic of the Notion, a completely
ready-made and solidified, one may say, ossified material is already to hand, and
the problem is to render this material fluid and to re-kindle the spontaneity of the
Notion in such dead matter. If the building of a new city in a waste land is attended
with difficulties, yet there is no shortage of materials; but the abundance of materials
presents all the more obstacles of another kind when the task is to remodel an ancient
city, solidly built, and maintained in continuous possession and occupation. Among
other things one must resolve to make no use at all of much material that has hitherto
been highly esteemed. ([90], 1277)
So Hegel’s treatment of subjective logic has three basic aspects: (i) revealing the subjective
character of what is commonly called logic (i.e., the formal logic), (ii) “re-kindling the spontaneity
of Notion” in the common “ossified” logical categories and finally (iii) “passing out of subjectivity
into objectivity [90], 1441”; this latter dialectical procedure can be called the objectification of
logic.
As Hegel suggests in the last quote and elsewhere (see, for example, [90], 86) the very distinction
between the objective and the subjective logic should be thought of as dialectical to wit polemical.
What he really aims at is a transformation of the common notion of logic into what he calls the
objective logic or simply logic. A better name for subjective logic is the “logic of Notion”,
which is the third concluding part of Hegel’s (objective) logic. (Beware that the three parts
of Hegel’s logic - the logic of Being, the logic of Essence and the logic of Notion - are to be
thought of as consecutive stages of a single process of dialectical reasoning rather than three
parts of the same whole, which co-exist side by side in some intellectual space.) However since
Hegel’s notion of logic is very far from being common Hegel struggles (dialectically!) against
the common view and use such labels as “objective” and “subjective” in this struggle. Let me
however leave this very preliminary elucidation of Hegel’s logic at this point and turn back to
Lawvere. (The dialectical character of the above explanation implies its open-endedness, and
the interested reader is advised to pursue a further study of Hegel’s logic independently.)
As we already know from the above quote ([155], p. 16) Lawvere’s project involving Hegel’s
logic is twofold: Lawvere wants to (i) recast Hegel’s dialectical logic in mathematical terms
of categorical logic and (ii) use Hegel’s dialectical logic as a guide in his mathematical research
including his research in categorical logic. Lawvere also makes it clear that his strategy is to merge
(i) and (ii) into a single mathematico-philosophical project, so when I distinguish between (i)
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and (ii) and keep them apart, I’m clearly doing an opposite move. The reason I am doing it is the
following: just as in Chapter 2 I discussed various philosophical influences on and philosophical
interpretations of Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method but did not discuss the impact of this
method on philosophy (which was indeed very significant), talking in this present Chapter about
Lawvere’s work I’m going to discuss only (ii) and leave (i) aside. Since in Lawvere’s work (i) and
(ii) are very closely merged my choice is a choice of perspective rather than a choice of material.
One and the same piece of Lawvere’s work can be usually seen both (i) as a piece of Hegelian
dialectics mathematized with the category theory and (ii) as a piece of mathematics inspired and
guided by Hegelian dialectics - and the author’s intention, as I understand it, is to synthesize
these two aspects into a single whole. Thus my choice to focus on (i) in this book makes my
perspective on Lawvere’s work special and deliberately incomplete.
Let us now see how Lawvere distinguishes between the objective and the subjective logic in the
context of categorical logic:
Arising [..] from the needs of geometry, category theory has developed such notions as
adjoint functor, topos, fibration, closed category, 2-category, etc. in order to provide
(i) a guide to the complex, but very non-arbitrary constructions of the concepts and
their interactions which grow out of the study of space and quantity.
It was only the relentless adherence to the needs of that basic subject that made cat-
egory theory so well-determined yet powerful. [..] If we replace “space and quantity”
in (i) above by “any serious object of study”, then (i) becomes my working definition
of objective logic. Of course, when taken in a philosophically proper sense, space and
quantity do pervade any serious field of study. Category theory has also objectified
as a special case
(ii) the subjective logic of inference between statements. Here statements are of
interest only for their potential to describe the objects which concretize the concepts.
([157], p. 16)
If we judge the above Lawvere’s definition of objective logic by Hegel’s standard we immediately
notice a gap (or rather a leap) in it: while Lawvere relates his objective logic to categories of space
and quantity directly, Hegel arrives to these categories only after some dialectical development
that begins with categories of Being, Nothingness and Becoming. However instead of trying to
find a place for these and some other missing Hegelian categories18 in the categorical logic I shall
18For such an attempt see [187].
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rather change the perspective (in accordance with my choice of perspective explained above) and
comment on Lawvere’s definition of logic as it stands using some key ideas coming from Hegel’s
logic but without assuming that Lawvere’s logic is supposed to represent Hegel’s logic fully and
faithfully.
Notice now how Lawvere relates the “study of space and quantity” and “any serious field of
study”. He, first, (a) tells us about a category-theoretic guide to conceptual constructions growing
out of the study of space and quantity, second, (b) tentatively defines the objective logic as a
category-theoretic guide to conceptual constructions growing from any serious field of study
and, finally, (c) states that “in a philosophically proper sense, space and quantity do pervade
any serious field of study”, so that (a) and (b) are in fact equivalent and one may think of
the objective logic as the logic of space and quantity without restricting the generality. This
micro-dialectics seems me quite remarkable and illuminating. Why Lawvere does not define the
objective logic as the logic of space and quantity to begin with? I suppose, because according to
the common opinion (formal) logic must apply in any serious field of study independently of its
subject-matter; so if Lawvere would say from the outset that his objective logic applies only to
the study of space and quantity one could think that this special logic applies only in a specific
field and for this reason perhaps even does not deserve the name of logic. This is why Lawvere
says first that the objective logic applies in any serious field of study and only then he makes it
clear that in the “philosophically proper sense” the logic of any serious field of study is the logic
of space and quantity.
What is then the philosophically proper sense in which “space and quantity do pervade any seri-
ous field of study”? Since Lawvere does not explain this I give my own explanation. It is useful
for my explanation to begin with Kant and Neo-Kantians and only then turn to Hegel. Remind
from 2.2 (a) Cassirer’s critique of Russell’s mathematical logicism, which stresses the fact that
Russell’s approach throws the general theory of magnitude away from the pure mathematics,
and (b) the related claim according to which logic and mathematics must not be “instruments
for building a metaphysical ’world of thought”’ but must apply only within the mathematized
empirical science. Both Cassirer’s claims are closely related because he assumes after Kant that
an adequate general mathematical theory of magnitude is necessary and sufficient for distinguish-
ing objects of (possible) experience from metaphysical “individuals”, which one may stipulate
for free. Talking about logic Cassirer has in mind Kant’s idea of transcendental logic, which
uses such a general theory of magnitude for this very purpose. Now by exchanging the general
theory of magnitude for the theory of space and quantity (which in the given context seems
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me unproblematic ) we can distinguish after Cassirer a philosophical sense in which this later
theory indeed pervade any serious field of study. If by a serious field of study we mean one that,
first, apply mathematics and, second, deal with empirical data then we need a general theory
of space and quantity in order to distinguish between those conceptual constructions, which can
possibly represent empirical objects, and those which can not.19. As long as an appropriate
theory of space and quantity is built into a system of logic this system of logic can be described
as “logic of space and quantity” and at the same time apply in any serious field of study (but
not elsewhere).
The above Kantian reconstruction of Lawvere’s “philosophically proper sense” in which “space
and quantity pervade any serious field of study” does not involve any assumption according to
which the space and quantity are in some sense subjective, so this can hardly be a controversial
point here. It is unsatisfactory rather in a different respect: the very idea of a theory allowing for
the sharp distinction between useful and “metaphysical” (in the sense of “merely speculative”)
mathematical constructions is doubtful. Even if I strongly disagree with Wigner’s view according
to which the effectiveness of mathematics in natural sciences is “unreasonable” and must be
thought of as a “miracle” and the “wonderful gift”, I realize that we are not living an the Kantian
paradise where all sound mathematics applies in natural sciences and technologies immediately.
So we need a more flexible and more dynamic way of thinking about these issues than Kant’s
philosophy may provide. Here the model of Hegel’s dialectical logic becomes relevant. Rather
then be a device for philosophical critique of existing science like Kant’s transcendental logic
the categorical logic is conceived by Lawvere after Hegel as a dialectical tool for re-configuring
the foundations of modern science, which involve, in particular, the categories of space and
quantity and the way in which these categories are applied in empirical studies (in particular, in
measurement). Thus there is a further philosophically proper sense in which space and quantity
pervade any serious field of study: a progress in the general theory of space and quantity is a
necessary condition of the substantial progress in the fundamental empirical research. Since the
objective logic is supposed to be a guide for further progress in any serious field of study it must
qualify as a dialectical logic of space and quantity.
Lawvere’s theory of space and quantity is found in [155]. The idea is to think of presheaf
X : Cop → Set as a rule that assigns to every object c of C a set of maps X going from c to
space X where this given object c is “placed”, so c plays here the role of “test space” or “shape”
and the bigger space X is determined in terms placements of this basic shape. A quantity is a
19Mathematics and logic themselves are serious fields of study insofar as they develop tools for dealing with
empirical data; thus they also deal with empirical data albeit indirectly.
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co-presheaf Y : C → Set thought of as a rule that assigns to every object c (a test space) the
set of incoming maps, each of which in its turn assigns certain “value” in this given space to
other objects. In [161] develops this theory further and, in particular, provides the categories of
space and quantity with metrics. A lot still remains to be done in order to make this conceptual
apparatus into a working tool for physicists and other scientists. During the last decade the
search for applications of category-theoretic methods in natural sciences became a field of active
research which I can not overview here.
As we have seen earlier Lawvere achieves an internalization of logic with respect to appropri-
ate categories in the sense that basic logical concepts such as propositional functions, logical
connectives, quantifiers, truth-values, theories and models, are understood as category-theoretic
constructions. In the above quote Lawvere describes this move in Hegelian terms as an “objectifi-
cation” of logic. The key idea here is that the “subjective logic of inference between statements”
(which, remind, is commonly identified with logic as such) must not be thought of as a self-
standing systems of laws and rules, which provides ultimate foundations of mathematics and
natural science, but must emerge as an aspect of basic conceptual constructions of science, which
involve categories of space and quantity, and perhaps some other. In my view, this is the most
important impact of categorical logic on the Axiomatic Method.
Let me to be clear at this point: the very idea that laws of logic are not self-standing is not
new. What we call today logical laws like the law of non-contradiction, Aristotle describes as
metaphysical laws. Aristotle’s syllogistics is equally grounded in his metaphysics and ontology.
Russell and other people who attempted to revive metaphysics in the 20th century grounded
their metaphysics onto the new mathematical logic rather than the other way round (this is why
Russell calls his metaphysical atomism “logical”). While Aristotle’s metaphysical views were
closely related to his own research in natural sciences the new logical metaphysics emerged in
the 20th century under the name of Analytic metaphysics stands wholly apart the contemporary
fundamental research in sciences but survives either in the form of self-contained intellectual
game, which combines playing with linguistic intuitions with some amount of formal rigor, or in
the form of applied discipline (applied ontologies in computer sciences). Thus the problem of
grounding logic remains today largely open. It becomes only more acute in the present situation
when we have got hundreds formal calculi, which are offered under the brand of “logic”. Hegel’s
notion of objectification of logic as a modern replacement for the traditional idea of grounding
logic in metaphysics suggests a strategy for solving this problem.
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4.9 Toposes and their Internal Logic
Now I shall demonstrate Lawvere’s dialectical method at work with an example of his axiomatic
treatment of the geometrical notion of topos. This is in fact something more than just an example
because it amounts to a mathematical discovery, which is important for our study on its own
rights. Remind Lawvere’s remark that “[t]he formalism of category theory is itself often presented
in “geometric” terms” ([150], p. 283, already quoted in the introductory part of Chapter 4). As
we shall now see the link between categorical logic and geometry is not limited to the geometric
way of presentation but is more profound. It has been first made explicit in Lawvere’s paper
Quantifiers and Sheafs of 1970 which begins as follows:
The unity of opposites in the title is essentially that between logic and geometry, and
there are compelling reasons for maintaining that geometry is the leading aspect. At
the same time, in the present joint work with Myles Tierney there are important
influences in the other direction: a Grothendieck “topology” appears most naturally
as a modal operator, of the nature “it is locally the case that”, the usual logical
operators, such as ∀, ∃, ⇒ have natural analogues which apply to families of geo-
metrical objects rather than to propositional functions, and an important technique
is to lift constructions first understood for “the” category S of abstract sets to an
arbitrary topos. We first sum up the principle contradictions of the Grothendieck-
Giraud-Verdier theory of topos in terms of four or five adjoint functors [..] enabling
one to claim that in a sense logic is a special case of geometry. ( [153], p. 329)
The unity of opposites in the title is that between logic and geometry because the term “quanti-
fier” refers to logic while the term “sheaf” refers to geometry. Since the geometrical background,
to which Lawvere refers here, is not generally known I’ll try to present it briefly for the non-
mathematical reader.
The notion of topos first appeared in the circle of Alexandre Grothendieck about 1960 as a
twofold upgrade of the notion of topological space (for an informal explanation of the notion of
topological space see 3.4 above). The first upgrade amounts to considering a given topological
space T together with the sheafs of functions from open subsets of this space to some target
sets; a sheaf respects conditions, which allow for seeing the target sets as “momentary images” of
the same continually variable set varying over T . (If the target sets are provided with an extra
structure, say, with the group structure, one may similarly think of groups continuously varying
over a given topological space.) In order to get from the notion of sheaf to that of topos we
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need first to render the former notion into category-theoretic terms. Think of T as a category
with objects open subsets of T (opens for short) and morphisms set-theoretic inclusions of these
subsets, so in the resulting category there is at most one morphism going from one given object
to another (for any pair of opens U, V we either do or do not have U ⊆ V ; categories with at most
one morphism with a fixed domain and a fixed codomain are called partial orders). Then a sheaf
can be defined as a functor T op → S from the category T op obtained from T by the “reversal
of arrows” to the category of sets S, which satisfies certain conditions assuring that the target
variable set varies (with respect to T ) continuously. 20 One gets now a basic example of topos by
considering the category of all sheafs on a given topological space together with maps between
those things (since sheafs are functors the maps are “functors between functors” aka natural
transformations). This topos can be naturally thought of as a space (or rather spacetime) of
sets continuously varying over T .
The second upgrade amounts to a generalization of the usual notion of topology. Given (usual)
topological space T one may always associate with a given open U its covering family CU which
is a collection of opens Vi ⊆ U such that their union equals U (i.e., each point of U belongs to
at least one of Vi); in particular, T itself is always covered by at least one collection of its opens.
Grothendieck observed that the notion of covering family makes sense not only for partial orders
but also for categories of more general sort and defined a covering family of a given object to
be a collection of incoming morphisms (not necessarily monomorphisms) closed under certain
operations. This led him to a more general notion of topology called Grothendieck topology
defined by distinguishing among all collections of morphisms sharing a codomain those, which
count as covering families of this given object. A category C provided with a Grothendieck
topology J is called a site (C, J). A sheaf over a site is defined just like in the case of topological
space. The Grothendieck topos is a category of sheaves over some given site. For a systematic
introduction I refer the reader to [177], ch. 2-3.
The notion of topos invented by Grothendieck and developed by his collaborated mentioned by
Lawvere in the above quote was not originally supposed to have any special relevance to logic; the
discovery of such a special relevance is wholly due to Lawvere. This is what Lawvere, modestly
calls the “influences in the other direction” meaning the impact of logical considerations. Let us
see what this impact amounts to.
20The fact that the arrows must be reversed in this case was difficult to understand without using the category-
theoretical notion of functor; this was a major difficulty for earlier attempts to develop a “topology without
points” [124].
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In the beginning of his seminal paper [153] Lawvere provides his definition of topos usually called
today the definition of elementary topos ; the title “elementary” reflects the fact that Lawvere’s
definition unlike Grothendieck’s original construction almost straightforwardly translates into the
standard first-order formal language [185]. According to this definition an (elementary) topos T
is CCC with a subobject classifier, which plays in a general topos the role similar to that played
by 2 (the two-point set) in the category of sets (which also qualifies as a topos in the sense of
Lawvere’s definition). 2 classifies subsets of a given set S in the sense that if one asks whether a
given element p ∈ S belongs to subset U ⊆ S there are just 2 possible answers: yes and no; this
allows for identifying every subset U with a particular function u : S → 2, which sends every p
belonging to U to “yes” and every p not belonging to U to “no”. Correspondingly the set 2S
of all such functions is identified with the set of all subsets (the powerset) of set S. Given two
objects A,B of CCC the exponential object AB always exists but in order to get a distinguished
object Ω playing the role of “object of truth values”, so that for all A ΩA represents the space
of subobjects of A, one needs an additional postulate. By a subobject of A one means here any
incoming monomorphism f , i.e., such f that for all g, h g ◦ f = h ◦ f implies g = h (given the
composition is written in the geometrical order). Given two subobjects f1, f2 of the same object
A consider morphism h such that f1 = h ◦ f2; according to the definition of subobject there is
no more than one such morphism. This shows that subobjects of a given object are partially
ordered. In the case of the category of sets, which qualifies as a particular elementary topos, the
partial order of subobjects is the (complete) Boolean lattice while in the general case the lattice is
Heyting. For a systematic treatment see [185], and for the most complete compendium of topos
theory existing to the date and developed from the elementary viewpoint see [125]. Evidently
Lawvere’s earlier work on categorical axioms for set theory, which we reviewed in 4.1, helped
Lawvere to formulate his axioms for (i.e., the definition of) an elementary topos. It was Lawvere
but not Grothendieck who first thought of sheaves as continuously variable sets and observed
that the category of such things shares with the category of usual “static” sets a number of basic
properties.
As Lawvere notices in the above quote the concept of elementary topos is more general than that
of Grothendieck topos: there is a large class of elementary toposes, which are not Grothendieck.
In particular, every category (Cop, S) of all presheaves, i.e., of contravariant functors from a
small category C (without topology) to the category of sets, is an elementary topos but not
Grothendieck topos. However the topological aspect of topos is treated in the elementary setting
too: Grothendieck topology is recaptured as a modal operator satisfying simple axioms.
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Lawvere’s axioms for elementary topos helped many people outside the community of specialists
in algebraic geometry to enter into this field and make a fruitful research in it. Everyone who
learns today the topos theory begins with Lawvere’s axioms for elementary topos. This makes
Lawvere’s axiomatization of topos theory a true success story of Axiomatic Method in the 20th
century mathematics. Although Lawvere’s axiom for toposes are not given in a wholly formal-
ized form they allow for a natural formalization (without going the roundabout way through a
membership-based set theory) as it has been shown (or better to say done) by McLarty [185].
However I insist that this just one aspect of the story but not the whole story.
Remind from the above quote Lawvere’s claim that “in a sense logic is a special case of geometry”.
It is stunning if we think about it against the background of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method. For
every modification of this method (either exemplified by Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 or by any
modern textbook in the axiomatic set theory or even by [185]) assumes what I have called above
(2.2) the mathematical logicism in the large sense of the term, i.e., the view according to which
(some system of) logic provides a foundation of mathematical theories by helping formulate
axioms of this theory and then derive from these axioms some further theorems. Now Lawvere
tells us that “geometry [rather than logic!] is the leading aspect” and that there is a sense in
which logic is a special sort of geometry. I shall purport now to explain this claim both from a
mathematical and philosophical viewpoints, and then show that Lawvere’s dialectical Axiomatic
method indeed does not reduce to Hilbert’s.
When Lawvere talks in the above quote about logic as a special case of geometry he refers to
the internal logic of a given topos. We have already discussed the idea of internalization of logic
in category theory meaning the possibility to construe basic logical concepts including logical
connectives and truth-values by category-theoretic means. This sense of being internal remains
wholly relevant when we talk about the internal logic of a topos but what is special about the
topos logic is the fact that toposes (unlike CCCs in general) have also a reach geometrical content
(this is particularly true in the case of Grothendieck toposes) and thus provide a dialectical inter-
play between geometry and logic. So in his [153] Lawvere not only axiomatized the topos theory
by bringing into this difficult geometrical theory the logical clarity of first-order logic: he also
discovered that toposes, which were earlier invented by Grothendieck as geometrical categories,
are also appropriate for “doing logic in them”, i.e., that toposes are not only geometrical but
also logical categories! In particular, Lawvere shows how his earlier invented notion of quantifier
as adjoint to substitution (see 4.3) is geometrically realized in any topos. (This particular result
gave the paper its title.) I would like to mention here that the internal logic of a given topos
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can be presented in the usual way with a symbolic syntax (called the Mitchell-Be´nabou language
or internal language) and the corresponding semantics of that language (called the Kripke-Joyal
semantics) associated with that topos, see [177], p. 296 - 318).
How the two aspects of Lawvere’s axiomatization of topos theory - (i) the logical clarification of
the geometrical notion of topos with first-order axioms and (ii) the internalization (and hence
the “geometrization”) of logic in a topos) - relate to each other? It is fair to say that they relate
dialectically but one may want to be more specific here. McLarty’s book [185] shows how this
relationships looks like when one develops Lawvere’s theory of elementary categories and toposes
with the standard Formal Axiomatic Method 21. In the Preface to his book McLarty describes
his general logical framework as follows:
Our metatheory avoids excluded middle and choice so it is sound in any topos, except
when we are explicitly concerned with constructions in Set. ( [185], p. vii)
After introducing categories and toposes (in a semi-formal way) McLarty comes to the internal
logic of toposes (Chapter 14) and then in Chapter 16 titled “From the Internal Language to
the Topos” he shows how a given topos can be described internally in terms of its own internal
language. The internal view on a topos, generally, does not fully coincide with the external view
- in spite of the fact that the “external logic” (i.e., the metatheory) is of the same sort that
the internal logic of the given topos, as this is indicated in the above quote. It is suggestive to
compare this effect with a similar situation in geometry where one may describe one and the
same space S either extrinsically as embedded into some outer spaces T or intrinsically in terms
of embedding of a “test spaces” P in S. Draw a straight line L one a sheet of paper and then
fold the paper. Extrinsically L is no longer straight but intrinsically it has not changed. So the
extrinsic and the intrinsic views on the situation are no longer the same (see 8.8 below).
Coming back to Lawvere I suggest that the geometrisation of logic in topos theory can be
philosophically interpreted as a way of objectification of logic (in the Hegelian sense of the
term explained above). This may work, of course, only if the geometrical notion of topos itself
proves objective in the appropriate sense. And this requires a topos to be not just an abstract
mathematical concept but a concept providing a connection between the geometrical intuition
and the world of experience, between the pure mathematics and the natural sciences. Lawvere
clearly states that establishing of such a connection is indeed his aim:
21Arguably, unless this theory is treated in this way it does not deserve the title of “elementary”. I would not
like to make an issue of this terminological point; I use the expression “elementary topos” interchangeably with
“Lawvere topos”.
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[E]xperience with sheaves, permutation representations, algebraic spaces, etc. shows
that a “set theory” for geometry should apply not only to abstract divorced from
time, space, ring of definition, etc., but also to more general sets, which do in fact
develop along such parameters. ( [153], p. 329)
(By categories of “more general sets” Lawvere means here toposes: remind the metaphor of sheaf
as a continuously variable set.)22
It is appropriate to ask: How it is possible to combine Hegel’s dialectical logic with the Axiomatic
Method? How Lawvere manages to do this? As far as one thinks about the Axiomatic Method in
Hilbert’s vein any combination of this method with Hegel’s dialectical logic seems to be impossible
for the following simple reason: while on Hegel’s account the “subjective” logic of inference is the
concluding element of a dialectical process, which involves categories of Magnitude (Lawvere’s
Space and Quantity) at an earlier stage, on Hilbert’s account such a subjective logic of inference
is supposed to be fixed from the outset and then used for an axiomatic introduction of further
categories including that of Magnitude. Remind however that in ([158], p. 213, see the quote in
the introductory part of Chapter 4) Lawvere describes the Axiomatic Method as the “unification
and concentration” of mathematical practice; obviously this description is much broader than
Hilbert’s notion of Axiomatic Method, which we thoroughly studied in Chapter 2. So we have
no reason to assume that Lawvere’s Axiomatic Method is the same as Hilbert’s.
Lawvere’s co-authored textbooks [164] and [163] give some more hints about Lawvere’s Ax-
iomatic Method. Both books begin with an introduction of basic category-theoretic concepts at
the example of the category of finite sets and their mappings (i.e., functions) and end up with
the elementary topos. Logic in the usual sense of logic of inference appears (or rather emerges)
only at this final stage in the form of the internal logic of elementary topos. Throughout the
exposition mathematical concepts are given appropriate physical meanings, in particular, spatial
and temporal meanings. Thus the structure of this exposition fits the idea of objective logic:
first one builds an empirically meaningful system of objective categories, and only then on this
objective basis introduces a system of subjective logic, which involves truth-values, types, con-
nectives, quantifiers and the rest of the usual formal logical machinery. This subjective logic not
only reflects the general features of the corresponding objective categories but is also fine-tuned
22It is not immediately clear how a purely mathematical study in sheaf theory and algebra may have a bearing
onto the physical time and the physical space. However the context of Lawvere’s work makes it clear that Lawvere
speaks here about time and space as objective physical categories rather than metaphors or subjective intuitions.
So I can see two possible answers. Either Lawvere believes that a serious mathematical study brings about
objective - and hence physically relevant - results even if this study is pursued quite independently of any physical
considerations. Or he intends to bring himself this objective meaning into the field by establishing a connection
with natural sciences through such basic categories as time and space (and quantity).
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by specific objective features of each given example: in particular, the set (or more generally the
object) of truth-values of the internal logic L of given topos T is determined by this very topos,
which is an objective and physically meaningful conceptual construction. Thus in the accordance
with Hegel the subjective logic emerges here on the top of the objective one.
One may argue that in order to cover all this material “more accurately” one should replace
the informal introduction of categories and toposes given in [164] and [163] by a more formal
treatment - or at least to make sure that such a routine formalization is unproblematic and then
skip it. After all, so the argument goes, the basic category and topos theory requires proving
a number of theorems, and one cannot possibly prove anything without using one system of
“underlying” logic or another. If one doesn’t specify any such system of logic this means that
one takes it for granted, perhaps even without knowing about it. To make this underlying
logic explicit is a purpose of logical analysis; such an analysis is necessary for clarification and
justification of proofs.
The argument sounds convincing but we may further ask: What justifies one’s choice of the
underlying logic? and How the principles of one’s favorite logic are grounded? One may re-
ply that these are Big Philosophical Questions that must be not meshed with mathematics; if
these questions can by reasonably answered at all the answers cannot possibly be mathematical
answers. What mathematician can and must do is to fix some reasonable system of logic on
pragmatic grounds and do mathematics with it. Then he may try the same with a different
system of logic.
Lawvere’s ambition, as I understand it, is to give to the aforementioned Big Questions not only
philosophical but also mathematical answers. On the philosophical side he relies onto Hegel’s
idea of objective logic. And on the mathematical side he uses the category theory for building
objective categories, which ground logic (i.e., the subjective logic of inference) and give logic
a particular shape (which turns to be variable at a certain degree). True, a presentation of
objective categorical constructions requires following some basic logical rules. This is particularly
true when we are talking about an axiomatic presentation. However this only reflects the fact
that every presentation is subjective - including the case when the presented thing is itself
objective. So the above argument does not really demonstrate the foundational significance of the
subjective logic. It only shows that some subjective logic L is needed for presenting mathematical
theories. Lawvere’s Hegelian requirement is that L must be grounded in mathematical structures,
which reflect objective empirical features of our world, and thus count as an aspect of objective
logic.
152
A possible way out of this dialectical circle is McLarty’s bootstrap: in his presentation he uses
from the outset a logic without the rule of excluded middle, which is sound in any topos; using
this basic logic he introduces categories and toposes and the notion of internal logic of a topos.
Thus it turns out that the basic logic used from the beginning of the exposition can be an
internal logic of any topos. This allows for developing the general theory of categories and
toposes internally in any topos: every theorem of the general “external” theory still holds true
in every internal version of the theory - albeit the internal version typically comprises theorems,
which do not hold externally, i.e., in the general case. From a logical point of view this is
perfectly consistent (notwithstanding my earlier arguments against equating the“external” with
the “general”). So McLarty’s book [185] shows how one can meet formal requirements of Hilbert’s
Axiomatic Method without buying its usual philosophical underpinning. I would like to stress
however that a formal treatment of topos theory like one presented in McLarty’s book by itself
does not reveal the objective character of this theory and of this logic. In Chapter 9 I shall
interpret Lawvere’s work differently and describe the New Axiomatic Method that better captures
the original features of Lawvere’s axiomatic reasoning.
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Conclusion of Part 1
In his textbooks [164] and [163] Lawvere and his co-authors stress the objective character of
the category theory in general and of the categorical logic in particular by suggestive real-life
examples relevant to the practice of modern science; in other places Lawvere also stresses the fact
that the category theory has emerged from a wide mathematical practice of “structural” mathe-
matics (see Chapter 8) and helped to “unify and concentrate” this practice in textbooks. All of
this qualifies as an evidence for the claim of objectivity of the categorical logic. However much
more, in my view, remains to be done in order to re-configure the standard notion of Axiomatic
Method, which has been designed on very different philosophical principles. Here Euclid’s ex-
ample can be helpful. Euclid’s geometry as presented in Euclid’s Elements is a systematically
organized discipline, which played the role of paradigmatic example of the systematic organi-
zation of knowledge for quite a while after it was first created. This remarkable organization
was achieved by Euclid not with some “background logic”, about which he was not aware, or
which he decided to hide from us, but rather by internal mathematical means, which I tried to
describe in Chapter 1. During the time of its flourishing Euclid’s geometry also justly qualified
as the only empirically justified theory of physical space; as such it served both the fundamental
physics and technology. It is only relatively recently that it proved insufficient on both accounts.
Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method designed as a replacement for Euclid’s method of organiz-
ing mathematical knowledge (which after Hilbert’s suggestion we also conveniently call by the
name of Axiomatic Method) does not qualify as an adequate replacement because of its formal
character: it makes no difference between the case when a given axiomatic theory contains a
valuable piece of knowledge and the case of a purely fictitious theory having to epistemic value
at all. True, Hilbert’s studies in foundations of mathematics allowed for a great progress in
logic through the application of mathematics to systems of formal symbolic logic and formal
mathematical theories built with these logical systems. So we have learned a great deal about
such formal systems - including the fact that some key questions about them, which in Hilbert’s
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view could be easily answered, in fact can not. But however valuable this new knowledge might
be for its own sake it can not constitute a sufficient basis for designing a general method of
building scientific theories and, in particular, of anything deserving the name of foundations of
mathematics. Since the Formal Axiomatic Method does not take into account any other features
of theories except formal, building a meaningful theory by this method turns to be a matter
of pragmatic, aesthetic or some other prejudged choice - or perhaps just a matter of good luck
and the so-called “scientific intuition”. After Cassirer and Lawvere I believe that this formal
turn makes science basically irrational, and that the right choice can be made only theoretically,
albeit not merely speculatively.
Thus the problem of replacement of Euclid’s Axiomatic Method remains wide open. Lawvere’s
work is a unique attempt to solve this problem with the novel mathematical technique of cate-
gorical logic. A further progress in this field requires a systematic study of the relevance of the
categorical logic in the natural sciences and in the modern technologies, which I cannot include
this book.
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Part II
Identity and Categorification
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Chapter 5
Identity in Classical and
Constructive Mathematics
5.1 Paradoxes of Identity and Mathematical Doubles
Changing objects (of any nature) pose a difficulty for the metaphysically- minded logician known
as the Paradox of Change. Suppose a green apple becomes red. If A denotes the apple when
green, and B when it is red then A = B (it is the same thing) but the properties of A and B are
different : they have a different color. This is at odds with the Indiscernibility of Identicals thesis
according to which identical things have identical properties. A radical solution - to explain away
and/or dispense with the notion of change altogether was first proposed by Zeno around 500 BC
and remains popular among philosophers (who often appeal to the relativistic spacetime to justify
Eleatic arguments). Unlike physics, mathematics appeared to provide support for the Eleatic
position : for some reason people were more readily brought to accept the idea that mathematical
objects did not change than to accept a similar claim about physical objects - in spite of the fact
that mathematicians had always talked about variations, motions, transformations, operations
and other process-like notions just as much as physicists.
The Paradox of Change is the common ancestor of a family of paradoxes of identity which might
be called temporal because all of them involve objects changing in time. Chrisippus’ Paradox,
Stature, The Ship of Theseus belong to this family [43]. However time is not the only cause of
troubles about identity: space is another. The Identity of Indiscernibles (the thesis dual to that
of the Indiscernibility of Identicals) says that perfectly like things are identical. According to
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legend in order to demonstrate this latter thesis, Leibniz challenged a friend during a walk to
find a counter-example among the leaves of a tree. Although there are apparently no perfect
doubles among material objects, mathematics appears to provide clear instances immediately:
think about two (different) points. But the example of geometrical space brings another problem:
either the Identity of Indiscernibles thesis is false or our idea of perfect doubles like points is
incoherent. In what follows I shall refer to this latter problem as the Paradox of Doubles.
Mathematics looks more susceptible to this paradox than physics. However were she living
today, Leibniz’s friend might meet his challenge by mentioning the indiscernibility of particles in
Quantum Physics [66]
The example of two distinct points A,B (Fig. 5.1) does not, it is usually argued, refute the
Identity of Indiscernibles because the two points have different relational properties: in Fig. 5.1
A lies to the left of B but B does not lie to the left of itself 1:
Fig. 5.1
The difference in the relational properties of A and B amounts to saying that the two points have
different positions. However the example can be easily modified to meet the argument. Consider
two coincident points (Fig. 5.2): now A and B have the same position.
Fig. 5.2
It might be argued that coincident points are an exotic case, one which can and should be
excluded from mathematics via its logical regimentation. But this is far from evident - at least
if we are talking about classical Euclidean geometry. For one of the basic concepts of Euclidean
geometry is congruence, and this notion (classically understood) presumes coincidence of points:
figures F,G are congruent iff by moving G (without changing its shape and its size) one can
make F and G coincide point by point.
The fact that geometrical objects may coincide differentiates them significantly from material
solids like chairs or Democritean atoms. The supposed impenetrability of material solids counts
1These relational properties of the two points depend on their shared space: the argument doesn’t go through
for points living on circle. I owe this remark to John Stachel.
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essentially in providing their identity conditions [173]. Thus, identity works differently for ma-
terial atoms and geometrical points.
This fact shows that Euclidean geometrical space cannot be viewed as a realistic model of the
space of everyday experience as is often assumed. One needs the third dimension of physical
space to establish in practice the relation of congruence between (quasi-) 1- and 2-dimensional
material objects through the application of a measuring rod or its equivalent.
We see that the alleged contradiction with the Identity of Indiscernibles is not the only difficulty
involved here. Indeed the whole question of identity of points becomes unclear insofar as they are
allowed to coincide. Looking at Fig. 5.2 we have a surprising freedom in interpreting “=” sign.
Reading “=” as identity we assume that A and B are two different names for the same thing.
Otherwise we may read “=” as specifying a coincidence relation between the (different) points
A and B. It is up to us to decide whether we have only one point here or a family of superposed
points. The choice apparently has little or no mathematical sense. One may confuse coincidence
with identity here without any risk of error in proofs. However this does not mean that one can
just assimilate the notions of identity and coincidence. For identity so conceived would be very
ill-behaved, allowing for the merger of different things into one and the splitting of one into many.
(Consider the fact that Euclidean space allows for the coincidence of any point with any other
through a suitable motion.) Perhaps it would be more natural to say instead that the relations
of coincidence and identity while not identical in general, coincide in this context?
For an example from another branch of elementary mathematics consider this equation: 3 = 3.
Just as in the previous case there are different possible interpretations of the sign “=” here. One
may read “=” either as identity, assuming that 3 is a unique object, or as a specific relation
of equality which holds between different ”doubles” (copies) of 3. Which option is preferable
depends on a given context. There is a unique natural number x such that 2 < x < 4; x = 3.
Here “=” stands for identity. But when one thinks about the sum 3 + 3 or the sequence 3, 3, 3, ...
it is convenient to think of the 3s as many. In this latter case 3 = 3 still holds but now “=” is
being read as equality rather than identity. Again the choice looks like a matter of convenience
rather than of theoretical importance.
Similarly, in one sense cube is a particular geometrical object, while in a different sense there
exist (in some suitable sense of “exist”) many cubes. When one proves that there exist exactly
5 different regular polyhedrons, and says that the cube is one of them, one speaks about the
cube in the first sense. When one considers a geometrical construction, which comprises several
cubes, one thinks about the cubes in the second sense. However no distinction between the
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two meanings of the term ”cube” can be found in standard textbooks, and it is not even clear
whether such distinction can be sharply made.
The above examples might make one think that the notion of identity simply plays no significant
role in mathematics. 2 × 2 = 4 remains true independently of whether the sign ”=” is read as
equality, or as identity, whether equality is treated as identity, or identity is weakened to equality.
It looks as if here one may choose one’s interpretation according to personal taste or preferred
philosophical position.
However such a liberal attitude to identity in mathematics looks suspicious from the logical point
of view. Claims of existence and uniqueness of mathematical objects satisfying given descriptions
(definitions) play an important role in mathematics. Such a claim means that a given description
indeed picks out (identifies) an object, not just a property. The standard definition of the unit
of a given group G is an example. Obviously a claim that such-and- such an object is unique
makes sense only if its identity conditions are fixed. But as we have seen they may in fact be
very loose. It is clear that 3 is the only natural number bigger than 2 and smaller than 4 but it
is not clear that 3 indeed refers to an unique object. But how can mathematics hang together
as a body of knowledge if it apparently does not meet Quine’s “no entity without identity”
requirement?
The unit of a group G is defined as the element 1 ∈ G such that for any element x ∈ G (including
1 itself) 1 ⊗ x = x ⊗ 1 = x, where ⊗ is the group operation. The existence of 1 is guaranteed
by definition but its uniqueness is proved. Suppose 1′ is another element of the group satisfying
the same condition: 1′ ⊗ x = x ⊗ 1′ = x. Then taking first x = 1, and then x = 1′ we have
1′ ⊗ 1 = 1⊗ 1′ = 1 = 1′.
There are several ways to approach this problem. I now explore them.
5.2 Types and Tokens
The remedy, which readily comes to mind on the part of anyone familiar with contemporary
Analytic metaphysics, is that of the type/token distinction. Consider another example, which
prima facie looks very like the above mathematical cases. There are 26 letters in the English
alphabet, and the letter a is one of them. In the last phrase the letter a is referred to as a
particular thing, namely a particular letter of the alphabet. But in this phrase itself there are
five such things. Hence the letter a is not a particular thing. The standard way of dissolving
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this puzzle is to say that here we have one a-type and five a-tokens.
In explaining the distinction, one starts from tokens: an a-token is a piece of paper with typo-
graphic pigment, or another material object (e.g. a piece of printer’s type) representing the letter
a. Obviously a-tokens are many. The second step is to explain what the a-type is. Let me however
show instead that the type/token distinction does not fix the problem of identity of mathematics
anyway: whatever mathematical types might be they do not correspond to well-distinguishable
tokens.
The natural number 3 (which I write in bold for further references) indeed looks like a type but
the 3s, which we find in the series 3,3,.. or in the formula 3+3 do not look like tokens from the
viewpoint of standard examples (like particular chairs). For formula 3+3 may be applied to many
different situations: one might add 3 chairs to 3 chairs, 3 points to 3 points, or even (taking a
liberal attitude) 3 chairs to 3 points. Arguably such application amounts to instantiation of both
3s (in formula 3+3) by certain sets of objects. That is certainly not how good tokens behave: the
fact that types can be instantiated but tokens cannot is essential; if we allow for the instantiation
of tokens by other tokens we either lose the type/token distinction or must provide it with a new
relational sense (which looks like an interesting project but I cannot pursue it here).
The case of points (or more structured geometrical figures like triangles) at first sight looks more
promising. Apparently points are well-distinguishable tokens of the same type. Unlike the case
of numbers it is common in mathematics to denote different point-tokens by different labels such
as A and B. However this works only until coincident points are taken into consideration. For
in the case of coincident points we cannot distinguish a singular point-token from a stock of
point-tokens. It is tempting in this case to think of the stock of points as a “place” occupied
by a family of singular point-tokens. But this again involves a reiteration of the type/token
distinction on another level as in the case of 3-tokens. Point-locations initially considered as
tokens can themselves be instantiated by second-order tokens stocked there. Once again this
destroys the usual distinction between point-tokens and the point-type. It is a condition of
acting as a (classical) token that the object so acting have determinate identity conditions - as
concrete symbols like printed numerals do. But our hypothetical number- and point-tokens do
not meet this condition. So the type/token distinction (at least in its usual form) does not help
us to handle the identity issue in mathematics. (This also makes me doubt how well it works
outside mathematics.)
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5.3 Frege and Russell on The Identity of Natural Num-
bers
Frege considered it a principal task of his logical reform of arithmetic to provide absolutely
determinate identity conditions for the objects of that science, i.e. for numbers. Referring to the
contemporary situation in this discipline he writes in the Introduction to his [58]:
How I propose to improve upon it can be no more than indicated in the present work.
With numbers [..] it is a matter of fixing the sense of an identity. (English translation
[63], p.Xe)
Frege makes the following critically important assumption : identity is a general logical concept,
which is not specific to mathematics:
It is not only among numbers that the relationship of identity is found. From which
it seems to follow that we ought not to define it specially for the case of numbers.
We should expect the concept of identity to have been fixed first, and that then from
it together with the concept of number it must be possible to deduce when numbers
are identical with one another, without there being need for this purpose of a special
definition of numerical identity as well. (Ibid., p.74e)
In a different place [60], [62] Frege says clearly that the concept of identity is absolutely stable
across all possible domains and contexts:
Identity is a relation given to us in such a specific form that it is inconceivable
that various forms of it should occur (p.254 in the edition [62], my translation from
German)
Frege’s definition of natural number, as modified by Russell [212] later became standard. I
present it here informally in Russell’s simplified version. Intuitively the number 3 is what all
collections consisting of three members (trios) share in common. Now instead of looking for a
common form, essence or type of trios let us simply consider all such things together. According
to Frege and Russell the collection (class, set) of all trios just is the number 3. Similarly for
other numbers2.
Isn’t this construction circular? Frege and Russell provide the following argument which they
claim allows us to avoid circularity here: given two different collections we may learn whether
2Following Russell [212] I use here words class, collection, and set interchangeably ignoring their technical
meanings if any. This terminological freedom is helpful for rethinking the concept of set (or class etc.) without
smuggling in ready-made solutions through the existing terminology.
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or not they have the same number of members without knowing this number and even without
the notion of number itself. It is sufficient to find a one-one correspondence between members of
two given collections. If there is such a correspondence, the two collections comprise the same
number of members, or to avoid any reference to numbers we can say that the two collections
are equivalent. I shall follow current usage in calling this equivalence Humean (see [119], book
1, part 3, sect. 1). Now we check that this relation is indeed an equivalence in the usual sense,
and define natural numbers as equivalence classes under this relation.
This definition reduces the question of identity of numbers to that of identity of classes. This
latter question is settled through the axiomatization of set theory in a logical calculus with
identity. Thus Frege’s project is realized: it has been seen how the logical concept of identity
applies to numbers. (In fact this does not work that smoothly as I show in 5.8 below.) In
an axiomatic setting “identities” in Quine’s sense (that is, identity conditions) of mathematical
objects are provided by an axiom schema of the form ∀x∀y(x = y ↔ . . .) called in [132] the
Identity Schema (IS).
This does not resolve the identity problem though because any given system of axioms, generally
speaking, has multiple models [17]. The case of isomorphic models is similar to that of equal
numbers or coincident points (naively construed): there are good reasons to think of isomorphic
models as one and there is also good reason to think of them as many. So the paradox of
mathematical doubles reappears. Thus the logical analysis a` la Frege-Russell certainly clarifies
the mathematical concepts involved but it does not settle the identity issue as Frege believed it
did.
In the recent philosophy of mathematics literature the problem of the identity of mathematical
objects is usually considered in the logical setting just mentioned: either as the problem of
the non-uniqueness of the models of a given axiomatic system or as the problem of how to fill
in the Identity Schema. For my present purposes it is important, however, to return to the
problem in its original informal version, which inspired Frege and Russell 100 years ago. Such
a return to the starting point is, in my view, helpful and perhaps necessary if one wishes (as I
do) to consider the Category-theoretic approach to identity discussed in this paper as a viable
alternative to the approach taken by Frege, Russell and their followers. At the first glance the
Frege-Russell proposal concerning the identity issue in mathematics seems judicious and innocent
(and it certainly does not depend upon the rest of their logicist project): to stick to a certain
logical discipline in speaking about identity (everywhere and in particular in mathematics). The
following historical remark shows that this proposal is not so innocent as it might seem.
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5.4 Plato
Given a sequence like 3,3,3,.. mathematicians conveniently talk about multiple copies of the
same number (similarly about copies of a given set, or space) . Such talk about copies carries
echoes from Plato. A glance at Plato’s philosophy of mathematics shows some features which
might be attractive for a mathematician resistant to the logical regimentation of talk of identity
in different contexts proposed by Frege and Russell. If I understand Plato correctly, according to
him identity applies only to the immutable ideas, and only ideas exist. (So Plato’s view in this
respect is in accord with Quine’s dictum about no entity without identity [199], p. 23.) Material
things don’t exist but become ( they change, come into and go out of being ) and hence have no
proper identities: this is another possible way out of the Paradox of Change. Mathematical things
occupy an intermediate position between material stuff and ideas: they involve a weaker sort of
becoming and a softer form of identity. In the case of numbers such “soft identity” is equality.
Things in the three layers of Plato’s ontology are partially ordered by “distorted copying” where
ideas are the maximal elements, mathematical objects are distorted copies of ideas, and material
objects are distorted copies of mathematical objects (and hence also of ideas). The distortion
of self-identical ideal numbers amounts to their replacement by families of equal mathematical
numbers. For example, there is a unique ideal number 3 and an indefinite number of its equal
mathematical copies. In other words numbers in mathematics are defined up to equality but not
up to identity 3.
There are multiple passages where Plato speaks of “X itself”, “X (thought of) through itself”
and “Idea of X” interchangeably or explains the latter through the former. For example in his
Symposium (210-211) Plato does this with the notion of Beauty, and in Phedon (96-103) with
number 2. (In this latter dialog Socrates rejects the view that 2 could be thought of as sum of
two units pointing to the fact that 2 can be equally obtained through division of given unit into
two halves. Since each of the two operations is the reverse of the other none of them can be
viewed as bringing 2 about. So one needs to think of the idea of 2 independently of operations of
this sort.) I interpret these passages in the sense, which seems me straightforward: the “identity
to itself” applies to ideas but neither to material things, nor to mathematical things (as they are
usually thought of). To see that Plato’s “idea of 2” is indeed something else than mathematical
number see last chapters of Aristotle’s Metaphysics where the author criticizes the Unwritten
Doctrine developed by Plato in the later period of his life [55]. Here the distinction between ideal
3Plato’s philosophy of mathematics should not be confused with the Mathematical Platonism in the sense
of [12], which has little if anything to do with historical Plato. For an introduction to Plato’s philosophy of
mathematics see [195].
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and mathematical numbers is made explicit. Aristotle stresses the fact that each ideal number is
unique while their mathematical copies are many (Met. 987b) and the fact that ideal numbers
are not a subject of arithmetical operations (Met. 1081a-1082b).
Thus unlike Frege Plato does not suppose that the notion of identity applies to whatever there is
(or whatever occurs) indiscriminately. Instead Plato thinks of identity as a specific property of
things he calls ideas and notices the fact that in mathematics the identity requirement is relaxed
(through the talk of an “intermediate” character of mathematical objects). In what follows I
shall show that this Platonic insight is particularly appealing in the context of our contemporary
Category-theoretic mathematics.
Plato hints at the following division of labor: mathematicians work on equalities whilst philoso-
phers take care of identities. In the case of arithmetic this is exactly what mathematicians (and
philosophers like Frege) have been doing for centuries. In geometry however the situation is more
complicated because equality in this discipline may mean - and historically did mean - different
things.
Euclid uses the term “equality” (Greek ison) in the sense of equicompositionality (of plane
geometrical figures ) but there are other equivalencies in geometry, which may be considered as
better “working substitutes for identity”: for example congruence, (geometric) similarity, and
affinity. For there is a sense in which the “same figure” means a figure of the same shape and the
same size, and there is another sense in which it means only a figure of the same shape, and the
notion of ”same shape” can itself also be specified in different ways. In addition geometry unlike
arithmetic allows for the identification of its objects (of geometrical figures) by directly naming
them, usually through naming of their most important points. This allows us to distinguish
two different triangles ABC and A′B′C ′ which are the “same” in any of above senses. There is
apparently no clear argument, which would allow us to choose one of these senses of the same
as basic and eliminate the others as an abuse of the language. In particular, as I have shown in
5.1, the pointwise specification of figures cannot do this job. So the situation in geometry (even
classical geometry!) is exactly that which [179] describes for a different purpose:
There is no equality in mathematical objects, only equivalences! (p. 8)
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5.5 Definitions by Abstraction
To pursue his project of reducing the various informal meanings of ”the same” in mathematics to a
standard notion of identity captured in a universal logic Frege proposed the method of ”definition
by abstraction”. In his [58] Frege gives the following example of such definition:
The judgment “line a is parallel to line b”, or, using symbols a//b , can be taken as
identity. If we do this, we obtain the concept of direction, and say: “the direction
of line a is identical with the direction of line b”. Thus we replace the symbol // by
the more generic symbol =, through removing what is specific in the content of the
former and dividing it between a and b. (translation [63], p. 74e)
Notice that the procedure as described here by Frege involves a change of notation: in the
formula a = b the symbols a, b no longer stand for lines but denote the same direction. Calling
this formal procedure definition by abstraction Frege suggests its interpretation. The idea is that
the procedure picks out a property common to all members of a given equivalence class. In 6.1
I shall show that this procedure can be interpreted differently.
As our earlier quotations from Frege’s [58] clearly show, in treating an equivalence E “as identity”
Frege does not mean to replace identity by something else. He aims at the exact opposite: to in-
troduce identity where mathematicians usually use only equivalencies. Definition by abstraction
is problematic from the logical point of view [219]. But I want to stress a different point. Even
if definition by abstraction were justified logically it would not provide what a mathematician
normally looks for. Frege’s direction (not to be confused with orientation!) is hardly an inter-
esting mathematical notion; this concept might play at most an auxiliary role in geometry and
can easily be dispensed with. The idea of a family of parallel lines does the same job as Frege’s
abstract direction but is more convenient and more intuitive. Similarly it is more convenient to
think of a natural number as a family of equal doubles rather than a unique abstract object.
Such abstract numbers would be much like Plato’s ideal numbers. Plato certainly had a point
in arguing that such things do not belong to mathematics! Frege would most likely answer that
the question of convenience does not matter because his proposal is logically justified and the
more traditional mathematical practice and parlance is not.
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5.6 Relative Identity
The Theory of Relative Identity is a logical innovation due to Geach ([71], ch.7) motivated by the
same sort of mathematical examples as Frege’s definition by abstraction. Like Frege Geach seeks
to give a logical sense to mathematical talk “up to” a given equivalence E through replacing E
by identity but unlike Frege he purports, in doing so, to avoid the introduction of new abstract
objects (which in his view causes unnecessary ontological inflation). The price for the ontological
parsimony is Geach’s repudiation of Frege’s principle of a unique and absolute identity for the
objects in the domain over which quantified variables range. According to Geach things can be
same in one way while differing in others. For example two printed letters aa are same as a type
but different as tokens. In Geach’s view this distinction does not commit us to a-tokens and
a-types as entities but presents two different ways of describing the same reality. The unspecified
(or absolute in Geach’s terminology) notion of identity so important for Frege is in Geach’s view
is incoherent 4.
Geach’s proposal appears to account better for the way the notion of identity is employed in
mathematics since it does not invoke “directions” or other mathematically redundant concepts.
It captures particularly well the way the notion of identity is understood in category theory.
According to Baez and Dolan [11]
In a category, two objects can be “the same in a way” while still being different (p.7)
so in category theory the notion of identity is relative in Geach’s sense. But from the logical
point of view the notion of relative identity remains highly controversial. Let x, y be identical
in one way but not in another, or in symbols: Id(x, y)&¬Id′(x, y). The intended interpretation
assumes that x in the left part of the formula and x in the right part have the same referent, where
this last (italicized) same apparently expresses absolute not relative identity. So talk of relative
identity arguably smuggles in the usual absolute notion of identity anyway. If so, there seems
good reason to take a standard line and reserve the term “identity” for absolute identity.
We see that Plato, Frege and Geach propose three different views of identity in mathematics.
Plato notes that the sense of the “same” as applied to mathematical objects and to the ideas
is different: properly speaking, sameness (identity) applies only to ideas while in mathematics
sameness means equality or some other equivalence relation. Although Plato certainly recognizes
essential links between mathematical objects and Ideas (recall the ideal numbers) he keeps the
two domains apart. Unlike Plato Frege supposes that identity is a purely logical and domain-
4For recent discussion see [43].
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independent notion, which mathematicians must rely upon in order to talk about the sameness
or difference of mathematical objects, or any other kind at all. Geach’s proposal has the opposite
aim: to provide a logical justification for the way of thinking about the (relativized) notions of
sameness and difference which he takes to be usual in mathematical contexts and then extend it
to contexts outside mathematics.
As Geach puts it
Any equivalence relation ... can be used to specify a criterion of relative identity.
The procedure is common enough in mathematics: e.g. there is a certain equivalence
relation between ordered pairs of integers by virtue of which we may say that x and
y though distinct ordered pairs, are one and the same rational number. The absolute
identity theorist regards this procedure as unrigorous but on a relative identity view
it is fully rigorous. ([71], p.249)
5.7 Internal Relations
In his paper “The classification of relations” of 1899 [217] Russell says:
Mr. Bradley has argued much and hotly against the view that relations are ever
purely “external”. I am not certain whether I understand what he means by this
expression but I think I should be retaining his phraseology if I described my view
as the view that all relations are external. (p.143)
In arguing that relations are, generally, internal Bradley [26] means roughly the following: the
relata of a given relation cannot, generally, be thought of independently of each other and of the
relation in question. (So relations, if any, such that their relata can be thought of independently
are external.) Bradley makes indeed a stronger claim:
Relations exist only in and through a whole, which cannot in the end be resolved into
relations and terms. [..] The opposite view is maintained (as I understand) by Mr.
Russell. But for myself, I am unable to find that Mr. Russell has ever really faced
this question (ib., p.127)
5
5Notice that in Bradley’s view there is no duality between external and internal relations since internal relations
are not supposed to be defined independently of their relata which would be an absurdity. (See [120] for further
discussion.)
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As we can see each of the two authors admits that he hardly understands arguments of the
other. Since Russell’s outright rejection of internal relations they have been under great sus-
picion amongst Analytic philosophers. Today the neglect of internal relations is not only the
consequence of underlying inclinations in systematic metaphysics but also a matter of available
logical means. For the main tradition of (modern) logical systems is developed in keeping with
Russell’s rejection of internal relations, so one may ask whether or not the standard modern
notion of n-placed relation as n-placed predicate can be possibly understood as internal relation.
Let us see. Consider the standard procedure of interpretation of given relation R(x, y) in given
domain D. Here x, y are logical variables which take their values among members of D that is
usually thought of as a class of individuals. When x, y take values a, b from D R(a, b) takes a
certain truth value (usually true or false) just like function f(x, y) = x+y takes value 3 when x
takes value 1 and y takes value 2 (and + is interpreted in the usual way). Noticeably the substi-
tution of a, b for x, y is proceeded uniformly for any binary relation and in this sense it doesn’t
depend on R. To put it in other words the substitution is formal: one first substitutes a, b for
x, y and then looks for the true-value of R(a, b). So relata a, b are assumed here independently
of R. This meshes well with Russell’s view according to which all relations are external.
But can R(x, y) be possibly understood as internal? Consider relation NEXT (m,n) between
natural numbers which says that number m is followed by number n. Arguably natural numbers
cannot be correctly thought of without NEXT . This means that this relation is internal. But
this claim apparently has nothing to do with the order in which NEXT is interpreted: nothing
prevents one to pick up numbers 1, 2, substitute them for m,n in NEXT (m,n) and then see
that NEXT (1, 2) is true. Thus the logical machinery involved here allegedly has no bearing on
the metaphysical controversy between the external and internal understanding of relations. So
given relation R(x, y) might be internal as well as external.
However the above argument is not convincing. For it involves an interplay between the formal
analysis of the concept in question and implicit assumptions made about this concept. As far as
we already know what are natural numbers then we can claim, of course, that 1 is followed by
2. We can also write down this truth in a more fashionable way as NEXT (1, 2). Formal logic is
used in this case for description of a ready-made concept. In such a case logic has no bearing on
how the concept in question is built, and so it is metaphysically neutral. But when logic is used
for concept-building like in the case of foundations of mathematics then specific features of logical
apparatus get directly involved into emerging concepts. In practice the distinction between the
two ways of applying logic can hardly be ever made rigidly: the major application of logic is a
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logical reconstruction of given background (in particular of common mathematical practice) but
not an external description of ready-made concepts nor creation of new concepts from nothing.
Logical reconstruction is making of new concepts from something. I will not elaborate this point
here and only notice that foundations of mathematics obviously involve concept-building even if
it has a descriptive function too (with respect to the common mathematical practice).
Is it possible to stipulate the relation NEXT between natural numbers without assuming a
fulfledged notion of natural number in advance? A positive answer is given with Hilbert’s ax-
iomatic method. One assumes some class of individuals N as domain of binary relation (two-
placed predicate) NEXT (m,n), and stipulates certain formal properties of NEXT as axioms.
The idea is that a system of axioms of this kind will turn abstract individuals into numbers. Or
to put it more accurately, elements of given class N will be thought of as natural numbers as far
as they verify some properly chosen axioms. Think about Peano’s arithmetic.
Is this procedure indeed compatible with the internalist account of relations? The answer is not
trivial, in my view. On the one hand, there is obvious reason to think of NEXT introduced ax-
iomatically as internal: unless NEXT (with its formal properties) is taken into account elements
of N are thought of as abstract individuals but not as numbers. But on the other hand, the
stipulation of relata of NEXT as individuals is incompatible with a strong version of internalism
about relations according to which these relata cannot be thought of without its relation at all,
not even as abstract “things” without properties. So the standard logical apparatus is indeed
incapable to represent relations which are internal in this strong sense.
Apparently Bradley defends such a strong version of internalism about relations when he says
that “a whole [..] cannot [..] be resolved into relations and terms”. True, this radical position
undermines the very notion of relation, so after all Russell’s account of relations should be
probably preferred. However Bradley’s remark points to a real problem which shows that the
notion of relation (or at least in its Russell’s restricted version) is far less powerful than it seems.
Notice that any axiomatic theory built by the standard Formal Axiomatic Method assumes its
objects (for example sets) to be individuals. However we have seen that the identity of basic
mathematical objects like points, circles or natural numbers is highly problematic. The blunt
stipulation of such things as individuals doesn’t resolve the problem but turns it into a new form:
given two classes N and N ′ (N ′ might be a “copy” of N) both satisfying axioms of arithmetic
which of the two classes is the class of natural numbers [17] ? ( See also Chapter 8 below.) I
suppose that in order to get a satisfactory solution of the identity problem in mathematics we
should give up the idea that mathematical objects always form classes and look for different ways
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of getting multiple objects into a whole. In the next Section I analyze the notion of class and
show its limits.
5.8 Classes
Sets of chairs or crowds of people are usually considered as a paradigm cases for our thinking
about the notion of many. There are different examples though. Think about clouds in the sky
or waves at see surface. One can always count persons or chairs or at least in principle so. But
one can hardly count clouds and waves. The problem is not that they are too many but that
there is no definite criterion for distinguishing one from another. Clouds and waves are certainly
many but this kind of many is in general not countable. For a mathematical example think
about families of equal numbers or of coincident points: the question of the cardinality of such
multiplicities (to choose a term for many with the broadest meaning) is apparently senseless.
In what follows I shall specify the sense of “countable” relevant to this context. I shall term
the wanted concept weak countability in order to avoid confusion with countability in the usual
set-theoretic sense.
In his [212], Chapter VI , Russell distinguishes between extensional and intensional “genesis of
classes”: the former proceeds through the “enumeration of terms” while the former proceeds as
follows: one takes a predicate P (x) and considers class {x | P (x)} consisting of all such x that
P (x) is true 6 . For example class {1, 2, 3} can be defined either through the direct enumeration
of its elements 1, 2, 3 (extensional genesis) or as the class of natural numbers smaller than 4
(intensional genesis). According to Russell the extensional genesis of classes through enumeration
is possible only when the number of elements (terms) is finite. However Russell claims that this
constraint is only “practical” and “psychological” but not logical and theoretical. In particular
he says:
[L]ogically, the extensional definition appears to be equally applicable to infinite
classes, but practically, if we were to attempt it, Death would cut short our laudable
endeavor before it had attained its goal. Logically, therefore, extension and intension
seem to be on a par. (ib., p 69)
After claiming the essential equivalence of extensional and intensional viewpoints Russell goes
ahead and claims the priority of extension:
6The principle according to which for each given predicate P (x) there exists class {x | P (x)} is called the
Comprehension Principle.
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A class [..] is essentially to be interpreted in extension. [..] But practically, though
not theoretically, this purely extensional method can only be applied to finite classes.
[..] [A]lthough any symbolic treatment must work largely with class-concepts and
intension, classes and extension are logically more fundamental for the principles of
Mathematics. (ib. p.81)
These arguments are not convincing. True, theories often extend domains of possible application
of available practical means through relaxing certain constraints. For example, since Ancient
times people tend to think about distances between celestial bodies and between pebbles on sand
on equal footing. In many cases such theoretical extension works and allows for improvement of
existing practical means; in other cases taking practical constrains into theoretical consideration
allows for improvement of theories (think about Gauss’ work in geodesy which motivated his
geometrical discoveries). However I cannot see how this might help to settle the issue of extension
and intension. What Russell says about Death is irrelevant: an immortal god would no better
succeed to accomplish the task of finishing enumeration of an infinite series than a mortal human
because the enumeration of an infinite series has no end. So to the contrary of Russell’s opinion,
the difficulty of the infinite enumeration is not practical nor psychological but certainly theoretical
and logical. Russell refers to the mathematical (Cantorian) notion of infinite set but he misses
an essential point of Cantor’s invention. In his [29] Cantor says roughly the following. Count
1,2,3,..This counting never ends - not practically nor theoretically - but we may stipulate a
new ideal object ω as the limit of this process just like we stipulate an irrational number r
as a limit of a series of its rational approximations. Then ω can be understood as a number
of all (finite) natural numbers, and so the talk about the set of all natural numbers becomes
reasonable. Cantor proposes here a specific extension of the usual finitary enumeration, and I
don’t think that the philosophical distinction between the theory and the practice much clarifies
this Cantor’s proposal.
Observe that Cantor’s invention has no immediate bearing on the issue of predication, so Russell’s
idea that a predicate may bring about anything like Cantorian set (remind that Russell doesn’t
distinguish between sets and classes) is a very strong independent hypothesis. The following
development of logic and set theory imposed well-known constraints upon the use of classes but
these commonly accepted constraints, in my view, are not sufficient. Set-theoretic “antinomies”
including Russell’s paradox forced Zermelo [255], [91] to restrict Russell’s “intensive genesis”
through the Aussonderungsaxiom, which allows for “genesis” of set S with property P only
when one is given another set M such that P is definite on M (which is tantamount to saying
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that P has definite truth-value for every element of M ; then S comprises all those elements x of
M for which P (x) is true). Russell changes his mind about classes already in 1906 [214], [213],
[91] by putting forward No Class Theory according to which what one needs in logic is only a
domain U of individuals but not any longer classes constructed out of U . In 1908 [215], [91]
Russell changes his mind again and puts forward his type theory.
Bernays in his [18] purports to save Russell’s early liberal notion of class through a formal
distinction between classes and sets. According to Bernays sets are classes having a specific
property of being individuals, that is, capable of being elements of other classes. For sets Bernays
accepts an improved version of the Aussonderungsaxiom (which he proves as a theorem). However
classes in Bernays’ view are formed by properties “automatically”, so one even doesn’t need a
quantifier for it and can simply write {x | P (x)} to denote the class of all x such that P (x) is
true (this class can be a set or a proper class dependently on predicate P ). Moreover Bernays
doesn’t exclude the possibility that classes can be produced in other ways not mentioned in his
theory 7:
This point of view suggests also to regard the realm of classes not as fixed domain of
individuals but as an open universe, and the rules we shall give for class formation
need not to be regarded as limiting the possible formations but as fixing a minimum
of admitted processes for class formation. ( [18], p. 57)
Bernays’ liberal notion of class remains very popular among mathematicians. People have learnt
that the notion of set shouldn’t be applied without caution but thanks to Bernays they feel free
to talk about classes of anything. This has changed the way of thinking even about elementary
mathematical concepts. The idea that the Euclidean plane contains the class of all circles would
sound completely weird in the 19th century but today’s mathematical students usually don’t feel
any inconvenience about it. In the eyes of many this freedom of thinking about infinite collections
(“Cantorian Paradise”) is a very important achievement of mathematics of 20th century.
A usual worry about such extensional representation of mathematical concepts concerns the issue
of infinity: why we need such huge collections where we can do well with only few examples?
Now I want to stress a different point. It concerns the fact that thinking of, say, circles on the
Euclidean plane, as forming a class we are obliged to take circles as full-fledged individuals with
definite identity criteria. But as I have tried to show in the beginning of this Chapter such
criteria are hardly available.
7The distinction between proper classes and sets has been introduced earlier by von Neumann. See Fraenkel
’s Historical Introduction to [18], p.32-33
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Before I elaborate on this crucial point let me make a methodological remark. When I criticize
the class-based representation of mathematical concepts I do not assume that there exist the
only right way to represent mathematical concepts. I believe that mathematical concepts are
exactly what we think about them, and that there is a sense in which the same concepts can
be represented differently. The class-based representation is a way of thinking about mathemat-
ical concepts which proved to be in many ways successful. My critical efforts directed against
this approach aim at revealing its hidden assumptions and constraints and at giving place for
alternative approaches, which look more promising. When I say “circles are not individuals” I
mean that the class-based representation of circles clashes with what people usually think about
circles in many standard contexts. I recognize that this clash alone provides no strong argument
against the class-based representation: perhaps we should fix the traditional way of thinking
about mathematical objects rather than modern formal methods. However in 6.2 I shall show
that these traditional intuitions support some important contemporary mathematical develop-
ments, so in order to promote these developments we need to elaborate on these intuitions rather
than rule them out.
5.9 Individuals
Bernays understands the notion of individual in the logical sense as an element of a domain of
quantification, that is, an element of some class. The extensionality property of classes (which
Russell rightly stresses as indispensable) implies that individuals so understood (elements of
classes) must have unproblematic identity criteria. To see this remind how the Axiom of Exten-
sionality is written in ZF :
EXT : ∀x∀y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y)
Informally this axiom says that sets are wholly determined by their elements. Although the
identity of sets is introduced in ZF independently of EXT the intuitive appeal of this axiom
certainly depends of the fact that it can be used for “checking identity”: given two sets one can
check whether or not they are the same through checking their elements 8.
8To make EXT into an instance of Keranen’s identity schema (5.3) we need to replace the implication by the
biconditional:
EXT ′ : ∀x∀y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)↔ x = y)
EXT ′ is true in ZF but is not used neither as a definition nor as an axiom for the reason of logical parsimony.
In fact ZF allows for another instance of the identity schema obtained from EXT ′ by the reversal of ∈:
INT : ∀x∀y(∀z(x ∈ z ↔ y ∈ z)↔ x = y)
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Remark however that in ZF there is no distinction between sets and elements as different types:
elements of sets are also sets. So EXT reduces the question about identity of given pair of sets
to the question about identity of some other pairs of sets. If given sets x, y are infinite then
checking the identity x = y through EXT reduces the problem to checking an infinite number
of identities. Prima facie this doesn’t look helpful. In fact EXT is helpful for checking identity
x = y only when the questions about identity of elements of x, y have obvious answers or at
least are easier to answer. If identity of elements of x, y is just as problematic as identity of x, y
themselves then EXT looses all of its appeal.
Bernays assumes the extensionality of classes but in order to avoid quantification over classes he
modifies EXT into this open formula
EXTCl : ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)↔ x = y)
which he uses as the definition of identity (equality) of classes (here x, y are classes while z ranges
over sets). So the extensionality of classes in Bernays’ account becomes also automatic and
doesn’t require a special axiom. Anyway EXTCl provides classes by definite identity conditions
just like sets. However according to Bernays certain classes (proper classes) cannot be elements
of other classes. Why not? Because it is known that making classes elements of other classes
in certain cases leads to contradiction. But this is a mere recognition of the fact but not an
explanation of the phenomenon. The colloquial explanation according to which proper classes
are “too big” or “over-comprehensive” [18]) for being elements of something bigger (because
there is nothing bigger?) certainly cannot be viewed as satisfactory.
Here is my explanation, which implies a substantial revision of Bernays’ point of view. I sup-
pose that multiplicities like “all sets” cannot be viewed as individuals because their elements
are not individuals either and hence have no definite identity conditions. Such multiplicities
cannot be thought as classes (or as elements of other classes) on the pain of loosing the sense
of extensionality. Although we can think about all sets in a way we cannot think of all sets as
individuals.
Indeed, in the traditional (pre-Cantorian) mathematics the individuation is always finitary and
associated with naming: one stipulates, for example, points A,B,C, .. (some of which might
appear to be identical) but not an infinite set of individual points. This doesn’t, of course,
preclude one of speaking, say, about “any point of given line”; the difference with the modern
Taking INT as giving the sense of identity brings about rather unusual way of thinking about sets, which I
developed in my [206].
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point of view is that this expression doesn’t commit one to an infinite set of points. Cantor’s
notion of infinite set is based on the assumption that individuals can form not only finite but also
infinite collections. In other words he assumes that thinking about all points of given line we can
still think of these points as individuals like A,B,C. Cantor provides the following justification of
this view. He shows that a properly generalized procedure of counting (enumeration) of elements
of given set works in the infinite case too. (This applies to all infinite sets but not only for
sets which are countable in the usual technical sense, see about Bernays’ Numeration Theorem
below.) This doesn’t really prove that elements of infinite sets are individuals in precisely the
same sense in which elements of finite sets like {A,B,C} count as individuals but this shows
that at least one essential feature of finite sets is preserved in the infinite case, namely, the fact
that elements of infinite sets may be brought into one-to-one correspondence just like elements
of finite sets {A,B,C} and {D,E, F}. This gives indeed a reason to think of elements of infinite
sets as individuals by analogy with the finite case.
I shall call multiplicities having a cardinality weakly countable and require classes to be weakly
countable. Given this additional requirement for classes I shall call elements of given class
individuals. Thus my hypothesis is that weak countability implies (at least a weak form of) indi-
viduation. Equating the weak countability with having certain cardinality I take the most liberal
attitude possible intended to preserve the whole of Cantorian set theory. More constructively-
minded people might prefer to equate the weak countability with the usual countability, or even
to insist that infinite enumeration is impossible.
This hypothesis is in accord with Russell’s point that all classes are in a certain sense “de-
numerable”. Unlike Russell Bernays says nothing about enumeration of classes but proves for
sets his Numeration Theorem ( [18], p.138) which improves upon Cantor’s infinitary enumera-
tion in terms of formal rigor and states that every set has a certain cardinality. The theorem
doesn’t hold for proper classes. Nevertheless Bernays assumes that proper classes consist of well-
distinguishable elements, and that the extensionality property holds for proper classes. In my
view this assumption is ungrounded. Just like Russell in [212] Bernays apparently thinks that a
mere predication brings about some sort rudimentary enumeration. I don’t think that this view
is tenable.
Consider predicate human for example. The collective term humans unlike the term all presently
living humans is not associated with any particular group of people. The expression all humans
does not make much sense unless it is further specified (we cannot count all future generations).
Nevertheless we can speak about humans as a multiplicity. When we talk about sets in math-
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ematics the situation is not different. Multiplicities of all sets or of all singletons don’t deserve
the name of classes because such multiplicities have no definite cardinalities and hence there is
no reason to think of their elements as individuals. (Remind that according to Bernays every set
as an element of the class of all sets is an individual.)
Bernays disqualifies Russell’s aforementioned definition of cardinal numbers as classes of equiva-
lent sets because he wants to define cardinal numbers as sets. Hence the idea to identify cardinal
numbers with certain ordinals. This technical solution causes Benacerraf’s problem already men-
tioned: why we should call cardinal number one particular set of given cardinality rather than
another? Such a definition of cardinal number differs drastically from Frege’s and Russell’s earlier
proposals discussed in 5.3 above.
Thus my point is that weak countability required by classes shouldn’t be always taken for granted
and expected to be found everywhere in mathematics. As the phenomenon of “mathematical
doubles” suggests many mathematical objects might be accountable in terms of internal relations
(in particular internal equivalences) which don’t allow for considering these object as full-fledged
independent individuals. Moreover the unique multitask notion of individual (and hence the
unique notion of identity) should be likely given up in favor of various specific structures. Some
structures of this sort appear in the Intuitionistic mathematics as we shall now see.
5.10 Extension and Intension
Consider after Frege [59], [61] expressions “Morning Star” and “Evening Star”: they have dif-
ferent meanings but refer to the same object, namely to planet Venus. Now if we think about
Morning Star and Evening Star as predicates then the previous remark translates as follows: the
two predicates have different intensions but one and the same extension. For a simple math-
ematical example think of predicates Equilateral Triangle and Isogonal Triangle (meaning the
usual Euclidean figures). Clearly the two predicates have different intensions. However they
have the same extension: a given triangle is isogonal if and only if it is equilateral. Importantly,
this latter claim is not an immediate consequence of the two definitions but a theorem based
on some further geometrical assumptions (cf. Theorems 5, 6 of of the First Book of Euclid’s
Elements).
The intension/extension distinction has a long history that I shall not try to overview here.
However I shall make few remarks about the fate of this traditional distinction in the 20th
century logic. The most characteristic feature of logic developed during this period is its formal
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character described in 2.3 above. The formalization of logic in the beginning of the 20th century
in works of Frege, Russell and their followers put extension-related and intension-related logical
notions in very unequal positions. Fitting [56] describes the situation as follows:
In classical first-order logic intension plays no role. It is extensional by design since
primarily it evolved to model the reasoning needed in mathematics.
By classical first-order logic Fitting means, of course, the formal predicate logic of Frege and
Russell. The second sentence should be understood in the context of another remark of the
author, according to which
Mathematics is typically extensional throughout - we happily write “3 + 2 = 2 + 3”
even though the two terms involved may differ in meaning.
Thus since mathematics is extensional throughout and the modern (classical) logic is designed
to model the mathematical reasoning intension has no place in this logic. So when intension
shows up in a non-mathematical context the classical logic doesn’t help to account for it and as
a result the notion of intension appears to be problematic or even mysterious.
I agree with Fitting, of course, that Frege-Russell’s logic gives no place for intension but I don’t
quite agree with his explanation of this fact. First of all I cannot see that “mathematics is
extensional throughout”. The equality 3 + 2 = 2 + 3, as well as the above example of equilateral
and isogonal triangles, demonstrates, in my view, that the intension/extension distinction is
relevant to mathematics: expressions 3 + 2 and 2 + 3 have different meanings but refer to the
same object, namely to the number 5. So by writing “3 + 2 = 2 + 3” one does not necessarily
ignore the difference between meanings of the two terms. Similarly, the theorem according to
which a given triangle is equilateral if and only if it is isogonal does not involve and does not
require the ignorance of the fact that concepts of being equilateral and being isogonal are different
(in their intensions)! On the contrary, if being equilateral would simply mean being isogonal then
there were no theorem. Similarly, if the expression “Morning Star” would simply mean the same
thing as the expression “Evening Star” then the claim that Morning Star and Evening Star is one
and the same planet would be trivial while in fact it is not. Thus I cannot find any significant
difference between mathematical and real life examples in this respect. In my view the principle
reason why early systems of formal logic (like Frege-Russell logic) are purely extensional (in the
sense that they don’t treat intension explicitly) is rather the following.
In the real life 9 some objects are used as signs, which refer to some other objects. This setting
9By the “real life” I understand here the domain of intended applications of logic. I assume that this domain
is sufficiently large to include usual linguistic examples as well as simple mathematical examples.
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is straightforwardly modeled by mathematical means with taking some mathematical objects to
be sings and some other mathematical objects to be referents of those signs. In this way one gets
both a formal syntax and formal semantics. Mathematics simply reflects in this case a broader
“real life” situation providing us with important epistemic and practical advantages similar to
those obtained through application of mathematics in natural sciences and technology.
Let us now see how intension can be taken into a formal account. A way to do this is to assume
after Frege that in addition to signs and their referents there exist such things as meanings and
then find an appropriate symbolic representation of meanings. Let MP and RP be the meaning
and the reference of a given predicate P . Symbolic expressions “MP ” and “RP ” stand for (i.e.,
refer to) some mathematical objects (MP and RP ) which represent the meaning and the referent
of P correspondingly: these mathematical objects are specified by semantics of our logic. Remind
that the symbolic expressions “MP ” and “RP ” not only refer but also mean something. If, for
example, the meaning of P is represented by some specific function then the meaning of MP
includes a definition of this function. The meaning of P and the meaning of MP are, generally,
different.
Now observe that a purely extensional formal logic is natural in a sense, in which any intensional
logic construed along the above lines is not. While a purely extensional formal logic simply
reflects a broader “real life” context an intensional logic construed as above does not do this
because it maps real life meanings to mathematical objects (i.e., referents of certain concepts)
but not to mathematical meanings. In other words, an intensional logic so construed treats
intension by extensional means, and in a sense reduces the former to the latter. In my view this
lack of naturalness is a reason why in a formal mathematized setting the logical intension always
looks more problematic than the logical extension.
Although the above argument does not rule out the possibility of representing meanings by
certain mathematical objects (examples of intensional logics designed in this way are given in
[56]) it points to a general difficulty of this approach and suggests this obvious alternative:
to represent real life meanings directly by mathematical meanings rather then by mathematical
objects of some sort. The problem is, of course, that we don’t really know what is a mathematical
meaning: it appears to be no less elusive than the real life meaning. As we shall now see this
straightforward way of formalizing intension can nevertheless work with the price of a substantial
reconsideration of Frege’s meaning/reference distinction.
Frege (see [59], [61]) has introduced his distinction between meaning and reference trying to
clarify questions like this: Is the Morning Star the same thing as the Evening Star or not?
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Frege’s answer is roughly the following: as it stands the question is ambiguous and has no
definite answer; in order to get a yes-know answer one should specify whether one asks this
question about the meaning of “Morning Star” (resp. “Evening Star”) or about the reference
of “Morning Star” (resp. “Evening Star”). Thus the initial ambiguous question splits into two
questions each of which has a definite answer: (i) Do expressions “Morning Star” and “Evening
Star” have the same meaning? (No); (ii) Do expressions “Morning Star” and “Evening Star”
have the same referent? (Yes). Notice that this solution is in line with Frege’s idea that the
identity relation is unique and applies indiscriminately to meanings, referents and what not.
Now consider the following alternative solution. One agrees that the question “Is Morning Star
the same thing as Evening Star?” has no yes-no answer but instead of distinguishing between
meaning and referents one distinguishes between two different identity relations by saying that
there is a sense of identity in which Morning Star and Evening Star are the same and there is
another sense of identity (i.e., a different identity relation) in which Morning Star and Evening
Star are different. One wants to speak here about the identity of meaning (intensional identity)
and the identity of reference (extensional identity) without positing meanings and references as
separate entities. This sounds like Geach’s relative identity (5.6) but now I am talking about a
very different approach. In the next Section I show how this idea is realized formally in Martin-
Lo¨f’s type theory. As we shall see this theory allows for representing intensional aspects of real
world examples by intensional mathematical notions.
5.11 Identity in the Intuitionistic Type Theory
The intuitionistic type theory with dependent types developed by Martin-Lo¨f [183] involves two
kinds of identity relations 10. First, we have here a notion of definitional equality of types (written
A = B) and of terms belonging to the same given type (x = y : A). Corresponding rules assure
that the definitional equality is an equivalence relation and that definitionally equal types and
terms are mutually interchangeable through substitution in the usual way. Second, we have here
a notion of propositional equality IdA(x, y) that reads as a proposition saying that objects x, y
of type A are equal. This second kind of identity (equality) does not apply to types. It does not
apply to terms belonging to different types either.
10The standard version of this theory involves four different kinds of identity ([183], page 59). Following Awodey
and Warren [9], [7] I simplify the original account by deliberately confusing some syntactic and semantical aspects.
Then we are left with the following two forms of identity described above in the main text. The version of type
theory presented in [249] applies the definitional equality also to contexts. For simplicity I don’t consider the
type-theoretic notion of context in this paper. For a more recent exposition of Martin-Lo¨f’s theory and discussion
of related philosophical issues see [79] and [229]
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If two terms x, y of given type A are definitionally equal they are interchangeable through sub-
stitution and hence also propositionally equal. If the converse is also the case (i.e. if any
propositionally equal terms are definitionally equal) the corresponding version of the theory is
called extensional ; otherwise it is called intensional. In the extensional theory the difference
between the two kinds of identity is trivial: even if it can be formally maintained it is wholly
redundant from a pragmatic viewpoint. However in the intensional theory this difference turns
to be fruitful and mathematically non-trivial as we shall later see.
Frege’s logic accounts for forms of reasoning about things as they (supposedly) are without
accounting for how we come to know these things and without accounting (at least in the special
case of identity statements) for the justification of one’s claims. Martin-Lo¨f’s constructive logic
in its turn is designed as an instrument of inquiry, which never appeals to an entity without
specifying explicitly the way, in which one comes to know this entity. The name constructive
refers here to the fundamental epistemic assumption behind this logic according to which the
best way to know a thing is to construct (or perhaps reconstruct) it. Since the Intuitionistic
Type theory is designed for dealing primarily with purely mathematical reasoning rather than
with reasoning in natural sciences, this epistemic assumption reduces to the maxim according to
which any mathematical object (that one may want to consider for purely mathematical or some
other purposes) must be explicitly constructed rather than simply found somewhere in Nature
or on the Platonic Heaven. However a similar constructive approach in natural sciences is well-
known too; it dates back at least to Kant’s First Critique [129] and has a continuing history
afterwards. For a version of the constructive approach in natural sciences, which is developed
against the background of the 20th century physics, I refer the reader to Fraassen’s doctrine
of Constructive Empiricism [57]. Whether or not the Intuitionistic Type theory or some other
system of constructive logic can be indeed applied in physics and other sciences remains an open
question, which I shall not tackle here. Instead I present below an alternative informal analysis
of Frege’s Venus example, which shows that the non-standard notion of identity used in the
Intuitionistic Type theory makes good sense in the real life too.
Suppose that at certain point of history astronomers observe what they call the Morning Star
(MS) and the Evening Star (ES). Behind these two names there is, of course, a strong epistemic
assumption according to which every morning they observe one and the same object (MS) and
every evening they observe another object (ES). In the following story I shall not try to make
explicit possible grounds of this assumption but simply take it granted.
So far our astronomers take MS and ES to be two different objects. Now suppose that they
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get a new evidence, which suggests that MS and ES are different appearances of one and the
same planet. It may be, for example, a data obtained from a new telescope. With these new
data in hand the astronomers develop a new theory, which accounts for the new and the old data
about MS and ES and on this basis provides a theoretical ground for the statement that MS
is identical to ES. On this basis they make a new linguistic convention by replacing the older
names MS and ES by the new single name “Venus”.
In terms of Intuitionistic Type theory the above setting can be formalized rather straightfor-
wardly. First, one needs a type A (for “astronomy”) of observable brighting spots (“stars”) si
on the sky and some notion of identity of such things, which allow one to identify a given star s
observed today with the same star observed yesterday. In spite of the fact that this identity is
epistemically non-trivial in the given context we take it to be definitional. Then for every pair of
stars s1, s2 we form another (dependent) type IdA(s1, s2) elements (terms) of which (if any) are
evidences (proofs) that s1 and s2 are identical. This latter notion of identity is propositional and
it should not be confused with the former (definitional) identity. When s1ands2 are definition-
ally identical they are also propositionally identical: in this case the definitional identity s1 = s2
plays the role of evidence (proof) of their propositional identity. However IdA(s1, s2 may be also
inhabited, i.e., s1, s2 can be propositionally identical, when they are not definitionally identical.
The Venus example is a case in point: although MS and ES are definitionally different they
are propositionally the same. Thus type IdA(MS,ES) must be inhabited by an independent
evidence like one obtained by our astronomers with the new telescope. For a further reference I
denote this evidence E1.
We see how the distinction between the definitional identity and the propositional identity can
apply to a physically meaningful context. This is however is not yet the end of our story: higher
identity types of the Intuitionistic Type theory suggest the following development.
Suppose that another group of astronomers makes independent observations trying either to
confirm or to refute the claim of the first group that MS and ES is the same planet Venus. This
other research group obtains evidence E2, which in fact supports the claim of the first group.
Now the question is whether the second group has simply repeated the observations made by the
first group or obtained a genuinely new evidence supporting the claim. This latter question has
an epistemic impact on the claim of identity of MS and ES and hence must be treated in the
same context: if the two evidences are independent this provides a stronger support to the claim.
The type IdA(MS,ES) of evidences (of identity of MS and ES) is equipped with a definitional
identity of such evidences. However it may once again turn out that two evidences, which are
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definitionally different, turn to be propositionally the same. For that reason we form higher
type IdIdA(MS,ES)(E1, E2) and see whether or not it is inhabited. If it is inhabited by several
(definitionally) different terms one may need to consider identity types of the third order, and
so on. In 6.9 I show that the complex structure, which arises in this way, may be described as a
groupoid of identities. Here I want to suggest that it better reflects the complexity of empirical
inquiry than Frege’s universal notion identity, which wholly ignores this complexity.
A Fregean may argue that what I discuss here is an epistemological issue (How we come to know
an identity statement?) which is not Frege’s problem. I don’t think that this claim is historically
correct. The following quote shows that epistemic concerns make part of Frege’s inquiry into the
notion of identity (equality):
Equality gives rise to challenging questions which are not altogether easy to answer.
Is it a relation? A relation between objects, or between names or signs of objects? In
my Begriffsschrift I assumed the latter. The reasons which seem to favor this are the
following: a = a and a = b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a = a
holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be labeled analytic, while statements of
the form a = b often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot
always be established a priori. The discovery that the rising sun is not new every
morning, but always the same, was one of the most fertile astronomical discoveries.
Even to-day the identification of a small planet or a comet is not always a matter of
course. ([61], 56)
I cannot see that Frege provides a satisfactory answer to this epistemic concern. His theory
of meaning and reference applies equally in the context where the meaning and the reference
are known and in the context where these things are merely assumed; it doesn’t reflect the
epistemic difference between the two situation. The multi-level type-theoretic propositional
identity considered above does this job by requiring an explicit proof of (or reason) why certain
things are equal and by making such proofs (reasons) into proper elements of the identity of the
given entity. The topological interpretation of this construction presented in 6.9 will allow for
an intuitive grasp of this construction.
The above discussion provides an insight onto this crucial question: In which sense if any the
concept of identity is fundamental? First of all we should admit that unless some identities are
fixed one cannot communicate (and arguably cannot even produce) any coherent thought. This
is clear because any language - no matter how “informal” and how metaphoric - requires a local
stability of certain phonetic, written, syntactic and (last but not least) semantic patterns. In
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order to use a language one needs to recognize and reproduce patterns of all these sorts. In any
natural language such a local stability is combined with a non-trivial global dynamics: languages
evolve in time and interact in space. Fixing semantic patterns requires fixing identities of entities,
which are not purely linguistic (like Sun, Morning Star and what not). The scientific discourse
demonstrates a similar contrast between the local stability and the global dynamics but in this
case the contrast is sharper: locally (say, in a given scientific publication) the meaning of terms is
fixed more rigidly than the meaning of words in the common speech while globally the scientific
language evolves more rapidly than the everyday language (since science itself evolves more
rapidly than more traditional human institutions like religion, family, etc.). Thus any reasonable
discourse and, in particular, any scientific discourse requires fixing some basic identities some of
which are linguistic and some of which are not.
These fixed identities must be locally stable in the following sense: once one assumes an identity
a = b one is forced to preserve it until the accomplishing of the given piece of reasoning. What
exactly counts as an accomplished piece of reasoning is a tricky question, which I shall not treat
here systematically. In the process of inquiry it often happens that one rejects certain earlier
made assumptions (for example, in the light of new evidences). Such revisions may be or be not
justified but in any event they are not regulated by rules of logical inference, which are supposed
to draw some consequences from given assumptions without changing these assumptions. In
this sense any logical reasoning is conservative: it preserves assumptions and reaches some new
conclusions. (I understand now “logic” in the usual sense, which does not include the dialectical
logic and similar non-conservative schemes.) Thus there is no way to assume a = b and then
argue that a and b are different: this would be a sheer contradiction.
This conservativity does not mean, however, that all identities are (locally) fixed “once and
for all”. Some identities may be not found among assumptions of the given reasoning but be
obtained as conclusions of this reasoning. In this respect identities, or more precisely propositions
expressing identities, behave just like all other propositions. Now we should take into account
that assumptions may play different roles in reasoning. Often one wants to chose as assumptions
some fundamental propositions, which may serve as grounds for some further conclusions but
cannot be themselves obtained as conclusions made on some “deeper” grounds (at least at the
given stage of knowledge). In this case the assumptions qualify as “first principles”. However in
other cases assumptions serve rather for bootstrapping one’s reasoning; in such cases they are
no more “fundamental” than conclusions (even if their logical role is not the same as the role
of conclusions). Definitional identities in the Intuitionistic Type theory seem to belong to this
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second category of assumptions. The fact that the Morning Star seen yesterday and the Morning
Star seen today is one and the same “star” is an assumption, which on the one hand, fixes a
linguistic convention, and on the other hand, identifies a continuing series of regularly observed
phenomena as the appearance of one and the same object (the Morning Star). Mutatis mutandis
this applies to the Evening Star too. The fact that we take the identities of the Morning Star
and of the Evening Star to be definitional reflects a stage of knowledge: this is where the given
reasoning begins; the reasons why one series of phenomena is made into the Morning Star and
the other series of phenomena is made into the Evening Star are left behind. Then one obtains
an evidence that the Morning Star and the Evening Star is one and the same planet Venus.
This latter identity in the given context qualifies as propositional. It reflects a further stage of
knowledge. Arguably it is more fundamental than the former definitional identities. (The true
reason why the Morning Star observed yesterday is the same thing as the Morning Star observed
today is the fact the Morning Star is Venus!). Notice that the progress of knowledge achieved
with the new propositional identity (MS = ES) is strictly conservative in the sense that it does
not require to revise the assumed definitional identities. (The discovery that MS = ES does
not contradict the fact that MS observed yesterday and MS observed today is one and the
same object.) This allows one to incorporate the change of knowledge into an inferential logical
scheme.
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Chapter 6
Identity Through Change,
Category Theory and Homotopy
Theory
6.1 Relations versus Transformations
The replacement of the equivalence xEy by the identity x = y discussed by Frege (5.5) allows
for an interpretation, which differs from Frege’s. Namely, equivalence E can be understood as
an invertible transformation (rather than relation), which turns x into y and vice versa; then the
identity = becomes the identity through this transformation. If E is the relation of Euclidean
congruence then the corresponding transformation is the (Euclidean) motion; thinking about E
as motion (rather than congruence) one says that y is the same object x but subject to translation
and/or rotation in the Euclidean space. Here x and y are said to be the same in the same sense
of “same” in which, for example, an adult yesterday and today is the same person. So we think
here geometrical figures in much the way we think of a substantial continuant - as an entity
capable changing its states and/or positions. Such a “substantialist” interpretation works also
for Frege’s example of parallel lines 1.
The substantialist reinterpretation of mathematical relations may look like an exercise in old-
fashioned metaphysics but it appears surprisingly fruitful from the mathematical point of view.
1For a more up-to-date account of the notion of substance and of identity through change see [251].
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For in mathematics the language of transformations is not formally equivalent to that of relations
as one might expect but is actually far richer. Given equivalence xEy there are, generally speak-
ing, many distinguishable transformations turning x into y while xEy only says that one such
transformation exists. So here the underlying naive metaphysics matters mathematically. The
difference becomes particularly evident in the case of (global) invertible transformations of a given
geometrical space. In the language of relations the existence of such transformations amounts
only to the claim that a given space is equivalent to itself. But in fact such transformations
contain the most basic information about the corresponding space. This was first recognized by
Klein [134] when he formulated a new research program in geometry (known today as “Erlangen
Program”) as follows:
Given a manifold and a group of transformations on it one should investigate the
structures on the manifold with respect to those properties that respect the transfor-
mations of the group. ([134], p.7, my translation from German)
It is not the notion of a substantial form surviving through transformations that is the major
issue in the new framework for the study of geometrical structure proposed by Klein. Rather
there is something of a different sort, which also remain unchanged through the transformations.
That something is the structure(s) or forms of the transformations themselves. I refer to the fact
that invertible geometrical transformations like Euclidean motions form algebraic groups under
composition. This fact remains completely hidden from view when one uses the language of
relations. Thus the traditional metaphysics of substance and form fulfills a mathematical need
which the new Frege-Russell metaphysics does not - whatever might be said in favor of the latter
against the former for philosophical reasons.
Let me next specify some terminology, which will be useful for what follows. We have considered
three different ways of thinking of what is involved in operating with an (arbitrary) equivalence
relation xEy:
1. Extension: Consider equivalence classes formed of those things equivalent under the relation
E
2. Abstraction: Replace the relation xEy by identity x = y, and read x, y anew as standing
for a (relational) property common to all and only members of the same equivalence class
under E
3. Substantivation: Think of the given relation as an invertible transformation of relata into
each other, and read E as identity through this transformation
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In the case of Humean relation H one may proceed from 1) to 3) through the following steps.
Given certain class of classes x, y, .. equivalent by H
• think of the one-one correspondences between elements of given classes x, y as invertible
transformations (isomorphisms) f, g... turning elements of x into elements of y and con-
versely (the invertibility implies that different elements of x turn into different elements of
y and vice versa);
• think of x, y as different states of the same underlying substratumX, and think of (auto)morphisms
f, g, ... as changes of X;
• similarly identify all classes equivalent to x and y with X.
A non-trivial fact, which makes mathematical sense of this metaphysical exercise, is that the
automorphisms of X form a group called its permutation group or symmetric group. To see
better what we gain and what we might lose in switching from relations to transformations
consider the following table:
Extensional reading Substantional reading
Write x ∼ y for “class x is equivalent (isomorphic)
to class y”
Write f : X → X or simply f for an isomorphism
from a class X to itself (automorphism)
∼ is an equivalence relation. Automorphisms of X form a group.
∼ is transitive, i.e., x ∼ y and y ∼ z implies x ∼ z. Given automorphisms f, g there exists a unique au-
tomorphism fg resulting from the application of g
after f .
∼ is reflexive, i.e., every class x is isomorphic to itself:
x ∼ x.
There exist an identity automorphism 1 such that for
any automorphism f we have 1f = f1 = f .
∼ is symmetric, i.e., if x ∼ y then y ∼ x. every atomorphism f has an inverse f−1 such that
ff−1 = f−1f = 1.
Let me now comment on each raw of this table separately.
Raw 1
Classes x, y from the left column are identified in the right column through Frege’s abstraction
and denoted by the same symbol “X”. Notice that x ∼ y is a proposition but f : X → X is a
(mathematical) object, namely a particular morphism (function). Proposition x ∼ y says that
there exists an isomorphism between x and y, while f is such an isomorphism. It is helpful to
forget for the moment about the abstraction and think of f as an isomorphism of the form x→ y.
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Then the translation from the left to the right cell of this raw can be described as an instantiation:
while the left cell tells us that an isomorphism of certain form exists the right cell points to such
an isomorphism. When x and y are identified through abstraction f turns into an automorphism
of the form X → X. The instantiation of a given concept provides a concrete instance (concrete
object) that falls under this given concept. This shows that translation from the left to the right
column involves a double conceptual transformation, namely, it involves concretization (of the
notion of isomorphism) along with abstraction (over given isomorphic classes).
Given an object of certain type one may always claim that an object of this type exists (in
some appropriate sense of “exists” - we are now talking about the existence of mathematical
objects and the present argument does not depend on any particular theory of mathematical
existence). But one may be also in a position to describe further properties of the given object,
including those properties, which this given object does not share with all other objects of the
same type. In other words a given object may also have some detectable specific properties.
As we shall briefly see this is a case in point: the language of transformations allows one not
only to claim that certain isomorphisms exist but also to describe specific properties of such
isomorphisms. This shows that the right cell contains some information, which is not found the
left cell. However if x ∼ y does not hold we still have a proposition, which tells us something
useful. Such information cannot be provided by means used in the right column: given no
authomorphism of the appropriate type one has nothing to talk about here (unless one brings
into consideration some further relevant objects like morphisms of more general sorts). This
shows that translation between the language of relations and the language of morphisms is not
wholly transparent in either direction.
Raw 2
As the following comments make clear there is an interesting conceptual link between the notion
of equivalence relation, on the one hand, and the notion of (algebraic) group, on the other
hand. In order to show this I take the standard definition of equivalence relation (as transitive,
reflexive and symmetric relation) and compare this definition with a category-theoretic (rather
than standard set-theoretic) definition of group as a group of transformations. The following
three raws of the table establish a piecewise correspondence between the two definitions.
Raw 3
In order to see more precisely how works the translation from the left to the right cell it is once
again helpful to begin with the instantiation. In the left cell we have x ∼ y and y ∼ z; by
instantiation we get f : x → y and g : y → z correspondingly. By the transitivity property
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we also have x ∼ z (in the left cell), which by instantiation gives us fg : x → z (in the right
cell). Now identifying x, y, z through abstraction we get the situation presented in the right cell.
Observe however that the transitivity property of ∼ does not reflect the fact that composition
fg is uniquely defined by f and g.
Raw 4
The reflexivity property of relation = amounts to the fact that for any given class x admits at
least one automorphism. Generally, classes admit many authomorphisms. While every element
of any given abstract class x is indiscernible from any other element of the same class, if any, (in
the sense that the concept of class doesn’t assume that every element of class has some particular
properties, which may allow one to distinguish this given element of the given class from another
element of the same class) automorphisms Ai of a given class x are not all alike (except the
trivial case when family {Ai} consists of a single element; notice that by reflexivity of relation ∼
family {Ai} cannot be empty). For {Ai} contains a distinguished automrphism called identity
automorphism, which sends every element of x into itself (but not only x to itself). Other
automorphisms of x permute its elements and so don’t have this property. The same property
of the identity authomorphism can be described in terms of composition as this is shown in the
right cell; this definition implies that the identity automorphism is indeed unique.
Proposition x ∼ x in the left cell tells us that the family {Ai} of automorphisms of class x is
not empty. The right cell provides a concrete instance of such automorphism, namely 1. This
concrete instance has a specific property (namely, the property of being identity automorphism),
which automorphisms of a given class do not have in general. This specific property is not
chosen arbitrary because every class has the identity automorphism but not not every class has
automorphisms of other sorts (the empty class and the class consisting of a single element do
not). Thus, once again, one can observe that the right cell contains more information than
the left: while the left cell tells us only that every class admits an automorphism the right cell
specifies that every class admits an automorphism with a specific property.
Let’s now see how abstraction works in this case. Given a family {xi} of isomorphic classes it
is easy too check that families of automorphisms {Ai} corresponding to these classes are also
isomorphic in the sense that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between members of {Ai}
and {Aj}. However this notion of isomorphism turns to be too weak to make good mathematical
sense in this latter case. When isomorphic classes xi, xj are identified through abstraction it
doesn’t matter which element of xi is identified with which elements of xj . In other words, such
an identification can be made through any one-to-one correspondence between the elements of
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the two classes. This is because elements of a given class are indiscernible in the sense that the
concept of class doesn’t assume that an element of class has some specific properties, which may
allow one to distinguish this given element from any other element of the given class. However
each family Ai contains a distinguished automorphism idi called identity automorphism, which
sends every element of xi into itself. Otherwise this distinguished automorphism can be defined
in terms of composition (without referring to elements) as this is shown in the right cell and called
the unit (of the given group of automorphisms). If families Ai and Aj are identified merely as
classes through some arbitrary one-to-one correspondence between their elements the difference
between identity automorphisms and other automorphisms is ignored, so what we get is again an
abstract class rather than an abstract family of automorphisms. To prevent this it is necessary
to identify the identity idi of the first family with the identity idj of the second family rather
than with any other member of this latter family. Unless an one-to-one correspondence between
members of {Ai} and {Aj} has the specific property just mentioned it hardly deserves to be
called isomorphism and cannot be used for an appropriate abstraction. This property (avoiding
confusion of identity automorphisms with other automorphisms) is necessary but not sufficient
for formulating the new notion of isomorphism. What one needs here is, of course, the notion
of group isomorphism defined in 8.5 below. Automorphisms of a given class is not just another
class or a family but a group in the sense explained in the right column of the table.
Raw 5
The symmetry property of relation ∼ described in the left cell consists of the following: given
an isomorphism of the form x → y there exists an isomorphism of the form y → x. The
notion of inverse automorphism not only provides an instance of isomorphism of the latter form
(modulo the identification of x, y through abstraction) but also describes a specific property of
this isomorphism.
Does the approach outlined above provide any viable alternative to Frege’s project of settling
the question of identity in mathematics by external logical means? Prima facie it seems that the
notion of identity through change (transformation) invoked here remains completely informal
and not likely to be helpful in avoiding paradoxes mentioned in 5.1. However I claim we have
here a new formal concept of identity as the unity of a group of transformations. This group-
theoretic notion of identity meshes well with the metaphysical intuition that any changing entity
contains a core invariant through changes. Merging equivalence classes x, y, .. into one “class-
substance” X indiscriminately, we recover a notion of identity as a particular transformation
(and one unique for a given group) which we may speculate is connected with the notion of
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repetition. Here the notion of “’repetition of the same” is thought of as giving meaning to the
notion of ”the same” rather than the other way round (cf. [39]). This group-theoretic identity is
obviously relative in Geach’s sense: objects can be identical up to a transformation of one type
but different up to a transformation of a different type (5.6). It is not immediately clear whether
this group-theoretic identity has anything to do with the logical notion of identity, which was
Frege’s concern. But at least we get a well-defined identity concept here, and one which makes
the metaphysical intuitions behind it precise.
There are at least three objections, which can be brought against the suggestion that we should
take this group-theoretic notion of identity as a serious candidate for the philosophical explication
of the notion of identity either inside or outside mathematics.
1. The logical (and metaphysical) notion of identity should apply to the widest possible do-
main of entities, so one can say which things in a given domain are the same and which
differ. But group-theoretic identity is relevant to a single object, namely its group.
2. Group-theoretic identity 1G does not allow us to form propositions like A = B “A is
identical to B”. Generally, the group-theoretic identity 1G like any other element of a
given group G is a particular mathematical object while identity is a basic logical concept.
In the group theory like elsewhere in mathematics the role of logical identity is played
by mathematical equality =. For the sake of the argument we can now ignore subtle
differences between the logical identity and mathematical equality discussed in the last
Chapter. Anyway 1G and = have little if anything in common except the common name
and some vague metaphysical intuitions behind it. For theoretical reason we need to
distinguish the two things sharply and reflect the distinction in the terminology rather
then allow ourselves to be led by confusing terms and the vague metaphysics.
3. In particular the group-theoretic identity 1G like any mathematical object needs certain
identity conditions. These identity conditions matter essentially, for example, when one
proves the uniqueness of the identity of a given group. Proposition “there exist 1G such that
for any f ∈ G we have 1Gf = f1G = f ′” takes the logical identity (equality) = for granted.
Hence one needs a prior logical notion of identity to cope with the group-theoretic notion
of identity, so no way the latter can be a candidate for the normalization or mathematical
explication of the more general notion.
In what follows we will see that these problems can be partly fixed through generalizing the
concept of group up to that of category.
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6.2 How To Think Circle
Arguably the best way to explain what is circle is to show one:
Fig. 6.1
However this wouldn’t work for one who tries to grasp the notion of circle from scratch because
the above circle has some specific features (like its size and its position on this book’s page),
which other circles may not have; so a beginner cannot possibly learn from this or any other single
example which features of the given picture are generic and must be taken into consideration
when one thinks and talks of circles, and which in the given context are superficial and thus must
be ignored. The above picture alone doesn’t allow one to see it as circle unless one is already
familiar with the concept of circle, i.e., already knows how circles look like. Only when a learner
is shown multiple figures and told which of them do qualify as circles (in spite of differences
in size, color, position, etc.) and which do not qualify as such (in spite of some resemblance
with circles like in the case of ovals) he may learn how correctly identify circles among figures of
different shapes.
The above story about learning the concept of circle reveals the following important feature of
this and other similar concepts. Every particular circle represents the concept of circle just as
well as any other particular circle; there is no sense in which a given circle c1 is a better or
worse circle than another given circle c2: as circles c1 and c2 are strictly equivalent. Yet it is an
essential feature of circles that such things are many and so this feature is an essential element
of the circle concept. It is equally essential that circles belong to a broader genus of things
like a geometrical figure and that this broader genus contains things of other types like ovals,
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etc2.
What are general concepts and what are their particular instances and how concepts relate to
their instances is a question that has been discussed in philosophy throughout it history at least
since Plato’s times. The modern distinction between types and tokens as well as the modern
Fregean notion of abstraction (as the identification of members of equivalence classes modulo
some equivalence relation) discussed in the last Chapter are rather traditional in this respect
even if they come with some modern symbolic techniques. My purpose of mentioning here this
very general issue is to point to a relatively new way of tackling it, which originates from the
19th century geometry.
Informally the idea is the following. Given two arbitrary items c1 and c2, which are supposed
to instantiate the same concept C (think about circles) consider transformations of the form f :
c1 → c2 (which may be or be not invertible). Then by specifying a type T of such transformations
and by choosing a single generic instance c∗ one may describe the whole extension EC of concept
C by saying that it consists of those and only those items, which are obtainable from c∗ through
some transformation of type T . (Notice that if these transformations are all invertible then EC
can be similarly obtained from any its element, i.e., every element of EC turns to be generic.
Otherwise this, generally, is not the case.) For example, it may be specified that by moving a
given circle and scaling it (changing its size without changing the shape) one always obtains a
circle while transformations of other sorts turn a circle into something else. Such a description
(appropriately improved) is sufficient for understanding what is circle in general and thus it fairly
presents the general concept of circle3.
One may object that the suggested way of thinking about the concept of circle through trans-
formations is not independent because it requires the specification of an appropriate type of
transformations: thinking about circles as generated by a generic circle through appropriate
transformations one no longer needs the circle-type but still needs a transformation-type. This
is a faire point but there are in fact ways to tackle the problem. First, transformations can
be specified in terms of composition with other transformations, see 6.1 above. So the notion
of composition of transformation provides means for distinguishing some transformations from
2In Plato’s view the distinction between better and worse “copies” of the generic “ideal circle” makes sense.
However I assume here that at least among mathematical circles no similar distinction can be made: every
mathematical circle is a circle, period.
3Since motions and scalings are invertible any circle is generic. In order to see how this condition may brake
assume a convention according to which a point counts as circle (of zero radius) and scaling (in the more liberal
sense of the term than above) allows for shrinking a circle (of a non-zero radius) into a point. Such conventions
are abundant in mathematics and there is nothing wrong with them. However it is clear that a zero-radius circle
(point) is not generic because scaling (liberally understood) and moving of a point always brings back a point,
and so no circle with a positive radius can be obtained from a point through these transformations.
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some others. Second, one may think about types of transformations again in terms of transfor-
mation (of the second level). Consider transformation f : c1 → c2 taking one circle into another
and another transformation g : c1 → c2 of the same type. Then consider a second-level trans-
formation α : f → g which takes f into g. Geometrically f and g can be thought as paths in a
geometrical space (for simplicity consider the case when f and g are motions); then α is a trans-
formation of one path into another. Then one may specify an appropriate type for second-level
transformations, point to a generic first-level transformation f∗ (or a number of such generic
transformations) and finally describe first-level transformations as those transformations, which
are obtained from f∗ through second-level transformations of the appropriate type. A similar
procedure can be applied to second-level transformations. The fact that we get here an infi-
nite regress from a mathematical viewpoint doesn’t make the whole procedure pointless: one
may think of an infinite structure involving transformations of n-th without assuming that n
is bounded. In 6.9 I describe a mathematical structure, which realizes this idea in a precise
form.
Let me now come back to the problem of identity. When an entity undergoes a transformation
it always remains unclear (at least at the linguistic level) whether this transformation produces
a new different entity or only a different state of the same entity. This gives rise to paradoxes
about identity similar to those mentioned in 5.1. As I have already stressed in 5.1 in mathe-
matics such ambiguities about identity are also ubiquitous. Instead of trying to fix this problem
by imposing some external logical regimentation I shall rather explore the possibility of using
transformations themselves for it. An identity transformation, which leaves a transformed object
as it is without producing any change in it may be thought of as an auxiliary formal notion like
zero or empty set. However one may also tentatively think of it as a means, which determines
the identity of its object. More generally one may try to use transformations (in some mathe-
matically refined sense of the term) for controlling identity. Think again about circles. As far
as we are talking about Euclidean circles living on Euclidean plane there is a natural criterion
of identity (leaving now aside the problem of coinciding figures stressed in 5.1), which in terms
of transformations can be described as follows: rotations of a given circle about its center and
the identity transformation count as self -transformations while all other available transforma-
tions (always of type T ) transform the given circle into another circle. If one now manages
to distinguish identity transformations and appropriate rotations from other transformations of
type T without using identity conditions for circles established otherwise then such a distinction
between different kinds of transformations may serve for introducing such identity conditions
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independently. Let me now bring into discussion some more mathematics and see whether this
project is viable.
6.3 Categorification
Circles together with their mutual transformations give us a toy example of a category in the
sense of Chapter 4, i.e., in the general mathematical sense of the term.
Generally, a category comprises:
• Class of its objects A,B,C, ...;
• For each ordered pair of objects A,B class of morphisms f : A → B, g : A → B, ..; given
f : A→ B, A is called domain of f and B is called codomain of f ;
• Composition fg of morphisms f, g such that the codomain of f equals the domain of g (see
the diagram below); the composition is associative : h(gf) = (hg)f = hgf ;
• Identity morphisms 1A associated with each object A and defined by the following condition
: for all morphisms f, g, 1A = f and g1A = g (provided the compositions 1Af and g1A
exist).
When in a categorical diagram any arrow A → C equals to any other arrow between objects A
and C obtained through composition of other arrows shown at this diagram the diagram is said
to be commutative. For example, saying this triangle
B
g
@
@@
@@
@@
A
f
??~~~~~~~
h
// C
is commutative is simply tantamount to saying that fg = h. Morphisms resulting from compo-
sition of shown morphisms can be omitted at a commutative diagram when this doesn’t lead to
an ambiguity. For example, saying this square
A
g // B
C
h
//
f
OO
D
i
OO
is commutative is tantamount to saying that fg = hi.
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Now the above construction with circles can be described as category C where objects are
circles and morphisms are mutual transformations of circles (motions and scalings) some of
which transform a given circle into itself while some other transform a given circle into another
circle. Composition of such transformations understood in the usual way obviously satisfies the
conditions mentioned in the above definition of the notion of category. Notice that our category of
circles C has the following additional property not assumed in the general definition of category :
all its morphisms (transformations) are invertible . The invertibility (aka reversibility) is a basic
property of all usual geometrical transformations (like motion or scale transformation) in virtue
of which such transformations form groups.
In the category-theoretic terms just introduced the invertibility of transformation (morphism)
f : A→ B amounts to existence of transformation (morphism) g : B → A (called the inverse of
f) such that fg = 1A and gf = 1B . In category theory this property is taken as the definition
of isomorphism, so isomorphisms are invertible morphisms by definition. A category like C such
that all its morphisms are isomorphisms is called groupoid. Thinking of objects of a groupoid
“up to isomorphism” one gets a group. (So group is a category with only one object such that
all its morphisms are isomorphisms.) However such identification causes a lost of information,
namely the lost of distinction between morphisms of objects to themselves (automorphisms) and
morphisms of objects to other objects. Thus groupoids provide an important counter-example
against the widespread belief according to which in categories all isomorphic objects can be
always viewed as identical.
The full strength of the notion of category is revealed through the case when morphisms between
objects are not all invertible, that is, are not all isomorphisms. A basic example is the category
of sets having sets as objects and functions between sets as morphisms (see 4.1 above). Fur-
ther examples are obtained through equipping sets with various structures like group structure
or topological structure. Then morphisms are required to “preserve” or “respect” the corre-
sponding structure: so in the category of groups morphisms are homomorphisms of groups, and
in the category of topological spaces morphisms are continuous transformations. (The precise
definitions are given below in 8.5 where the idea of “preservation of structure” is critically re-
considered.) Using these common examples one should not forget that categories of structured
sets don’t cover all categories of interest as shows the example of Grothendieck topos from 4.9.
Our circle category C also belongs to this latter sort (unless a circle is construed as a structured
set of its points).
Thus the upgrade of the notion of group up to that of category involves two independent
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steps:
1. introduction of multiple identities (multiple objects) instead of unique identity (unique
object);
2. allowing for non-invertible morphisms.
This upgrade can be shown with the following diagram 4:
Examples of categories given so far are concrete categories. This means that objects of such
categories are specified in advance (usually this means that they are construed a` la Bourbaki as
structured sets), so a category could be seen as a structure over and above given class of its specific
objects. However category theory allows for a different approach: starting with the general notion
of category one specifies its algebraic properties to the effect that the structure of morphisms
between objects and their compositions determines properties of these objects. The specification
of given abstract category amounts to the requirement that certain morphisms exist and certain
diagrams commute. As it has been already explained in 4.1 a properly specified abstract category
“turns into” the category of sets [146] in the sense analogous to that, in which logical variables
in axiomatic systems like ZF turn into sets under its intended interpretation.
At the early stage of category theory people often opposed categorical foundations of set theory to
the standard foundations as “external” approach to “internal”. The idea is that while in the case
of standard foundations sets are reconstructed though their elements, that is, “from inside”, in
categorical foundations sets are taken as black boxes interacting through morphisms (functions),
so what sets are is ultimately determined in “sociological” terms of their mutual behavior. This
is a right point as far as it concerns basic intuitions about sets but from the formal point of view
4In the standard set-theoretical setting monoid is defined as set M provided with a binary operation ⊗ and
unit (identity element) 1. The existence of inverse elements is not required.
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such intuitions are not essential. The relation of membership x ∈ y taken as basic in ZF and its
likes can be read in both senses - from the left to the right and from the right to the left - and
this makes no formal difference (although the intuition behind the extensionality axiom makes
the former “internal” reading preferable). At the same time it is not correct that the categorical
approach doesn’t allow one to “look inside an object”: in particular the relation of membership
can be perfectly reconstructed by categorical means. In both cases objects of given theory (in
particular sets) are first taken as abstract individuals and then “interactions” between the objects
tell us “what these objects are”. A real difference between the two approaches (and this is my
second remark) concerns how exactly these “interactions” are accounted mathematically. In
the standard axiomatic approach they are interpreted as relations, and relations in their turn
are formalized as predicates (like the two-place predicate ∈). In the categorical approach the
“interactions” are accounted for as morphisms (transformations) 5.
Since categories represent concepts in a specific way the mathematical use of the term “cat-
egory” is after all not in odd with how this term has been used throughout the history of
philosophy.
6.4 Are Identity Morphisms Logical?
In the last Chapter we considered the complicated interplay between the “usual” mathematical
equality and the “usual” (Fregean) logical identity. Then in 6.1 we introduced into the play
the notion of identity transformation (as the unit of a group of transformations) and finally in
6.3 generalized this latter notion up to that of identity morphism in a category. In 6.1 we
also suggested that the notion of identity transformation, on the one hand, and the notion of
identity relation, on the other hand, are two different representations of the same pre-theoretical
identity concept. We compared these two notions on the basis of common metaphysical intuitions
about identity including intuitions about the identity through change. Admittedly such a base
for comparison is very shaky. One may argue then that the very idea to treat the identity
relation and identity transformations (identity morphisms) on equal footing is obviously wrong.
The argument goes as follows. The identity relation is a fundamental logical concept while
5As Lawvere puts it
The crystallized philosophical discoveries which still propel our subject include the idea that a
category of objects of thought is not specified until one has specified the category of maps which
transform these objects into one another and by means of which they can be compared and distin-
guished. ([154], p.1)
Words “category of objects of thought” apparently paraphrase Cantor’s famous definition of set as “a collection
into a whole of [..] objects of our intuition or our thought”, see [30].
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identity morphisms are specific mathematical objects. In order to define the category-theoretic
notion of morphism in general, and the notion of identity morphism in particular, one applies a
logical notion of identity anyway. This allegedly shows that the identity relation makes part of
foundations while identity morphisms do not 6.
One way of responding to this critique is to emphasize the “geometrical point of view” [181]
on category theory against the “logical point of view” [198] without assuming that the two
points of view are incompatible. I believe, however, that there is indeed a strong and important
philosophical opposition between the two viewpoints, which needs to be resolved through a
dialectical Aufhebung rather than downplayed through some peaceful reconciliation of these
viewpoints. And I also believe that we are now already well prepared for taking the logicist
challenge. So I can reply as follows.
True, the common intuitions about the identity through change cannot by themselves replace
a rigorous logical concept of identity. However when these intuitions are put in a rigorous
geometrical form they become strong candidates for representing objective features of our world
and may help us to build a working identity concept appropriate for natural sciences. For
reasons discussed in the Introduction and in the proceedings Chapters I strongly reject the
notion according to which some “primitive” logical notion of identity formed independently from
our best science and our best mathematics can possibly qualify as a part of foundations of these
disciplines. I believe after Cassirer that the proper function of logic and mathematics “is only
within the empirical science itself” ([32], p. 43-44). This approach squares well with Hegel’s
notion of objective logic, which inspires Lawvere’s work in categorical logic (4.8). So what I
propose to do with the naive intuitions about identity through time is not to “clarify” them with
some independently designed logical machinery but rather use them for developing a new logical
machinery that could better serve the needs of today’s science. I claim that the relevance of these
pre-theoretical intuitions is measured only by their role in the modern scientific practice but not
by their role in the everyday thinking and in the everyday language. Since the common intuition
about the identity through change apparently continues to play a role in today’s sciences (whether
we are talking about the identity of living organisms or the identity of quantum particles), I take
this notion seriously and believe that in an appropriately mathematized form it should make
part of the scientific logic. Since category theory supports this intuition I consider this theory
as an appropriate mathematical vehicle for it. However I also take into consideration the fact
that the relevance of traditional intuitions in the modern science is very limited, and that in
6For a general logicist critique of foundational pretenses of category theory see [53].
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many important contexts such intuitions are manifestly inadequate and become obstacles for a
further scientific progress (as in quantum physics). So my aim is not to save the old intuitions
by putting them in a new mathematical form (as often do Analytic metaphysicians) but rather
to modify these intuitions with the new mathematics in such a way, which would make them
more adequate to today’s science (see Chapter 7 below). Rather than take the logical notion
of identity as primitive and study its formal properties I want to construe this notion in terms
of some geometrical categories, which qualify as candidates for the objective representation of
space, time and quantity.
Since the general notion of category can hardly qualify as such a candidate the categorical
notion of identity morphism cannot replace the standard logical identity relation. Even if this
replacement makes some sense in the special context described in 6.1 it obviously makes no
sense in other contexts including the context of foundations of category theory. So in order to
push the project forward we need some neater ideas. In fact I have already described one such
idea, namely, Lawvere’s idea of internalization of the equality relation in the categorical logic
(4.5). In the next Section I present a development of this idea in Be´nabou’s work. In (6.9) we
shall see a reappearance of this idea in a geometrical (more precisely, homotopic) interpretation
of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory called homotopy type theory. In homotopy type theory morphisms
of an appropriate category represent the logical notion of identity as it appears in Martin-Lo¨f’s
type theory, which is much richer than the standard one (see 5.11 above).
6.5 Fibred Categories
The following discussion is based on [16] by Jean Be´nabou. The idea is the following. Recall
that categories have been introduced in 6.3 as classes of a certain kind (classes of objects and
morphisms). Which properties of classes are used in such a “naive” category theory? Let category
C be our “object of study” and category B be our “optical instrument” for studying C. B can be
thought of as category S of sets; however we can also consider different possibilities, in particular
abstractly defined toposes. Following Be´nabou I shall call objects of B sets (remembering that
they could be somewhat different than usual sets) and call classes of morphisms or objects of C
families. (In what follows families will reappear as multiplicities of a different sort than classes.)
Now given a set I (an object of B) we may master category C(I) called fiber over I whose
objects and morphisms are families of objects and morphisms of C indexed by elements of I,
that is, families of the form X = {Xi} and f = {fi : Xi → Yi} where i ∈ I. Be´nabou remarks
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that speaking about categories naively we assume more than this, so we cannot just fix some
sufficiently large set I and use it for indexing every time when this is needed. Namely, we also
assume the possibility of re-indexing: given families X = {Xi}, Y = {Yj} in C where i ∈ I, j ∈ J
and morphism u : J → I in B we assume that family of objects Xu(j) and family of morphisms
f = {fj : Yj → Xu(j)} is uniquely defined and “behaves properly”. This allows us to extend
C(I) through introducing new category Fam(C) of families of C where objects are families of
objects of C indexed by different sets and morphisms are pairs of the form (u, f) where u and f
are as just described. Morphisms of the form f = {fi : Xi → Yi} we identify with (idI , f) where
idI is identity morphism of I in B. The composition of morphisms in Fam(C) is defined in the
obvious way. We equipe the construction with projection functor pC which sends every family
of objects of C to the set by which this family is indexed and every morphism (u, f) between
families to morphism u between sets: pC : {Xi} → I, (u, f)→ u.
Now suppose that we know what equality is in Fam(C) and in B but not in C. This implies
that we cannot think of families (of objects and morphisms of C) extensionally as usual. In
particular given a family X = {Xi} where i ∈ I and morphism u : J → I in B we cannot define
another family Y = {Yj} by saying that Yj = Xu(j) because the latter equality doesn’t make
sense for us! Nevertheless we can achieve the same effect through requiring certain properties
of Fam(C) and pC . What we need for it is to characterize morphism φ(u,X) = (u, {idYj}) in
Fam(C) without using equality in C; {idYj} to be the family of identity morphisms of objects
Yj = Xu(j) in C.
Given u : J → I and X = {Xi} φ is characterized up to unique isomorphism by the following
property:
(i): for any morphism ψ = (v, g) with codomain X in Fam(C) and any v′ such that v = v′u in
B there exists in Fam(C) a unique ψ′ such that ψ = ψ′φ and pCψ′ = v′.
In addition morphisms of the form φ = (u, {idYj}) satisfy the functoriality conditions
(ii): φ(u,X) = idX (where idX is the identity morphism of family X), and φ(uv,X) = φ(u,X)φ(v,Y )
for each v : K → J .
Now we use these properties as definition of abstract functor p : F → B called Grothendieck
fibration over B (or fibred category over B) in the case when only the property (i) is taken
into account, and called Grothendieck split fibration over B in the case when in addition for
each pair (X,u : J → p(X)) one makes a particular choice of φ(u,X) called splitting satisfying
the functoriality conditions (ii). Thus equality in a category can be defined as splitting of
fibration over an appropriate base. Noticeably given a fibration its splitting might not exist
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or be not unique. I refer the reader for further details to[16]. Talking about fibrations in
this Section I always mean Grothendieck fibrations. The relationships between this categorical
notion of fibration and the geometrical notion of Hurewicz fibration mentioned in 4.5 above will
be discussed in 6.8.
Be´nabou’s theory of equality in categories allows for regarding objects and morphisms of a given
category as families rather than bold individuals; these families can be occasionally split into
elements through a (split) fibration in different ways dependently of the choice of base. Such
splitting is the inverse operation with respect to the informal identification of isomorphic objects
and morphisms, and unlike the latter it is performed more rigorously and “more categorically”.
This inversion is remarkable : it shows that given the definition of equality through split fibration
families are no longer thought of as extensional multiplicities, that is, as classes. Recall however
that given a fibration p : F → B categories F,B are construed in the usual way and, in particular,
assume the usual equality of morphisms and objects, so the internalized equality relates only to
hypothetical category C such that F = Fam(C). As Be´nabou stresses in the end of his paper
such “meta-equality” is indispensable “unless you do something different from Category theory”.
In the end of this Chapter we shall see that this “something different” is a real option.
6.6 Higher Categories
Given abstract category C consider class Hom(A,B) of morphisms f, g, ... of the form A → B.
Then turnHom(A,B) into a new category formally introducing morphisms of the form α : f → g,
that is, morphisms between morphisms of C:
A
f
&&
g
88
 
 B
Do this for all pairs of objects of C. Observe that morphisms α can be composed in two different
compatible ways shown at the below diagram
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Af
&&
g
88
 
 B
h
&&
i
88
 
 C −→ A
k
&&
l
88
 
 C
where k = fh and l = gi (horizontal composition)
A
f
&&
g
88
 
 B
A
g
&&
h
88
 
 B
↓
A
f
&&
h
88
 
 B
(vertical composition)
Requiring now appropriate equational conditions (which say that certain diagrams commute), we
obtain a 2-category. It comprises objects A,B, ..., morphisms f, g, .. between objects (the same
as in C) called in this context 1-morphisms, and morphisms between morphisms α, β, .. called
2-morphisms. See [166] for precise definitions. (The reason why these definitions are many will
be clear in a moment.) An example of 2-category which has been around from the very beginning
of category theory (even it was not called by this name) is 2-category 2−Cat having (some, for
example, all small) categories as objects, functors between these categories as 1-morphisms and
natural transformations between the functors as 2-morphisms [176].
Let me now explain what 2-categories have to do with the internalization of identity (equality).
Remark that in a 2-category we have not only the usual composition of 1-morphisms but also
functor F : Hom(A,B) ×Hom(B,C) → Hom(A,C) (provided that in category HomC having
Hom-categories of C as objects Cartesian product × is available). On 2-morphisms this functor
acts as their horizontal composition while in Hom-categories 2-morphisms are composed verti-
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cally. If functors of the form F preserve identities in Hom-categories (2-identities) then equalities
in C may be omitted without any lost. This means that we don’t even need to define C as a
category but may think of it as a class of objects and morphisms between these objects, and
then define composition of these morphisms “from above” through functors like F . In this case
one may speak indeed about “replacement of relations by morphisms”: 2-identites from Hom-
categories make in C the job of equalities. The situation here is quite analogous to one we have
seen in fibred categories: at the top “meta-” level of construction (namely in Hom-categories
and in the category HomC of the Hom-categories) one uses the “god-given” equality but at the
bottom level equalities are got rid of.
An apparent difference between the two approaches is this: in higher categories the notion of
class is used at all levels including the lowest one while in fibred categories this notion is used only
at the meta-level while at the lower level classes are replaced by non-extensional families. But
is the assumption that objects of 2-category form a class necessary? Prima facie it is the case.
For in order to compose 2-morphisms α, β in a Hom-category (that is, compose them vertically)
we need to check that domain of α equals codomain of β. So 1-morphisms (objects of Hom-
categories) should form a class of well-distinguishable elements provided with a notion of equality
allowing for distinguishing them). If we take this view then the internalization of equality in
C just described will be only partial: it will apply to equalities of the form fg = h but not to
equalities of the form f = f . However it is easy to get around this point through identification
of 1-morphisms with 2-identities, so all needed equational conditions could be written in terms
of 2-morphisms. Then one may claim that in C “there is no equality”, and hence its elements
don’t need to form a class.
It should be noted that the usual interest of people working in higher category theory is not
internalization of equality as such but weakening of equality, that is, finding a rigorous way of
replacing equalities with certain isomorphisms (see 8.2 below). This approach is quite natural
in the given context since the requirement that functors of the form F preserve all 2-identities
is very strong. Since we are no longer obliged to think of C as a category in the usual sense we
get a room for playing. Instead of imposing on Hom-categories equational conditions implied
by the assumption that C is a category we can use weakened conditions which don’t imply that
2-isomorphisms replacing equalities in C are identities. Such weak 2-categories have been first
introduced by Be´nabou in [15] under the name of bicategories. In bicategories
• (i) the usual associativity law (fg)h = f(gh) is replaced by the requirement of existence
of associativity (2-)isomorphism a : (fg)h → f(gh) (eventually called associator by other
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authors);
• (ii) the usual axioms of identity 1Af = f and f1B = f (for f : A → B is replaced by the
requirement of existence of unit 2-isomorphisms l : 1Af → f and r : f1B → f .
These isomorphisms are subjects of equational conditions called coherence laws, which I shall
not list here, see [167]) where this idea is developed in several different variants.
The notion of 2-category allows for a straightforward geometrical analogy : think of objects as
points, of 1-morphisms as oriented lines, and of 2-morphisms as oriented surfaces bounded by
the lines. Whether we use this analogy (which is quite profound as we shall briefly see) or not
the notion of 2-category calls for the inductive generalization to the notion of n-category for
arbitrary n and further to ω-category (leaving bigger ordinals apart). The strict (meaning non-
weakened) versions of the notions of n- and ω-category look unproblematic : the enrichment of
a given category C bringing the notion of 2-morphism explained in the beginning of this Section
can be easily reformulated as an inductive step bringing the notion of k-morphism provided with
k different kinds of composition. However the notions of weak n- and ω-categories are much less
transparent. There are many alternative definitions of weak n- and ω-categories around ; ten
of them are presented in [166]. A specific obstacle for putting these things into order, which
is not irrelevant to the issue discussed in this paper, is this : it is not immediately clear which
notion of equivalence one should apply to answer the question whether two given definitions of
weak n- category are equivalent or not. In the rest of this Chapter I present a recent geometrical
approach to weak higher categories, which sheds more light on the identity issue.
6.7 Homotopies
The geometrical analogy mentioned in the end of the previous Section can be developed into
a genuine example of n-category and then used for the introduction of this later concept [174].
As we shall now see in such a context the idea of weak identity emerges naturally in the sense
that one gets a weak category first and then needs some further efforts in order to construct a
strict category out of it. This suggests a reverse of the usual conceptual order, which turns the
so-called “weak identity” into the “true” identity and leaves the whole strategy of “weakening
identity” without its usual appeal. We shall also see that this geometrical setting is closely
related (in a sense that will be made precise) to a logical calculus, which allows for discussing the
non-standard notion of identity in precise formal terms. Finally we shall see that the categorical
notion of fibration discussed in 6.5 also plays a crucial role in this setting.
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Consider a topological space T , points A,B, ... of this space and paths f, g, .... between these
point. A path is not to be confused with a curve. While a curve in a space is a subspace of
this space a path in T is a map from a distinguished unit space I into T . Often I is identified
with the real interval [0,1], which can be thought of as the time interval corresponding to motion
beginning at some point A and ending at point B and thus producing path f from A to B. Given
two points A,B there is, generally, many different paths from A to B. Formally these different
paths are represented by different continuous maps of the form f : [0, 1]→ T such that f(0) = A
and f(1) = B (see fig ???). Beware that different curves may represent the same curve: this
happens every time when the corresponding functions f have the same image. Such paths can
be thought as being traced by a moving particle which moves between the same endpoints A,B
along the “same route” during the same time interval [0,1] and differ only in the character of
their motion: for example particle x may move with a constant speed and particle y move faster
than x during a half of the time and slower than x during the other half of the time. So what in
the homotopy theory is called a “path” is indeed a motion, which is equipped with some notion
of “absolute time”, which allows one to localize a given moving particle at a given moment of
time t ∈ [0, 1] at certain point P of the given space T .
Fig. 6.2
Now consider a tentative category P with objects A,B, ... points of T and morphisms paths f, g, ...
between these points. We assume that for every path f : [0, 1] → T , f(0) = A and f(1) = B,
there is the inverse path g : [0, 1]→ T , g(0) = B and g(1) = A, so P is a groupoid. It remains to
define the composition of morphisms and check the axioms. Intuitively the composition of paths
appears unproblematic: given path f from A to B and another path g from B to C one may
easily imagine a composite path h from A to C, where B is a midpoint. However an attempt
of a more rigorous mathematical description reveals a hidden complexity of the situation. By
composing f : [0, 1] → T and g : [0, 1] → T straightforwardly we get a map h∗ of the form
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[0, 2] → T , which is not a path in the sense of our definition. So in order to get h = fg of the
same form h : [0, 1] → T we should do something different. Here the intuitive interpretation of
paths as motions becomes helpful. Remind that [0,1] is the time taken by a continuous motion
from the beginning of a given path to its end. Now we have two such motions - one from A to
B and the other from B to C - each of which takes the same time [0,1]. We want to produce
now a motion from A to C, which takes the same time. Clearly, in order to do this one needs to
move faster!
Fig. 6.3
Mathematically this intuitive idea can be realized as follows. First, we introduce a real variable
t ∈ [0, 1] called in this context a parameter, so that for every value of t f(t) represents a precise
position (i.e. a point) on path f . Path g is treated similarly. One doesn’t need to introduce a
different parameter for g because motions along f and g can be seen as simultaneous, so f(t)
and g(t) represent two different points. However in order to compose f and g one needs to put
these two motions in the right order, and as I have just noticed, the composite motion must have
a different speed. For this purpose we introduce a new parameter t′ = t2 (so the time is halved
and hence the speed gets doubled) and using this new parameter define the composition h = fg
as follows:
h(t′) =
 f(2t
′), 0 ≤ t′ ≤ 12
g(2t′ − 1), 12 < t′ ≤ 1
so t′ ranges from 0 to 1 as required. This trick is called a reparameterization.
The problem is that there are many different reparameterizations, which can be used for this
purpose, and which produce different results. So no particular reparameterization gives us a
general definition of path composition. Obviously the unit interval in h : [0, 1] → T can be cut
not only into the two equal halves but also in any other proportion (so the motion along f may
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become slower and the motion along g become faster). Moreover the reparameterization needs
not to be linear: the speed of motion along either of the two composed paths f, g needs not
to be constant. Generally, the reparameterization amounts to choosing a particular continuous
“scaling map” s : [0, 1] → [0, 2] from the space [0, 2][0,1] of such maps. Each particular choice
of s brings about a new definition of path composition. There is no way to make a “right” (or
as mathematicians say canonical) choice here. In the general situation the composition of paths
can be pictured as follows (Fig. 6.4):
Fig. 6.4
Suppose now that some particular map s : [0, 1]→ [0, 2] is chosen and the composition of paths
h = fg is defined as above. Let s(t) = 2t for simplicity 7. It remains to check whether points
and paths composed according this rule indeed form a category. Identity morphism of a given
point A is defined as map sending each point of [0,1] to A and it is straightforward to check
that it behaves as expected. (Intuitively such identity paths can be thought of as “staying in
rest” at A during the whole time interval [0,1].) However checking the associativity property
reveals a further problem: the composition of paths turns to be not associative. This can be
seen immediately at the below diagram: (fg)h sends the middle point 12 to C while f(gh) sends
1
2 to B, which means that the two composite paths from A to D are different in spite of the
fact that both are represented by the same curve (see Fig. 6.5). So P defined as above is not a
category!
7This is, of course, the same linear reparameterization “by halves” that we used earlier. However then we
thought about it as a function [0, 2]→ [0, 1]. The above diagram shows that the right sense of the scale function
s is [0, 1]→ [0, 2] because it must be composable with (f + g) : [0, 2]→ T . Generally, s needs not to be invertible,
so there can be no function transforming the old parameter into the new one.
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Fig. 6.5
Here we get an important conceptual choice. We may either fix the associativity with an ad-
ditional effort or explore the obtained non-associative structure (which is not a category in the
usual sense of the term). I shall now briefly consider both options; we shall see that the sec-
ond option provides a more general view onto this situation and makes explicit some further
structures, which otherwise “remain hidden”.
(a) Fixing the Associativity
In order to fix the associativity of path composition it is sufficient to redefine our category P
by taking its morphisms to be certain equivalence classes of paths rather than paths themselves.
The appropriate equivalence relation is that of homotopy ; two paths a called homotopic when
there is a homotopy between them. Once again we encounter here a systematic terminological
confusion when one and the same term is commonly used for denoting a relation and a map (see
6.1). The notion of homotopy as a map is as follows: it is a continuous map u : [0, 1]2 → T
(where [0, 1]2 is the real square) such that u(t, 0) = f(t), u(t, 1) = g(t) and u(0, r) = f(0) = g(0),
u(1, r) = f(1) = g(1) for all values of parameters t, r from [0,1]. As we can see a homotopy
between paths can be thought of as a “path between paths” or as a “path of the second order”.
Correspondingly, a path can be described as a “zero-order homotopy”. A homotopy can be
represented with a two-dimensional surface (cell) delimited by a pair of curves representing two
homotopic paths in a way similar to which paths are represented by curves8 (Fig. 6.6):
8In the introductory literature the path homotopy is often also described as a continuous transformation of
one path into another. This is somewhat misleading because such a description doesn’t take into account the role
of the interval [0,1] and suggests thinking about paths as if they were continuous curves. The difference between
a path homotopy and a continuous transformation is similar to that between a path and a curve: a homotopy is
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Fig. 6.6
Now observe that given two composable paths f, g different choices of scale function s always
correspond to homotopic (albite, generally, not equal) compositions h = fg. The homotopy
works in this case as a “reparameterization of reparameterization”, which allows to transform
one given reparameterization into another continuously along a new parameter r ranging over
the interval [0,1]. Since the morphisms of our category are no longer paths but homotopy
classes of paths this observation allows us to define their composition up to homotopy : just as
we no longer distinguish between homotopic paths we shall not distinguish between homotopic
compositions of paths. So the problem is partly fixed: the composition of morphisms is now
defined in our category uniquely. Since for any choice of scale function (fg)h is homotopic to
f(gh) the associativity is fixed too: instead of saying that compositions (fg)h and f(gh) are
homotopic we shall say that they are equal. Thus we get a well-defined category P1 with objects
points of T and morphisms equivalence classes of homotopic paths. This category is called the
fundamental groupoid of given topological space T . By collapsing groupoid P1 into a group
(through identification of all its objects) one gets the more familiar notion of fundamental group
of a topological space9.
(a) Exploring the Non-Associativity
The idea is now the following: instead of forcing the uniqueness and the associativity of path com-
position through the identification of homotopic paths consider path homotopies as 2-morphisms
of a higher category. Since the composition of paths is not unique and not associative the ob-
tained 2-groupoid P2 is weak in the sense of 6.6. However if we want to complete the construction
at this point we still need to fix the composition of 2-morphisms (i.e., the composition of path
homotopies) precisely. This can be done by the trick already used for P1: the path homotopies
not just a transformation but a parameterized transformation or “transformation through time”, where the time
has a particular shape of the unit interval (but can also be of some other specified shape). The representation
of paths by curves is imperfect because different paths can be represented by the same curve. A similar remark
concerns the representation of homotopies by 2-dimensional cells. When different paths are represented by the
same curve the homotopies of these paths are not representable by 2-cells in the usual way.
9There is a very interesting attempt to generalize the usual homotopy theory by allowing for non-invertible
paths; in this case the fundamental category is not necessary a groupoid, see [78].
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proper are replaced by equivalence classes of such homotopies; more precisely, path homotopies
are identified up to homotopy of the next order. Homotopies of the next order are “homotopies
between path homotopies”, i.e., maps of the form [0, 1]3 → T .
Alternatively, we may take yet higher homotopies into consideration and proceed to build the
ladder up until any n and further ad infinitum. (What exactly happens when n tends to infinity is
a tricky question, which I informally discuss in 6.10). The infinite-dimensional (weak) groupoid
(Pω so obtained is called the fundamental ω-groupoid of T . This groupoid was first described
by Grothendieck in a private letter [83] dated by 19.02.1983 and then used by other authors
as a basic motivating example of the very notion of (weak) n-category [167], [174]. The idea
according to which Pω captures all the basic structure of the corresponding topological space T
is called sometimes the Grothendieck conjecture.
Considering the choice between the two above options we can again notice a controversy between
using relations (equivalences), on the one hand, and using transformations, on the other hand,
see 6.1 above. However since we are working now in a general categorical context (rather
than the limited group-theoretic context) the “substantialist” interpretation of transformations
developed in 6.1 becomes, generally, irrelevant. In what follows we shall see how this extended
context allows for a more sophisticated identity concept than the traditional notion of substance
preserving its identity through time and change.
Similar constructions can be made with the category Top of topological spaces (with morphisms
continuous transformations) rather than a single topological space T as above. Two continuous
maps A
f //
g
// B between two spaces A,B from Top are called homotopical when there exist a
homotopy between them. A homotophy h between two continuous maps f, g : A → B in Top
is a continuous map h : A × [0, 1] → B such that h(0) = f and h(1) = g (this later notion of
homotopy generalizes upon the notion of path homotopy explained above). By identifying all
homotopic maps in Top one gets the homotopy category hTop. However one may also consider
homotopies of continuous maps in Top as 2-morphisms. So one gets a two-dimensional version
Top2 of Top. Taking into consideration higher homotopies (i.e., continuous maps of the form
h : A × [0, 1]k → B and proceeding inductively one gets an infinite-dimensional topological
category Topω.
In this latter setting there emerges another important homotopical concept, namely that of
homotopy equivalence, which is more general than the simple notion of being homotopic. Consider
again a pair of topological spaces A,B with two continuous maps, which this time go into the
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opposite directions: A
f //
B
g
oo , and consider compositions fg and gf . Remind that if fg = 1A
and gf = 1B then f and g are called mutually inverse. Now consider a weaker property, namely
the situation when fg is homotopic to 1A and gf is homotopic to 1B (which is tantamount
to saying that there exist homotopies fg × I → 1A and gf × I → 1B). When this latter
condition holds spaces A and B are called homotopy equivalent, or interchangeably, belonging to
the same homotopy type. This definition straightforwardly generalizes (at the price of losing its
concrete geometrical meaning) to general categories by replacing continuous maps by functors
and homotopies by natural equivalences of these functors, i.e., by isomorphisms of these functors,
which are invertible 2-arrows. The obtained equivalence relation between general categories is
called categorical equivalence or equivalence of categories; it has been already mentioned at
several occasions in this book.
6.8 Model Categories
So far we considered the basic homotopy theory as a geometrical motivation of and/or a geo-
metrical underpinning for the higher category theory. Now I want to outline another important
idea that has emerged at the joint of category theory and homotopy theory. So far talking about
homotopies we took the notion of topological space for granted and used it as a foundation of
homotopy theory. We can however ask: What is a general category, which allows for doing
homotopy theory in the same (or similar) way, in which we do it in Top?
What we are now looking for is a categorical axiomatization of the homotopy theory, i.e., a list
of axioms that makes an abstract category to behave like Top with respect to its homotopic
properties (although some reasonable generalization of these properties is also expected). Such
axioms were suggested by Quillen [197] in 1967; the resulting concept is called a model category
(the term is short for “model of homotopy theory”, see [197], p. 3). A model category is an
abstract category with three distinguished classes of morphisms, each closed under composition:
weak equivalences, fibrations and cofibrations. The weak equivalences play the role of general-
ized homotopy equivalences, fibrations are generalized fibrations and the cofibrations are maps,
which are in an appropriate sense dual to fibrations (while fibrations are “homotopic surjec-
tions” cofibrations are “homotopic injections”); morphisms of these three distinguished classes
are the subject of several axioms. The notion of model category proves sufficient for developing
an abstract homotopy theory, which comprises not only classical but also many non-classical
examples and thus turns to be a fruitful generalization of the classical homotopy theory. While
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in the last Section we have shown how the (classical) homotopy theory helps to develop the
higher category theory in concrete geometrical terms, now we are discussing how the (ordinary)
category theory helps to develop the homotopy theory abstractly (which in the given context
means axiomatically). So we have here another case of fruitful dialectical interplay between the
“logical” (axiomatic) and the “geometrical” points of view, which can be compared with the
interplay between logic and geometry in Lawvere’s topos theory (4.9). Quillen’s book of 1967
[197] presents in an axiomatic form geometrical results obtained in and around Grothendieck’s
school in early 1960ies. The notion of fundamental ω-groupoid is first suggested by Grothendieck
in his letter to Quillen [83] written in 1983. (So the order of my exposition in this case is not his-
torical.) In the following two Sections we shall see how this fruitful dialectical interplay between
logic and geometry continues nowadays in the homotopy type theory and how a new theory of
identity emerges in it.
For a modern introduction into the theory of modal categories see Hovey:1999. Here I consider
only Quillen’s key axiom, which expresses in an abstract form the so-called homotopy lifting
property. This property is used for defining (Hurewicz) fibrations in the classical homotopy
theory (see 4.5 above) as follows. Consider in Top a commutative square:
X
f //
1X×0

E
p

X × [0, 1]
h
//
h∗
::
B
where h is a homotopy. Map p is called fibration when for any space X there exist homotopy h∗
(the dotted arrow) making both triangles commute. The idea is that fibrations “lift” homotopies
from the base level “upstairs”; recall from textbf4.5 the example of Mo¨bius strip and observe
that a given fibration may also happen to be a homotopy equivalence.
In Quillen’s axiomatic setting the above property is reformulated and stated as an axiom in the
following abstract form: given a commutative square as below
X //
i

A
p

Y //
>>
B
where i is a cofibration, p is a fibration and at least one of these is also a weak equivalence, there
exists the lifting homotopy shown by the dotted arrow.
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Beware that although the notion of Grothendieck fibration (see 6.5 above) equally involves the
intuitive idea of lifting and equally derives from the canonical example of fibered bundle, its
relation to the notion of Hurewicz fibration used in the classical homotopy theory and in Quillen’s
axiomatic theory of model categories is not straightforward. No known model structure (i.e., the
structure of model category) on CAT (i.e., on “the” category of categories) turns Hurewicz
fibrations into Grothendieck fibrations.
Nevertheless this works in the special case of the canonical model structure on the category Grpd
of groupoids [4], which is the following:
• Weak equivalences are equivalences of categories (see the definition in the last Section);
• Fibrations are isofibrations of groupoids, i.e., functors p : E → B such that for each object
e from E and any isomorphism i : p(e)↔ b from B there exists an isomorphism j : e↔ e′
such that p(j) = i. Any Grothendieck fibration is obviously an isofibration; the converse
does not hold generally but it does hold in the case of groupoids where all morphisms are
isomorphisms;
• Cofibrations are faithful functors between groupoids, i.e., functors injective on objects.
Thus in this canonical model category fibrations (i.e., Hurewicz fibrations construed axiomati-
cally) are also Grothendieck fibrations.
6.9 Homotopy Type Theory
We have considered independently three non-standard identity concepts: one (i) in Martin-Lo¨f’s
intuitionistic type theory (5.11), another (ii) in Be´nabou’s theory of fibred categories (6.5),
and finally one (iii) in the higher category theory and homotopy theory (6.6 - 6.7). All of
these approaches can be seen as different developments of Lawvere’s 1970 insights about the
internalization of the identity relation in the categorical logic and its geometrical realization
([152], see 4.5) although the question about the precise impact of Lawvere’s ideas obviously
requires an accurate historical study in every particular case. In this Section I show how (i)
and (iii) nicely combine together in a recently emerged theory called homotopy type theory10.
(ii) also turns to be relevant to the new theory both technically (as discussed in [249], Section
2.4) and conceptually (see below); however it is, in my view, yet premature to discuss this latter
connection in general philosophical terms.
10This new theory emerged already after the author published an earlier version of this Chapter as a part of
separate paper [207], so this present Section is an update.
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Remind from 4.4 that Martin-Lo¨f’s Intuitionistic Type theory has a category-theoretic model
called Locally Cartesian Closed category (LCCC). Any such model verifies the type-theoretic
Extensionality Axiom (aka Reflection Principle) according to which any propositional equality
IdA(x, y) implies the definitional equality x = y. Since the intensional version of the theory
discussed in 5.11 is described in a merely negative way (as one where the Extensionality Axiom
is not assured) a LCCC, formally speaking, is also a model of the intensional version of Martin-
Lo¨f’s theory. One may wonder, however, whether there exist intensional models of this theory,
i.e., models, which do not verify the Extensionality Axiom.
Using some earlier results, which I shall not treat here (see [230] for further references), Hofmann
and Streicher [116], [117] suggested in 1994 an intensional groupoid model of Martin-Lo¨f’s theory,
where a given basic type A (more precisely: a judgements of the form ` A : type) is groupoid
A, term x of type A ( judgement ` x : A) is object x of groupoid A, and dependent type B(x)
(judgement x : A ` B(x) : type) is fibration of the form B → A. (I abuse here the notation
in the common way by using the same names for type-theoretic syntactic objects and for their
corresponding semantic values.) Identity type IdA(x, y) in this model is the arrow groupoid of
groupoid A, which is a functor category of the form [I, A] where I is the connected groupoid
having exactly two non-identical objects and a single non-identity isomorphism between these
objects. Clearly this model allows groupoid IdA(x, y) to be non-empty when terms (objects) x
and y are not definitionally equal. This shows that the Extensionality Axiom is not verified by
the given model.
For a more precise historical account I would like to reveal the fact that the above summary of
Hofmann and Streicher’s paper [117] is somewhat anachronistic. Although the authors notice
that their “use of the term groupoid is in accordance with homotopy theory” ([117], p. 91)
they don’t consider groupoids as topological fundamental groupoids but treat them as abstract
categories with all morphisms invertible. Instead of talking about fibrations (as I did in the
above summary without specifying the precise sense of the term) they use the notion of family
of groupoids indexed by groupoid developed in [239]. The idea of using families of objects and
morphisms of one category as objects and morphisms of another category is similar to Bn´abou’s
(6.5) but in this case it involves further technicalities related to the purpose of modeling the type-
dependence. The crucial idea of Hofman and Streicher was to replace families of sets indexed
by sets by families of groupoids indexed by groupoids. This also makes an echo of Bn´abou’s
ideas about using some non-standard “sets” for indexing (even if Bn´abou means here some other
toposes rather than Grpd). It is also interesting to observe that since in Grpd Hurewicz fibrations
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are Grothendieck fibrations (6.8) - and since we also know how to describe Hofman&Streicher’s
model in terms of Hurewicz fibrations [9] - thinking about indexed families and fibrations in the
sense of Bn´abou’s [16] turns to be wholly relevant in this context.
In 2006 Voevodsky lectured and circulated an unpublished note On the homotopy λ-calculus
[244] where he described a large research program of studying type systems by homotopical
methods. Independently Awodey&Warren suggested in 2007 (the date of submission of [9]) an
intensional model of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory similar to Hofmann&Streicher’s model but more
abstract and more explicitly homotopical in the sense that it used the setting of the general
model category. Thus Awodey&Warren revealed the homotopical aspect of Hofmann&Streicher’s
groupoid model, and thus contributed by their research to Voevodsky’s program. By the same
pattern Awodey&Warren showed that every model category admits an internal language, which
is a form of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory. This latter result is of great interest for us on its own
rights, because it shows that toposes are not exceptional in their role of joint between geometry
and logic. Figuratively speaking, it shows that the geometrical operation of fibration is just as
significant from a logical point of view as the geometrical operation of sheafification.
A simple way of thinking about Hofmann&Streicher’s groupoid model geometrically is this:
think of given groupoid A (interpreting the corresponding type) as the fundamental groupoid
of some topological space T ; then terms x, y present themselves as points of T and the arrow
groupoid IdA(x, y) is the groupoid of paths (in T ) between points x, y with morphisms path
homotopies. This geometrical viewpoint is not only intuitively appealing but also allows for
a fruitful conceptual reconstruction of the initial groupoid model. As long as we are working
with the usual “flat” groupoids (1-groupoids) A and IdA(x, y) are seen as two different objects.
However as we already know from 6.7 the two things can be naturally made into elements of
the same 2-categorical construction of weak 2-groupoid11. Moreover, we have seen that from
a geometrical point view there is no reason to stop at level 2: given a topological space T
the construction of its fundamental n-groupoids Pn proceeds inductively “up to” the infinite-
dimensional groupoid Pω.
Observe that the flat groupoid model of Hofman&Streicher (or its 2-dimensional presentation)
does not have resources for presenting the structure of higher identity types, i.e., types of the
11In the end of their paper Hofmann&Streicher consider this possibility:
[I]t might be interesting to view equivalent categories as propositionally equal. This, however, would
require “2-level groupoids” in which we have morphisms between morphisms and accordingly the
identity sets are not necessarily discrete. We do not know whether such structures (or even infinite-
level generalizations thereof) can be sensibly organized into a model of type theory. ([117], p. 108)
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form IdIdA(x,y)(x
′, y′) and higher because α, β : IdIdA(x,y)(x
′, y′) implies α = β (definitionally).
Awodey [7] calls this latter property the “extensionality one dimension up” ; a model of inten-
sional type theory having this property interprets the non-trivial structure of first-order identity
types like IdA(x, y) without reducing terms of this type to definitional identities (so it qualifies
as intensional model) but it does reduce (or as mathematicians say truncate) all the hierarchy of
higher identity types. The aforementioned Awodey&Warren’s model[9] has the same unwanted
property. In his dissertation [249] Warren solves this difficulty by extending Hofman&Streicher’s
model to higher dimensions with strict ω-groupoids and expresses the “hope that these construc-
tions can be generalized to yield models using other kinds of higher-dimensional structures such
as, e.g., the weak ω-groupoids of Kapranov and Voevodsky” (p. 5) referring to [131] where the
authors introduce the notion of homotopic ω-groupoid described in 6.7. I shall not try to provide
more details about the current state of the art in this active research area but stress the fact
that homotopy type theory makes precise the idea of construing the notion of identity in terms
of morphisms (paths) rather than relations (see 6.1 and 6.4above). To conclude this Chapter I
turn now to the foundational aspect of Voevodsky’s program.
6.10 Univalent Foundations
The ultimate ambition of Voevodsky’s research program is building new foundations of mathe-
matics, which he calls Univalent Foundations. Here is how Voevodsky describes the purpose of
this new foundations:
The broad motivation behind univalent foundations is a desire to have a system in
which mathematics can be formalized in a manner which is as natural as possible.
Whilst it is possible to encode all of mathematics into Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory,
the manner in which this is done is frequently ugly; worse, when one does so, there
remain many statements of ZF which are mathematically meaningless. This problem
becomes particularly pressing in attempting a computer formalization of mathemat-
ics; in the standard foundations, to write down in full even the most basic definitions
- of isomorphism between sets, or of group structure on a set - requires many pages
of symbols. Univalent foundations seeks to improve on this situation by providing a
system, based on Martin-Lo¨f’s dependent type theory, whose syntax is tightly wedded
to the intended semantical interpretation in the world of everyday mathematics. In
particular, it allows the direct formalization of the world of homotopy types; indeed,
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these are the basic entities dealt with by the system. ([246], p. 7)
In addition to its theoretical aspect this foundational program pursue a practical purpose: to
allow for a systematic use of computer proof-assistants like Coq in the everyday mathematical
practice. The success of this project would make the formalization of mathematical reasoning
useful not only for the purposes of “speculative foundations” (Lawvere) but also for purely
mathematical purposes like proof-checking. The reason why the univalent foundations can be
helpful in this respect is twofold. First, effective proof-assistants including Coq are designed on
the basis of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory or similar formal calculi; in fact the interaction between
the constructive type theory and computer science has been active and very productive from
the early days of both disciplines. Second, the univalent foundations purports to provide the
contemporary everyday mathematics (which is quite unlike the everyday mathematics of early
1900-ies) with a universal language which has a formal aspect (of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory)
and an intuitive geometrical (or more precisely, homotopical) aspect. Proof-assistants like Coq
become a part of the same combination.
Before we discuss some epistemological aspects of this new tentative foundations let me de-
scribe the idea more precisely. To begin with I assume the ω-groupoid homotopic interpretation
of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory as our intended interpretation of this theory, and in Grothendieck’s
spirit identify the ω-groupoids with the corresponding topological spaces (of which these groupoids
are fundamental groupoids). Accordingly, I call types “spaces”, call terms “points”, write
pathsA(x, y) instead of IdA(x, y) (meaning the space of all paths from x to y in the space
A) and so on.
Consider now this inductive definition (see [245]):
• (i) Given space is called A contractible (aka space of h-level 0) when there is point x : A
connected by a path with each point y : A in such a way that all these paths are homotopic.
• (ii) We say that A is a space of h-level n+1 if for all its points x, y path spaces pathsA(x, y)
are of h-level n.
This completes the definition.
Let us look at members of this hierarchy at low levels:
• Level 0: up to homotopy equivalence there is just one contractible space that we call “point”
and denote pt;
• Level 1: up to homotopy equivalence there are two spaces at this level: the empty space ∅
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and the point pt. (For ∅ condition (ii) is satisfied vacuously; for pt (ii) is satisfied because
in pt there exists only one path, which consists of this very point.) We call ∅, pt truth
values; we also refer to types of this level as properties and propositions. Notice that h-
level n corresponds to the logical level n− 1: the propositional logic (i.e., the propositional
segment of our type theory) lives at h-level 1.
• Level 2: Types of this level are characterized by the following property: their path spaces
are either empty or contractible. So such types are disjoint unions of contractible com-
ponents (points), or in other words sets of points. This will be our working notion of set
available in this framework.
• Level 3: Types of this level are characterized by the following property: their path spaces
are sets (up to homotopy equivalence). These are obviously (ordinary flat) groupoids (with
path spaces hom-sets).
• Level 4: Here we get 2-groupoids
•
•
• Level n+2: n-groupoids
•
The above informal definitions are straightforwardly written in the language of type theory; then
one may formally prove some expected simple theorems. Let iscontr(A) and isaprop(A) be
formally constructed types “ A is contractible” and “A is a proposition” (for formal definitions
see [246], p. 8). Then one formally deduces (= further constructs according to the same general
rules) types isaprop(iscontr(A)) and isaprop(isaprop(A)), which are non-empty and thus “hold
true” for each type A; informally these latter types tell us that for all A “A is contractible”
is a proposition and “A is a proposition” is again a proposition. With the same technique
one defines in this setting type weq(A,B) of weak equivalences (i.e., homotopy equivalences)
of given types A,B (as a type of maps e : A → B of appropriate sort) and formally proves
its expected properties. These formal proves involve a different type isweq(A,B) of h-level 2,
which is a proposition saying that A,B are homotopy equivalent, i.e., that type weq(A,B) is
inhabited.)
Remark that the non-trivial homotopic identity (i.e., in Martin-Lo¨f’s terminology the proposi-
tional identity) works so far only for terms of each given type but not for types themselves.
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This means that we still treat the identity of types only as “god-given” (Be´nabou), i.e., def-
initional. However in fact we have already smuggled an intrinsic identity condition for types
when we reasoned above about these types (under the name of “spaces”) up to homotopy equiv-
alence: this condition is, of course, the homotopy equivalence itself. If we simply replace types
by equivalence classes of types in the usual way then we immediately fall back into the circle of
classical foundational problems about classes and relations, which we have discussed in Chapter
5. And we also abandon in this case at this basic level of our construction the geometrical
view according to which sets and classes are homotopy types of special sort (of h-level 2). This
is why Voevodsky suggests here a different solution. Consider “big” type U (for “universe”)
of all “small” types A,B, ... As terms of U the small types can be compared by path spaces
pathsU (A,B). Since the small types include equivalence types weq(A,B) we can now produce
map θ : pathsU (A,B) → weq(A,B), which tells us that propositionally identical types are ho-
motopy equivalent. We want however to have also the inverse map, which would allow us to see
homotopy equivalent types as identical. For this reason (and some other reasons, which I leave
aside) Voevodsky introduces at this point the axiom of univalence, according to which for all
types A,B the above map θ is itself a (homotopy) equivalence. Informally Voevodsky states this
axiom (which gives the Univalent Foundations its brand name) as follows:
[T]he homotopy theory of the types in the universe should be fully and faithfully
reflected by the equality on the universe. [246], p. 8)
The axiom of univalence is the only geometrically motivated principle, with which Voevodsky
extends Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory. Given this axioms the interchangeable terms “type” and
“space” can be also interchanged with the term “homotopy type”. Thus in Voevodsky’s univalent
foundations homotopy types turn to be the elementary bricks for constructing the whole of the
mathematical universe including its logic. (The axiom of univalence also has more specific non-
trivial consequences, which I shall not consider here.)
Let us now compare Voevodsky’s style of formalization with the standard Hilbert-style formal-
ization. In both cases we have a symbolic syntax and an interpretation of this syntax but
the relationships between the syntax and its interpretation is not the same. Remind from 2.4
that in Hilbert’s case the interpretation works separately for logical and non-logical symbols:
while the semantic of logical symbols is fixed the semantic of non-logical symbols is variable.
In Voevodsky’s case we also make difference between the symbolic syntax of type theory and
the geometrical interpretation of this syntax (even if Voevodsky’s strategy is to merge the two
things as close as possible). However Voevodsky’s approach does not involve the same difference
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between logical and non-logical symbols: on his account the same symbols and the same con-
structions are interpreted both in logical and geometrical terms 12; in particular, in the univalent
setting propositions are objects (of h-level 1) among other mathematical rather than some sort
of Fregean metaphysical eternal entities, which live in a separate domain. In other words logic
in this setting is wholly internalized.
This sheds a new interesting light on Hilbert’s distinction between the real and the ideal, and
actually on the whole of Formal Axiomatic Method. In his lecture Voevodsky [245] criticizes the
standard set-theoretic foundations by saying that such foundations require a reconstruction of
types of all h-levels from types of one particular h-level (namely, from types of h-level 2, i.e.,
sets) while his novel approach allows one to reach types of all levels directly. I think that a
similar critical argument can and should be made with respect to the “logical” h-level 1; in this
case the critique touches upon the Formal Axiomatic Method itself rather than only upon the
idea of using sets in foundations. Observe that Hilbert’s mathematical world in fact comprises
three kinds of entities: (1) “real” finite strings of symbols; (2) propositions and (3) “ideal”
mathematical objects (that is, all mathematical objects except finite strings of symbols). It
doesn’t matter whether propositions count as real or ideal on this account; what does matter
is that fact that propositions serve here as the only joint between (1) and (3), i.e., between the
real and the ideal. Remind Hilbert’s idea: any well-formed string of symbols, which represents
a system of consistent propositions, determines some ideal mathematical object (or, typically, a
system of such objects), which makes all these propositions true. Think of Hilbert’s axioms for
Euclidean geometry and the Euclidean space (however represented). Thus with the exception of
the limited domain of finitary combinatorial objects HIlbert’s Axiomatic Method is a method of
putting every mathematical theory into a propositional form. This propositional reductionism
is a tenet of what I have called above the mathematical logicism in the broad sense, and it is
technically built into Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method. Now in Voevodsky’s vein I remark that
propositions form just one particular level of the infinite hierarchy of homotopy types (namely,
the h-level 1), and that the propositional reductionism is both unreasonable and unnecessary.
In any event this propositional reductionism does not make part of Voevodsky’s approach. This
feature makes Voevodsky’s Axiomatic Method quite unlike Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method. In
Chapter 9 I generalize upon Lawvere’s and Voevodsky’s approaches to axiomatization, suggest
on this basis a general description of New Axiomatic Method and contrast this new method to
Hilbert’s method.
12In his lecture [245] Voevodsky says that “logic concerns the h-level 1 because this is where the truth values
live” (min. 12 of the recording). This, in my sense, must be understood in the sense that logic necessarily involves
objects of the h-level 1 (since it uses truth values) but not in the sense that it concerns only types of this level.
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Lawvere’s tripartition Formal - Conceptual - Semantic [126] suggests thinking about the ho-
motopic interpretation of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory as the “conceptual layer” of this theory; in
that sense Voevodsky’s univalent foundations can be described as a conceptual foundations. To
extend this Lawverian perspective on homotopy type theory it seems me also appropriate to
consider this theory as a form of objective logic in Hegel&Lawvere’s sense. The fact that the
homotopy type theory can arguably serve as a foundation of today’s everyday mathematics is a
strong argument in favor of its objectivity. However as I have already argued in 6.4 a further
test of objectivity involves testing the relevance of this system of logic in natural sciences. I
conclude this Chapter with some preliminary remarks, which suggest that this crucial test may
be positive.
Remind from 5.11 the discussion about the relevance of identity types of Martin-Lo¨f’s type
theory in empirical contexts, and in particular in Frege’s Venus example. I argued then that
type IdP (MS,ES) provides an adequate logical form of a proposition stating that the Morning
Star and the Evening Star are the same planet Venus; term e of this type is an evidence (aka
proof) that the proposition is true. Let us now reconsider this example using the homotopical
interpretation of identity types as path groupoids. This interpretation tells us how evidence e
should look like: it is a continuous path from MS to ES. Surprisingly this is exactly what the
naive intuition about objects enduring through time suggests: given such a path between MS
and ES we qualify these two things as two different appearances of the same thing! (Let me for
simplicity limit now the time of observations by 24 hours.) Even if one cannot observe the whole
of this path directly one should find other theoretical and empirical reasons of its existence. For
the existence of such a path constitutes the very meaning of the claim that MS and ES are
the same object (Fig. 6.7). As we see the homotopy interpretation of identity types performs
really well against this basic notion of identity through time, which is responsible for identity of
particles in the classical mechanics and by an extension also in the classical astronomy, biology
and many other areas of science.
Fig. 6.7
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The classical mechanical setting, which we have just considered, implicitly assumes the “exten-
sionality one dimension up” and leaves no place for path homotopies. However in the spacetime of
General Relativity path homotopies become relevant. Consider the phenomenon of gravitational
lensing : a remote light source S is placed behind massive galaxy G with respect to the observer
O; the galaxy bends the light rays in such a way that the observer sees two “false images” S′, S′′
of the source (Fig. 6.8).
Fig. 6.8
In order to identify the source S, i.e., to prove that S′ and S′′ is one and the same object,
it is not sufficient to trace paths (i.e., light rays) p1, p2 between the observer and the source
but it is sufficient to prove that p1, p2 are homotopic (by performing some actual homotopy or
otherwise). However this latter condition is not necessary. What happens when the galaxy is
replaced by a spacetime wormhole W? Under some realistic conditions the lensing effect persists.
But paths p1, p2 are no longer homotopic, and so we get in this case a different path groupoid
(Fig.6.9).
Fig. 6.9
It is known that in the quantum field theory homotopical effects have a bearing on the statistics of
particles [232], and that different statistics are naturally interpreted in terms of different identity
conditions of particles [67]. This suggests that homotopies in the spacetime of general relativity
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we may have similar effects, so that the replacement of G by W may have a bearing on the identity
types of the light source. (In our toy model the corresponding identity types are different but it
remains unknown whether this difference accounts for any real physical effect.) These, of course,
are bold speculations, which cannot prove anything. However they suggest, in my view, a sound
research strategy. Considering the fact that in the past important breakthroughs in science
always involved (albeit never reduced to) a renewal of mathematics at the foundational level I
assume that such a renewal will necessarily make part of a substantial scientific progress in the
future. Since genuinely original foundational proposal in mathematics are rare, I believe that
each one deserves an empirical test. Even if Lobachevsky’s attempt to apply his new geometry
to the real physical space did not bring immediately any valuable physical result, it established
an epistemic strategy, which proved successful later.
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Conclusion of Part 2
We have seen that category theory provides a new and genuinely original mathematical treatment
of the identity concept. If one needs to describe this new approach to identity with a single word
then, I think, the right word is “internalization”. The strategy of internalization of identity can
be described as follows: instead of assuming after Frege that the identity concept must be fixed
before one begins doing mathematics, try to reconstruct this concept within mathematics using
all appropriate means; after performing such a bootstrap think how to make the newly designed
identity concept self-standing by trying to get rid of any pre-established “external” notion of
identity in the foundations of your science.
In the category theory such an approach to identity was initiated by Lawvere in 1970 [152].
Independently, and wholly outside category theory, Martin-Lo¨f developed in early 1980ies his
version of type theory [183] where he also treated the identity concept internally. The complexity
of the identity concept in Martin-Lo¨f’s theory was not designed in purpose but was discovered
later by Hofman and Streicher [117] who refuted the so-called Uniqueness of Identity Proof
conjecture (aka UIP conjecture) according to which axioms of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory allegedly
implied that all identity types are simple in the following sense: given two proofs p1, p2 : IdA(x, y)
there is always a proof t : IdIdA(x,y)(p1, p2) showing that p1, p2 are identical. So it is fair to say
that the intrinsic complexity of Martin-Lo¨f’s identity types was discovered rather than put there
by hand. From the retrospect it is clear that since type-theoretic considerations were also behind
Lawvere’s ideas about identity the two lines of research had to meet at some point. But when
this really happened several years ago it was quite surprising anyway.
In Chapter 5 I tried to sketch the history of thinking about identity and equality in mathematics
(without following the historical order of events) paying a special attention to the view, which
has emerged in the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. In the following
Chapter 6 I showed how the identity concept is treated in category theory. Two things seem
me clear: first, that the new categorical approaches to identity are philosophically relevant (and
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sometimes also strongly philosophically motivated) and, second, that the standard Frege-Russell’s
view on identity is not adequate to these new approaches. We have seen that the contemporary
mathematics played a crucial role in Frege’s and Russell’s then-new thinking about identity:
these philosophers improved on the traditional logic with new mathematical concepts (like that
of function) and, reciprocally, tried to improve on their contemporary mathematics with a new
logical regimentation. It appears to me that the first part of this project was by far more
fruitful. Having this in mind I tried in Chapter 6 to learn some philosophical lessons from recent
mathematical theories about identity rather than impose any particular philosophical agenda
upon mathematics. Nevertheless I believe that in a longer run such philosophical lessons may
have a feedback effect. The main philosophical lesson about the identity concept that I have
learnt from the categorical logic in general, and the homotopy type theory, in particular, is this:
the identity concept (as well as other basic logical notions) must be thought of on equal footing
with all other scientific concepts but not as a prerequisite for doing science.
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Part III
Subjective Intuitions and
Objective Structures
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Chapter 7
How Mathematical Concepts Get
Their Bodies
7.1 Changing Intuition
By Kant’s popular word “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are
blind” Critique of Pure Reason (B75). In 1.3 we have seen how this general claim applies to
Euclid’s geometry, that is, how exactly concepts and intuitions work here closely together. In
this Chapter I consider a question that Kant himself never systematically studied, namely the
question of how mathematics develops. It is obvious that mathematical concepts change through
time: some of them change their content preserving the name (and something like “general
idea”), some new mathematical concepts regularly emerge and some old concepts stop growing
and die off. Today’s philosophers of mathematics like biologists of the 18th century still often
replace a study of living populations by a study of dead specimen preserved with some special
techniques. But even if the evolutionary view in the philosophy of mathematics is not common
the phenomenon of conceptual change in mathematics is so evident that nobody can deny its
very existence.
What about mathematical intuitions? Do mathematical intuitions change along with mathe-
matical concepts or not? This question does not have a similar obvious answer. For one thing
it is not clear how one may notice an intuitive change if any. (Hereafter I use the expression
“intuitive change” formed by analogy with the established expression “conceptual change” in the
sense of changing intuition, not in the sense of change, which has an intuitive meaning or has
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some other special relation to intuition.) Indeed, the emergence of a new concept or a change of
content of some earlier existing concept can be precisely described on the basis of textual and
other relevant symbolic evidences, in particular, by comparing the corresponding mathematical
definitions. But how one can possibly access and study raw intuitions? One may even argue
that the notion raw intuition is ill-formed because if such a thing would exist it could not be
rationally known.
In addition to this general epistemological difficulty there are two more specific reasons why the
issue of intuitive change in mathematics has been never systematically studied, so that the very
existence of such a phenomenon remains questionable. One reason has to do with some interpre-
tations of Kant’s philosophy, according to which mathematical intuitions are somehow wired into
our brain and cannot possibly change without making a change in our biological constitution as
homo sapiens. The other reason is related to the former. Since throughout the 19th century
mathematical concepts manifestly changed, and since the new changed concepts were no longer
compatible with older intuitions, some philosophers including Russell convinced themselves and
tried to convince other people that Kant was altogether wrong about the fundamental role of
intuition in mathematics; they developed a new philosophy of mathematics, which didn’t reserve
for intuition any significant epistemic role. The influence of this philosophy, which in the previ-
ous Chapters I called mathematical logicism, is also a reason why the phenomenon of intuitive
change in mathematics remains largely unnoticed by philosophers.
In this Chapter I shall not try to develop a systematics philosophical critique of Kant’s and Rus-
sell’s views on mathematics but instead try to demonstrate at some historical examples that the
intuitive change in mathematics is a real historical phenomenon. My general picture is this. In
the beginning of the 20th century many people overdramatized new tendencies in mathematics
and convinced themselves that mathematics during several decades wholly changed its nature.
I don’t believe that such a radical change really happened. A broader historical outlook shows
that mathematics develops both through the invention of new concepts and the invention of new
intuitions. However it often happens that one of these parallel developments goes ahead the
other. When the intuitive development goes ahead mathematics is full of poorly conceptualized
intuitions and so mathematicians work on their conceptualization. When the conceptual devel-
opment goes ahead mathematics is full of poorly intuited concepts and mathematicians work
on building the appropriate intuitions. Both kind of situations may co-exist in the historical
time. However in a given historical period (and in a given mathematical community) situations
of one of these two sorts may dominate. In other words, in the real history of mathematics we
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find a dialectical interplay between conceptual and intuitive developments rather than the stable
Kantian harmony1. The first half of the 20-th century was the time when the concept-building
clearly dominated over the building of new intuitions. The development of new intuitions was
not wholly suppressed but it became a prerogative of a narrow circle of creative mathematicians
who invented new mathematical concepts and solved with them real mathematical problems;
the rest of the community received these concepts mostly in the sterilized form of formal and
quasi-formal (like in Bourbaki’s case) axiomatic theories. Hence the popular thesis about the
abstract character of the new mathematics. However already in the second half of the 20th
century this general tendency began to change; the homotopic approach in the category theory
described in 6.9 is just one evidence of this change among many others. Thus I claim that the
tendency towards a “higher abstraction” of the 20th century mathematics is nothing but a local
effect comparable with similar tendencies taking place in other historical periods (see below); it
does not represent a global tendency in the historical development of mathematics.
Before I substantiate this controversial claim with some historical evidences let me make two
methodological points. First, I should answer the question “How one can study raw intuitions?”.
My answer is that one can not study raw intuitions just one cannot study bare concepts whatever
this might mean. Here I am wholly with Kant. What one, however, can do is to reconstruct
the historical dialectics of concepts and intuitions and specify some situations when “intuitions
go ahead” and some other situations when “concepts go ahead”. I’m not going to represent
here in this way the overall history of mathematics but I shall demonstrate what I have in
mind with several examples. Second, I should say more precisely what I mean by intuition.
I borrow my basic notion of mathematical intuition from Kant - both in the sense of Kant’s
Transcendental Aesthetics and in the sense of Kant’s Doctrine of Method (see 1.3 above). One
may argue that Kant’s notion of intuition does not make sense outside the mathematical context,
which Kant had in mind when he developed this notion. I cannot see why this can be true. As
far as I can see in an appropriately generalized form Kant’s notion of mathematical intuition
applies to mathematics throughout its history. The following historical examples demonstrate
this secondary claim too.
1In fact Kant himself did not describe the relationships between concepts and intuitions as a perfect harmony.
His notion of regulative idea accounts for the situation when “the concepts go ahead”. However Kant did not
treat the question of historical development of mathematics systematically.
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7.2 Form and Motion
It is a truism that in the geometrical Books of his Elements Euclid develops a systematic the-
ory. It is perhaps less obvious that this systematic approach concerns not only geometrical
concepts but also geometrical intuitions. The intuitive geometrical content of Euclid’s Elements
is organized as follows. It comprises
• primitive intuitions corresponding to concepts of point, straight line and circle;
• complex intuitions built with the primitive intuitions. Such combination of primitive in-
tuitions is colloquially called a “construction by ruler and compass”. In Euclid’s Elements
such constructions are regulated by Postulates 1-3 (see 1.4).
Constructions by ruler and compass allow for an intuitive grasp on complex geometrical configu-
rations, which cannot be so grasped immediately. It is not uncommon in the literature to identify
the notion of intuition with a primitive immediate intuition but this restriction is not justified.
Mathematics in general and geometry in particular requires complex intuitions as well as com-
plex concepts. Let me demonstrate the notion of complex intuition with an example. Think of
a regular 1024-gon (polygon with 1024 sides) and proceed as follows. Inscribe a square into a
circle. Then by halving angles between diagonals of the square construct an octagon inscribed
into the same circle as shown at the below diagram (fig 7.1).
Fig. 7.1
Then halve the angles between all the neighboring diagonals of the octagon, get 16-gon and repeat
the same procedure 5 more times. (I leave obvious details of this construction to the reader.)
Although the resulting figure cannot be grasped immediately it is now intuitively grasped through
the above procedure, which involves only a few primitive geometrical intuitions. In addition to
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these primitive geometrical intuitions it involves an intuition lying behind the very notion of
procedure and, more specifically, behind the idea of iteration. This latter intuition is temporal
rather than spatial. The construction of 1024-gon also involves some basic arithmetical intuitions,
which allow one to calculate powers of 2.
A chiligon (1000-gon) is often referred to (after Descartes) as an example of geometrical object,
which can be thought of but cannot be imagined. The above example shows that the big number
of sides of a polygon does not always make an intuitive grasp impossible. However the method
of intuitive grasping used in this example does not work for the chiligon because it cannot be
constructed by ruler and compass. A similar difficulty concerns a regular heptagon, doubled cube
and many other relatively simple geometrical concepts. This difficulty shows that the intuitive
and the conceptual legs of Euclid’s geometry don’t always match each other as expected2.
The problem was actually twofold. On the one hand, Greek geometers came across a number of
geometrical concepts, which they couldn’t provide with an intuitive support by standard means,
i.e. by performing a construction by ruler and compass. On the other hand, they produced
a number of intuitively appealing constructions by other means than ruler and compass but
didn’t know how to treat them theoretically; I am talking about a cycloid, a spiral and other
so-called mechanical curves. (Unlike the circle such curves could not be described without
referring to a mechanical setting.) Thus they got a number of problematic cases some of which
could be described as poorly intuited concepts while some other could be described as poorly
conceptualized intuitions. They applied mechanical curves for solving problems unsolvable by
ruler and compass; such solutions pointed to new ways of matching concepts with intuitions.
However they didn’t develop any alternative systematic theory which could compete with the
standard theory based on ruler and compass.
This situation changed significantly only in the Early Modern times. At this point of history the
ancient notion of primitive geometrical form lost its earlier appeal, and the idea of construction by
ruler and compass was already commonly seen as a pure convention like today. In his Geometry
of 1637 [41] Descartes describes an alternative instrument (sometimes called Cartesian compass)
able to produce a large variety of curves other than circles; he argues that constructions made
with this new mechanism and the traditional ruler should be treated on equal footing with
traditional constructions by ruler and (standard) compass3 . The Cartesian compass is, of
2As it has been first conjectured by Gauss and proved in 1837 by Wantzel [248] a regular polygon is constructible
by ruler and compass if and only if its number of sides is a product of a power of 2 and a Fermat prime. Fermat
primes are primes of the form 22
n
+ 1 where n is a positive integer.
3Descartes does not give up the ancient distinction between mechanical and (properly) geometrical curves
altogether but changes its sense: on Descartes’ account only non-algebraic curves qualify as mechanical. Following
the ancient pattern Descartes claims that such mechanical curves do not belong to the subject-matter of pure
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course, only a by-product of the Early Modern reform of mathematics but it well illustrates
the fact that mechanical intuitions, which remained in Greek geometry marginal, in the new
geometry became central.
In the beginning of his Geometrical Lectures of 1735 [13] Barrow claims that all geometrical ob-
jects are ultimately generated by motion. Although today we can describe Euclid’s and Barrow’s
geometrical universes by the same term “Euclidean space” Barrow’s universe is a great extension
of Euclid’s universe. Curves produced by arbitrary continuous motions were somehow “around”
in Euclid’s universe but they did not belong to it properly. Obviously in order to treat such
curves mathematically Barrow, Newton and other people had to invent a wholly new conceptual
apparatus. But they also had to clarify the geometrical intuitions that fitted the new conceptual
apparatus. This new geometrical intuition no longer supports the view on geometrical objects
as combinations of primitive forms but supports the view on geometrical objects as traces of
continuous motions.
7.3 Non-Euclidean Intuition
The invention of Non-Euclidean geometries in 19th century is often referred as a crucial moment
of history when geometry lost its traditional link with empirical spatial intuitions. But this
view is plainly wrong. This invention involved the development of new spatial intuitions, not
abandoning of spatial intuitions altogether. The idea to cut geometry from spatial intuitions came
about later, in the very end of 19th century. It soon developed into a powerful trend, which we
have discussed in Chapter 2. The biased view on the 19th century geometry mentioned in the
beginning of this paragraph is a by-product of this later trend 4.
geometry. However this ban of transcendental curves was hardly ever respected in Modern mathematics.
4After explaining the basics of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method in a college-level textbook its author writes [82]
The formalist viewpoint just stated is a radical departure from the older notion that mathematics
asserts “absolute truths”, a notion that was destroyed once and for all by the discovery of Non-
Euclidean geometry. This discovery has had a liberating effect on mathematics, who now feel free
to invent any set of axioms they wish and deduce conclusions from them. In fact this freedom may
account for the great increase in the scope and generality of modern mathematics. (p. ??)
Leaving aside the issue of mathematical truth I would like only to stress that Greenberg’s account of events is
wrong historically. Although it is not unreasonable to consider the “discovery of Non-Euclidean geometry” as
a historical cause, which gave rise to the Formal Axiomatic Method, there is a historical distance of at least 40
years between these events (I count from Lobachevsky’s German publication of 1840 [171] to Pasch’s Foundations
of New Geometry of 1882 [193], which was the most important predecessor of influential Hilbert’s Foundations of
1899 [109] One may suggest that during this period of time the new geometry remained in an obscure state, so that
before Pash and Hilbert treated it axiomatically nobody could make good sense of it. This is again historically
false: there were a lot of important work in the new geometry during this period, which include Riemann’s
pathbreaking generalization [204] and Klein’s synthesis [133], [135] that gave to Lobachevsky’s geometry its
modern name “hyperbolic”. If these argument are not convincing for one who believes that the Hilbert-style
axiomatization is the only way to make a mathematical theory reasonable, I may remark that my opponent
should apply this principle also to the Euclidean geometry. This view implies that the Euclidean geometry was
in an obscure state before Hilbert too.
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It is well-known that the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries was a result of long attempts
to prove Euclid’s 5th Postulate: failing to get a reductio ad absurdum of the negation of this
Postulate some people guessed that they were exploring a new vast territory rather than approach
the expected dead end. But why did the 5th Postulate attract so much attention to begin
with? An obvious answer is that 5th Postulate does not have the same intuitive appeal as
other Euclid’s first principles; this is why since Antiquity this Postulate was widely seen as
problematic. This remark shows that the often repeated claim that the human “natural” spatial
intuition is intrinsically Euclidean does not stand against obvious historical evidence. Were
this true geometers would always take the 5th Postulate as a self-evident principle along with
other Euclid’s Postulates and Axioms and wouldn’t spent significant efforts trying to prove this
particular Postulate on the basis of other principles. It was the mathematical education rather
than human nature that later made the majority of people to take the Euclidean intuition for
granted, so only the tiny minority of experts could still see and address the problem.
Today Lobachevsky’s hyperbolic geometry is usually taught in a Hilbert-style axiomatic form pro-
vided with some models including Beltrami pseudosphere model, Klein disc model and Poincare´
semisphere model [82]. I recognize that this axiomatic presentation of geometry has certain
merits; in any event it provides a pattern of axiomatic thinking, which is crucially important
for the 20th century mathematics. However such a presentation of hyperbolic geometry sug-
gests a wrong idea that there are only these two conceptions of this geometrical theory: one
purely formal and the other one interpreted with one of the aforementioned models. I claim
that there is yet another way of thinking about the hyperbolic geometry, which is Lobachevsky’s
own. Lobachevsky associates geometrical intuitions to geometrical concepts directly in the same
way in which anyone does this when one studies Euclidean geometry. Since Lobachevsky thinks
about his new geometry as a generalization of the traditional geometry rather than as a separate
theory 5 his geometrical intuition (which I call hyperbolic) is an extension of the Euclidean intu-
ition rather than a wholly new type of geometrical representation. I stress this point in order to
confront the widespread philosophical myth according to which the invention of Non-Euclidean
geometry required an abrupt departure from the “usual” geometrical intuition. In what follows I
demonstrate Lobachevsky’s hyperbolic intuition at work (after [171]); I treat Lobachevsky’s case
more attentively than other historical cases considered in this Chapter because of its importance
5Here is an explicit statement:
The principle conclusion, to which I arrived .... was the possibility of Geometry in a broader sense
than it has been [earlier] presented by Euclid the Founder. This extended notion of this science [=of
Geometry] I call Imaginary Geometry; Usual [=Euclidean] Geometry is included in it as a particular
case. ([172], Introduction, my translation from Russian)
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for the history of the Axiomatic Method.
Instead of Euclid’s Fifth Postulate (P5) Lobachevsky uses the Axiom of Parallels (AP, aka
Playfair Axiom) known to be equivalent to P5 since the Antiquity:
(AP) Given a line and a point outside this line there is unique other line which is
parallel to the given line and passes through the given point.
Here the term “parallels” stands as usual for straight lines having no common points. We
shall shortly see how Lobachevsky changes this Euclidean terminology. For a terminological
convenience I shall call a given straight line secant of another given straight line when the two
lines intersect (in a single point). Let’s now make the required construction and see what the
intuition shows about it. Although the intuition does not show whether AP is true or not it
shows several other important things (all of which can be proved from Euclid’s first principles
without using P5 unless it is explicitly stated otherwise):
• (i) Parallel lines exist (unlike round squares); moreover through each given point P outside
any given straight line l passes at least one parallel line m.
• (ii) Given a straight line and point P outside this line there exist secants of the given line
passing through the given point. To construct a secant take any point of the given line and
connect it to the given point outside this line.
• (iii) Let PS be perpendicular to l and A be a point of l. Consider a straight line PR
such that angle SPR is a proper part of angle SPA (and hence is less than angle SPA).
I shall call line PR lower than line PA and call PA upper than PR). Beware that this
definition involves the perpendicular PS, and so depends on the choice of P . Then PR
intersects l in some point B, i.e. it is a secant. Thus a line, which is lower than a given
secant, also is a secant (Fig.7.2). (In order to prove (iii) rigorously one needs Pasch’s axiom
which Lobachevsky never mentions but often uses tacitly. This axiom first introduced in
[193] reads: Given a triangle and a straight line intersecting one of the triangle’s sides
but passing through none of the triangle’s apexes the given line intersects one of the two
other sides of the given triangle. To apply this axiom to the given case one needs a simple
additional construction that I leave to the reader.
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Fig.7.2
• (iv) There exist no upper bound for secants of a given line passing through a given point
outside this given line. For given some secant PA one can always take a further point C
such that A will lay between S and C and so secant PC be upper than the given secant
PA (Fig. 7.2).
• (v) Let m be parallel to l , which is constructed as in (i). Let n be another parallel to l
passing through the same point P . Suppose that n is lower than m (obviously this condition
doesn’t restrict the generality). Then any straight line which is upper than n and lower
than m is also parallel to l (Fig. 7.3)
Fig. 7.3
• (vi) Parallels to a given straight line passing through a given point have a lower bound.
(In order to prove this rigorously one needs some continuity principle like one asserting the
existence of Dedekind cuts. Lobachevsky doesn’t state such a principle explicitly.
• (vii) Any straight line PA- a secant or a parallel - passing through point P as shown at
Fig. 2 is wholly characterized by its characteristic angle SPA. In particular this concerns
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the lowest parallel mentioned in (vi). Let the measure of SPA corresponding to the case of
the lowest parallel be α. Now it is clear that by an appropriate choice of l and P one can
make α as close to pi/2 as one wishes. For given any angle SPA < pi/2 it is always possible
to drop perpendicular AT on PS (Fig. 7.4). Then PA is a secant of AT and so by (iii)
all parallels to AT including its lowest parallels are upper than PA. Hence the value of α
corresponding to straight line AT and point P outside this line is between SPA and pi/2.
Since the only variable parameter of the configuration is the distance d between the given
straight line and the given point outside this line the angle α is wholly determined by this
distance.
Fig. 7.4
Propositions (i - vii) provide an intuitive basis for Lobachevsky’s geometry (see [170], propositions
7, 16, 21). Then he proceeds as follows. First, he makes a terminological change: he calls
“parallels” (not just non-intersecting straight lines but) the two boundary lines which separate
secants from non-secants (i.e. parallels in the usual terminology) passing through a given point.
So in Lobachevsky’s terms there exist exactly two parallels to a given straight lines passing
through a given point, which may eventually coincide if AP holds (i.e. in the Euclidean case). For
further references I shall call these two parallels right and left (remembering that this assignment
of parity is arbitrary). Since Lobachevsky’s definition of parallels involves the choice of P it is
not immediately clear that the parallelism so defined is an equivalence. So Lobachevsky must
show that the property of being parallel (in his new sense) to a given straight line is independent
of this choice ([170], proposition 17), and that the relation of being parallel is symmetric and
transitive (while reflexivity is taken for granted by the usual convention) ([170], propositions 18,
25). For the obvious reason the transitivity applies here only for parallels of the same orientation,
i.e., separately for right and for left parallels. Lobachevsky provides the required proofs making
them in the traditional synthetic Euclid-style manner. Then Lobachevsky proves some further
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properties of parallels, in particular the fact that the angle α characterizing a parallel (see (vii)
above) can be made however close to pi/2 and however close to zero ([170], proposition 23). This
immediately implies that if AP does not hold then given an angle ABC, however small, there
always exist a straight line l laying wholly inside this angle and intersecting none of its two sides
(Fig. 7.5). This is already by far more counterintuitive than (i-vii) but still not counterintuitive
enough to rule out this construction as absurd and on this ground to claim a proof of AP.
Fig. 7.5
It is appropriate to notice that the above elementary intuitive considerations were known to
people working on the Problem of Parallels long before Lobachevsky (see [20]). So the hyperbolic
intuition has been actually developed (in the minds of very few intelligent people) long before
the official birth of Non-Euclidean geometry. Lobachevsky first managed to conceptualize these
intuitions (without leaving them out!) in a way that allowed him to develop on this basis a sound
mathematical theory. I provide some further details in 8.8 below.
Let me now briefly mention another important intuitive change occurred in the 19th century
geometry, which is related to the new concept of geometrical space put forward in 1854 by
Riemann [205] on the basis of earlier geometrical works by Gauss [70]; see [20] for historical
details. Today this concept of space is known as Riemanian manifold ; besides its importance
in the pure mathematics it plays an important role in the contemporary physics by providing
the mathematical foundation for the theory of General Relativity, which remains to the date the
best available theory of physical spacetime. The concept of Riemanean manifold needs a special
discussion that I cannot include here; although without this concept the corresponding intuition
cannot be properly communicated I nevertheless provide below its very rough description.
One may get a sense of the Riemanian intuition through the experience which once led Gauss
to his geometrical discoveries: move around in a hilly environment and try to forget about the
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third dimension (which is not particularly difficult when the explored territory is sufficiently
large). If you need to reach a destination, which is only few feet away, and ask yourself which
way is the shortest, the answer is obvious: this is the old good Euclidean straight line. But if the
destination is few miles away you need to think hard to find the shortest path and it may turn
out that the optimal solution is not unique. Thus one needs here a new kind of spatial intuition,
which does not cancel the Euclidean intuition but qualifies it as local and extends it with new
global features.
Even if the notion of Riemann manifold is dispensable when one needs to map the hilly surround-
ings of Hanover (this was Gauss’ practical charge that helped him to make his great theoretical
discoveries) it is certainly indispensable for mapping the surroundings of our planet at the cos-
mological scales. So there is no point in saying that Riemann’s generalized notion of geometrical
space is “more abstract” than the traditional notion of Euclidean space. People knew something
about curve spaces long before Riemann and Einstein! What they didn’t know was how to treat
such spaces mathematically: their spatial intuition remained blind in this respect. Thanks to
Gauss, Lobachevsky, Riemann and other great mathematicians of the past this intuition now
became much sharper and helps us to orientate ourselves in the physical spacetime at large
scales where the Euclidean intuition becomes manifestly insufficient (albeit not wholly irrele-
vant).
7.4 Lost Ideals
The above examples of intuitive change are examples of sharpening pre-mathematical intuitions
and transformation of earlier developed mathematical intuitions with newly invented geometrical
concepts. Now I am going to provide a historical example of different sort when a mathematical
concept was put in place before an appropriate intuition became available. As we shall see this
particular example has a general significance because it demonstrates a modern way of intuiting
mathematical objects, which applies very broadly.
Given a commutative ring 6 (K,⊕,⊗) an ideal (in the sense of modern algebra) is a subset I
of K such that I is (i) closed under ⊕ and (ii) closed under ⊗ in a stronger sense than usual:
for all a from K and all b from I a ⊗ b is in I. Learning this standard definition a student
may wonder where the funny name “ideal” comes from. The definition itself gives no clue to it
but historical works provide a clear answer (see [47]). The term stems from the notion of ideal
6A commutative ring is an algebraic structure which has two operations, which are subject to certain axioms
like in the case of algebraic group. A canonical example of commutative ring is the ring of integers.
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number (Idealzahl) introduced by Kummer in 1847. Kummer observed that in some rings of
cyclotomic integers 7 usual integers extended with pth root of 1 where p is a prime number. the
unique factorisation into primes fails. Kummer stipulated, i.e., “put by hand”, numbers of new
type that provided the unique prime factorisation in such problematic cases. He called these
new numbers “ideal” because he did not have any justification of the existence of such things.
This was not something quite unusual in mathematics: ideal points in geometry, imaginary
roots in algebra and even the familiar negative numbers were introduced into mathematics in a
similar way. It goes without saying that Kummer’s work did not reduce to this bold stipulation:
assuming that the ideal numbers provide for the unique factorization he proved a number of
non-trivial theorems about these stipulated things.
It is important to keep in mind that the intended meaning of “ideal” depends on what in a given
context counts as “real”. Although our present discussion concerns only mathematical contexts
and does not touch upon general philosophical notions of real and ideal, there are important
differences between various mathematical contexts too. Remind from 2.4 that for Hilbert only
strings of symbols are real, while all other mathematical objects are ideal. According to another
popular view, real numbers are real but complex numbers are not. For Kummer all complex
numbers are real but his newly invented “ideal” numbers are not. (In the last paragraph I
deliberately confuse the technical and the non-technical senses of term “real number” but I hope
that the reader can easily distinguish them properly.)
The relativity of the real/ideal distinction may suggest that it is nothing but a matter of subjec-
tive attitude. However we have just seen that what is really at stake here is the question about
the existence of mathematical objects of certain sort. And this latter question has a bearing on
the question of legitimacy of mathematical reasoning that involves such objects. In the given
case the question concerns the legitimacy of Kummer’s theory of ideal numbers. Is this theory
sound or not? By saying that this is a matter of subjective attitude one loses any epistemic
criterion in mathematics whatsoever.
Talking about the existence of mathematical objects we must also restrict the context appropri-
ately. Mathematicians may disagree about metaphysical views concerning the nature of mathe-
matical objects (some may believe that such objects sit at the Platonic heaven, some that they
are fictions, etc.) and still agree about which mathematical theory is sound and which is not. I
leave now the metaphysics wholly aside and focus on the epistemology. In order to make this
7A ring of cyclotomic integers is the ring of elements m+ p
√
1 where m is a usual integer and p
√
1 is a complex
p-th root of unity.
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clear I change the terminology: instead of asking “do ideal numbers really exist or not?” I shall
ask “are ideal numbers well-formed or not?”. I assume that if a given mathematical theory
is sound then all its objects are well-formed. (I use now the word “sound” not in the special
logical but in the general epistemological sense - instead of saying “sound” I could say “good”
or “acceptable”.)
We already know Hilbert’s way of answering such questions: formalize the given theory and
check its formal consistency. If Kummer’s theory of ideal numbers is consistent then it is sound
and Kummer’s numbers exist or are well-formed if one prefers. We also know that the check of
consistency is generally more problematic than Hilbert believed when he designed this method.
But in any event my present purpose is not to apply Hilbert’s approach (or some of its modernized
versions) to Kummer’s theory but rather look at this theory and its further development from a
Kantian perspective paying attention both to its conceptual content and to its intuitive content.
My talk of “forming objects” is, of course, of Kantian origin.
In Kantian terms mathematical ideal objects (aka “ideal elements”) can be described as “thoughts”,
which are not wholly “empty” (for otherwise they wouldn’t qualify as mathematical objects at
all) but which are only poorly supported by intuitions. Like all modern mathematical objects
the ideal mathematical objects are supported by some symbolic intuition (2.4), which comes into
the play as soon as one uses symbols for denoting such objects. But unlike mathematical objects
of other sorts the ideal objects lack any other intuitive support. For example the concept of num-
ber 3 is supported both (i) by the intuition associated with symbol “3” and (ii) by a complex of
intuitions associated with counting. In the case of ideal objects such a further intuitive support
is missing.
Now I am going to argue that such a situation can be improved: an “ideal” object first introduced
purely formally may acquire an additional intuitive support and thus, to put it metaphorically, get
a body. A classical example of this sort is that of the so-called “imaginary” number i = sqrt−1,
i.e., the number satisfying i2 = −1) This number has been first introduced in the 16th century
as a formal device for solving cubic equations (by “solving equation” I mean here finding its real
roots). In the 19th century Gauss and other people developed a geometrical interpretation of i
and other complex numbers representing these numbers by points on the Euclidean plane [188].
Ever since no research mathematician (leaving philosophers aside) doubts that the imaginary
numbers are just as real as the real numbers (Kummer’s example is representative in this sense);
today the very term “imaginary number” is no longer much in use and in any event it wholly
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lost its original appeal. 8.
Let us now see how a similar improvement has been made with Kummer’s ideal numbers. In
order to understand how ideals lost their ideal character and became full-fledged mathematical
object it is useful once again to look into the history of this notion. This notion was given its
modern shape by Dedekind who also introduced the term (the term “ideal” used as a noun),
see [47] and the historical references therein. Dedekind definition of ideal differs from ours
in only one respect: instead of an abstract ring K Dedekind considers cyclotomic rings and
other similar rings based on complex numbers. Then he shows that Kummer’s ideal numbers
can be identified with certain infinite classes of complex numbers, which fall under Dedekind’s
general definition. In comparison with our modern notion of ideal Dedekind’s strikes as too
special and too “concrete”. One should not however forget that considering infinite collections
of mathematical objects (like complex numbers) as mathematical objects in their own rights is
a relatively recent idea. In Dedekind’s times it was very new and even revolutionary. Anyway
there is a sense in which Dedekind “constructs” algebraic ideals from complex numbers in a way
analogous to which Euclid constructs triangles from straight segments. Admittedly this sense of
“construction” is overtly non-constructive (in any of usual technical senses of being constructive).
Yet the term “construction” is, in my view, wholly appropriate for describing a mental act by
which one collects some given objects into an infinite collection and then operates with this
infinite collection as a new object (compare 3.2 above). If elements of the infinite collection are
full-fledged mathematical object provided with a non-symbolic intuitive support (as in the case
of complex numbers) such a (liberally understood) construction brings about a new full-fledged
object, which is equally supported by the intuition. This intuition about infinite collections
allows us to think of Dedekind’s ideals as full-fledged mathematical objects rather than purely
formal entities like Kummer’s ideal numbers.
In order to get from Dedekind’s notion of algebraic ideal to the modern notion defined in the
beginning of this Section one more step is needed: to replace infinite collections of complex
numbers by infinite collections of abstract elements (or “pure units” by Cantor’s word) and define
abstract algebraic operations correspondingly. This step can be justly described as a generalizing
abstraction because the modern notion of ideal generalizes on various “concrete” examples of
ideals including Dedekind’s examples. For this reason the modern algebra is sometimes referred
8Since complex numbers “officially” don’t count as geometrical objects one may argue that complex number c
and its geometrical representation with point p are two different things. Indeed in this case the concept and the
intuition are more detached than, say, in the case of Euclidean triangle. We shall shortly see that in the case of
algebraic ideals the appropriate intuition and the concepts fit each other more closely.
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to as abstract algebra 9. I suggest, however, that this move towards a higher abstraction in
mathematics is accompanied by an opposite development, which involves a new modification of
mathematical intuition; this new intuition allows for thinking about abstract algebraic structures
in concreto without restricting the generality and without using familiar examples. Indeed
an algebraic ideal in the sense of modern definition can be called abstract only against the
background of a variety of concrete examples like Dedekind’s. Although the knowledge of such
examples helps one to appreciate the power of the modern concept of ideal, this knowledge is not
absolutely necessary for its understanding. The modern structural mathematics (see Chapter
8 below) uses abstract sets in a way similar to which Euclid uses points, straight lines and
circles, namely as a basic material for building all further constructions (in the liberal sense of
“construction” explained above). This develops a specific set-theoretic intuition which represents
elements of abstract sets as primitive “dots” and interprets abstract operations in terms of
manipulations with dots. Since the relevant sets are, generally, infinite the everyday experience
with small finite collections often becomes misleading in this context. However this common
experience serves as a basis for a further refinement and further modification of the set-theoretic
intuition; such a refinement makes part of the modern mathematical education. The fact that
the resulting intuition turns to be problematic in many respects is not a reason for denying its
very existence. It is rather a reason for building new mathematical concepts and developing new
mathematical intuitions, which are more satisfactory.
The set-theoretic intuition developed in the 20th century mathematics stems from Cantor’s
“naive” set theory. In order to analyze the intuitive aspect of this theory it is useful to apply
Russell’s distinction between the “extensional genesis” and the “intensional genesis” of (infinite)
classes (see 5.8 above). Remind that the former is a form of infinite enumeration and the latter
amounts to using the comprehension principle according to which for each property P (x) there
exist (= it is possible to generate) class X of all x such that P (x). I shall consider some intuitive
aspects of both these methods in turn.
In his Foundations of a general theory of manifolds of 1883 [28] Cantor purports to extend the
ordinary natural numbers series with new “transfinite” numbers. Cantor gives the name of first
principle of generation to the usual operation (+1) which allows one to build every finite number
n starting with zero. According to thesecond principle of generation the infinite iteration of the
first principle has a limit. When one applies the first principle iteratively starting with zero
the corresponding limit ω can be described as the smallest number, which is bigger than every
9This abstract style of doing algebra follows the pattern of Waerden’s course [241] first published in 1930 (vol.
1) - 1931 (vol.2). For the history of modern algebra see [36].
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natural n. Applying again the first principle to ω one gets ω+ 1, ω+ 2, and so on; then applying
again the second principle one gets 2ω, then again by the first principle 2ω + 1, 2ω + 2, .., then
again combining the two principles one gets 3ω, .. , ω2, ωω, etc..
As we see only the last mentioned step brings one beyond the domain of countable collections.
It is often argued that this latter step is crucial: while the countable infinity can be accepted as
a reasonable idealization of finitary enumeration the domain of uncountable cannot be grasped
with the extensional genesis (i.e., with an idealized enumeration) in principle. Cantor suggests
a different analysis. The crucial step is where the second principle of generation first comes
into the play and brings about the limit value ω. The usual intuition about counting does not
support the idea of such a limit. However a relevant geometrical setting makes the idea more
clear. Consider the series of fractions 1n (where n is a natural number) against the background
of the real line shown at the below diagram Fig. 7.6
Fig. 7.6
It provides a clear picture of how this series tends to the limit 0. The proposition saying that 1n
tends to zero can be strictly formulated in terms of the linear order relation between fractions
extended with 0: 0 is the biggest number, which is smaller than each number 1n . In the case of
the natural series n we have a similar linear order: the order of natural numbers n is obtained
from the order of fractions 1n by the simple reversal. As long as the series of fractions is taken
together with its limit 0 the reversal of order translates 0 into Cantor’s ω. Having in mind this
reversal one may use the above diagram or its like for representing ω. Although this geometrical
representation does not directly apply beyond ω (beware that Cantor’s theory does not allow for
infinitesimals!) it provides an intuitive support for the second principle, which can be applied
iteratively.
Turning now to the intensional genesis I propose the following question: Is there anything sim-
ilar to the idea of building mathematical objects using the comprehension principle in the pre-
Cantorian mathematics? After all it is very improbable that this way of building mathematical
objects, which today is used widely (with appropriate restrictions of the comprehension principle)
would not have any predecessor in the older mathematics. At least one such example immedi-
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ately suggests itself: it is building geometrical objects as loci. A simple example of geometrical
locus is given by Euclid’s definition of circle (Definition 15 of Book 1 of the Elements) according
to which
A circle is a plane figure contained by a single line [which is called a circumference],
(such that) all of the straight-lines radiating towards [the circumference] from a single
point lying inside the figure are equal to one another. [51]
Reading this definition as a definition of geometrical locus amounts to the following paraphrase
10:
A circle is a line C such that for all straight-lines OA and OB where O is a given
fixed point and A,B are two points of C, we have OA = OB
Today we can further paraphrase Euclid’s definition as follows:
A circle is a set of points equidistant from a given point
This latter definition would hardly make sense to Euclid since for him a circle is first of all
a line (with such-and-such properties) and he never suggests the idea of equating lines with
their points. Anyway this modern rendering of the ancient notion of geometrical locus suggests
a convenient way of thinking about infinite sets formed with the comprehension principle in
terms of familiar geometrical objects. So in the case of intentional genesis a properly modified
traditional geometrical intuition is also relevant. A further modification of this intuition may
play a role in “abstract” contexts 11 , for example, when one defines an algebraic ideal in the
modern structural way explained above.
It is interesting to notice that Cantor’s general theory of sets emerged as a generalization of a
theory of point-sets, on which Cantor worked earlier. There are also other important historical
connections between Cantor’s set theory and the 19th century geometry [54], [156], which I
cannot discuss here. These historical facts suggest that Cantor smuggled into his general notion
of set, which he famously described as “a collection into whole of definite, distinct objects of our
intuition or our thought” [30], quite a lot of geometrical content. It remains an open question
10The concept of geometrical locus was certainly already known to Euclid. The term “locus” is the Latin
translation of Greek word “topos”, which was systematically used in Greek geometry as a technical term with
the same meaning. For the history of the notion and the term see [2].
11
Some years ago I began an introductory course on Set Theory by attempting to explain the invariant
content of the category of sets [..]. I was concerned to present an ideological vision of the significance
of the objects of this category, which I called abstract sets. I emphasized that an abstract set may be
conceived of as a bag of dots which are devoid of properties apart from mutual distinctness. ([156],
p. 5)
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whether Cantor’s set theory can be reasonably reconstructed on some appropriate geometrical
basis. Voevodsky’s suggestion to treat sets as a particular homotopy type (6.10) is a possible way
of solving this problem. Without going into details I would like only stress here a foundational
significance of this endeavor. In the standard set-theoretic foundations of mathematics sets are
primitive and geometrical spaces are built as structured sets through the Formal Axiomatic
Method (3.2). Making sets into a special geometrical concept reverses this conceptual order and
makes geometrical spaces more basic. In the next Section I explain why this conceptual reversal
is, in my view, desirable.
7.5 Are Intuitions Fundamental?
I hope having convinced the reader by the above examples that mathematical intuitions change
at least as fast as mathematical concepts. Another recent intuitive change of the same sort is
connected to the category theory: I have already discussed the intuitive geometrical aspect of
this theory earlier in this book (see particularly 6.2 - 6.3) and I shall discuss it again in the
next Chapter (8.8). Let me now try to answer a more general question: Is the mathematical
intuition fundamental (as Kant believed) or it is only an auxiliary instrument, which helps
mathematicians to do their science? I claim that it is fundamental. The core argument goes as
follows. I assume after Cassirer (i) that “[t]he principle according to which our concepts should
be sourced in intuitions means that they should be sourced in the mathematical physics” and
(ii) that “[l]ogical and mathematical concepts must no longer produce instruments for building a
metaphysical ’world of thought’ ” ([32], p. 43-44). I also assume that this sourcing of mathematics
from empirical sciences is a fundamental issue. The conclusion follows.
It is appropriate to ask what the examples of mathematical intuition treated in this Chapter
have to do with the empirical science. As long as Euclid and Barrow are concerned the answer is
obvious: both geometrical theories were closely related to the contemporary empirical research.
In Euclid’s times, when the mathematical physics in the modern sense of the word did not yet
exist, the relevant empirical research was mostly limited to astronomy, geography and optics;
the new geometry of curves pioneered by Barrow (among other people) provided a geometrical
basis for Newton’s physics. The case of non-Euclidean geometries may look less convincing in
this respect - and the fact that a non-Euclidean geometry provided a basis for Einstein’s theory
of relativity may look just as a stroke of luck. However in fact Lobachevsky from the very
beginning of his geometrical studies tentatively thought about his newly invented non-Euclidean
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spaces as physical spaces. He does not take for granted the idea according to which the geometry
of physical space is unique, and does not think about the spectrum of new geometries as a
spectrum of merely mathematical possibilities. See, for example, the following passage that
reads today as a precipitation of Einstein’s General Relativity and modern field theories:
[T]he assumption according to which some natural forces follow one Geometry while
some other forces follow some other specific Geometry, which is their proper Geom-
etry, cannot bring any contradiction into our mind. ([172], p. ??, my translation)
This shows that Lobachevsky’s “hyperbolic intuition” qualifies as intuition in Kant’s and Cas-
sirer’s sense: it is not a merely subjective play of imagination but a suggestive way of thinking
about “natural forces”. When this aspect of the history of the 19th century geometry is taken
into consideration the success of the new geometry in the 20th century physics no longer looks
as a miracle [81].
In the case of the set-theoretic intuition the situation is more complicated. It is often argued
that since there is no infinite sets in the nature the set theory (except its finitely fragment) is
irrelevant to natural sciences. It follows that set-theoretic intuitions (if any) cannot be relevant
in natural sciences either. In my view this argument points to a real problem, but in order to
better illuminate the problem this argument must be formulated differently. What does it mean
that there is no infinite sets in nature, how we can know this? And how this fact makes the set
theory irrelevant in natural sciences? After all there is no perfect Euclidean points in the nature
either: at best a point can only represent a physical particle in appropriate empirical contexts.
Why an infinite set cannot do a similar job?
The real problem, as I see it, is that in the 20th century the set theory developed wholly inde-
pendently from empirical sciences. Interestingly, Cantor himself thought of possible empirical
applications of his theory [80]. However since Zermelo in 1908 [255] turned the research in set
theory into a formal axiomatic research (3.1) Cantor’s approach was disqualified as “naive” and
no longer developed (until in 1994 Lawvere [156] took Cantor’s original approach seriously and
tried to develop it in a novel way). Many mathematicians have been convinced by the argument
according to which the pure logic and mathematics somehow extends beyond any possible experi-
ence into the putative universe of infinite sets; the trick of Hilbert-style formalization offers itself
as a means allowing to reach this “metaphysical world of thought” (Cassirer) aka “Cantorian
Paradise” (Hilbert) by finitary means. In this context the symbolic intuition, which allows for
manipulation with finite strings of symbols according certain rules, is supposed to be sufficient
for treating infinities mathematically (as ideal objects in Hilbert’s sense). As I have already
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argued in Chapter 3 this letter proposal has never been popular in the mainstream mathematics.
Outside the formal axiomatic studies of sets mathematicians still think about sets “naively” and
support this thinking by non-symbolic intuitions, which I have described in the last Section.
Although these intuitions hardly support an empirical application of set-based mathematics di-
rectly, they help to connect the set-based mathematics to the older mathematics, which is still
widely used in physics and other natural sciences (think of differential equations and the theory
of dynamical systems, for example).
The question about the role of mathematical intuitions in empirical sciences needs a separate
discussion that I cannot provide here. Evidently the standard Kantian understanding of this
role does not immediately apply to Quantum Mechanics and other parts of the contemporary
physics where empirical observations and measurements are very indirect. However taking it
for granted that the empirical science provides the only epistemic access to reality, I claim after
Kant and Cassirer that all sound mathematics is sourced from this type of science. One may
further ask whether the pure mathematics is ultimately itself an empirical science or it is rather a
non-empirical (a priori) ingredient of empirical sciences. I leave now this question aside because
it has no bearing on my principle claim according to which the pure mathematics cannot be
founded independently for the mathematized empirical science.
Cassirer calls the link between the pure mathematics and the empirical science intuition without
specifying what it is and how it works in the modern context. One may argue that since the
role of direct observations by the naked eye no longer plays a fundamental role in science, the
symbolic intuition is after all the best possible interface between the pure mathematics and
the empirical science. In order to evaluate this argument we need first of all to distinguish
between two different claims: one according to which (i) the symbolic intuition is the basic sort
of intuition in the contemporary mathematics, and the other one according to which (ii) the
symbolic intuition as a part the Formal Axiomatic Method plays (or should play) a fundamental
role in the contemporary mathematics12. (ii) implies (i) but not conversely. As I have already
stressed in 3.3 the way in which symbols are used in theories built by the Formal Axiomatic
Method is quite unlike the way in which symbols are used elsewhere in mathematics; I have also
argued in 3.3 that this particular way of using symbols makes the formal mathematics not apt
for being applied in the modern empirical science. Since after Cassirer I want to understand the
mathematical intuition as a link between the pure mathematics and the empirical science I rule
(ii) out. But this argument has no bearing on (i), which remains plausible.
12(ii) is Hilbert’s mature view, see 2.4, 2.6 above.
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As for (i) I refer the reader to the earlier discussion on the notion of symbolic intuition in 2.4 -
2.5. As long as by the symbolic syntax one understands the standard strings of symbols, one may
remark that this syntax is very good for some purposes and not so good for some other purposes.
In any event we cannot grant to this type of syntax - and hence to the symbolic intuition, which
allows one to manipulate with symbols using this syntax - any exceptional epistemic role. So
we should treat the symbolic intuition in this restricted sense of the term on equal footing with
mathematical intuitions of other types including, for example, the geometrical intuition behind
the homotopy theory (6.7).
If, however, one understands the notion of symbol in a more general sense, namely, as any
representation, which does not involve the idea of resemblance between a given symbol and
what this symbol stands for, then (i) is indeed justified. However in this case the notion of
symbolic intuition becomes unspecific. For Kant, saying that the traditional geometry provides
a representation of the physical space that resembles this physical space, would not make sense
because things in themselves and their representations do not admit such a relation; one may
rather talk here about resemblances between different representations. Saying that the traditional
geometrical diagrams resemble the geometrical objects, which those diagrams represent, does
not make sense either, because for Kant the geometrical objects are representations. Thus given
the above general notion of symbol, all mathematical intuition turns to be symbolic (which is
Cassirer’s view) and (i) turns into a general claim about the symbolic character of mathematical
intuition.
The relevant difference between older and newer types of empirical representation is this. A
traditional diagram representing the Solar system resembles the Solar system. A mechanical
model of Solar system (I mean a real mechanism used for educational or other purposes) also
resembles the Solar system. Now I am talking about the resemblance between two material
objects (one of which is natural and the other artificial), not about the Kantian issue of mental
representation. Clearly, no reasonable model of atom resembles the actual atom in a similar way.
Remark, however, that this relation of resemblance plays no role in Kant’s theory of scientific
representation. Hence the Kantian approach to scientific representation (albeit not all specific
details of Kant’s theory) applies to the Quantum physics after the model of Newtonian physics.
Thus Kant already showed us how to do the modern science without using the naive notion of
resemblance between physical objects and their images. He did this for the Newtonian physics
but his general approach applies to today’s physics as well. Moreover, in today’s physics this
approach becomes even more pertinent because the recent physics makes the older notion of
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resemblance between physical objects and their images manifestly absurd.
To repeat, I do not want to say that Kant’s original approach is fully adequate to today’s
science. It is obviously not. But I do want to suggest that any adequate approach to scientific
representation should build on Kant’s in one way or another. True, many basic intuitions playing
the central role in the Newtonian physics (like the intuition of mechanical motion stressed by
Barrow) turn to be irrelevant in the new context, or at least they need to be conceptualized
very differently. However these differences are differences between different intuitions and their
corresponding concepts rather than differences between different types of relationships between
concepts and intuition. This is why I think that Kant’s general notion of intuition is suitable
for today’s physics as well as to today’s mathematics. I recognize that Hegel was right when
he criticized Kant’s “subjective bent” even if I don’t quite satisfied by his proposed solution of
this problem. In my view this problem can and should be addressed rather in a naturalistic
framework providing an objective scientific representation of human subjectivity as a part of an
objective representation of human natural environment. It goes without saying that this topic
needs a more specific discussion, which I cannot provide in this book.
To conclude this Chapter I would like to suggest that the argument according to which all
intuitions about infinite collections are doomed to be irrelevant in the empirical sciences, is
wrong. So I do not defend here some form of finitisme according to which infinities must be
banned in mathematics because they cannot make any empirical sense. I believe after Cantor [80]
that they really can. But this requires a different set theory; Lawvere’s ETCS and Vovodsky’s
homotopical theory of sets give an idea how such a new theory of set may look like. The
traditional Scholastic distinction between the potential and the actual infinity used by Cantor
in [28] must not be taken for granted and used then as the philosophical basis for mathematical
theories of the infinite. Relevant empirical consideration [201] are both more illuminating and
more suggestive in this respect. The metaphysical idea of mathematics penetrating into the
non-empirical domain of the infinite must be definitely abandoned as non-scientific.
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Chapter 8
Categories versus Structures
In this Chapter I shall discuss a notion, which have been already used throughout this book,
namely, the notion of mathematical structure. I shall also discuss a philosophical view known
as structuralism and analyze its relationships with the category theory. According to a popular
opinion the category theory wholly justifies the structural approach in mathematics and provides
a framework for developing the structural mathematics. I shall argue that the relationships
between the category theory and the mathematical structuralism are more involved: although
the category theory helps the mathematical structuralism to win over some of its traditional
rivals (including all varieties of mathematical substantialism) it also transforms the traditional
structuralism into something very different. Although many people in this context prefer to
talk about a new form of structuralism [178], [93], [94], [6], [186] 1 I find this terminological
choice rather unfortunate because it only points to the continuity of the conceptual change but
does not help one to describe this change itself. I wholly recognize the fact that the category
theory grew up on the basis of the structuralist mathematics, and that structuralist motivations
played a major role in the historical development of this theory. Nevertheless I claim that the
category theory supports a new vision of mathematics and science, which is incompatible with
the traditional structuralism. Of course, this claim is defensible only if the structuralist view is
sharpened accordingly. Some people may argue that my interpretation of structuralism is too
restrictive. Anyway in this Chapter I shall try to persuade the reader that there is a sharp
conceptual difference between the structuralist view and the new view on mathematics emerging
with the category theory.
1A structuralist view on category theory also underlies the recent monograph [181] even if the author does not
discuss structuralism explicitly in this book.
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8.1 Structuralism, Mathematical
In its most popular usage the name of structuralism refers to a broad intellectual movement in
France during the time period from 1945 to late 1960-ies or early seventies, which was very influ-
ential not only in philosophy but also in mathematics, linguistics, sociology, economics, political
science and other humanities [46]. Bourbaki’s structuralist manifesto [24] was first published
in French during the same year 1948 when Levi-Strauss defended his thesis The Elementary
Structures of Kinship [168], which soon afterwards became a canon of the structural approach
in humanities. Today one can reasonably ask whether the notion of mathematical structure as
formulated by Bourbaki and the notion of structure used by Levi-Strauss was indeed the same no-
tion [200]. Although the answer to this question is far from being obvious it is a well-documented
historical fact that the structural approach in mathematics, on the hand, and the structural ap-
proach in humanities, on the other hand, closely and fruitfully interacted (in particular, through
the application of apply new mathematical methods in linguistics and other humanities). This,
in my view, is a sufficient reason to count the mathematical structuralism of Bourbaki as a proper
part of the French post-war structuralist movement.
I insist on this point for the following reason. Just about the time when according to the official
history [46] the French structuralism declines (the late 1960-ies) and gets succeeded by a variety
of new intellectual trends, which North-American academic experts classify under the title of
post-structuralism, the structuralism has a new birth in North America. This new structuralism
started by Sneed [226] and Suppe [231] limits its scope by the philosophy of science and forcefully
denies any relationships with French structuralism with the noticeable exception of Bourbaki’s
mathematical structuralism. The program of this new structuralism can be roughly described
as application of Bourbaki’s method for a philosophical reconstruction of scientific theories; the
purpose of such reconstruction is the structural analysis of theories, which is a special sort
of formal analysis, see [247] for further details. Independently, yet another version of North-
American structuralism establishes itself in 1990-ies as an influential philosophy of mathematics;
this latter structuralism is known under the name of mathematical structuralism, see Hellman’s
[95] for a definition and the references. Mathematical structuralism equally recognizes Bourbaki’s
structuralism but not the rest of French post-war structuralism. In this context the historical
connection between Bourbaki’s mathematical structuralism and the rest of French structuralism
needs to be mentioned specially.
To complete my short list of structuralisms I would like to mention the structural realism emerged
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in UK in early 2000ies [141]. This kind of ontological structuralism in the philosophy of science
does not have any direct connection to Sneed’s structuralism but does have many direct connec-
tions to the mathematical structuralism in Hellman’s sense.
Although I don’t discuss in this book French structuralism (except Bourbaki’s mathematical
structuralism) I borrow something important from its spirit and from its general intellectual at-
titude. The story of decline of structuralism in one part of the world followed by the reappearance
of (a different) structuralism in another part of this world tells us something important about
different ways of doing philosophy. French post-war structuralism functioned as a suggestive
idea, which prompted significant developments in mathematics and humanities (I don’t know
about sciences); it never construed itself as a philosophical doctrine supposed to be learnt and
transmitted through generations in its original form. It’s early decline in the late 1960-ies could
be expected because French structuralism never construed itself as long-living. It had something
of an intellectual fashion - and for this a reason its esteem in certain academic circles was very
poor. The fact that in the late 1960-ies structuralism in France was succeeded by new influential
trends (the so-called post-structuralism) is an evidence that the decline of structuralism was not
a symptom of intellectual stagnation.
The North-American structuralism in any of its multiple varieties, on the contrary, construed
itself in the form of philosophical doctrine to begin with. This is why it is much easier to describe
this later structuralism as a coherent system of beliefs. According to Hellman the contemporary
mathematical structuralism is
[..] a view about the subject matter of mathematics according to which what matters
are structural relationships in abstraction from the intrinsic nature of the related ob-
jects. Mathematics is seen as the free exploration of structural possibilities, primarily
through creative concept formation, postulation, and deduction. The items making
up any particular system exemplifying the structure in question are of no importance;
all that matters is that they satisfy certain general conditions - typically spelled out
in axioms defining the structure or structures of interest - characteristic of the branch
of mathematics in question. ([95])
(Beware that the above definition describes only the core mathematical structuralism, which
branches then into multiple varieties, which I leave aside.)
Mathematical structuralism in the above sense generalizes upon well-established patterns of the
20th century mathematics including Bourbaki’s Elements; in what follows I shall explain in more
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detail its relevance to the Formal Axiomatic Method and other distinctive features of mathematics
practiced during this century. However Hellman’s mathematical structuralism presents itself as a
view on mathematics simpliciter without any explicit historical reflection; it simply tells us what
mathematics is, not what it used to be in the past, nor what it will be in the future. Does this
mean that Hellman and other adherents of North-American mathematical structuralism really
believe that mathematics has some sort of eternal nature, which they try to describe? Perhaps
some of them do. However there is also a more sophisticated way of tackling this issue, which
perhaps better fits this people’s intellectual attitude:
• (1) Since (1.1) today’s mathematics is the best known mathematics it follows that (1.2) in
order to answer the question What is mathematics? it is sufficient to take into consideration
only today’s mathematics. The history of mathematics is an important subject but it does
not have a bearing on this question.
• (2) Talking about today’s mathematics it is sufficient to take into consideration only well-
established patterns of modern mathematical reasoning and leave aside all recent ideas and
new approaches, which so far remain controversial in eyes of mathematicians themselves.
In the unlikely event that in the near future mathematics once again will change its shape
(like it happened in early 1900-ies) a philosopher should change her mind accordingly. But
as long as a philosophy of mathematics fits the content of standard mathematical textbooks
there is no reason to promote such changes.
Let me now express some criticisms and explain my own position with respect to French and
North-American structuralisms.
I agree with premiss (1.1) but I disagree that the conclusion (1.2) follows. The fact that mathe-
matics rapidly develops is its essential feature, i.e., an essential part of the answer to the question
What is mathematics? (Mutatis mutandis this is true about any science.) One cannot understand
what mathematics is and how it develops without studying its history and without anticipating
its future.
(2) points to a crucial difference between French and North-American structuralisms and ex-
plains why the latter structuralism emerges when the former structuralism dies off. To repeat,
the French structuralism worked as a suggestive idea, which died when the relevant structuralist
suggestions were already successfully used in mathematics and elsewhere, so that the idea was no
longer suggestive but became somewhat commonsensical. Exactly at this point North-American
philosophers could take the opportunity of putting this idea in the form of philosophical doc-
260
trine. My own project is mixed. Following the pattern of French structuralism I shall consider
the mathematical structuralism as a suggestive idea, not as a doctrine. Thus I reject (2) and not
only discuss some well-established patterns of modern mathematical thinking but also discuss
some history and some work in progress. However I also take the advantage of using Hellman’s
precise definition of structuralism for making explicit a non-structuralist aspect of category the-
ory (see 8.6) below). Thus my following critique of structuralism does not aim at showing that
the mathematical structuralism is wrong as a doctrine; it rather aims at showing that the struc-
turalism is outdated and no longer suggestive. This critique also helps me to formulate a different
idea, which in my view is both more modern and more suggestive. Although this alternative
idea is motivated more by recent mathematics than by recent philosophy I don’t mind if someone
describes it as a form of mathematical post-structuralism.
8.2 What Replaces What?
Here is how a working mathematician describes an example of mathematical structure for a
philosophical reader:
All infinite cyclic groups are isomorphic, but this infinite group appears over and over
again - in number theory, in ornaments, in crystallography, and in physics. Thus, the
“existence” of this group is really a many-splendored matter. An ontological analysis
of things simply called “mathematical objects” is likely to miss the real point of
mathematical existence. [175]
This example well demonstrates the generalizing power of the structural approach: the concept
of cyclic group 2 can be instantiated by apparently very different mathematical constructions
belonging to different areas of mathematics; in this way this concept establishes a conceptual link
between these different areas. Mac Lane’s example also illustrates the controversy between the
mathematical structuralism and the rival view of set-theoretic substantivism. According to this
latter view a group or any other mathematical object construed as a structured set a` la Bourbaki
(see 3.2) is a set at the first place. The above quote suggests that this base set does not really
matter; what really matters is only the structure supported by this (or any other) set. Before I
shall try to make it more clear what is meant here by structure let me remind a passage from
2Remind the definition of general group from 6.1. An infinite cyclic group is a group with an infinite number
of elements and such that any of its elements is generated by some distinguished element g and its inverse g−1.
A group is said to be generated by a set of its distinguished elements (called generators) when every element of
this group is a product (in the sense of the group operation) of the generators. A canonical example of an infinite
cyclic group is the additive group of whole numbers, which is generated by numbers 1 and -1.
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Burbaki’s structuralist manifesto of 1948, which has been already quoted in 3.2. After discussing
logical difficulties of set theory Dieudonne´ (under the name of Bourbaki) remarks:
The difficulties did not disappear until the notion of set itself disappears ... in the light
of the recent work on the logical formalism. From this new point of view mathematical
structures become, properly speaking, the only “objects” of mathematics. (quoted
by English translation [24], p. 225, footnote)
It is not clear what Dieudonne´ exactly means by the “disappearance” of sets, and I doubt that
in 1948 he could really justify his claim. However the above quote clearly demonstrates the
intention.
Let us now see more precisely what this controversy is really about. For the sake of my further
argument I modify Mac Lane’s example as follows: I replace the words “infinite cyclic group”
by the words “number three” and the word “isomorphic” by the word “equal”. So we get this
statement
All threes are equal but this number appears over and over again - in number theory, in ornaments
.... Thus the “existence” of this number is really a many-splendored matter.
which describes the traditional “wobble about identity” in mathematics, which I treated in
Part II of this book. Thus the above modification reveals a traditional aspect of structuralism,
which often remains unnoticed when people stress the novelty of this approach. Indeed the
familiar number three is just as promiscuous as the infinite cyclic group or perhaps even more
promiscuous. The number three equally “appears” (to use MacLane’s word) both inside and
outside mathematics: in a trio of apples, a trio of points, a trio of groups, a trio of numbers
or a trio of anything else. As in Mac Lane’s original example, there is a systematic ambiguity
between the plural and the singular forms of nouns in our talk about numbers. (Notice Mac
Lane’s talk about “all infinite cyclic groups” and “this infinite group” in the same sentence; in
my paraphrase I talk similarly about a number.) This shows that the notion of “many-splendored
existence” (i.e., of multiple instantiation) is not at all specific for the 20th century structural
mathematical thinking. Thus in order to understand what is indeed specific for the structural
thinking one should look elsewhere.
Comparing Mac Lane’s example with its modified version one can see that in Mac Lane’s example
the notion of isomorphism plays the same role as the notion of equality (as distinguished from
identity) plays in the traditional mathematics. The idea that isomorphic objects can be treated
as equal is crucial for structuralism - at least if we are talking about structuralism as a trend in
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mathematics rather than a philosophical doctrine about mathematics.
However we need to be again more specific here. Remind from 6.1 that the idea of “taking
isomorphism for equality” branches into two very different ideas. The first idea can be dubbed
the replacement of isomorphisms by equalities, the second the replacement of equalities by isom-
rophisms. To see clearly the difference between the two approaches one should first of all to
disambiguate the term “isomorphism”, which may denote either a relation or a map (transfor-
mation). The two meanings of the term are related as follows: the relation of isomorphism x ' y
holds if and only if there is a map f : x→ y, which is isomorphism (or in other words, which is
invertible). Notice that the notion of isomorphism as a map stands first in the conceptual order:
one needs this notion in order to define the further notion of isomorphism as a relation.
The replacement of isomorphisms by equalities works as follows. One takes the relation of equal-
ity = for granted or introduces it independently from the notion of isomorphism. Then one
introduces the relation of isomorphism ' (using = if needed). Finally one “replaces” ' by =
through the Fregean abstraction (5.5). Thus the replacement of x ' y by x = y brings an ab-
stract object that one may denote x or y or by a new symbol X. The replacement of equalities by
isomrophisms is more involved because it doesn’t rely upon usual ways of thinking about equality
but purports to construe this notion anew using isomorphisms. Since the notion of isomorphism
as relation depends on the notion of isomorphism as a map this idea amounts to a construal of
equalities (identities) in terms of maps. We have explored this idea above in Chapter 6; remind
that in the most developed form existing to the date this idea has been realized in the homotopy
type theory where the relevant isomorphisms are paths and their homotopies (including all higher
homotopies) in some topological space (see 6.9).
Which of the two approaches is more helpful for explaining what is a mathematical structure?
At the first glance the replacement of isomorphisms by equalities is exactly what one needs
for this purpose. Suppose one notices a similarity between (i) an ornament, (ii) an arithmetical
construction and (iii) a piece of mathematical physics, which one wants to describe as a structural
similarity. In order to make this observation more precise one constructs mutual isomorphisms
between (i), (ii), (iii); the existence of such isomorphisms is the intended precise sense of the
expression “structural similarity”. Then one wants to study the structural aspect of (i), (ii), (iii)
independently from their other specific properties (in a way similar to which one may want to
study the arithmetical aspect of trio of apples, trio of points and of any other trio disregarding
all specific properties of apples, points, etc.). For this purpose one forms an appropriate notion
of structure thinking about this structure as a thing, which (i), (ii), (iii) share in common and
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which makes (i), (ii), (iii) structurally similar. The replacement of isomorphisms by equalities,
which is a special case of Fregean abstraction, brings one the notion of an abstract group G of the
appropriate type (let it be the infinite cyclic group of Mac Lane’s example). Now one may forget
about irrelevant properties of (i), (ii), (iii) and study this group independently as an abstract
algebraic structure. So one no longer cares about patterns of ornament, about numbers or about
physical bodies but studies the “structural relationships in abstraction from the intrinsic nature
of the related objects. [..] The items making up any particular system exemplifying the structure
in question are of no importance.” (Hellman) So it looks like the replacement of isomorphisms
by equalities is a right way of making mathematical structures.
Let me now explain why this way of making mathematical structures is not quite satisfactory.
Suppose we have two abstract groups G1, G2 formed as above; these groups are construed as
sets S1, S2 of abstract elements provided with abstract binary operations. The notion of group
isomorphisms, which has been used for treating (i), (ii), (iii), makes perfect sense in the new
abstract setting too. Suppose that the given groups are isomorphic, in symbols G1 ' G2. We
want now to say that groups G1, G2 are the same (or equal) but it turns out that this statement
has some unwanted consequences. Namely, G1 = G2 implies S1 = S2. The latter equality is un-
wanted because the idea is that different sets S1, S2 may support the same structure. So we want
here a further abstraction, which would allow us to consider the group structure independently
from any underlying set. This explains why Dieudonne´’s wishes that sets disappear. However
the replacement of isomorphisms by equalities is no longer helpful. It allows one to abstract from
irrelevant features of (i), (ii), (iii) but it does not allow one to get rid of the fact that each of (i),
(ii), (iii) is a collection of well-distinguishable elements. Unless one takes this fact into consider-
ation one cannot build isomorphisms between (i), (ii), (iii), so the replacement of isomorphisms
by equalities becomes irrelevant. Thus the notion of abstract set, which one wants to use as a
precise mathematical expression of the idea of collection of “abstract elements having no intrinsic
nature” (Hellman), appears to be an obstacle for the structuralist way of thinking. One says that
those abstract “items [..] are of no importance” (Hellman) but one does not know how to get
rid of them altogether. Set-theoretic substantivism is a view according to which this difficulty
is fundamental, so one should accept some notion of set and some fundamental identity relation
before talking of abstract mathematical structures. Structuralism suggests to do something else,
typically without making this suggestion more specific (like in Bourbaki’s case).
What about the replacement of equalities by isomrophisms? Since this approach did not exist in a
precise mathematical form until very recently, it had no significant influence on the mathematical
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structuralism as a philosophical doctrine. But as a general idea (not always well distinguished
from the idea of replacement of isomorphisms by equalities) it pushed these developments in
mathematics, which finally made a precise mathematical expression of this idea possible. In 8.5
I show how the replacement of equalities by isomrophisms and, more generally, the categorification
(in the broad sense of 6.3) indeed allow for a further development of the structuralist line of
thinking. However in 8.6 I show how the same development transforms the structuralist way of
thinking about mathematical (and other) matters into something different.
8.3 Erlangen Program and Axiomatic Method
Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method (in the sense of FoundationsEˆof 1899 rather than Founda-
tionsEˆof 1934-39) is one of the main tenets of mathematical structuralism. Remind Hilbert’s
words according to which
[I]t is self-evident that every theory is merely a framework or schema of concepts
together with their necessary relations to one another, and that basic elements can
be construed as one pleases. [..] [E]ach and every theory can always be applied to
infinitely many systems of basic elements. For one merely has to apply a univocal
and invertible one-to-one transformation and stipulate that the axioms for the trans-
formed things be correspondingly similar. (quoted by [64], see the longer quote in
2.1)
This Hilbert’s description of a mathematical theory perfectly squares with Hellman’s description
of the subject-matter of mathematics. When Hellman describes mathematics as “the free ex-
ploration of structural possibilities, primarily through creative concept formation, postulation,
and deduction” he most certainly has Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method in mind. Noticeably, Hilbert
explicitly mentions in the above quote the notion of isomorphism (under the name of univocal
and invertible one-to-one transformation), which is absent from Helmann’s description but cru-
cial for the structuralism. Since Hilbert talks here about isomorphisms as transformations, a
(formal) theory in Hilbert’s intended sense can be described as an invariant of such transfor-
mations, namely, as an invariant of all invertible transformations of each model of this theory
into each other model. A geometrical origin of this idea becomes evident when one compares it
with Klein’s Erlangen Program [134], which, remind, is the idea of studying geometrical spaces
through the identification of groups of automorphismes of these spaces and their invariants (6.1)3
3On the history of Klein - Hilbert partnership see [208].
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Now I would like to stress a foundational and unificational aspects of Klein’s program, which I
did not discuss earlier.
The Erlangen Program was formulated by Klein as a part of his research aiming at common
foundation and unification of Euclidean and recently discovered Non-Euclidean geometries. Two
major publications relevant to this research are Klein’s papers [133] of 1871 and [134] of 1873; the
Program was first published just in between, in 1872. Klein’s idea (which he partly borrows from
Cayley, see [228]) is to use the group-theoretic Erlangen approach for presenting Lobachebsky’s
hyperbolic geometry and Euclidiean geometry (which Klein calls parabolic) as special cases of
projective geometry. Klein, of course, did not build a projective space as an abstract structure
like we do this today. Instead, he first describes projective transformations and their invariants
in the traditional way using Euclidean geometry (in the analytic form), and then specified some
transformations of Euclidean lengths, which did not affect the group of projective transforma-
tions but brought what we would call today models of Non-Euclidean spaces of two sorts: of
constant negative curvature (aka hyperbolic or Lobachevskian) and of constant positive curva-
ture (elliptic). Using this construction Klein presents the projective geometry as a foundation of
a whole family of metric geometries including the Euclidean geometry (as the case of null curva-
ture). From the modern viewpoint Klein’s approach to foundations of geometry looks peculiar or
even wholly misguided because it limits itself to the case of differentiable manifolds of constant
curvature and does not involve any explicit topological consideration. Leaving now aside the
general question concerning the role of Klein’s approach in the history of geometry, I shall talk
only about a special relationship between Klein’s and Hilbert’s approaches to foundations of
geometry.
Klein describes the projective structure as the core geometrical structure, which unifies geometry
(or at least its fragment) as described above. By the same pattern Hilbert points to the logical
structure as the core structure that unifies all theories including geometrical theories. In order to
make this analogy more precise I shall distinguish between two different senses of the expression
“logical structure”, both of which are relevant in this context. First, one may talk about the
logical structure of certain theory T . Logical structure of T is made explicit by the formal version
FT of T . So a logical structure in this first sense is a formal theory (or the axiomatic structure
of a given formal theory if one prefers). In Klein’s spirit such formal theory FT can be described
as an invariant of transformation of any given model T of this theory into any other model of
the same theory: remind Hilbert’s “univocal and invertible one-to-one transformation” in the
above quote. Second, by the logical structure one may mean the universal logical structure of the
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world, which “is invariant under all possible one-one transformations of the world onto itself” (
[235], p. 149). The latter quote is Tarski’s definition of logicality, see 2.2 above. Taski’s “world”
is, technically, a typed universe, which comprises individuals, classes of individuals, classes of
classes of individuals, etc.; “transformations of the world onto itself” are automorphisms of this
universe, which respect typing. I shall comment also on the philosophical aspect of Tarski’s
notion of world shortly. For the sake of my argument I assume hereafter that Tarski’s notion of
logicality correctly explicates Hilbert’s implicit notion of logicality.
Saying that Hilbert considers the logical structure as the core structure of all theories I am
talking about the logical structure in the second sense. So Hilbert’s axiomatic construction of
formal theories like Klein’s construction has two levels: it comprises logic at the base level and
(formal) theories at the next level. This Hilbert’s two-level construction reflects Klein’s two-level
construction as follows: for Klein each (metric) geometry is the projective geometry provided
with an additional metric structure; for Hilbert each (axiomatic) theory is logic provided with
an additional axiomatic structure (say, with the axiomatic structure of Euclidean geometry).
Geometrical structures and logical structures are construed here similarly in terms of invariants
of corresponding transformations. This analogy between Klein’s and Hilbert’s foundations is
visualized at the below diagram where PG stands for projective geometry, MG for metric geom-
etry (in the restricted sense of the Riemanian geometry of manifolds with constant curvature),
s1, s2 are functors forgetting some structure (the metric structure for s1 and the non-logical
axiomatic structure for s2) and, finally, a1, a2 for my suggested two-level analogy between Klein
and Hilbert:
MG
a1 //
s1

Theories
s2

PG a2
// Logic
Freudeltal [65] is greatly impressed by Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 and describes the preceding
history anachronistically from Hilbert’s axiomatic viewpoint. In his view Klein’s approach in
foundations of geometry is fundamentally confused. According to Freudental Klein “did not un-
derstand the logical function of the model” and as a result “[t]he logic of geometry was obscured
rather than clarified by [Klein’s] discovery of a model for non-Euclidean geometry”; thus “this
discovery did not contribute to clarifying the foundations of geometry” ([65], p. 614). Freudental
stresses the fact that Hilbert’s axiomatic approach helps one to avoid a vicious circle in Klein’s
reasoning who first uses Euclidean geometry for introducing projective geometry and then sug-
267
gests the latter as a foundation of the former (Klein himself denies that the circle is vicious)
([65], p. 614). A similar point can be made about many other logical difficulties of the 19th
century geometry easily found, in particular, in Lobachevsky’s works. However these advantages
of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method come with a price about which Freudental is well aware and which
he readily accepts:
[According to the view popular in the end of the 19th century, i]n any case geometry
deals with real space - Pasch, Enriques, Veronese, Pieri, Klein stressed this, and at
the eleventh hour (1987) Russell wrote his philosophy [of] Foundations of Geometry,
which reveals the faint footstep of Kant rather then the paw of the lion.
Wir denken uns drei vershiedene Systeme von Dingen. [Let us consider three dis-
tinct systems of things.] - the bond with reality is cut. Geometry has become pure
mathematics. ([65], p. 618)
“Wir denken uns drei vercshiedene Systeme von Dingen..” is the beginning of the first chapter of
Hilbert’s Foundations of 1899 [109], see 2.1. Unlike Greenberg [82] Freudental locates the “cut
of the bond with reality” precisely: the cut was made not by the discovery of Non-Euclidean ge-
ometries but by Hilbert’s axiomatic treatment of these geometries. Freudental describes Pasch’s
philosophical work aiming at the empirical justification of geometrical axioms as a ballast, which
didn’t allow Pasch’s axiomatization of geometry of 1882 [193] to become as influential as Hilbert’s
axiomatization of 1899. Freudental quotes Einstein [49] saying that
The progress entailed by axiomatics consists in the sharp separation of the logical
form’ and the realistic and intuitive contents. [..] The axioms are voluntary creations
of the human mind. [..] To this interpretation of geometry I attach great importance
because if I had not been acquainted with it, I would never have been able to develop
the theory of relativity. (quoted after [65], p. 619)
Stressing the “liberating effect” (Greenberg) and the success of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method in
“the lobbies of science and philosophy” ( [65], p. 619) Freudental does not provide any philosoph-
ical argument justifying the idea of pure mathematics cut from any “realistic content”. He rather
suggests that the public success of this idea talks for itself. However today this success appears
today to be more problematic than it appeared a century ago. Obviously the liberating effect
of Hilbert’s axiomatic approach triggered important developments in mathematics and physics,
which wholly changed the shape of these sciences. However neither in the pure mathematics
nor in physics Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method is systematically applied today in its original form.
The liberation from outdated patterns of thinking is necessary for scientific progress but it is not
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sufficient, so we need today to think about new ways of linking mathematics with experience
and with reality.
A drawback of Hilbert’s axiomatic revolution, which I have already stressed in 2.2 and judged
unacceptable, is the revival of the traditional metaphysical thinking (that Kant calls dogamtic)
in the new cloths of formal logical methods. Tarski’s analysis of logicality makes this return of
metaphysics very explicit. Tarski’s world (which, remind, serves Tarski for defining logicality)
is a “metaphysical world of thought” (Cassirer), which is not simply prior to any experience
but which (unlike Kant’s world of pure intuitions) is also wholly independent of the world of
experience. Tarski’s world of individuals and classes would be still there even if the empirical
science would not exist and would not be possible. Whether this metaphysical world is believed
to exist independently on some Platonic heaven, or believed to exist in the human or some
super-human mind, is a secondary metaphysical issue, which I shall not go into.
A more specific critical argument against Hilbert’s axiomatic approach and in favor of Klein’s
approach consists of saying that using logic is the universal invariant structure of all theories
for the unification of geometry is an overkill, which leaves unnoticed some important details the
hierarchy of relevant geometrical structures. This explains why we still call the hyperbolic geom-
etry by this name invented by Klein. The axiomatic classification of geometries into Euclidean
and Non-Euclidean on the basis of Euclid’s Fifth Postulate reflects the history of the question
rather than the structure of the subject-matter itself. As Weyl put this in 1923
The question of the validity of the “fifth postulate”, on which historical development
started its attack on Euclid, seems to us nowadays to be a somewhat accidental point
of departure. [84] p.??
This Weyl’s remark squares with Lawvere’s general critique of Formal Axiomatic Method accord-
ing to which Hilbert-style axiomatic presentations of theories are “subjective” (4.3). In Chapter
4.3 we shall see how this problem is fixed with the New Axiomatic Method.
Let me summarize this Section. We have seen that Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method combines two
ideas: one is the idea of mathematical structure as an invariant of some group of transformations,
and the other is the idea of logic as a ultimate foundations of scientific thought on a par with
metaphysics. The former idea stems from the 19th century geometry, and more specifically from
Klein’s Erlangen Program [134], the latter - from Aristotle and the following Scholastic tradition.
The two ideas are combined by Tarksi’s method: logic is thought of as a structure invariant under
all possible transformations of the metaphysical world unto itself. None of these two ideas entails
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the other. However their mixture, which one may call structural logicism, became in the 20th
century popular and influential. Mathematical structuralism as described by Hellman [95] shares
Hilbert’s logicist assumption and so qualifies as a version of structural logicism. This logicist
assumption also makes part of the set-theoretic substantialism but in this latter case it is not
combined with the structural view on logic.
8.4 Objective Structures
Kant’s theory of mathematical representation provides a link between the pure mathematics
and the mathematically-laden empirical science. Euclid has his own theory of representation,
which he develops on the basis of his geometry and presents in his Optics ([52], vol. 7; English
translation [50])4. Euclid’s Optics, Ptolemy’s Optics Ptolemy:1996 and later geometrical theories
of spatial representation developed under the name of theories of perspective [3] are interesting
for the history of physics because they provide geometrical models of observation and explicitly
introduce the observer into a mathematical picture. Although Kant’s theory of mathematical
representation and mathematical theories of perspective are very different in their character it
seems me appropriate to consider them from a common viewpoint.
According to Kant the origin of mathematical objectivity lies in the fact that all mathematical
objects are constructed according to certain rules, which can be either explicit as in the case of
Euclid’s Postulates (1.4) or implicit. This is why for Kant all sound mathematics is objective,
and there is a single idealized subject (that Kant calls transcendental subject) who is doing the
sound mathematics. This Kantian view squares with Newton’s notion of absolute space and time,
which allegedly lies behind any subjective relational representation of space and time (say, in
same frame of reference). So Kant’s notion of objectivity accounts for the objectivity of Newton’s
absolute space and time rather than for a relational notion of objectivity that may arise from
comparing various frames of reference5. Today one cannot, of course, use Newton’s outdated
views on space and time for defending the Kantian view on objectivity. On the contrary, one
can refer to the success of relational theories of space and time (most importantly in Einstein’s
theory of relativity) as a reason for taking seriously mathematical theories of objectivity, which
explicitly introduce the observer into the picture. Leaving the history of perspective for another
study I shall now describe a recent mathematical theory of objectivity, which is closely related
4Euclid’s Optics is a geometrical theory of vision rather an optical theory in the modern sense of the term.
Latin word perspectiva is the translation of Greek optika first used by Boethius ([3], p. xx)
5In fact Kant’s attitude to Newton’s theory of absolute space and time was critical and complicated; it changed
during Kant’s career. What I say about it here is a rough approximation, for details see [68].
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to the structuralist trend in mathematics and physics.
Consider a geometrical object S, for example a stature thought of as a solid in the Euclidean
3-space, and a series of images Pi of S taken from different perspectives. Considering changes
of perspective as transformations of one such image into another (Pi → Pj) one may describe
S as an invariant of the given group of transformations. Under appropriate conditions such a
description determines S uniquely. This way of thinking about geometrical objects is pertinent
when one uses coordinate systems. For example circle C with radius R and centre O is represented
with the orthogonal coordinate system with the origin in O by the equation x2+y2 = R2. But in
a different orthogonal coordinate system this very circle C is represented by a different equation.
So if one wants to study the geometry of this circle using orthogonal coordinates one needs to
learn how to switch from one such coordinate system to another and extract the information,
which is invariant under the change of coordinate system (which in the given example is easy but
in other cases is not). As long as coordinate systems represent physical frames of reference this
problem is also relevant to physics. A classical example is given by Einstein’s Special Relativity
(SR). In the Newtonian physics it is assumed that spatial lengths and time intervals are objective
in the sense that they don’t depend on the particular frame of reference, in which they are
measured. SR tells us that the Newtonian assumption is only approximately correct for frames
of reference which move with respect to each other with velocities significantly smaller than the
speed of light. So in SR spatial lengths and time intervals are no longer objective in that sense:
here measurements of lengths and times by different observers brings results, which do not agree
with each other in the usual Euclidean way. However the spacetime of SR is also equipped
with the notion of spatiotemporal interval, which measures the spatiotemporal distance between
events; in SR spatiotemporal intervals are invariant under the change of reference frame, and
in this sense are objective. Since the spatiotemporal interval interval between some observed
events can be calculated on the basis of measurements of lengths and time intervals made in any
given frame of reference, different observers can again agree with each other about what they
observe.
Generalizing upon the last example one can attach the following physical sense to the Erlangen
Program: given a space think about the automorphisms of this space as transformations of one
point of view on this space (= reference frame) into another. Invariants of these transformations
represent objective features of this space (and the objective features of stuff found “in” this space)
as distinguished from subjective representations of these features in each reference frame. Such
transformations, which transform a given reference frame into another reference frame, are called
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in physics passive transformations. So the invariance under passive transformations is the most
obvious meaning of being objective, which is formulated in mathematical and physical rather
than general philosophical terms. However the invariance under some active transformations,
which transform the given space itself rather than views on this space, also contribute to the
colloquial notion of physical objectivity. (Beware that the distinction between passive and active
transformations comes from physics and has no purely mathematical sense: we are now talking
about the same geometrical transformations but interpret them differently.) It turns out that
for purely mathematical reasons the assumption about certain symmetries of space and time )
implies the existence of certain quantities globally conserved in all physical processes (Noether
theorem). In particular, the assumption according to which a world living some time ahead or
some time behind our actual world in the absolute Newtonian time would not be distinguishable
from our world by its physical properties, implies the existence of the conserved quantity that
we call energy. The principle of conservation of energy (which survives in the relativistic model
without the absolute time) is “more objective” than any contingent spatiotemporal state of affairs
in the sense that unlike the spatiotemporal facts this principle can be independently tested in
very different (closed) physical systems at different places in different times by different people
[191].
So far we were talking about invariants of transformations as quantities, which in physics are
usually represented by real or complex numbers. When Klein formulated his Erlangen Program
he meant a more general notion of invariant but, as I have already mentioned, he did not use
our modern mathematical notion of invariant structure; in particular, he did not know how
to describe metric and projective spaces as abstract structures. The notion of objectivity as
invariance under transformations that does not involve the notion of structure can be called
pre-structural6. One can however go further and introduce the modern notion of mathematical
structure into physical contexts and provide relevant structures with some sense of physical
objectivity. I cannot say which role if any this idea plays in today’s physics but it does play a
role in some recent philosophy of physics: it is the core idea of the recent structural realism and
the recent structuralist trend in the philosophy of physics [38][141].
In Hellman’s terms the structuralist idea of objectivity can be formulated as follows: invariant
structures are objective, exchangeable particular items instantiating these structures are not.
When this idea is interpreted ontologically (so that the objectivity implies existence) the result-
6On the basis of this pre-structural notion of objectivity coming from physics Nozick [191] develops a general
philosophical theory of objectivity, which covers the objectivity of truth, the objectivity of knowledge and the
ethical objectivity.
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ing ontology resembles Plato’s ontology where only enduring invariant Forms really exist while
material items, which “partake” these forms don’t really exist but rather become (5.4). As
Nozick puts this (discussing conserved quantities in physics)
[S]omething whose amount in this universe cannot be altered, diminished or aug-
mented should count as (at least tied for being) the most objective thing there actu-
ally is. ([191], p. 81)
In 8.8 I describe a more dynamical non-structuralist way of thinking about objectivity suggested
by category theory.
8.5 Types and Categories of Structures
Remind from 2.1 that Hilbert’s idea of Formal Axiomatic Method did not work out quite as
expected: soon after publishing in 1899 his Foundations of Geometry Hilbert realized that his
system of axioms for geometry has non-isomorphic models, i.e., that this theory is not categorical.
As long as Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method is used as intended the lack of categoricity is seen as
a problem, and one wants to enforce the categoricity by some additional means (like Hilbert’s
second-order axiom of completeness used in the second edition of Foundations of Geometry
published in 1903 [98]. However as I have already stressed in Chapter 3 this Axiomatic Method
is rarely (if ever) used as intended by Hilbert; at least, it is not used as intended in the 20th
century structural mathematics.
A canonical example of structural axiomatic theory is group theory (see 3.2 above); for the
reader’s convenience I repeat here the relevant axioms:
G1: x ◦ (y ◦ z) = (x ◦ y) ◦ z (associativity of ◦)
G2: there exists an item 1 (called unit) such that for all x x ◦ 1 = 1 ◦ x = x
G3: for all x there exists x−1 (called inverse of x) such that x ◦ x−1 = x−1 ◦ x = 1.
The fact that there are non-isomorphic groups means that the formal theory GT determined
by axioms G1-3 is not categorical. However GT is not the group theory in the usual sense of
the word. The group theory in the usual sense of the word is a theory of models of G1-3 called
groups. When axioms G1-3 are called axioms of group theory then either the relevant notion
of theory is not Hilbert’s or the expression “group theory” does not have its usual sense. The
categoricity of GT can be enforced with additional axioms, for example, with axioms, which
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specify that the intended model of our new formal theory GC is the infinite cyclic group. So
GC pins down this particular group. But the group theory studies all groups but not only this
or that particular group. (Talking about a “particular group” I mean, of course, “particular up
to isomorphism”.) Thus the lack of categoricity of theory GT is not a problem but rather an
advantage: axioms G1-3 determine a type of structures of interest and by adding new axioms one
may specify particular structures (like the infinite cyclic group) and study these structures in the
context of other structures of the same type. This makes the content of the “pure” group theory.
However groups are also studied in the context of structures of some other types like in the case
of homotopy theory. In such cases one leaves the boarders of the “pure” group theory and applies
this theory in other parts of mathematics. A homotopy group (i.e., a group of homotopies) is a
mixed structure, which combines a group structure with an appropriately decorated topological
structure. The possibility to combine structures of different types is crucial for Bourbaki’s
project of unifying mathematics and designing its global “architecture” [24]. The general idea
of Bourbaki’s architecture is this: to specify a small number of “great types of structures” and
then reconstruct the rest of mathematics by combining structures of these “great types”. Thus
Bourbaki’s structural mathematics can be described as a joint model theory of a whole bunch of
formal theories like G, which combine with each other in various ways. The artificial character of
this description reflects the artificial character of Hilbert’s notion of formal theory. In the context
of modern structural mathematics it is more natural to call GT and its likes definitions rather
than theories. This remark reveals a traditional aspect of the modern structural mathematics:
just like in Euclid’s mathematics one introduces here some general concepts through definitions,
specifies these general concepts through some further definitions, instantiates these concepts with
certain objects (which in the structural mathematics are called structures) according to certain
rules and, finally, applies some further constructions for proving non-trivial theorems (which,
generally, do not follow directly from the definitions).
Let me now use the example of group theory for being more specific. Saying that groups G1 and
G2 are isomorphic is tantamount to the following:
I1: elements of G1 are in one-to-one correspondence with elements of G2;
I2: for all elements a1, b1, c1 from G1 such that a1 ⊕ b1 = c1 the corresponding elements a2,
b2, c2 from G2 satisfy a2 ⊗ b2 = c2 where ⊕ is the group operation in G1 and ⊗ is the group
operation in G2.
A one-to-one correspondence between elements of two given groups that satisfies I2 is called
(group) isomorphism. Groups are isomorphic if and only if there exists isomorphism between
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them. One may think about a one-to-one correspondence between elements of groups G1 and
G2, which satisfies condition I2, as a map or transformation i : G1 → G2 of one group into
another group. Since a one-to-one correspondence is a symmetric construction the choice of G1
as the source and G2 as the target of this transformation is arbitrary. In other words, one and
the same isomorphism-qua-correspondence gives rise to two isomorphisms- qua-transformations
i : G1 → G2 and j : G1 → G2 , which run in opposite directions and cancel each other on both
sides 7. As I have already remarked, this terminology is slightly confusing but it is too common
for trying to change it.
Invertible maps aka isomorphisms are not the only sort of maps between groups suggested by
definition G1-3. Instead of one-to-one correspondence between elements of G1, G2, one considers
a more general kind of correspondence that is allowed to be many-to-one (but not one-to-many).
In other words, one considers functions f : S1 → S2 from the set S1 of elements of G1 to the
set S2 of elements of G2. Condition I2 remains the same; notice that it can be satisfied when
elements a1, b1 are different but elements a2, b2 are the same. A maps satisfying these relaxed
conditions is called a (group) homomorphism.
Similar general notion of map can be defined for any mathematical structure. However there is no
canonical way for doing this as can be seen at the example of topological spaces. Remind that a
topological space is the set T = P (S) of subsets of some given set S some of which are called open
while some other are called closed, which satisfy certain axioms. An isomorphism of topological
spaces (aka homeomorphism aka invertible continuous transformation) i : T1 → T2 takes each
open of T1 into an open of T2 and each closed of T1 into a closed of T2. Now one wants to define
a continuous (but not necessarily invertible) transformation of topological spaces as a general
transformation that transforms one topological space into another (similarly to homomorphisms
for groups). One may think of two possibilities: either to take opens to opens without assuming
the corresponding condition for closed, or the other way round, to take closed to closed without
assuming the corresponding condition for opens. The axioms of topological space treat opens
and closed differently but they don’t allow one to rule out one of these two options in favor of
the other on some formal reasons. So the definition of continuous transformation is a matter of
further specification of the notion of topological space. The standard definition of continuous
7“[C]ancel each other” means exactly this: the composition transformation i ◦ j resulting from the application
of transformation j after transformation i sends every element of G1 into itself and composition transformation
j ◦ i sends every element of G2 into itself (beware that none of the two conjuncts implies the other). Given these
conditions each of transformations i and j is called the inverse of the other. The inverse map can be defined
without referring to elements of groups if these groups are thought of as objects of a category: maps i, j are called
mutually inverse when i ◦ j = 1G1 and j ◦ i = 1G2 where 1G1 is the identity morphism of G1 and 1G2 is the
identity morphism of G2.
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transformation corresponds to the second option: the inverse image of an open set is always
open while the direct image of an open set can be also closed.
Group homomorphisms and similar maps between structures of other types are colloquially
called “structure preserving” (or “structure reflecting” as in the above example of continuous
transformation). This is somewhat misleading because if such maps preserve anything at all it is
a type of structure but not a particular structure. Think about this trivial example: for all groups
G1, G2 there exist a homomorphism h: G1 → G2 which sends every element of G1 to the unit
of G2. This homomorphism “destroys all information” about G1 reducing its image to a single
element; it doesn’t provide any information about G2 either (except the fact that G2 is a group).
Thus homomorphisms, generally, don’t allow for invariants in anything like the same sense in
which isomorphisms do so. The colloquial talk of “preservation” of structure apparently stems
from the early days of group theory when group homomorphisms were not well distinguished
from group isomorphisms and were seen as a sort of “imperfect” isomorphisms [253].
In order to see that thinking about homomorphisms as imperfect isomorphisms is misleading
try to replace isomorphisms by homomorphisms in the process of abstraction described in 5.5.
One might expect to get in this way a generalized notion of structure but this doesn’t work.
Recall the first step: given class G of groups we have divided it into equivalence subclasses of
isomorphic groups. Two groups are isomorphic if and only if there exists isomorphism (i.e., an
invertible transformation) between them; clearly this is an equivalence relation. Let me (for
the sake of argument) call two groups homomorphic if and only if there is a homomorphism
between them. Although this latter relation is also an equivalence, one can see the difference:
since all groups are homomorphic (see the above example of group homomorphism) one cannot
use this equivalence for dividing G into equivalence subclasses. Saying that two given groups
are homomorphic is tantamount to saying that the given groups are groups. So the relation of
homomorphism just introduced (not to be confused with the standard notion of homomorphism
as transformation) doesn’t make sense.
We see that homomorphisms cannot do the same job as isomorphisms: the invertibility condition
stressed by Hilbert in the above quote turns out to be crucial for structural abstraction. One
cannot reason “up to homomorphism” in anything like the same way in which people reason
up to isomorphism doing structural mathematics. Since “invariant” in the given context is just
another word for structure it is clear that homomorphisms, generally, don’t have invariants in
anything like the same sense in which isomorphisms and groups of isomorphisms do so.
Let me now explain how the category theory enters into the picture. The emergence of category
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theory in he 1940s and its further development in the context of structural mathematics was
related to a growing awareness of the role of general maps (not only isomorphisms). This is a
simple theorem [175] that a class of structures of any fixed type provided with an appropriate
notion of general map form a category. A non-mathematical reader is advised to refresh the def-
inition of category given in 6.3 above. In this present Section I present some basic mathematical
context in which this notion has been first invented and proved useful. This is the context of
structural mathematics. For a detailed historical account of early days of category theory see
[137].
Remind from 8.2 the Bourbaki’s intention to get rid of the set-theoretic background of structural
mathematics and work with “pure structures” whatever this might mean. Apparently the notion
of category makes this structuralist dream true. Consider the category G of groups for example.
In order to build this category in the usual way one needs, first, to introduce groups (through
G1-3 or with an equivalent system of axioms), second, introduce group homomorphisms and,
finally put these elements together and, in particular, explain how the homomorphisms compose
with each other. In this construction the set-theoretic background is indispensable. However one
may try to reverse the conceptual order and introduce G from the stretch, first, as an abstract
generally category, and then (through some additional axioms) as a specific category distinct
from any other category by some distinctive categorical properties. As soon as this is done one
may claim that the notion of group is fully accounted for in terms of maps (including identity
maps aka objects), and so the set-theoretic background is effectively dispensed.
We have seen in 4.1 how Lawvere realized such a project for the category of sets [146]. This
and other similar achievements show that the idea of categorification (in the broad sense of
6.3) works out. We shall now see, however, that the better it works the less relevant becomes
its structuralist philosophical underpinning. Since this philosophical underpinning concerns the
Axiomatic Method, it is not just a matter of personal philosophical taste. In the next Chapter
I shall argue that Hilbert’s structural Axiomatic Method is not appropriate for the categorical
mathematics and suggest a replacement.
8.6 Invariance versus Functoriality
In their seminal paper that marks the official birth of category theory Eilenberg and Mac Lane
describe this theory as a continuation of the Erlangen Program:
This may be regarded as a continuation of the Klein Erlanger Program, in the sense
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that a geometrical space with its group of transformations is generalized to a category
with its algebra of mappings. ( [48], p. 237)
Commenting on this passage Marquis says:
Klein’s fundamental idea was that to study a geometry, one had to look at its group
of transformations and, furthermore, the geometric properties of that geometry are
those which are invariant under the group of transformations. This seems to be the
core of the generalization that Eilenberg and Mac Lane had in mind. ([181], p. 10)
I disagree with Mariquis’ understanding of the core of this generalization. In my view, the core
of the generalization is another feature of the Erlangen Program, which Marquis also mentions,
namely the very idea of considering mathematical objects together with their transformations
(mappings). The categorical generalization of this idea amounts to including non-invertible map-
pings into the picture and treating them on equal footing with invertible ones (6.3). The notion
of invariant, which is crucial for Klein’s original approach, does not play the same major role
in a categorical setting: there are no invariants of categories of geometrical transformations
similar to invariants of groups of such transformations. Algebras of mappings don’t play the
same role: they are rather abstract algebraic objects similar to abstract groups (as distinguished
from groups of concrete geometrical transformations). The categorical counterpart of invari-
ance is rather functoriality that splits into covariance and contravariance. Saying this I don’t
try to follow Eilenberg&MacLane verbatim. Apparently these authors indeed have the idea of
“preservation of structure” in their minds when they say:
The invariant character of a mathematical discipline can be formulated in these terms.
Thus, in group theory all the basic constructions can be regarded as definitions of co-
and contra-variant functors, so we may formulate the dictum: The subject of group
theory is essentially the study of those constructions of groups which behave in a
covariant or contravariant manner under induced homomorphisms. More precisely,
group theory studies functors defined on well specified categories of groups, with
values in another such category.
I cannot see that the subject-matter of group theory construed as “those constructions of groups
which behave in a covariant or contravariant manner under induced homomorphisms” indeed
expresses the “invariant character” of this discipline. In this passage Eilenberg&MacLane de-
scribe the co- and contra-variance (i.e., the functoriality) as a generalized invariance. But this
is misleading. What has been said above about non-invertible group homomorphisms mutatis
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mutandis applies to non-invertible functors: they don’t leave anything invariant, not even the
type of structure because the domain and the codomain categories of a given functor e : A→ B
can be categories of structures of different types. The covariance of functor e amounts to the
commutativity of all diagrams of the form
x
ex //
f

e(x)
e(f)

y
ey
// e(y)
were f : x → y is morphism in A, e(f) : e(x) → e(y) is the image of morphism f under functor
e in B, and ex, ey are called components of functor e.
A contravariant functor e′ reverses arrows as follows:
x
e′x //
f

e′(x)
y
e′y
// e′(y)
e′(f)
OO
Assuming after Klein, Eilenberg, MacLane and Mariquis that morphisms and functors are trans-
formations one can see that the above square diagrams are wholly dynamic: everything changes
in them and nothing remains invariant. These squares represent not some invariant structures
surviving through changes but certain coherences between different changes, which make these
diagrams to commute. This coherence of transformation in mathematics is called functoriality.
Unless the relevant functors are invertible functoriality does not imply invariance. The tendency
of thinking of functoriality as generalized invariance is the same tendency by which people think
of homomorphisms as imperfect isomorphisms. This tendency can be described as a case of
conceptual inertia, which prevents one from making the full justice of a new concept.
According to Eilenberg&MacLane’s dictum the genuine group-theoretic features are those fea-
tures of groups, which vary functorially. This dictum provides a clear epistemic criterion for
distinguishing epistemically significant features of groups from all their other features. But con-
tra Eilenberg&MacLane I claim that this new epistemic criterion does not reduce to the older
platonic or structuralist criterion according to which only invariant features are epistemically
significant, while all variable features are not.
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The switch from the structuralist thinking in terms of invariance to the new categorical thinking
in terms of covariance and contravariance (i.e., functoriality) signifies a decisive brake with the
structuralist viewpoint, which is not yet commonly realized. This conceptual change remains,
however, an open philosophical and mathematical problem rather than a mere psychological
problem. Since the concept of category is born in the context of structural mathematics it
comes equipped with a structural method of theory-building (to wit Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic
Method) and with the structural definition of category given by Eilenberg and Mac Lane in [48].
In order to establish the new point of view one needs to remake this basic framework on new
grounds. Before the job is done the new idea survives through various compromises with the
established view; one of such compromises I am now going to describe.
8.7 Are Categories Structures?
Axioms for category theory suggested by Eilenberg and Mac Lane [48] provide a structural
definition of category in the same way in which axioms G1-3 provide a structural definition of
group. This suggests considering the notion of category as just another type of structure on a
par with groups, rings, topological spaces, etc. . However the intended application of this notion
described in 8.5 does not quite fit this idea as we shall now see. The category G of groups or
the category of structures of any other type embodies the corresponding type of structures in a
way similar to which the set N of natural numbers embodies the (extension of the) concept of
natural number. In the pre-Cantorian mathematics one could embody the concept of natural
number only by instantiating this concept with some particular numbers; after Cantor one can
also represent the full extension of this concept by set N . Similarly, in the pre-categorical
mathematics one could embody the general concept of group only by instantiating it with some
particular structure like that of infinite cyclic group 8; after Eilenberg and Mac Lane one can
also represent the full extension of group concept by category G. One may remark that the
concept of proper class is sufficient for it. However as I have already stressed in 5.8 the proper
classes mathematically sterile in the sense that one cannot do any further construction with
them. Categories, on the contrary, are very productive in this sense: given G as above one may
square it (G2 is the category of functors from the two-point set to the category of groups), power
8Notice that I talk here about the instantiation of the group concept not in the same sense in which Hellman
talks about the instantiation of structures by particular “systems”. Each particular group structure can be
instantiated by such a system of concrete “items” and concrete operations with these items. This is Hellman’s
instantiation. I am talking here about the instantiation of the general group concept by a particular group
structure. One may object that what I call instantiation is rather a specification because a particular group
structure is not an individual object but another concept. I do count particular structures as particular objects
determined up to isomorphism.
280
with it some other category (consider, for example category V ectG of linear presentations of
groups), etc. Thus unlike proper classes categories are effective vehicles for types of structures
just like structures are effective vehicles for concepts like that of the infinite cyclic group.
Using Hilbert’s distinction between mathematics and metamathematics one may describe a cat-
egory of structures as a metastructure meaning that all structures of a given type are models of
the same formal theory (like theory GT), and so the given category belongs to the metatheory
(namely, the model theory) of this theory. Does this metastructure qualify as a structure in the
usual sense of the word? The answer is in negative because of the size problem (5.8): since the
collection of all groups or all structures of any other fixed type is not a set but a proper class
it is problematic to think about the categories of such structures on a par with these structures
themselves.
A category in which all morphisms (including identity morphisms) form a set (as distinguished
from a proper class) is called small. Small categories can be thought of as structures on their own.
Some well known mathematical structures are small categories. In particular, a (single) group
is a category with only one object and all morphisms invertible; a partial order is a category
having at most one morphism going from one given object to another given object. Eilenberg
and MacLane realize that small categories are the only categories, which are fully legitimate (as
long as one uses their axiomatic definition of category) - and they also realize that the reduction
of categories to small categories makes the concept of category uninteresting. So they suggest
an “intuitive” point of view:
We remarked [..] that such examples as the“category of all sets”, “category of all
groups” are illegitimate. The difficulties and antinomies here involved are exactly
those of ordinary intuitive Mengenlehre [i.e. the naive set theory]; no essentially new
paradoxes are apparently involved. Any rigorous foundation capable of supporting
the ordinary theory of classes would equally well support our theory. Hence we have
chosen to adopt the intuitive standpoint, leaving the reader to insert whatever type
of logical foundation (or absence thereof) he may prefer. ( [48], p. 246)
In 4.4 we have seen how Lawvere [147] tries to solve this problem with his idea of category
of categories as foundation (CCAF). He first uses Eilenberg&MacLane’s axioms for defining an
abstract category CAT , about which he thinks intuitively without considering model-theoretic
issues (the elementary theory); then he strengthens this theory specifying by internal means
of CAT each particular object C of CAT as a category (the basic theory). Lawvere does not
refer in CCAF to classes but one may argue after Mayberry Mayberry:2000 that some primitive
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notion of class or collection is involved in this construction anyway because otherwise the Formal
Axiomatic Method used at the first step wouldn’t work. In order to use Eilenberg&MacLane’s
axioms, so the argument goes, one needs to think of collection of individuals and relations between
these individuals, which satisfies these axioms under an appropriate interpretation; since the
given system of axioms is obviously non-categorical one should also distinguish between different
collections satisfying these conditions. Since the Formal Axiomatic Method applies everywhere
in mathematics and not only in category theory one cannot identify such a primitive notion of
collection of individuals with a category from the outset but is obliged to consider a category as
a special type of mathematical structure on a par with other types of structure.
I agree with Mayberry that a primitive notion of collection is an indispensable ingredient of
the Formal Axiomatic Method. But unlike Mayberry I don’t believe that this method is itself
indispensable in mathematics. Instead of thinking about categories as structures of special
sort I suggest to think about structures as categories of special sort9. Since Hilbert’s Formal
Axiomatic Method brings about nothing but structures (8.3) in order to justify the view on
mathematical structure as a special type of category one needs to build category theory and the
rest of mathematics with a different method.
8.8 Objects Are Maps
Remind Gauss’ idea of intrinsic geometry, which I mentioned talking about the intuitive back-
ground of Riemann’s geometry in (7.3). In his [70] Gauss identified some geometrical properties
of surfaces, including the intrinsic notion of curvature, that do not depend on the way in which
a given surface is embedded into the outer 3-space. This idea later allowed Einstein (after Rie-
mann) to conceive of a curve space independently of any embedding of this space in some outer
flat space. The notion of intrinsic geometry has a clear invariant character: the Gaussian curva-
ture and other intrinsic characteristics (including topological characteristics) of a given surface
do not change when this surface is folded or unfolded. However I would like to stress a different
aspect of Gauss’ idea, which allowed for a new way of thinking about objects and spaces in
geometry.
Given a surface one can think of it (i) in the usual way as a two-dimensional object living in the
Euclidean 3-space and (ii) as a 2-space on its own rights (characterized by the intrinsic properties
9Lawvere suggests (in person) to identify structures with functors from small categories to a large background
category like that of sets. In order to make this categorical notion of structure self-sustained one needs to treat
the size issue categorically without referring to set theory; I leave now this important subject aside.
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of the given surface), which is a home for its points, lines, triangles, etc.. Generally, a geometrical
object can be described in this context as a map of the form s : B → C where B is a type of
the given object and C is a space where the given object lives and instantiates (or represents,
which in the given context is the same) its type. This way of thinking about spaces and objects
in spaces can be represented by this diagram:
TY PE
object// SPACE
It is suggestive also to think about a general categorical morphism in this way. As we can see
it agrees with the way in which morphisms are thought of in logical categories (4.3) and also
illustrates the dialectical unity of geometry and logic stressed by Lawvere at the example of
topos (4.9). Since we interpret all domains as spaces and all codomains as types these notions
are relational in the given context (each type serves as a space for incoming morphisms and each
space serves as a type for outgoing morphisms). I shall illustrate this way of thinking about
objects, spaces and types at some elementary geometrical examples.
Let us distinguish between two different notions of Euclidean plane: (i) the domain of Eu-
clidean Planimetry and (ii) an object living in the Euclidean 3-space (ESPACE). I shall write
EPLANE for Euclidean plane in the first sense, and write eplane for Euclidean plane in the
second sense. Then an eplane can be presented as a map:
EPLANE
eplane // ESPACE
Such maps are many (there are many planes in the space) but they all “are of” the same type;
this type in its turn is inhabited (as a space) by objects of different types:
CIRCLE
circle // EPLANE
A more interesting example I borrow from Lobachevsky [171]. Although Lobachevsky reasoned
about the hyperbolic space intuitively without using Euclidean models he actually used what in
modern term can be described as a non-standard hyperbolic model of Euclidean plane. Namely,
he found in the hyperbolic space a special surface that he called the horisphere and showed
that intrinsically the geometry of this surface is the plane Euclidean geometry. (This helped
Lobachevsky to develop the hyperbolic trigonometry and on this basis build an analytic model
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for his geometry.) Thus we have got an object of type EPLANE that does not look like
eplane:
EPLANE
horisphere// HSPACE
(HSPACE stands for hyperbolic space). We can see that the idea tho classify geometrical
objects into types by their shapes and forms is misleading because it works only when the
background space is fixed. However one can learn about any geometrical type by studying it
intrinsically as a space, i.e., by studying objects of all types living in it. My suggested approach
unlike the Riemanian approach does not privilege the intrinsic description against the extrinsic
one: the fact that a horisphere is intrinsically an Euclidean plane (in the sense of being of type
EPLANE) is just as significant as the fact that this horisphere is an object in the hyperbolic 3-
space (HSPACE): when one studies geometrical objects there is, generally, no epistemic reason
for privileging their types over their spaces or privileging their spaces over their types.
The geometrical objects so construed are composeable in the obvious way. Here is an example
of composite object:
CIRCLE
circle1 //
circle2

EPLANE
eplanewwnnn
nnn
nnn
nnn
ESPACE
In the given situation we tend to identify circle1 living on EPLANE with circle2 living in
ESPACE. However if ESPACE is projected back onto EPLANE and this projection turns
circle2 into an oval the difference becomes obvious.
I leave it to the reader to check that the composition of objects is associative.
Developing this toy categorical geometry it is suggestive to think about spaces as places where
objects meet:
?
??
??
??
•??
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think about types as places where objects split:
•
??
?
??
??
??
and think about the composition of objects as an operation that glues spaces and types to-
gether:
?
??
??
??
•
??
?
??
??
????
and thus form new objects capable for “self-representation”:
@
@@
@@
@@

??~~~~~~~
@
@@
@@
@@??~~~~~~~
Among such self-representing objects there is one that we call identity object and denote 1; the
identity object is distinguished by the usual conditions ( f !‘1 = f for each object f represented
in the same space, and 1!‘g = g for each object g of the same type), which in the given context
are read as the conditions of being neutral with respect to the composition of objects. Think
about EPLANE for example. We know how EPLANE represents objects of various types (circles,
triangles and the like) and we also know how EPLANE is represented in its turn in various other
spaces. Now in order to make sense of saying that all these representations are representations
in and of the same thing one should think of this thing itself as an object that represents itself
in a way, which stabilizes the dynamics of all inner (incoming) and outer (outgoing) representa-
tions.
The associative composition of objects and the above assumptions about the identity objects
makes these objects into a category, which I denote Geo for further references. Clearly Geo is
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not a well-defined specific category but rather a way of thinking about categories geometrically
and of thinking about geometry categorically10.
As the reader have seen what in category theory is usually called morphism I call object and what
in category theory is usually called object I call identity object. This suggested terminological
change is not without a reason. The distinction between objects and morphisms is useful in the
structural mathematics because it helps to construct categories from structures of certain types
(like groups) and appropriate morphisms of these structures (like group homomorphisms). Geo
can be also construed in this way as the category of differentiable manifolds and differentiable
maps (assuming that differentiable manifolds are construed as structured sets) or as some other
similar category. However I suggest a different way of thinking about Geo and about categories
in general. Before I shall try to clarify this different way of thinking let me remind that the usual
distinction between objects and morphisms of categories is formally dispensable: since with each
object A of given category C is associated a unique identity morphism 1A, one may formally
identify objects of C with their corresponding identity morphisms and thus consider objects as
morphisms of special sort. Thus, formally, a general category can be described as a class of things
called morphisms provided with a (partial) binary associative operation called composition. I
claim that the name of objects is more appropriate for these things than the name of morphisms.
Saying this I do not mean that any such thing can be called object in the most general sense
of the term (as suggested among others by Parsons [192]). Instead I have in mind a particular
notion of object, which implies that objects form categories. This way of thinking about objects
can be expressed by the slogan “objects are maps”.
One may wonder why I am not happy with the established mathematical terminology and don’t
want to get rid of the term “object” altogether and talk about maps or morphisms. The reason
is that the term “object” does not belong exclusively to mathematics but has also a philosoph-
ical meaning; as a philosophical notion the notion of object is closely related to the notion of
objectivity. Although my notion of object is not standard for the 20th century philosophy and
for the 20th century mathematics, it is rooted in an earlier philosophy and earlier mathematics,
in particular, in the Kantian philosophy and in the 19th century geometry. Since these histori-
cal links play a significant role in my proposal, I am not ready to scarify the term “object” by
replacing it by the term “map”. In addition, since the term “object” is used in category theory
anyway, I want to contrast in this context my proposed notion of object against the usual notion,
which underpins the established terminology.
10For an introduction into the modern categorical geometry I refer the reader to [72].
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In the beginning of his Founadations of 1899 [109] Hilbert proposes thinking about geometrical
objects as abstract “things” (of several basic types) and about geometrical spaces as “systems
of things” (2.1). I claim that the Kantian idea according to which an object is not simply
a thing but is a represented thing, deserves to be taken seriously. The principal modification
of Kant’s original viewpoint, which I suggest, is the following: while Kant assumed that all
objects are represented in the same space I allow for representations in different spaces. We
have seen that the 19th century geometry provides us with relevant examples. The example of
Lobachevsky’s horisphere is particularly useful in this respect because it shows that geometrical
objects, generally, are determined not only by their types (i.e., by their intrinsic properties) but
also by spaces in which they are represented. We have also seen that the modern mathematical
notion of category provides a suitable framework for such objects if one identifies these objects
with morphisms of some category.
Further, I believe that the notion of object is epistemically prior to the notions of type and space.
We encounter objects first and only then classify them into types and organize them into spaces.
That types of geometrical objects are many has been well understood already in Euclid’s times;
the fact that there are also many representation spaces, and that each geometrical type may serve
as a representation space, has been well understood by mathematicians only in the 19th century
(although the development of this idea can be traced through the history of mathematical studies
of perspective back to Euclid’s Optics [50],[3]).
I suggest in the Kantian vein that this way of thinking about objects is relevant not only to
objects of special sort that we call geometrical objects but to all mathematical objects and to all
other objects. This claim goes on a par with the popular slogan of category-theorists according
to which objects cannot be adequately studied unless their corresponding maps are also taken
into consideration. I add that those maps are true objects, and that what the category-theorists
call objects are objects of very special sort.
The notion of objecthood described in this Section suggests a revision of the structuralist notion
of objectivity described in Section 8.4 above. In the 20th century philosophy this structuralist
notion of objectivity is usually opposed to the logicist notion of objectivity as the universal logical
validity, which stems from Frege. However as soon as structuralism is reconciled with logicism
(8.3) there is a space for agreement: the proponents of Fregean logical objectivity and proponents
of more liberal structuralist objectivity agree that the key to objectivity is invariance. Then the
controversy reduces to questions about different kinds of invariance: some people defend the
invariance of Form, some other defend the invariance of Substance, etc.. Nozick ([191], ch.2)
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provides a general solution for such debates by allowing the objectivity to have degrees, which
correspond to different kinds of transformations and different kinds of invariants.
The categorical notion of object as a map and the idea of functoriality as a generalized invariance
( 8.6) suggests thinking about objectivity in terms of functoriality (i.e., co- and contravariance)
rather than invariance. This approach sublates the debate about invariance and refuses the
Platonic viewpoint (taken by Nozick as a matter of course) according to which the most objective
things are those, which are the most stable and the lest capable for change. The functorial
objectivity amounts to the coherence of changes rather than to the lack of change. Think
about Geo as a category of observers observing each other. One does not need Leibniz’ notion
of pre-established harmony (which sounds like a structural notion) for achieving a harmony
(i.e., coherence) between observations made by different observers. What one needs is a set of
appropriate global properties of Geo like the property of being Cartesian closed; such properties
can be thought of as emerging properties like elsewhere in science. If Geo is apt for supporting
an internal logic this logic is “shared” by all observers without being construed as an invariant
structure. If this logic supports truth-values it enables our observers to agree about objective
truths. Beware that objects in this picture are, generally, not the observers themselves but
mutual representations of the observers. The observers (which can be also called subjects) are
objects of special sort capable for the (objective) self-representation.
Interestingly, this picture allows different observers to play different roles, and thus does not
require any global symmetry of the universe. Remark that the example of Special Relativity
used by Nozick for the justification of his structuralist notion of objectivity as invariance does
not immediately generalize to the General Relativity. Although the general covariance, which is
the key concept of General Relativity, can be locally expressed in terms of invariant quantities,
the general covariance does not imply the existence of global invariants. At the same time the
general covariance can be always expressed in terms of of functoriality [10]. I leave this and other
relevant physical examples for a future study.
Let me summarize.
In 8.3 I have argued that Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method not only provided the Euclidean and
Non-Euclidean geometry with some particular foundations but also suggested a way of unifying
various geometrical theories on the same logical basis. Ultimately Hilbert aimed at the unification
of all sciences by the same method ( 2.1, 2.4). The specific way in which Hilbert thinks about
logic and about axiomatic theories allows one to interpret Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method as a far-
reaching generalization of Klein’s project of unification of geometry on the basis of projective
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geometry. Then in 8.6 I have shown that although the category theory as conceived by Eilenberg
and MacLane in 1945 [48] continues Klein’s Erlangen Program in a way, it does not give the same
place to the structural notion of invariance but replaces it by a more general and conceptually
very different notion of functoriality. Finally, in the present Section I showed how geometrical
types, spaces and objects can be organized into a category, and on this basis suggested a non-
structural way of thinking about objecthood and objectivity. In the next concluding Chapter I
show how this way of thinking affects the Axiomatic Method.
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Chapter 9
New Axiomatic Method (instead
of conclusion)
In the following long promised presentation of the New Axiomatic Method I shall use as a guide
Lawvere’s description of Axiomatic Method as “unification and concentration” ([158], p. 213)
and generalize upon some examples of axiomatic thinking due to Lawvere and Voevodsky. I
begin with the unification, then turn to the concentration and, finally, discuss the place and the
special character of logic in the New Axiomatic Method.
9.1 Unification
Categorical logic and categorical geometry suggest a unification strategy, which essentially differs
from the structuralist unification strategy used by Klein and Hilbert. Instead of looking for a
core invariant structure shared by all geometrical spaces one studies maps between these spaces
(i.e., objects in the sense of 8.8) and organizes the universe of these maps/objects into a category.
Given such category Geo (as in 8.8) there is, generally, no way and no sense to dispense with its
objects in a way similar to which one may dispense with concrete examples of the infinite cyclic
group and conceive of this group as an abstract structure.
One may ask what to do if some multiplicity of objects that one wishes to account for by category-
theoretic methods does not really form a category. Since I am trying now to describe only a very
general epistemic strategy (alternative to the structuralist strategy) I don’t stick to the standard
definition category. I already mentioned one modification of this standard notion, namely the
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notion of (weak) n-category; some other modification of the original concept are found in the
literature and some other may appear in the future. The key unificatory notion offered by the
New Axiomatic Method is that of composition (which is, generally, non-commutative). The
general unificatory strategy is this:
(Ia) Take relevant objects and try to compose them:
// • //
(Ib) Use joints • between composable objects as types and spaces. This works as follows. Fix
some object x and try to compose it with other objects from the left; classify objects composable
with x in this way into the same type:
// •
??
?
??
??
??
Then fix some object y and try to compose it with other objects from the right; put all objects
composable with y in this way into the same space:
?
??
??
??
• //??
(Ic) Think of joints between objects as neutral self-represented objects, i.e., by the identity ob-
jects.
I add this latter item having in mind to organize the multiplicity of objects into a category. Since
the standard notion of category may develop this latter item can be understood liberally.
Let me now compare the unificatory strategy (Ia-c) with the unificatory strategy offered by the
Formal Axiomatic Method. As a basis for unification of mathematics and all science Hilbert
tacitly assumes a notion of universal logic. So the Hilbertian unification works top-down. As
soon as the idea of universal logic is given up, and one is converted into a logical pluralist, the
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unifying power of the Formal Axiomatic Method is lost. The categorical unification just de-
scribed works in a bottom-up way through the double-sided composition of objects. One may
ask whether this method of unification is appropriate for “big unifications”, which involve objects
of different categories. In fact such a unification can be achieved in the same bottom-up way
through a reiteration of principles (Ia-c). Given two categories A,B consider “interdisciplinary”
or “mixed” objects of the form A → B and then build a category of such mixed objects. For a
mathematical example (for the mathematical reader) think about the homology groups under-
stood as contravariant functors from the topological category of chain complexes to the algebraic
category of abelian groups. Clearly such mixed objects play a major role in the modern structural
mathematics and in its global architecture. Thus the New Axiomatic Method unlike the Formal
Axiomatic Method bridges different fields directly through appropriate objects (and categories
of such objects) rather than tries to put all such fields on some common invariant ground.
9.2 Concentration
(Ia-c) are elements of a strategy rather than algorithmic steps because in the real world very
few objects are immediately available, so one needs further efforts for constructing them. Let
me first point to some relevant examples and then suggest a generalization. My first example is
Lawvere’s functorial semantics (4.6) Prima facie the functorial semantics simply reproduces the
Hilbert-Tarski scheme (I mean the notion of formal theory and its interpretation) by categorical
means. However the application of categorical technique is not an innocent step as we shall now
see. In the language of category theory an interpretation of given formal theory T is construed
as functor T → B where B is a base contentual theory. After Tarski Lawvere takes for B the
category Set of sets (supported by ETCS). The first step that takes Lawvere away from Hilbert’s
structuralism is his observation that in most situations of interest the categoricity of theory T
(in logicians’ sense of the uniqueness of its model up to isomorphism) is not only unrealistic
but also undesirable because what really matters is a set of properties of category M of models,
which cannot obtain unless M is sufficiently reach. Lawvere’s 2004 commentary [159], according
to which T can be seen as a special generic object of M , i.e. as a generic model (see Lawvere’s
quote in 4.6 above), is a further step in the same direction.
Remarkably, this last step brings us back to the traditional way of thinking about first principles
of geometry found in Euclid, who introduces several basic geometrical shapes (point, straight line,
circle) and describes several procedures (in Postulates 1 - 3) that generate from these basic shapes
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all further constructions. Independently from Lawvere’s functorial semantics this traditional
geometric idea reappears in category theory in 1960s in Ehresmann’s sketch theory. In the case
of sketch theory the Euclidean geometrical analogy is even more precise because sketches are
not logical categories that express propositional axioms but rather geometrical “generic figures”;
in some approaches sketches are not even categories but directed graphs with an additional
structure, see [250] for an overview and further references. Independently from Ehresmann
Lawvere used a similar approach in the basic theory making part of his CCAF [147]; remind from
4.2 that Lawvere’s internal description of general category involves a sketch-like construction
with four basic generic shapes: point for objects, straight segment for morphisms, triangle for
composition of morphisms and square for the associativity of composition.
Yet more closely the Euclidean genetic approach is reproduced by Voevodsky [245] in the first
geometrical part of his Univalent Foundation: like Euclid Voevodsky begins constructing his hi-
erarchical universe of homotopy types with a point and then applies a simple inductive procedure
for generating from this point the rest of this universe (6.10).
Remind also that the traditional genetic approach also plays a role in Hilbert’s Formal Ax-
iomatic Method, namely in its more advanced symbolic version (2.3 - 2.4). Every student of
mathematical logic learns today this traditional genetic method with the notion of well-formed
formula generated by a given alphabet of symbols through several iteratable syntactic operations.
The New Axiomatic Method lifts Hilbert’s restriction according to which the genetic method of
theory-building and object-building must be reserved to strings of symbols. Accordingly the
New Method allows for generic procedures other than manipulations with symbols (albeit it
takes advantage of reducing such procedures to manipulations of symbols when such reduction
is possible and useful like in the case of computer implementation of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory).
Which generic procedures are allowed in mathematics and which are not, in my understanding,
is not a general question about the Axiomatic Method and so it does not have a general an-
swer. The idea to restrict the spectrum of possible generic procedures once and for all on some
epistemic, pragmatic or other grounds cannot be justified.
Thus the second element of the New Axiomatic Method is this:
(II) Specify basic objects and basic constructions that concentrate the current knowledge about the
given field. Specify procedures that generate all other relevant objects and relevant constructions
from the basic ones.
Admittedly this rule represents a traditional rather than original feature of the new method.
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Nevertheless its revival in today’s mathematics is quite remarkable. It is a form of atomism
which remains alive in the modern science. Looking at Hilbert’s formal mathematics from a
historical perspective one may ironize that Hilbert apparently took too straightforwardly the
metaphor of the Ancient atomists according to which atoms were letters of Greek alphabet. The
New Axiomatic Method uses the atomistic genetic principle in a more general sense without
reducing its scope to syntactic issues.
The reader may remark at this point that although we have already spoken about unification
and concentration, which is supposed to cover the whole of Axiomatic Method, we did not yet
say a word about logic. Indeed (I-II) cover only the geometrical part of this method. These two
steps prepare (so far solely by intuitive geometrical means) a field of objects, which constitutes
an objective background for the further logical organization of a given theory. Without such
a background the logical organization of theories cannot be objective in Hegel-Lawvere’s sense
(4.8). Once again let me stress that this intuitive non-logical element of Axiomatic Method is also
present in Hilbert’s Formal Axiomatic Method albeit in a rudimentary form that involves only
syntactic constructions (2.4). Hilbert recognizes other forms of mathematical intuition [108] but
leaves them outside the ready-made axiomatic mathematics; the New Axiomatic Method brings
them back in and thus significantly extends the scope of axiomatic thinking.
9.3 Internal Logic as a Guide and as an Organizing Prin-
ciple
As soon as the objective geometrical background G of a given theory is fixed and organized into
a category with (I-II) it makes sense to think about the “subjective logic of inference between
statements” ([157], p. 16, see 4.8), i.e., about logic in the common sense of the word. The
appropriate technical notion of logic is that of internal logic L of category G. As soon as L is
taken together with G but not in an abstract form it qualifies not only as subjective but also
as objective (this squares with the idea that every subject is an object of sort, see 8.8 above).
L allows one to reproduce the geometric steps (I - II) (unification and concentration) in a new
logical form; this logical reproduction can be understood as an axiomatic reflection upon the
preceding “naive” geometrical stage. However in our case unlike Hilbert’s case this reflection
does not involve any attempt to abolish geometrical intuitions or to reduce these intuitions to
some special form. Like in the last Section I begin the following presentation with some examples
and then suggest a generalization.
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We have already learned about two sorts of geometrical categories supporting an internal logic:
toposes (4.9) and (higher) homotopy categories (6.9). I refer specifically to Lawvere’s paper
[153] where the author provides his axiomatic treatment of topos theory, and the recent Voevod-
sky’s lecture [245] where the author suggests new Univalent Foundations of mathematics (6.10).
These works are relatively rare examples of successful application of logical methods in the recent
mainstream mathematics: in both cases logical considerations greatly simplify and clarify oth-
erwise very difficult mathematical concepts and ideas. The role played by Lawvere’s axiomatic
topos theory with respect to the earlier geometrical research on toposes and related subjects
in the Grothendieck school can be justly compared with the role of Hilbert’s Foundations of
Geometry with respect to the 19th century geometry. Voevodsky’s Univalent Foundations play
a similar role with respect to the modern algebraic geometry.
Lawvere’s and Voevodsky’s axiomatic approaches share a common feature, which concerns the
relationship between geometry and logic in their theories. Lawvere describes this relationships
in Hegelian terms as a dialectical contradiction. Voevodsky uses the title of “direct formaliza-
tion” for describing the fact that the relevant fragment of homotopy theory models Martin-Lo¨f’s
type theory without any additional axiom. (The only geometrically motivated axiom used by
Voevodsky in the Univalent Foundations is his Axioms of Univalence.) In both cases the relevant
system logic is internal with respect to the corresponding geometrical theory. This makes a sharp
difference with Hilbert’s axiomatic approach, where logic is always external, i.e., fixed wholly
independently from geometrical or any other specific mathematical theories, which this logic
supports. Hilbert’s approach assumes an asymmetric relationship between geometry and logic:
geometry is supposed to be logical while logic is not supposed to be geometrical. Lawvere’s and
Voevodsky’s approaches make this relationship symmetric: their geometrical theories are logical
and their logic is geometrical. Lawvere’s axiomatic topos theory and Voevodsky’s homotopy
type theory qualify both as theories of logic and as theories of geometry. Although logical and
geometrical aspects of these theories can be distinguished, this distinction is not the usual dis-
tinction between the logical form and the geometrical content. The relevant distinction between
logical and geometrical aspects is rather a matter of interpretation. For example, one and the
same element of a given topos Lawvere interprets in turn (i) logically as a set of truth-values
(more precisely, a truth-value object) and (ii) geometrically as a particular sheaf. Similarly in
the homotopy type theory one and the same element is interpreted either (i) logically as identity
type or (ii) geometrically as groupoid of homotopies. Talking in this context about interpretation
one should beware that the relevant notion of interpretation is not standard either. The standard
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model-theoretic notion of interpretation (or more precisely, its most basic version) assumes the
relationships between a theory and its models, which can be pictured in that way:
Theory
yysss
sss
sss
s
 %%KK
KKK
KKK
KK
Model1 Model2 Model3
In topos theory and homotopy type theory there is no such intermediate element, which can
be (and also can be not) interpreted either logically or geometrically: one immediately inter-
prets geometrical notions in logical terms (Voevdsky’s “direct formalization”) and, reciprocally,
interprets logical notions in geometrical terms. (While the geometrical interpretation of logical
notions qualifies as interpretation in the sense of model theory, the reciprocal interpretation does
not.) This can be visualized as follows:
Logic // Geometryoo
An elementary duality between geometry and logic can be noticed already in the toy geometrical
category Geo from 8.8 where morphism A → B is a geometrical object of type A represented
in space B. Types are turned into spaces and reciprocally by the reversal of arrows. Since the
notion of space belongs to geometry and the notion of type belongs to logic this duality of types
and spaces represents in a rudimentary form the dialectical duality of geometry and logic.
Given geometrical category G with internal logic L one may “do mathematics in G” using the
standard Formal Axiomatic Method, i.e., take L as basic logic and built further theories in the
usual way by considering various non-logical axioms and systems of such axioms. This gives rise
to the notion of internal theory (internal with respect to G). I would like to stress once again
that Lawvere’s axiomatic topos theory as presented in [153] and Voevodsky’s homotopy type
theory as presented in [245] are not internal theories in the above special sense. This is why I
claim that Lawvere and Voevodsky apply a different Axiomatic Method, which I call the New
Axiomatic Method. In the New Axiomatic Method the internal logic L serves for building the
geometrical theory of G but not for building some further theories “in” G. The theory of G is
not a metatheory, which provides some additional geometrical support to L, but a full-fledged
axiomatic geometrical theory. G and L can be also described as two different aspects of the same
theory, one of which is geometrical and the other is logical.
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As I have already mentioned at several occasions in Chapter 4 a similar kind of relationships
between geometry and logic is found in Euclid’s Elements, which by Friedman word is a general
“form of rational representation” (2.5) rather than a specific mathematical theory comparable
with the theory of Euclidean geometry presented in Hilbert’s Foundations of Geometry. Law-
vere’s topos theory and Voevodsky’s homotopy type theory also qualify as such general forms
of rational representation rather than specific theories treating some small fragments of the Pla-
tonic mathematical universe. This return of the older pattern of axiomatic thinking appears
natural when one considers the history of Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method during the passed cen-
tury. Hilbert granted the freedom to invent new mathematical axioms but not the freedom to
invent new systems of logic. This second degree of axiomatic freedom has been developed after-
wards and changed the sense of Axiomatic Method. Hilbert’s thinking about this method is this:
first, one develops an intuitive mathematical theory, and then axiomatizes this theory using a
ready-made system logic as a tool, which helps one to put ideas in the right order. Today one
has a choice between different ready-made logical tools and a freedom to construct new logical
tools appropriate to the given task. Thus one is no longer in a position allowing for relying
on logic as something given; the epistemic requirement according to which one must “reason
logically” in the new context means that one must pay attention to logical issues like truth and
rules of inference but not that one must stick to some particular logical rules. This is why every
modern axiomatic theory, or at least every axiomatic theory, which is supposed to be used as
a foundation in mathematics and science, can be today only a self-sustained form of rational
reasoning and rational representation.
How internal logic L of given geometrical category G may help one to build an axiomatic theory
of G? In order to see how it works remind of Hilbert’s notion of axiomatization of logic as
distinguished from the axiomatization of particular mathematical theories like the theory of
Euclidean geometry (2.3). Remind also of Russell’s radical mathematical logicism according to
which all mathematics is logic and each mathematical theorem is a logical tautology. The alleged
tautological character of mathematics does not make mathematical theorems trivial and useless.
Similarly, the fact that L qualifies as a system of logic rather than a non-logical formal theory like
Hilbert’s formal theory of Euclidean geometry, does not imply that all tautologies of L are trivial
and non-interesting. Moreover since L is fully interpreted in G each tautology of L translates
into a contentual geometrical proposition. If L is presented axiomatically, i.e., if its tautologies
are generated from a set of distinguished tautologies called axioms, the axiomatic presentation
of L directly translates into an axiomatic presentation of G. Since L unlike G makes explicit
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forms of judgement and forms of inference of judgements from other judgements L allows one
to complete the “geometrical axiomatization” (I - II) described earlier in this Chapter with a
full-fledged “logical axiomatization”, which involves the logical specification of forms of correct
reasoning in G
1.
So let me formulate the last element of the New Axiomatic Method, which concerns logic:
(III) Given a category of objects formed according to (I - II) use these objects for building a
system of logic, which is sound in this field, and which expresses essential facts about this field
in the form of tautologies. Then use the obtained logic for a further axiomatic organization of
the given field through the logical unification and logical concentration.
Lawvere’s notion of quantifier as adjoint to substitution (4.3, 4.5) is a logical supplement of
the basic geometrical unificatory mechanism described in 9.1: given object f : A → B that
provides the basic geometrical unification of areas A,B, the quantification along f is a logical
operation that moves propositions from one of these areas to the other. The logical mode
of concentration is the familiar choice of axioms for L, which complements the geometrical
concentration described in 9.2. The Curry-Howard correspondence in Cartesian closed categories
(4.4) is the correspondence between these two modes of concentration.
It is appropriate to ask what to do if obtained geometrical category G does not support any
internal logic. In this case the theory of G cannot be an independent axiomatic theory and
thus must be included into a larger theory with internal logic. Generally, the New Axiomatic
Method does not allow one to make up axiomatic theories by a fiat because unlike the Formal
Axiomatic Method it doesn’t use ready-made external logical tools. I don’t see this feature of
the New Method as a disadvantage because the purpose of this method is to build axiomatic
theories having some objective significance rather than support the pure speculation. Even if
the pure mathematical intuition alone cannot provide a clear-cut boundary between science and
speculation it does this job as a part of the empirical intuition. This is why in the New Axiomatic
1Although Voevodsky calls the association of L (Matrin-Lo¨f’s type theory) to G (homotopy theory) the “direct
formalization” (of G by L) it is clear that L does not represent the logical form of G in the usual sense of the word.
Let x, y be individual variables and R be a binary predicate variable. The expression xRy is said to represent the
logical form of linguistic expression Mary loves John in the sense that this latter expression obtains from xRy
when variables x, y,R are given the appropriate semantic values; by giving these variables some other semantic
values one may obtain other contentual expressions like Peter hates Paul or 1 > 0, which have the same logical
form but different contents. Hilbert’s formal theory of Euclidean geometry represents the logical form of the
traditional intuitive Euclidean geometry in the same traditional sense of “logical form” (2.1) However homotopy
theory is not just one contentual intuitive interpretation of Matrin-Lo¨f’s type theory among a bunch of other
such interpretations. Matrin-Lo¨f’s type theory and the appropriately adjusted homotopy theory are rather two
different legs of the same theory called homotopy type theory. The basic relationship between these two legs is
not that of form and content.
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Method the intuition plays its traditional role of join between the pure mathematics and the
empirical science. The fact that Hilbert’s Axiomatic Method in its original form contributed
very little to the 20th century science must be taken seriously as a lesson. I suggest that the
New Axiomatic Method outlined in this concluding Chapter will perform better in this respect.
I leave the justification of this claim for another book.
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